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November 17, 2019

An Education In Detecting Ransomware Without Any Signatures

Learn how to detect ransomware without any malware signatures. See how Darktrace is one of the leading fighters against ransomware and other cyber risks.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO
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17
Nov 2019

Across Darktrace’s global customer base, ransomware is rapidly on the rise. And unlike the indiscriminate ransomware worms — like WannaCry and BadRabbit — that we’ve discussed in the past, the trend of today’s attacks is toward selective “big game hunting.” The Ryuk ransomware incident I blogged about last month demonstrates how criminals now seek to exploit the particular vulnerabilities of their strategic targets.

Despite the increasing sophistication of these attacks, however, detecting them is ultimately just a classification problem — albeit a highly complex and consequential one. To understand what makes this problem difficult, consider three ways of identifying ransomware. The first and most common way is to cross-reference new activity with the digital ‘signatures’ of known malware strains, catching attacks that the security community has already catalogued. Of course, such fixed signatures are blind to the novel malware variants that dominate the modern threat landscape.

The second level uses supervised machine learning, which entails training an AI on lots of historical examples of ransomware attacks in an attempt to find their commonalities. While this approach can, in theory, detect ransomware that isn’t identical to training data, the supervised learning approach is essentially just signatures on steroids, failing to flag malicious behavior that is fundamentally unlike anything seen before. Rather, addressing the ransomware epidemic once and for all requires unsupervised machine learning. By understanding how each particular employee and device functions while ‘on the job’ — without any signatures or training data — Cyber AI does just that.

An education in ransomware

When a world-leading education institution was hit with a strain of the Dharma ransomware family this past October, Darktrace Cyber AI immediately alerted on the attack using this learnt knowledge of the institution itself — rather than with signatures. The following timeline details each phase of the incident:

Figure 1: An overview of the attack.

In summary, the threat-actors brute-forced their way into the institution’s network by exploiting a server that lacked protection against such RDP brute-forcing — compromising an admin’s credentials. They then proceeded to scan the network until they located an open port 445, whereupon they moved laterally using the PsExec tool that allows for remote administration. The initially compromised server copied the ransomware, named “system.exe,” to hidden SMB shares on the other machines via the SMB protocol. Finally, that ransomware began encrypting data on all of these devices.

Cyber AI traced every step of the above attack by contrasting it with the institution’s normal online behavior. The graph below shows the infected server’s activity throughout the entire incident.

Figure 2: Every colored dot represents a high-confidence Darktrace alert indicating significantly anomalous activity.

Beyond just detecting the attack, however, Darktrace’s AI Autonomous Response tool, Antigena, would have taken targeted action to neutralize it within seconds. When hit with machine-speed threats like ransomware, human security teams need such AI tools to contain the damage, as Antigena would have done:

An alternate reality with Autonomous Response

The attack would have gone quite differently had it been met with Autonomous Response. To start with, Antigena would have blocked the threat-actor’s repeated login attempts over RDP, since these attempts originated from external IP addresses that had never communicated with the organization before. Antigena works by enforcing the normal ‘pattern of life’ for each impacted user and device, meaning that it would not have blocked IP addresses that regularly communicate with the RDP server. This ensures that activity necessary to daily operations isn’t interrupted during even serious threats.

Figure 3: Darktrace alerts on one of the multiple unusual IP addresses that attempted brute-forcing.

By this point, the threat would already have been neutralized by the blocked brute-forcing. But had the attackers somehow still managed to scan the network for open SMB services, Antigena would have intervened once again to surgically restrict that behavior, as Darktrace recognized that the infected server almost never scanned the internal network.

Figure 4: Darktrace alerts on the anomalous scanning behavior, which Antigena would have autonomously blocked.

Continuing on with the hypothetical, though, the server now employs PsExec to move laterally to other devices — activity that Darktrace identified as anomalous immediately. Antigena would have escalated its response at this point, stopping all outbound connections from the server for several hours. Ultimately, Autonomous Response would have completely disarmed the threat, as it has successfully demonstrated on millions of occasions already.

Uncovering the Unpredictable

It has never been easier for threat-actors to devise novel ransomware strains and to gain access to new command & control domains. Using fixed signatures, IP blacklists, and predefined assumptions is therefore insufficient, since no security tool can predict the next fundamentally unpredictable attack. Only Cyber AI — which learns what’s normal for each unique user and device it defends — is equipped for such a challenge.

Of course, detection alone won’t cut it. Modern ransomware is increasingly automated; in this particular case, the entire incident took less than two hours, from the initial brute-forcing to the concluding encryption. And although Darktrace alerted on the threat in real time, the security team was occupied with other tasks, leading to a compromise. That’s where Autonomous Response has become business-critical across every industry — it’s on guard 24/7, even when the security team can’t be.

To learn more about how Autonomous Response neutralizes ransomware without relying on signatures, check out our white paper: The Evolution of Autonomous Response: Fighting Back in a New Era of Cyber-Threat.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO

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May 1, 2026

How email-delivered prompt injection attacks can target enterprise AI – and why it matters

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What are email-delivered prompt injection attacks?

As organizations rapidly adopt AI assistants to improve productivity, a new class of cyber risk is emerging alongside them: email-delivered AI prompt injection. Unlike traditional attacks that target software vulnerabilities or rely on social engineering, this is the act of embedding malicious or manipulative instructions into content that an AI system will process as part of its normal workflow. Because modern AI tools are designed to ingest and reason over large volumes of data, including emails, documents, and chat histories, they can unintentionally treat hidden attacker-controlled text as legitimate input.  

At Darktrace, our analysis has shown an increase of 90% in the number of customer deployments showing signals associated with potential prompt injection attempts since we began monitoring for this type of activity in late 2025. While it is not always possible to definitively attribute each instance, internal scoring systems designed to identify characteristics consistent with prompt injection have recorded a growing number of high-confidence matches. The upward trend suggests that attackers are actively experimenting with these techniques.

Recent examples of prompt injection attacks

Two early examples of this evolving threat are HashJack and ShadowLeak, which illustrate prompt injection in practice.

HashJack is a novel prompt injection technique discovered in November 2025 that exploits AI-powered web browsers and agentic AI browser assistants. By hiding malicious instructions within the URL fragment (after the # symbol) of a legitimate, trusted website, attackers can trick AI web assistants into performing malicious actions – potentially inserting phishing links, fake contact details, or misleading guidance directly into what appears to be a trusted AI-generated output.

ShadowLeak is a prompt injection method to exfiltrate PII identified in September 2025. This was a flaw in ChatGPT (now patched by OpenAI) which worked via an agent connected to email. If attackers sent the target an email containing a hidden prompt, the agent was tricked into leaking sensitive information to the attacker with no user action or visible UI.

What’s the risk of email-delivered prompt injection attacks?

Enterprise AI assistants often have complete visibility across emails, documents, and internal platforms. This means an attacker does not need to compromise credentials or move laterally through an environment. If successful, they can influence the AI to retrieve relevant information seamlessly, without the labor of compromise and privilege escalation.

The first risk is data exfiltration. In a prompt injection scenario, malicious instructions may be embedded within an ordinary email. As in the ShadowLeak attack, when AI processes that content as part of a legitimate task, it may interpret the hidden text as an instruction. This could result in the AI disclosing sensitive data, summarizing confidential communications, or exposing internal context that would otherwise require significant effort to obtain.

The second risk is agentic workflow poisoning. As AI systems take on more active roles, prompt injection can influence how they behave over time. An attacker could embed instructions that persist across interactions, such as causing the AI to include malicious links in responses or redirect users to untrusted resources. In this way, the attacker inserts themselves into the workflow, effectively acting as a man-in-the-middle within the AI system.

Why can’t other solutions catch email-delivered prompt injection attacks?

AI prompt injection challenges many of the assumptions that traditional email security is built on. It does not fit the usual patterns of phishing, where the goal is to trick a user into clicking a link or opening an attachment.  

Most security solutions are designed to detect signals associated with user engagement: suspicious links, unusual attachments, or social engineering cues. Prompt injection avoids these indicators entirely, meaning there are fewer obvious red flags.

In this case, the intention is actually the opposite of user solicitation. The objective is simply for the email to be delivered and remain in the inbox, appearing benign and unremarkable. The malicious element is not something the recipient is expected to engage with, or even notice.

Detection is further complicated by the nature of the prompts themselves. Unlike known malware signatures or consistent phishing patterns, injected prompts can vary widely in structure and wording. This makes simple pattern-matching approaches, such as regex, unreliable. A broad rule set risks generating large numbers of false positives, while a narrow one is unlikely to capture the diversity of possible injections.

How does Darktrace catch these types of attacks?

The Darktrace approach to email security more generally is to look beyond individual indicators and assess context, which also applies here.  

For example, our prompt density score identifies clusters of prompt-like language within an email rather than just single occurrences. Instead of treating the presence of a phrase as a blocking signal, the focus is on whether there is an unusual concentration of these patterns in a way that suggests injection. Additional weighting can be applied where there are signs of obfuscation. For example, text that is hidden from the user – such as white font or font size zero – but still readable by AI systems can indicate an attempt to conceal malicious prompts.

This is combined with broader behavioral signals. The same communication context used to detect other threats remains relevant, such as whether the content is unusual for the recipient or deviates from normal patterns.

Ask your email provider about email-delivered AI prompt injection

Prompt injection targets not just employees, but the AI systems they rely on, so security approaches need to account for both.

Though there are clear indications of emerging activity, it remains to be seen how popular prompt injection will be with attackers going forward. Still, considering the potential impact of this attack type, it’s worth checking if this risk has been considered by your email security provider.

Questions to ask your email security provider

  • What safeguards are in place to prevent emails from influencing AI‑driven workflows over time?
  • How do you assess email content that’s benign for a human reader, but may carry hidden instructions intended for AI systems?
  • If an email contains no links, no attachments, and no social engineering cues, what signals would your platform use to identify malicious intent?

Visit the Darktrace / EMAIL product hub to discover how we detect and respond to advanced communication threats.  

Learn more about securing AI in your enterprise.

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About the author
Kiri Addison
Senior Director of Product

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April 30, 2026

Mythos vs Ethos: Defending in an Era of AI‑Accelerated Vulnerability Discovery

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Anthropic’s Mythos and what it means for security teams

Recent attention on systems such as Anthropic Mythos highlights a notable problem for defenders. Namely that disclosure’s role in coordinating defensive action is eroding.

As AI systems gain stronger reasoning and coding capability, their usefulness in analyzing complex software environments and identifying weaknesses naturally increases. What has changed is not attacker motivation, but the conditions under which defenders learn about and organize around risk. Vulnerability discovery and exploitation increasingly unfold in ways that turn disclosure into a retrospective signal rather than a reliable starting point for defense.

Faster discovery was inevitable and is already visible

The acceleration of vulnerability discovery was already observable across the ecosystem. Publicly disclosed vulnerabilities (CVEs) have grown at double-digit rates for the past two years, including a 32% increase in 2024 according to NIST, driven in part by AI even prior to Anthropic’s Mythos model. Most notably XBOW topped the HackerOne US bug bounty leaderboard, marking the first time an autonomous penetration tester had done so.  

The technical frontier for AI capabilities has been described elsewhere as jagged, and the implication is that Mythos is exceptional but not unique in this capability. While Mythos appears to make significant progress in complex vulnerability analysis, many other models are already able to find and exploit weaknesses to varying degrees.  

What matters here is not which model performs best, but the fact that vulnerability discovery is no longer a scarce or tightly bounded capability.

The consequence of this shift is not simply earlier discovery. It is a change in the defender-attacker race condition. Disclosure once acted as a rough synchronization point. While attackers sometimes had earlier knowledge, disclosure generally marked the moment when risk became visible and defensive action could be broadly coordinated. Increasingly, that coordination will no longer exist. Exploitation may be underway well before a CVE is published, if it is published at all.

Why patch velocity alone is not the answer

The instinctive response to this shift is to focus on patching faster, but treating patch velocity as the primary solution misunderstands the problem. Most organizations are already constrained in how quickly they can remediate vulnerabilities. Asset sprawl, operational risk, testing requirements, uptime commitments, and unclear ownership all limit response speed, even when vulnerabilities are well understood.

If discovery and exploitation now routinely precede disclosure, then patching cannot be the first line of defense. It becomes one necessary control applied within a timeline that has already shifted. This does not imply that organizations should patch less. It means that patching cannot serve as the organizing principle for defense.

Defense needs a more stable anchor

If disclosure no longer defines when defense begins, then defense needs a reference point that does not depend on knowing the vulnerability in advance.  

Every digital environment has a behavioral character. Systems authenticate, communicate, execute processes, and access resources in relatively consistent ways over time. These patterns are not static rules or signatures. They are learned behaviors that reflect how an organization operates.

When exploitation occurs, even via previously unknown vulnerabilities, those behavioral patterns change.

Attackers may use novel techniques, but they still need to gain access, create processes, move laterally, and will ultimately interact with systems in ways that diverge from what is expected. That deviation is observable regardless of whether the underlying weakness has been formally named.

In an environment where disclosure can no longer be relied on for timing or coordination, behavioral understanding is no longer an optional enhancement; it becomes the only consistently available defensive signal.

Detecting risk before disclosure

Darktrace’s threat research has consistently shown that malicious activity often becomes visible before public disclosure.

In multiple cases, including exploitation of Ivanti, SAP NetWeaver, and Trimble Cityworks, Darktrace detected anomalous behavior days or weeks ahead of CVE publication. These detections did not rely on signatures, threat intelligence feeds, or awareness of the vulnerability itself. They emerged because systems began behaving in ways that did not align with their established patterns.

This reflects a defensive approach grounded in ‘Ethos’, in contrast to the unbounded exploration represented by ‘Mythos’. Here, Mythos describes continuous vulnerability discovery at speed and scale. Ethos reflects an understanding of what is normal and expected within a specific environment, grounded in observed behavior.

Revisiting assume breach

These conditions reinforce a principle long embedded in Zero Trust thinking: assume breach.

If exploitation can occur before disclosure, patching vulnerabilities can no longer act as the organizing principle for defense. Instead, effective defense must focus on monitoring for misuse and constraining attacker activity once access is achieved. Behavioral monitoring allows organizations to identify early‑stage compromise and respond while uncertainty remains, rather than waiting for formal verification.

AI plays a critical role here, not by predicting every exploit, but by continuously learning what normal looks like within a specific environment and identifying meaningful deviation at machine speed. Identifying that deviation enables defenders to respond by constraining activity back towards normal patterns of behavior.

Not an arms race, but an asymmetry

AI is often framed as fueling an arms race between attackers and defenders. In practice, the more important dynamic is asymmetry.

Attackers operate broadly, scanning many environments for opportunities. Defenders operate deeply within their own systems, and it’s this business context which is so significant. Behavioral understanding gives defenders a durable advantage. Attackers may automate discovery, but they cannot easily reproduce what belonging looks like inside a particular organization.

A changed defensive model

AI‑accelerated vulnerability discovery does not mean defenders have lost. It does mean that disclosure‑driven, patch‑centric models no longer provide a sufficient foundation for resilience.

As vulnerability volumes grow and exploitation timelines compress, effective defense increasingly depends on continuous behavioral understanding, detection that does not rely on prior disclosure, and rapid containment to limit impact. In this model, CVEs confirm risk rather than define when defense begins.

The industry has already seen this approach work in practice. As AI continues to reshape both offense and defense, behavioral detection will move from being complementary to being essential.

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About the author
Andrew Hollister
Principal Solutions Engineer, Cyber Technician
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