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September 4, 2022

Steps of a BumbleBee Intrusion to a Cobalt Strike

Discover the steps of a Bumblebee intrusion, from initial detection to Cobalt Strike deployment. Learn how Darktrace defends against evolving threats with AI.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher
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04
Sep 2022

Introduction

Throughout April 2022, Darktrace observed several cases in which threat actors used the loader known as ‘BumbleBee’ to install Cobalt Strike Beacon onto victim systems. The threat actors then leveraged Cobalt Strike Beacon to conduct network reconnaissance, obtain account password data, and write malicious payloads across the network. In this article, we will provide details of the actions threat actors took during their intrusions, as well as details of the network-based behaviours which served as evidence of the actors’ activities.  

BumbleBee 

In March 2022, Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) provided details of the activities of an Initial Access Broker (IAB) group dubbed ‘Exotic Lily’ [1]. Before March 2022, Google’s TAG observed Exotic Lily leveraging sophisticated impersonation techniques to trick employees of targeted organisations into downloading ISO disc image files from legitimate file storage services such as WeTransfer. These ISO files contained a Windows shortcut LNK file and a BazarLoader Dynamic Link Library (i.e, DLL). BazarLoader is a member of the Bazar family — a family of malware (including both BazarLoader and BazarBackdoor) with strong ties to the Trickbot malware, the Anchor malware family, and Conti ransomware. BazarLoader, which is typically distributed via email campaigns or via fraudulent call campaigns, has been known to drop Cobalt Strike as a precursor to Conti ransomware deployment [2]. 

In March 2022, Google’s TAG observed Exotic Lily leveraging file storage services to distribute an ISO file containing a DLL which, when executed, caused the victim machine to make HTTP requests with the user-agent string ‘bumblebee’. Google’s TAG consequently called this DLL payload ‘BumbleBee’. Since Google’s discovery of BumbleBee back in March, several threat research teams have reported BumbleBee samples dropping Cobalt Strike [1]/[3]/[4]/[5]. It has also been reported by Proofpoint [3] that other threat actors such as TA578 and TA579 transitioned to BumbleBee in March 2022.  

Interestingly, BazarLoader’s replacement with BumbleBee seems to coincide with the leaking of the Conti ransomware gang’s Jabber chat logs at the end of February 2022. On February 25th, 2022, the Conti gang published a blog post announcing their full support for the Russian state’s invasion of Ukraine [6]. 

Figure 1: The Conti gang's public declaration of their support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine

Within days of sharing their support for Russia, logs from a server hosting the group’s Jabber communications began to be leaked on Twitter by @ContiLeaks [7]. The leaked logs included records of conversations among nearly 500 threat actors between Jan 2020 and March 2022 [8]. The Jabber logs were supposedly stolen and leaked by a Ukrainian security researcher [3]/[6].

Affiliates of the Conti ransomware group were known to use BazarLoader to deliver Conti ransomware [9]. BumbleBee has now also been linked to the Conti ransomware group by several threat research teams [1]/[10]/[11]. The fact that threat actors’ transition from BazarLoader to BumbleBee coincides with the leak of Conti’s Jabber chat logs may indicate that the transition occurred as a result of the leaks [3]. Since the transition, BumbleBee has become a significant tool in the cyber-crime ecosystem, with links to several ransomware operations such as Conti, Quantum, and Mountlocker [11]. The rising use of BumbleBee by threat actors, and particularly ransomware actors, makes the early detection of BumbleBee key to identifying the preparatory stages of ransomware attacks.  

Intrusion Kill Chain 

In April 2022, Darktrace observed the following pattern of threat actor activity within the networks of several Darktrace clients: 

1.     Threat actor socially engineers user via email into running a BumbleBee payload on their device

2.     BumbleBee establishes HTTPS communication with a BumbleBee C2 server

3.     Threat actor instructs BumbleBee to download and execute Cobalt Strike Beacon

4.     Cobalt Strike Beacon establishes HTTPS communication with a Cobalt Strike C2 server

5.     Threat actor instructs Cobalt Strike Beacon to scan for open ports and to enumerate network shares

6.     Threat actor instructs Cobalt Strike Beacon to use the DCSync technique to obtain password account data from an internal domain controller

7.     Threat actor instructs Cobalt Strike Beacon to distribute malicious payloads to other internal systems 

With limited visibility over affected clients’ email environments, Darktrace was unable to determine how the threat actors interacted with users to initiate the BumbleBee infection. However, based on open-source reporting on BumbleBee [3]/[4]/[10]/[11]/[12]/[13]/[14]/[15]/[16]/[17], it is likely that the actors tricked target users into running BumbleBee by sending them emails containing either a malicious zipped ISO file or a link to a file storage service hosting the malicious zipped ISO file. These ISO files typically contain a LNK file and a BumbleBee DLL payload. The properties of these LNK files are set in such a way that opening them causes the corresponding DLL payload to run. 

In several cases observed by Darktrace, devices contacted a file storage service such as Microsoft OneDrive or Google Cloud Storage immediately before they displayed signs of BumbleBee infection. In these cases, it is likely that BumbleBee was executed on the users’ devices as a result of the users interacting with an ISO file which they were tricked into downloading from a file storage service. 

Figure 2: The above figure, taken from the event log for an infected device, shows that the device contacted a OneDrive endpoint immediately before making HTTPS connections to the BumbleBee C2 server, 45.140.146[.]244
Figure 3: The above figure, taken from the event log for an infected device, shows that the device contacted a Google Cloud Storage endpoint and then the malicious endpoint ‘marebust[.]com’ before making HTTPS connections to the  BumbleBee C2 servers, 108.62.118[.]61 and 23.227.198[.]217

After users ran a BumbleBee payload, their devices immediately initiated communications with BumbleBee C2 servers. The BumbleBee samples used HTTPS for their C2 communication, and all presented a common JA3 client fingerprint, ‘0c9457ab6f0d6a14fc8a3d1d149547fb’. All analysed samples excluded domain names in their ‘client hello’ messages to the C2 servers, which is unusual for legitimate HTTPS communication. External SSL connections which do not specify a destination domain name and whose JA3 client fingerprint is ‘0c9457ab6f0d6a14fc8a3d1d149547fb’ are potential indicators of BumbleBee infection. 

Figure 4:The above figure, taken from Darktrace's Advanced Search interface, depicts an infected device's spike in HTTPS connections with the JA3 client fingerprint ‘0c9457ab6f0d6a14fc8a3d1d149547fb’

Once the threat actors had established HTTPS communication with the BumbleBee-infected systems, they instructed BumbleBee to download and execute Cobalt Strike Beacon. This behaviour resulted in the infected systems making HTTPS connections to Cobalt Strike C2 servers. The Cobalt Strike Beacon samples all had the same JA3 client fingerprint ‘a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1’ — a fingerprint associated with previously seen Cobalt Strike samples [18]. The domain names ‘fuvataren[.]com’ and ‘cuhirito[.]com’ were observed in the samples’ HTTPS communications. 

Figure 5:The above figure, taken from Darktrace's Advanced Search interface, depicts the Cobalt Strike C2 communications which immediately followed a device's BumbleBee C2 activity

Cobalt Strike Beacon payloads call home to C2 servers for instructions. In the cases observed, threat actors first instructed the Beacon payloads to perform reconnaissance tasks, such as SMB port scanning and SMB enumeration. It is likely that the threat actors performed these steps to inform the next stages of their operations.  The SMB enumeration activity was evidenced by the infected devices making NetrShareEnum and NetrShareGetInfo requests to the srvsvc RPC interface on internal systems.

Figure 6: The above figure, taken from Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, depicts a spike in srvsvc requests coinciding with the infected device's Cobalt Strike C2 activity

After providing Cobalt Strike Beacon with reconnaissance tasks, the threat actors set out to obtain account password data in preparation for the lateral movement phase of their operation. To obtain account password data, the actors instructed Cobalt Strike Beacon to use the DCSync technique to replicate account password data from an internal domain controller. This activity was evidenced by the infected devices making DRSGetNCChanges requests to the drsuapi RPC interface on internal domain controllers. 

Figure 7: The above figure, taken from Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, depicts a spike in DRSGetNCChanges requests coinciding with the infected device’s Cobalt Strike C2 activity

After leveraging the DCSync technique, the threat actors sought to broaden their presence within the targeted networks.  To achieve this, they instructed Cobalt Strike Beacon to get several specially selected internal systems to run a suspiciously named DLL (‘f.dll’). Cobalt Strike first established SMB sessions with target systems using compromised account credentials. During these sessions, Cobalt Strike uploaded the malicious DLL to a hidden network share. To execute the DLL, Cobalt Strike abused the Windows Service Control Manager (SCM) to remotely control and manipulate running services on the targeted internal hosts. Cobalt Strike first opened a binding handle to the svcctl interface on the targeted destination systems. It then went on to make an OpenSCManagerW request, a CreateServiceA request, and a StartServiceA request to the svcctl interface on the targeted hosts: 

·      Bind request – opens a binding handle to the relevant RPC interface (in this case, the svcctl interface) on the destination device

·      OpenSCManagerW request – establishes a connection to the Service Control Manager (SCM) on the destination device and opens a specified SCM database

·      CreateServiceA request – creates a service object and adds it to the specified SCM database 

·      StartServiceA request – starts a specified service

Figure 8: The above figure, taken from Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, outlines an infected system’s lateral movement activities. After writing a file named ‘f.dll’ to the C$ share on an internal server, the infected device made several RPC requests to the svcctl interface on the targeted server

It is likely that the DLL file which the threat actors distributed was a Cobalt Strike payload. In one case, however, the threat actor was also seen distributing and executing a payload named ‘procdump64.exe’. This may suggest that the threat actor was seeking to use ProcDump to obtain authentication material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). Given that ProcDump is a legitimate Windows Sysinternals tool primarily used for diagnostics and troubleshooting, it is likely that threat actors leveraged it in order to evade detection. 

In all the cases which Darktrace observed, threat actors’ attempts to conduct follow-up activities after moving laterally were thwarted with the help of Darktrace’s SOC team. It is likely that the threat actors responsible for the reported activities were seeking to deploy ransomware within the targeted networks. The steps which the threat actors took to make progress towards achieving this objective resulted in highly unusual patterns of network traffic. Darktrace’s detection of these unusual network activities allowed security teams to prevent these threat actors from achieving their disruptive objectives. 

Darktrace Coverage

Once threat actors succeeded in tricking users into running BumbleBee on their devices, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI immediately detected the command-and-control (C2) activity generated by the loader. BumbleBee’s C2 activity caused the following Darktrace models to breach:

·      Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External

·      Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL

·      Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed

·      Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External

·      Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint

·      Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

·      Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

·      Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External

·      Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

·      Device / Multiple C2 Model Breaches 

BumbleBee’s delivery of Cobalt Strike Beacon onto target systems resulted in those systems communicating with Cobalt Strike C2 servers. Cobalt Strike Beacon’s C2 communications resulted in breaches of the following models: 

·      Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

·      Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

·      Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

·      Compromise / SSL or HTTP Beacon

·      Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare

·      Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination 

The threat actors’ subsequent port scanning and SMB enumeration activities caused the following models to breach:

·      Device / Network Scan

·      Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration

·      Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance

·      Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity  

The threat actors’ attempts to obtain account password data from domain controllers using the DCSync technique resulted in breaches of the following models: 

·      Compromise / Unusual SMB Session and DRS

·      Anomalous Connection / Anomalous DRSGetNCChanges Operation

Finally, the threat actors’ attempts to internally distribute and execute payloads resulted in breaches of the following models:

·      Compliance / SMB Drive Write

·      Device / Lateral Movement and C2 Activity

·      Device / SMB Lateral Movement

·      Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

·      Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual SMB Script Write

·      Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual Internal EXE File Transfer

·      Anomalous Connection / High Volume of New or Uncommon Service Control

If Darktrace/Network had been configured in the targeted environments, then it would have blocked BumbleBee’s C2 communications, which would have likely prevented the threat actors from delivering Cobalt Strike Beacon into the target networks. 

Figure 9: Attack timeline

Conclusion

Threat actors use loaders to smuggle more harmful payloads into target networks. Prior to March 2022, it was common to see threat actors using the BazarLoader loader to transfer their payloads into target environments. However, since the public disclosure of the Conti gang’s Jabber chat logs at the end of February, the cybersecurity world has witnessed a shift in tradecraft. Threat actors have seemingly transitioned from using BazarLoader to using a novel loader known as ‘BumbleBee’. Since BumbleBee first made an appearance in March 2022, a growing number of threat actors, in particular ransomware actors, have been observed using it.

It is likely that this trend will continue, which makes the detection of BumbleBee activity vital for the prevention of ransomware deployment within organisations’ networks. During April, Darktrace’s SOC team observed a particular pattern of threat actor activity involving the BumbleBee loader. After tricking users into running BumbleBee on their devices, threat actors were seen instructing BumbleBee to drop Cobalt Strike Beacon. Threat actors then leveraged Cobalt Strike Beacon to conduct network reconnaissance, obtain account password data from internal domain controllers, and distribute malicious payloads internally.  Darktrace’s detection of these activities prevented the threat actors from achieving their likely harmful objectives.  

Thanks to Ross Ellis for his contributions to this blog.

Appendices 

References 

[1] https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/exposing-initial-access-broker-ties-conti/ 

[2] https://securityintelligence.com/posts/trickbot-gang-doubles-down-enterprise-infection/ 

[3] https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/bumblebee-is-still-transforming

[4] https://www.cynet.com/orion-threat-alert-flight-of-the-bumblebee/ 

[5] https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/04/29/adventures-in-the-land-of-bumblebee-a-new-malicious-loader/ 

[6] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/conti-ransomwares-internal-chats-leaked-after-siding-with-russia/ 

[7] https://therecord.media/conti-leaks-the-panama-papers-of-ransomware/ 

[8] https://www.secureworks.com/blog/gold-ulrick-leaks-reveal-organizational-structure-and-relationships 

[9] https://www.prodaft.com/m/reports/Conti_TLPWHITE_v1.6_WVcSEtc.pdf 

[10] https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/bumblebee-loader-linked-conti-used-in-quantum-locker-attacks 

[11] https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/bumblebee-loader-cybercrime 

[12] https://isc.sans.edu/diary/TA578+using+thread-hijacked+emails+to+push+ISO+files+for+Bumblebee+malware/28636 

[13] https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/28664 

[14] https://www.logpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/buzz-of-the-bumblebee-a-new-malicious-loader-threat-report-no-3.pdf 

[15] https://ghoulsec.medium.com/mal-series-23-malware-loader-bumblebee-6ab3cf69d601 

[16]  https://blog.cyble.com/2022/06/07/bumblebee-loader-on-the-rise/  

[17]  https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/35460/ 

[18] https://thedfirreport.com/2021/07/19/icedid-and-cobalt-strike-vs-antivirus/

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher

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August 21, 2026

AI Agents: Securing the Path from Intent to Action

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The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) recently published guidance on managing the cyber risk of agentic AI. While the document is framed as interim advice as more formal guidance is developed, the framing reflects the current state of the industry: organizations are already deploying agents into production environments while standards, controls, and operating models for autonomous systems remain unsettled. Governance is evolving alongside adoption rather than preceding it, a reality which underscores the importance of robust controls.  

The NCSC’s guidance recommends aligning controls to an agent's level of autonomy, assigning distinct identities, limiting permissions, constraining access to systems and data, monitoring activity, maintaining human oversight, and preserving the ability to intervene when necessary. Most of these recommendations will sound familiar to security teams. The challenge is not the novelty of the controls. It is the type of system those controls now need to govern.

The shift from model security to agent security

For several years, AI security discussions have focused heavily on models. Can a model be manipulated? Jailbroken? Trusted? Can it expose information it should not? Those questions remain important, but they capture only part of the problem. A model generating text is one thing. A system connected to identities, applications, tools, workflows, and business data is another.

The difference becomes clearer when comparing a chatbot that answers questions with an agent that can retrieve customer records, update tickets, invoke tools, trigger workflows, and interact with external systems. The underlying model may be identical. Its access is not. The security question begins to shift from what the model knows to what the system can do.

The same theme appears in the Five Eyes statement released earlier this year, describing AI as a force multiplier that is accelerating both offensive and defensive cyber operations. The NCSC guidance explores what that reality looks like when autonomous systems begin operating inside enterprise environments.

Securing AI agents in operation

The NCSC spends relatively little time debating model behavior and considerably more time discussing identity, permissions, monitoring, oversight, containment, and response. Agents are treated as participants within an environment rather than isolated pieces of technology.  

That's broadly consistent with how we think about the problem at Darktrace.

An agent should not be treated as an extension of a user account. It develops its own behavioral patterns. It accesses systems, interacts with data, invokes tools, and moves across workflows in ways that can be observed independently. Understanding what an agent is permitted to do matters. Understanding how it actually behaves once deployed, and whether that behavior aligns with business intent, matters just as much.

Identity provides an obvious example. The NCSC recommends assigning distinct identities to agents rather than allowing them to disappear into surrounding human or service accounts. Most importantly, assigning agents distinct identities enables independent behavioral monitoring.

Development assumptions vs. real-world behavior

The same principle extends to monitoring. NCSC guidance places agent activity within normal security operations rather than treating it as a separate AI governance function. Many of the controls described are put in place before an agent begins operating. Sandboxing, credential design, approval workflows and human oversight all reflect judgments about how the system is expected to behave and what risks it is likely to create.

Actual use may challenge those assumptions. Access patterns change. Workflows expand. Systems begin interacting with resources they have never touched before. Processes that appeared reasonable during design behave differently in production. Human oversight requirements may turn out to be either excessive or inadequate once the system is operating at scale and operating within the context of unique business processes.

The Five Eyes statement points to a similar issue: organizations need confidence that controls continue to work as intended once systems are exposed to real users, data, tools and operational pressures. Often, the question is not whether an agent is technically allowed to perform an action, but whether its behavior remains consistent with the role it was intended to play.

Monitoring and governance of AI agents go hand-in-hand

This problem is exactly why monitoring and governance should be treated as part of the same process. Governance sets the initial parameters for deployment, while monitoring provides evidence about whether those parameters remain appropriate. That evidence should, in turn, inform changes to permissions, controls and oversight.

This matters increasingly as autonomous systems are integrated into business processes. The relevant risk is shaped not only by the model or agent itself, but by what it can access, what actions it can take, and how its behavior changes in practice.

Developing continuous oversight of AI agent behavior

The implication is clear: governance cannot end at deployment. Organizations need a way to understand how agents behave after deployment, test whether controls remain appropriate, and adjust them as conditions change. That requires visibility not just into technical activity, but into whether that activity makes sense in the context of the business process the agent is intended to support.

This is where business-centric behavioral security can become critical. Risk does not emerge from the model itself: it emerges from the actions an autonomous system takes within the enterprise and the downstream consequences of those actions.  

An agent can operate exactly as intended and still create risk if it accesses sensitive information in an unexpected context, exercises permissions in ways that create unintended exposure, or influences business processes in ways that were not anticipated during design and review.

Traditional governance vs. behavioral analytics

Traditional governance frameworks provide assurance at a point in time. Behavioral security can provide ongoing visibility into how autonomous systems interact with the organization they are meant to serve. Rather than focusing exclusively on model performance or policy compliance, organizations need to understand whether an agent's behavior aligns with business intent, operational expectations, and acceptable risk tolerances as conditions change.

As enterprises move from isolated AI deployments to interconnected ecosystems of agents, visibility into behavior becomes as important as visibility into code. Governance determines what an autonomous system is permitted to do. Behavioral analytics helps determine what it is doing, what business outcomes it is producing, and whether those outcomes remain aligned with the organization's objectives.

[related-resource]

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About the author
Margaret Cunningham, PhD
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO

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August 19, 2026

When AI Becomes the Lure: A Fake Gemini Installer Delivers Vidar

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Key takeaways

  • Darktrace observed a customer download a fake Google Gemini installer hosted on Google Colab, resulting in the execution of the Vidar information stealer.
  • Darktrace identified the compromise through behavioral indicators, including suspicious process activity, anomalous network communications, and indicators of credential theft, before autonomously containing the threat.
  • The incident highlights how threat actors are increasingly exploiting trusted platforms and a growing interest in AI tools to distribute malware through seemingly legitimate software acquisition workflows.

The Growing Abuse of Generative AI

As organizations are increasingly adopting generative AI tools into their daily workflows, attackers are adapting their distribution methods accordingly too. As part of their day-to-day work, users are now searching for AI assistants, programming tools, browser extensions, desktop applications, and productivity integrations.

Recent reports have highlighted campaigns that use fake AI software and AI-related installers to distribute malware and steal credentials [1]. Researchers have documented campaigns that exploit fake AI-themed websites and services to distribute information stealers and backdoors [2]. Security researchers have also observed attackers disguising malware as legitimate installers for AI software to increase the likelihood of victim interaction and execution [3].

In July 2026, Darktrace observed one such case within a customer environment in the Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA) region, where attackers used a fake generative AI installer to deliver the prolific information stealer Vidar. This incident highlights how threat actors are exploiting interest in AI services to distribute established malware using increasingly convincing social engineering techniques.

How a Fake Gemini Installer Delivered Vidar

Initial Access: From Search Result to Malware Download

Unlike many malware campaigns that begin with a phishing email, this activity appears to have originated from a user searching for and downloading software.

Darktrace first observed unusual activity on the customer network after a suspicious executable file was launched from a user’s Download folder. Further investigation revealed that the file purported to be a Google Gemini installer and was named “Download_Google_Gemini_For_Windows.exe”.

During the initial analysis, it was noted that the top search result for the suspicious filename associated pointed to a file hosted on Google Colab, a cloud-based Jupyter notebook platform, commonly used by developers, researchers, and data scientists to run code and machine learning workloads through a web browser. By leveraging another trusted Google platform, the attacker increased the likelihood that users would perceive the download as legitimate, making the lure more convincing to those searching for Gemini-related software.

Figure 1: The Google Colab page containing a download prompt for the fake Google Gemini installer.

Further investigation of the Google Colab page revealed that the download prompt redirected users to a secondary site, hxxps://micronsoftwares[.]com, which posed as a "Windows Software Hub" download page and offered the fake Gemini installer for download.

Figure 2: The secondary website posing as a "Windows Software Hub" download page, which likely hosted the fake Gemini installer.

While the investigation did not uncover any HTTP or file-download telemetry data that conclusively identified the download source, SSL communication sessions with Google Colab were detected immediately before the suspicious file was executed. The timing of these connections suggests that the user interacted with the Colab resource before being redirected to the secondary site from which the executable was downloaded.

The user was not simply tricked into opening an email attachment; instead, the attacker embedded malicious content into a process many users would consider entirely legitimate: searching for and downloading software associated with a trusted platform.

Weaponizing Trusted Platforms

At the time of review (July 15, 2026), Darktrace's Threat Research team confirmed that the Google Colab page was still active and prompting users to download a ZIP archive containing the binary file.

The archive also appeared to contain a README file instructing users to run the binary file with administrator privileges and add it to their antivirus software’s exception lists. These instructions suggest that the campaign relied heavily on social engineering, convincing users to take actions that would facilitate malware execution and potentially bypass security checks.

The use of a legitimate platform also complicates the user’s decision-making. Downloads associated with a trusted service are often perceived as less suspicious than those hosted on unfamiliar domains. When combined with the branding of a widely used AI tool, the lure becomes even more convincing.

Malware Analysis

Darktrace’s Threat Research team identified the executable file as the information-stealing malware Vidar. Analysis revealed that the binary file was a newer Go-compiled variant that communicated with Telegram-based infrastructure. Darktrace’s researchers also identified dtm[.]kijangturbo88[.]top as a command-and-control (C2) endpoint associated with the activity. While the malware itself was not novel, the lure and delivery mechanism was.

For a deeper look at the information stealer, see Darktrace’s 2023 analysis of Vidar.

Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of the unusual outbound connection associated with the fake Gemini installer.

Shortly after execution, the process established communications with the external IP address 91.98.98[.]86 via port 443, directly linking the executable to suspicious network activity observed on the device. Subsequent open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysis of the revealed multiple malicious associations [5].

Additional Darktrace detections included unusual SSL activity from the affected device. Analysis of related SSL telemetry identified 91.98.111[.]49 as additional infrastructure associated  with the activity [6].

Subsequent alerts from the customer's Microsoft Defender for Endpoint integration later confirmed activity consistent with the theft of browser credentials and other sensitive data from the affected endpoint.

Taken together, these detections provided a clear picture of the attack, from the execution of a suspicious file and unusual network connections to indicators of C2 activity and credential theft.

Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of anomalous activity following the execution of the fake Gemini installer, seen in the Model Alert Event Log.

Darktrace's Autonomous Response

Following the detection, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response took immediate containment action, including blocking communication with suspicious external infrastructure, including 91.98.98[.]86, and quarantining the compromised device.

Despite the apparent legitimacy of the activity, with the installer hosted on a trusted platform and resembling a routine software download, Darktrace was able to detect and contain the attack because the device's behavior deviated from its normal pattern.

Figure 5: Automated containment actions implemented by Darktrace's Autonomous Response following the detection of activity associated with the fake Gemini installer.

Conclusion

This investigation highlights how threat actors continue to adapt established malware delivery techniques to emerging technology trends. While the malware itself was not new, the distribution method was. By disguising Vidar as a Google Gemini installer and hosting the malicious content on a trusted platform, the attack aligned its lure with a growing behavioral trend: users actively searching for AI tools and services as part of their day-to-day work.

Although fake installers are not a new phenomenon, the rapid rise of generative AI has created new opportunities for threat actors. Rather than relying solely on traditional delivery methods, attackers can now target users who are actively searching for AI applications. As AI adoption continues to accelerate across enterprise environments, organizations should remain alert to campaigns that exploit this interest through fake applications, malicious websites, manipulated search results, the misuse of trusted platforms, and AI-themed social engineering.

Credit to Rushanth Ramanathan (Cyber Analyst) Joanna Ng (Detection Engineer)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

  • Security Integration / C2 Activity and Integration Detection
  • Endpoint / New Suspicious Executable Launched
  • Endpoint / Process Connection / Unusual Connection from New Process
  • Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Security Integration / High Severity Integration Detection
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly /  Antigena Significant Security Integration and Network Activity Block

•Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly /  Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC Type Description
Download_Google_Gemini_For_Windows.exe File Fake Gemini-themed installer observed during the investigation.
GoogleAppInstaller.exe File Related executable identified through endpoint telemetry.
91.98.98[.]86 IP Address External destination contacted by the malicious executable.
91.98.111[.]49 IP Address Related infrastructure identified through SSL certificate pivoting.
dtm[.]kijangturbo88[.]top Domain Command-and-control endpoint identified during malware analysis.
1e13c2c9eac72daf63fd00a9946878949e159ae6ec51b54ec64f942d79d61913 SHA256 Malware sample associated with the fake Gemini installer.

MITRE ATT@CK Mapping


MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique
Initial Access T1204 User Execution
Execution T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
Defence Evasion T1036 Masquerading
Credential Access T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
Credential Access T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
Command and Control T1071 Application Layer Protocol
Exfiltration T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
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About the author
Rushanth Ramanathan
Cyber Analyst
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