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July 24, 2025

Untangling the web: Darktrace’s investigation of Scattered Spider’s evolving tactics

Learn about a recent Scattered Spider attack observed by Darktrace, comparing tactics with those seen in previous attacks. Widespread use of LOTL techniques alongside continued changes in TTPs such as their recent use of Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) platforms can make it challenging for security teams to harden defenses.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Emma Foulger
Global Threat Research Operations Lead
man on computer doing work scattered spider cybersecurityDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog image
24
Jul 2025

What is Scattered Spider?

Scattered Spider is a native English-speaking group, also referred to, or closely associated with, aliases such as UNC3944, Octo Tempest and Storm-0875. They are primarily financially motivated with a clear emphasis on leveraging social engineering, SIM swapping attacks, exploiting legitimate tooling as well as using Living-Off-the-Land (LOTL) techniques [1][2].

In recent years, Scattered Spider has been observed employing a shift in tactics, leveraging Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) platforms in their attacks. This adoption reflects a shift toward more scalable attacks with a lower barrier to entry, allowing the group to carry out sophisticated ransomware attacks without the need to develop it themselves.

While RaaS offerings have been available for purchase on the Dark Web for several years, they have continued to grow in popularity, providing threat actors a way to cause significant impact to critical infrastructure and organizations without requiring highly technical capabilities [12].

This blog focuses on the group’s recent changes in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) reported by open-source intelligence (OSINT) and how TTPs in a recent Scattered Spider attack observed by Darktrace compare.

How has Scattered Spider been reported to operate?

First observed in 2022, Scattered Spider is known to target various industries globally including telecommunications, technology, financial services, and commercial facilities.

Overview of key TTPs

Scattered Spider has been known to utilize the following methods which cover multiple stages of the Cyber Kill Chain including initial access, lateral movement, evasion, persistence, and action on objective:

Social engineering [1]:

Impersonating staff via phone calls, SMS and Telegram messages; obtaining employee credentials (MITRE techniques T1598,T1656), multi-factor authentication (MFA) codes such as one-time passwords, or convincing employees to run commercial remote access tools enabling initial access (MITRE techniques T1204,T1219,T1566)

  • Phishing using specially crafted domains containing the victim name e.g. victimname-sso[.]com
  • MFA fatigue: sending repeated requests for MFA approval with the intention that the victim will eventually accept (MITRE technique T1621)

SIM swapping [1][3]:

  • Includes hijacking phone numbers to intercept 2FA codes
  • This involves the actor migrating the victim's mobile number to a new SIM card without legitimate authorization

Reconnaissance, lateral movement & command-and-control (C2) communication via use of legitimate tools:

  • Examples include Mimikatz, Ngrok, TeamViewer, and Pulseway [1]. A more recently reported example is Teleport [3].

Financial theft through their access to victim networks: Extortion via ransomware, data theft (MITRE technique T1657) [1]

Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) techniques [4]:

  • Exploiting vulnerable drivers to evade detection from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) security products (MITRE technique T1068) frequently used against Windows devices.

LOTL techniques

LOTL techniques are also closely associated with Scattered Spider actors once they have gained initial access; historically this has allowed them to evade detection until impact starts to be felt. It also means that specific TTPs may vary from case-to-case, making it harder for security teams to prepare and harden defences against the group.

Prominent Scattered Spider attacks over the years

While attribution is sometimes unconfirmed, Scattered Spider have been linked with a number of highly publicized attacks since 2022.

Smishing attacks on Twilio: In August 2022 the group conducted multiple social engineering-based attacks. One example was an SMS phishing (smishing) attack against the cloud communication platform Twilio, which led to the compromise of employee accounts, allowing actors to access internal systems and ultimately target Twilio customers [5][6].

Phishing and social engineering against MailChimp: Another case involved a phishing and social engineering attack against MailChimp. After gaining access to internal systems through compromised employee accounts the group conducted further attacks specifically targeting MailChimp users within cryptocurrency and finance industries [5][7].

Social engineering against Riot Games: In January 2023, the group was linked with an attack on video game developer Riot Games where social engineering was once again used to access internal systems. This time, the attackers exfiltrated game source code before sending a ransom note [8][9].

Attack on Caesars & MGM: In September 2023, Scattered Spider was linked with attacked on Caesars Entertainment and MGM Resorts International, two of the largest casino and gambling companies in the United States. It was reported that the group gathered nearly six terabytes of stolen data from the hotels and casinos, including sensitive information of guests, and made use of the RaaS strain BlackCat [10].

Ransomware against Marks & Spencer: More recently, in April 2025, the group has also been linked to the alleged ransomware incident against the UK-based retailer Marks & Spencer (M&S) making use of the DragonForce RaaS [11].

How a recent attack observed by Darktrace compares

In May 2025, Darktrace observed a Scattered Spider attack affecting one of its customers. While initial access in this attack fell outside of Darktrace’s visibility, information from the affected customer suggests similar social engineering techniques involving abuse of the customer’s helpdesk and voice phishing (vishing) were used for reconnaissance.

Initial access

It is believed the threat actor took advantage of the customer’s third-party Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) applications, such as Salesforce during the attack.

Such applications are a prime target for data exfiltration due to the sensitive data they hold; customer, personnel, and business data can all prove useful in enabling further access into target networks.

Techniques used by Scattered Spider following initial access to a victim network tend to vary more widely and so details are sparser within OSINT. However, Darktrace is able to provide some additional insight into what techniques were used in this specific case, based on observed activity and subsequent investigation by its Threat Research team.

Lateral movement

Following initial access to the customer’s network, the threat actor was able to pivot into the customer’s Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI) environment.

Darktrace observed the threat actor spinning up new virtual machines and activating cloud inventory management tools to enable discovery of targets for lateral movement.

In some cases, these virtual machines were not monitored or managed by the customer’s security tools, allowing the threat actor to make use of additional tooling such as AnyDesk which may otherwise have been blocked.

Tooling in further stages of the attack sometimes overlapped with previous OSINT reporting on Scattered Spider, with anomalous use of Ngrok and Teleport observed by Darktrace, likely representing C2 communication. Additional tooling was also seen being used on the virtual machines, such as Pastebin.

 Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of C2 beaconing to a teleport endpoint with hostname CUSTOMERNAME.teleport[.]sh, likely in an attempt to conceal the traffic.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of C2 beaconing to a teleport endpoint with hostname CUSTOMERNAME.teleport[.]sh, likely in an attempt to conceal the traffic.

Leveraging LOTL techniques

Alongside use of third-party tools that may have been unexpected on the network, various LOTL techniques were observed during the incident; this primarily involved the abuse of standard network protocols such as:

  • SAMR requests to alter Active Directory account details
  • Lateral movement over RDP and SSH
  • Data collection over LDAP and SSH

Coordinated exfiltration activity linked through AI-driven analysis

Multiple methods of exfiltration were observed following internal data collection. This included SSH transfers to IPs associated with Vultr, alongside significant uploads to an Amazon S3 bucket.

While connections to this endpoint were not deemed unusual for the network at this stage due to the volume of traffic seen, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was still able to identify the suspiciousness of this behavior and launched an investigation into the activity.

Cyber AI Analyst successfully correlated seemingly unrelated internal download and external upload activity across multiple devices into a single, broader incident for the customer’s security team to review.

Cyber AI Analyst Incident summary showing a clear outline of the observed activity, including affected devices and the anomalous behaviors detected.
Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst Incident summary showing a clear outline of the observed activity, including affected devices and the anomalous behaviors detected.
Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of internal data downloads and subsequent external uploads to an Amazon S3 bucket.

Exfiltration and response

Unfortunately, as Darktrace was not configured in Autonomous Response mode at the time, the attack was able to proceed without interruption, ultimately escalating to the point of data exfiltration.

Despite this, Darktrace was still able to recommend several Autonomous Response actions, aimed at containing the attack by blocking the internal data-gathering activity and the subsequent data exfiltration connections.

These actions required manual approval by the customer’s security team and as shown in Figure 3, at least one of the recommended actions was subsequently approved.

Had Darktrace been enabled in Autonomous Response mode, these measures would have been applied immediately, effectively halting the data exfiltration attempts.

Further recommendations for Autonomous Response actions in Darktrace‘s Incident Interface, with surgical response targeting both the internal data collection and subsequent exfiltration.
Figure 4: Further recommendations for Autonomous Response actions in Darktrace‘s Incident Interface, with surgical response targeting both the internal data collection and subsequent exfiltration.

Scattered Spider’s use of RaaS

In this recent Scattered Spider incident observed by Darktrace, exfiltration appears to have been the primary impact. While no signs of ransomware deployment were observed here, it is possible that this was the threat actors’ original intent, consistent with other recent Scattered Spider attacks involving RaaS platforms like DragonForce.

DragonForce emerged towards the end of 2023, operating by offering their platform and capabilities on a wide scale. They also launched a program which offered their affiliates 80% of the eventual ransom, along with tools for further automation and attack management [13].

The rise of RaaS and attacker customization is fragmenting TTPs and indicators, making it harder for security teams to anticipate and defend against each unique intrusion.

While DragonForce appears to be the latest RaaS used by Scattered Spider, it is not the first, showcasing the ongoing evolution of tactics used the group.

In addition, the BlackCat RaaS strain was reportedly used by Scattered Spider for their attacks against Caesars Entertainment and MGM Resorts International [10].

In 2024 the group was also seen making use of additional RaaS strains; RansomHub and Qilin [15].

What security teams and CISOs can do to defend against Scattered Spider

The ongoing changes in tactics used by Scattered Spider, reliance on LOTL techniques, and continued adoption of evolving RaaS providers like DragonForce make it harder for organizations and their security teams to prepare their defenses against such attacks.

CISOs and security teams should implement best practices such as MFA, Single Sign-On (SSO), notifications for suspicious logins, forward logging, ethical phishing tests.

Also, given Scattered Spider’s heavy focus on social engineering, and at times using their native English fluency to their advantage, it is critical to IT and help desk teams are reminded they are possible targets.

Beyond social engineering, the threat actor is also adept at taking advantage of third-party SaaS applications in use by victims to harvest common SaaS data, such as PII and configuration data, that enable the threat actor to take on multiple identities across different domains.

With Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI, anomaly-based detection, and Autonomous Response inhibitors, businesses can halt malicious activities in real-time, whether attackers are using known TTPs or entirely new ones. Offerings such as Darktrace /Attack Surface Management enable security teams to proactively identify signs of malicious activity before it can cause an impact, while more generally Darktrace’s ActiveAI Security Platform can provide a comprehensive view of an organization’s digital estate across multiple domains.

Credit to Justin Torres (Senior Cyber Analyst), Emma Foulger (Global Threat Research Operations Lead), Zaki Al-Dhamari (Cyber Analyst), Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, FCISO), and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

---------------------

The information provided in this blog post is for general informational purposes only and is provided "as is" without any representations or warranties, express or implied. While Darktrace makes reasonable efforts to ensure the accuracy and timeliness of the content related to cybersecurity threats such as Scattered Spider, we make no warranties or guarantees regarding the completeness, reliability, or suitability of the information for any purpose.

This blog post does not constitute professional cybersecurity advice, and should not be relied upon as such. Readers should seek guidance from qualified cybersecurity professionals or legal counsel before making any decisions or taking any actions based on the content herein.

No warranty of any kind, whether express or implied, including, but not limited to, warranties of performance, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, or non-infringement, is given with respect to the contents of this post.

Darktrace expressly disclaims any liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on the information contained in this blog.

Appendices

References

[1] https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-320a

[2] https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015/

[3] https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/scattered-spider-rapid7-insights-observations-and-recommendations/

[4] https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/scattered-spider-attempts-to-avoid-detection-with-bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver-tactic/

[5] https://krebsonsecurity.com/2024/06/alleged-boss-of-scattered-spider-hacking-group-arrested/?web_view=true

[6] https://www.cxtoday.com/crm/uk-teenager-accused-of-hacking-twilio-lastpass-mailchimp-arrested/

[7] https://mailchimp.com/newsroom/august-2022-security-incident/

[8] https://techcrunch.com/2023/02/02/0ktapus-hackers-are-back-and-targeting-tech-and-gaming-companies-says-leaked-report/

[9] https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-behind-riot-games-breach-stole-league-of-legends-source-code

[10] https://www.bbrown.com/us/insight/a-look-back-at-the-mgm-and-caesars-incident/

[11] https://cyberresilience.com/threatonomics/scattered-spider-uk-retail-attacks/

[12] https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/ransomware/ransomware-as-a-service-raas/

[13] https://www.group-ib.com/blog/dragonforce-ransomware/
[14] https://blackpointcyber.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/DragonForce.pdf
[15] https://x.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1812932749314978191?lang=en

Select MITRE tactics associated with Scattered Spider

Tactic – Technique – Technique Name

Reconnaissance - T1598 -   Phishing for Information

Initial Access - T1566 – Phishing

Execution - T1204 - User Execution

Privilege Escalation - T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Defense Evasion - T1656 - Impersonation

Credential Access - T1621 - Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation

Lateral Movement - T1021 - Remote Services

Command and Control - T1102 - Web Service

Command and Control - T1219 - Remote Access Tools

Command and Control - T1572 - Protocol Tunneling

Exfiltration - T1567 - Exfiltration Over Web Service

Impact - T1657 - Financial Theft

Select MITRE tactics associated with DragonForce

Tactic – Technique – Technique Name

Initial Access, Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation - T1078 - Valid Accounts

Initial Access, Persistence - T1133 - External Remote Services

Initial Access - T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application

Initial Access - T1566 – Phishing

Execution - T1047 - Windows Management Instrumentation

Privilege Escalation - T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Lateral Movement - T1021 - Remote Services

Impact - T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact

Impact - T1657 - Financial Theft

Select Darktrace models

Compliance / Internet Facing RDP Server

Compliance / Incoming Remote Access Tool

Compliance / Remote Management Tool on Server

Anomalous File / Internet Facing System File Download

Anomalous Server Activity/ New User Agent from Internet Facing System

Anomalous Connection / Callback on Web Facing Device

Device / Internet Facing System with High Priority Alert

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP

Anomalous Connection / High Priority DRSGetNCChanges

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal SSH

Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel

Compliance / Pastebin

Anomalous Connection / Possible Tunnelling to Rare Endpoint

Compromise / Beaconing Activity to External Rare

Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint

Compromise / SSH to Rare External AWS

Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Anomalous Connection / Large Volume of LDAP Download

Unusual Activity / Internal Data Transfer on New Device

Anomalous Connection / Download and Upload

Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Compromise / Ransomware/Suspicious SMB Activity

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Emma Foulger
Global Threat Research Operations Lead

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October 30, 2025

WSUS Exploited: Darktrace’s Analysis of Post-Exploitation Activities Related to CVE-2025-59287

WSUS Exploited: Darktrace’s Analysis of Post-Exploitation Activities Related to CVE-2025-59287Default blog imageDefault blog image

Introduction

On October 14, 2025, Microsoft disclosed a new critical vulnerability affecting the Windows Server Update Service (WSUS), CVE-2025-59287.  Exploitation of the vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated attacker to remotely execute code [1][6].

WSUS allows for centralized distribution of Microsoft product updates [3]; a server running WSUS is likely to have significant privileges within a network making it a valuable target for threat actors. While WSUS servers are not necessarily expected to be open to the internet, open-source intelligence (OSINT) has reported  thousands of publicly exposed instances that may be vulnerable to exploitation [2].

Microsoft’s initial ‘Patch Tuesday’ update for this vulnerability did not fully mitigate the risk, and so an out-of-band update followed on October 23 [4][5] . Widespread exploitation of this vulnerability started to be observed shortly after the security update [6], prompting CISA to add CVE-2025-59287 to its Known Exploited Vulnerability Catalog (KEV) on October 24 [7].

Attack Overview

The Darktrace Threat Research team have recently identified multiple potential cases of CVE-2025-59287 exploitation, with two detailed here. While the likely initial access method is consistent across the cases, the follow-up activities differed, demonstrating the variety in which such a CVE can be exploited to fulfil each attacker’s specific goals.

The first signs of suspicious activity across both customers were detected by Darktrace on October 24, the same day this vulnerability was added to CISA’s KEV. Both cases discussed here involve customers based in the United States.

Case Study 1

The first case, involving a customer in the Information and Communication sector, began with an internet-facing device making an outbound connection to the hostname webhook[.]site. Observed network traffic indicates the device was a WSUS server.

OSINT has reported abuse of the workers[.]dev service in exploitation of CVE-2025-59287, where enumerated network information gathered through running a script on the compromised device was exfiltrated using this service [8].

In this case, the majority of connectivity seen to webhook[.]site involved a PowerShell user agent; however, cURL user agents were also seen with some connections taking the form of HTTP POSTs. This connectivity appears to align closely with OSINT reports of CVE-2025-59287 post-exploitation behaviour [8][9].

Connections to webhook[.]site continued until October 26. A single URI was seen consistently until October 25, after which the connections used a second URI with a similar format.

Later on October 26, an escalation in command-and-control (C2) communication appears to have occurred, with the device starting to make repeated connections to two rare workers[.]dev subdomains (royal-boat-bf05.qgtxtebl.workers[.]dev & chat.hcqhajfv.workers[.]dev), consistent with C2 beaconing. While workers[.]dev is associated with the legitimate Cloudflare Workers service, the service is commonly abused by malicious actors for C2 infrastructure. The anomalous nature of the connections to both webhook[.]site and workers[.]dev led to Darktrace generating multiple alerts including high-fidelity Enhanced Monitoring alerts and alerts for Darktrace’s Autonomous Response.

Infrastructure insight

Hosted on royal-boat-bf05.qgtxtebl.workers[.]dev is a Microsoft Installer file (MSI) named v3.msi.

Screenshot of v3.msi content.
Figure 1: Screenshot of v3.msi content.

Contained in the MSI file is two Cabinet files named “Sample.cab” and “part2.cab”. After extracting the contents of the cab files, a file named “Config” and a binary named “ServiceEXE”. ServiceEXE is the legitimate DFIR tool Velociraptor, and “Config” contains the configuration details, which include chat.hcqhajfv.workers[.]dev as the server_url, suggesting that Velociraptor is being used as a tunnel to the C2. Additionally, the configuration points to version 0.73.4, a version of Velociraptor that is vulnerable to CVE-2025-6264, a privilege escalation vulnerability.

 Screenshot of Config file.
Figure 2: Screenshot of Config file.

Velociraptor, a legitimate security tool maintained by Rapid7, has been used recently in malicious campaigns. A vulnerable version of tool has been used by threat actors for command execution and endpoint takeover, while other campaigns have used Velociraptor to create a tunnel to the C2, similar to what was observed in this case [10] .

The workers[.]dev communication continued into the early hours of October 27. The most recent suspicious behavior observed on the device involved an outbound connection to a new IP for the network - 185.69.24[.]18/singapure - potentially indicating payload retrieval.

The payload retrieved from “/singapure” is a UPX packed Windows binary. After unpacking the binary, it is an open-source Golang stealer named “Skuld Stealer”. Skuld Stealer has the capabilities to steal crypto wallets, files, system information, browser data and tokens. Additionally, it contains anti-debugging and anti-VM logic, along with a UAC bypass [11].

A timeline outlining suspicious activity on the device alerted by Darktrace.
Figure 3: A timeline outlining suspicious activity on the device alerted by Darktrace.

Case Study 2

The second case involved a customer within the Education sector. The affected device was also internet-facing, with network traffic indicating it was a WSUS server

Suspicious activity in this case once again began on October 24, notably only a few seconds after initial signs of compromise were observed in the first case. Initial anomalous behaviour also closely aligned, with outbound PowerShell connections to webhook[.]site, and then later connections, including HTTP POSTs, to the same endpoint with a cURL user agent.

While Darktrace did not observe any anomalous network activity on the device after October 24, the customer’s security integration resulted in an additional alert on October 27 for malicious activity, suggesting that the compromise may have continued locally.

By leveraging Darktrace’s security integrations, customers can investigate activity across different sources in a seamless manner, gaining additional insight and context to an attack.

A timeline outlining suspicious activity on the device alerted by Darktrace.
Figure 4: A timeline outlining suspicious activity on the device alerted by Darktrace.

Conclusion

Exploitation of a CVE can lead to a wide range of outcomes. In some cases, it may be limited to just a single device with a focused objective, such as exfiltration of sensitive data. In others, it could lead to lateral movement and a full network compromise, including ransomware deployment. As the threat of internet-facing exploitation continues to grow, security teams must be prepared to defend against such a possibility, regardless of the attack type or scale.

By focussing on detection of anomalous behaviour rather than relying on signatures associated with a specific CVE exploit, Darktrace is able to alert on post-exploitation activity regardless of the kind of behaviour seen. In addition, leveraging security integrations provides further context on activities beyond the visibility of Darktrace / NETWORKTM, enabling defenders to investigate and respond to attacks more effectively.

With adversaries weaponizing even trusted incident response tools, maintaining broad visibility and rapid response capabilities becomes critical to mitigating post-exploitation risk.

Credit to Emma Foulger (Global Threat Research Operations Lead), Tara Gould (Threat Research Lead), Eugene Chua (Principal Cyber Analyst & Analyst Team Lead), Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO),

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

References

1.        https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59287

2.    https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-now-exploiting-critical-windows-server-wsus-flaw-in-attacks/

3.    https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-server-update-services/get-started/windows-server-update-services-wsus

4.    https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2025/10/24/microsoft-releases-out-band-security-update-mitigate-windows-server-update-service-vulnerability-cve

5.    https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-59287

6.    https://thehackernews.com/2025/10/microsoft-issues-emergency-patch-for.html

7.    https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog

8.    https://www.huntress.com/blog/exploitation-of-windows-server-update-services-remote-code-execution-vulnerability

9.    https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/microsoft-cve-2025-59287/

10. https://blog.talosintelligence.com/velociraptor-leveraged-in-ransomware-attacks/

11. https://github.com/hackirby/skuld

Darktrace Model Detections

·       Device / New PowerShell User Agent

·       Anomalous Connection / Powershell to Rare External

·       Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

·       Compromise / High Priority Tunnelling to Bin Services

·       Anomalous Server Activity / New User Agent from Internet Facing System

·       Device / New User Agent

·       Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname

·       Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server

·       Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)

·       Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

·       Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)

·       Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint

·       Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare

·       Security Integration / Low Severity Integration Detection

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block

·       Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Server Anomaly Block

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

o   royal-boat-bf05.qgtxtebl.workers[.]dev – Hostname – Likely C2 Infrastructure

o   royal-boat-bf05.qgtxtebl.workers[.]dev/v3.msi - URI – Likely payload

o   chat.hcqhajfv.workers[.]dev – Hostname – Possible C2 Infrastructure

o   185.69.24[.]18 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

o   185.69.24[.]18/bin.msi - URI – Likely payload

o   185.69.24[.]18/singapure - URI – Likely payload

The content provided in this blog is published by Darktrace for general informational purposes only and reflects our understanding of cybersecurity topics, trends, incidents, and developments at the time of publication. While we strive to ensure accuracy and relevance, the information is provided “as is” without any representations or warranties, express or implied. Darktrace makes no guarantees regarding the completeness, accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of any information presented and expressly disclaims all warranties.

Nothing in this blog constitutes legal, technical, or professional advice, and readers should consult qualified professionals before acting on any information contained herein. Any references to third-party organizations, technologies, threat actors, or incidents are for informational purposes only and do not imply affiliation, endorsement, or recommendation.

Darktrace, its affiliates, employees, or agents shall not be held liable for any loss, damage, or harm arising from the use of or reliance on the information in this blog.

The cybersecurity landscape evolves rapidly, and blog content may become outdated or superseded. We reserve the right to update, modify, or remove any content

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About the author
Emma Foulger
Global Threat Research Operations Lead

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October 24, 2025

Patch Smarter, Not Harder: Now Empowering Security Teams with Business-Aligned Threat Context Agents

Patch Smarter, Not Harder: Now Empowering Security Teams with Business-Aligned Threat Context Agents Default blog imageDefault blog image

Most risk management programs remain anchored in enumeration: scanning every asset, cataloging every CVE, and drowning in lists that rarely translate into action. Despite expensive scanners, annual pen tests, and countless spreadsheets, prioritization still falters at two critical points.

Context gaps at the device level: It’s hard to know which vulnerabilities actually matter to your business given existing privileges, what software it runs, and what controls already reduce risk.

Business translation: Even when the technical priority is clear, justifying effort and spend in financial terms—especially across many affected devices—can delay action. Especially if it means halting other areas of the business that directly generate revenue.

The result is familiar: alert fatigue, “too many highs,” and remediation that trails behind the threat landscape. Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management addresses this by pairing precise, endpoint‑level context with clear, financial insight so teams can prioritize confidently and mobilize faster.

A powerful combination: No-Telemetry Endpoint Agent + Cost-Benefit Analysis

Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management now uniquely combines technical precision with business clarity in a single workflow.  With this release, Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management delivers a more holistic approach, uniting technical context and financial insight to drive proactive risk reduction. The result is a single solution that helps security teams stay ahead of threats while reducing noise, delays, and complexity.

  • No-Telemetry Endpoint: Collects installed software data and maps it to known CVEs—without network traffic—providing device-level vulnerability context and operational relevance.
  • Cost-Benefit Analysis for Patching: Calculates ROI by comparing patching effort with potential exploit impact, factoring in headcount time, device count, patch difficulty, and automation availability.

Introducing the No-Telemetry Endpoint Agent

Darktrace’s new endpoint agent inventories installed software on devices and maps it to known CVEs without collecting network data so you can prioritize using real device context and available security controls.

By grounding vulnerability findings in the reality of each endpoint, including its software footprint and existing controls, teams can cut through generic severity scores and focus on what matters most. The agent is ideal for remote devices, BYOD-adjacent fleets, or environments standardizing on Darktrace, and is available without additional licensing cost.

Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management user interface
Figure 1: Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management user interface

Built-In Cost-Benefit Analysis for Patching

Security teams often know what needs fixing but stakeholders need to understand why now. Darktrace’s new cost-benefit calculator compares the total cost to patch against the potential cost of exploit, producing an ROI for the patch action that expresses security action in clear financial terms.

Inputs like engineer time, number of affected devices, patch difficulty, and automation availability are factored in automatically. The result is a business-aligned justification for every patching decision—helping teams secure buy-in, accelerate approvals, and move work forward with one-click ticketing, CSV export, or risk acceptance.

Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management Cost Benefit Analysis
Figure 2: Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management Cost Benefit Analysis

A Smarter, Faster Approach to Exposure Management

Together, the no-telemetry endpoint and Cost–Benefit Analysis advance the CTEM motion from theory to practice. You gain higher‑fidelity discovery and validation signals at the device level, paired with business‑ready justification that accelerates mobilization. The result is fewer distractions, clearer priorities, and faster measurable risk reduction. This is not from chasing every alert, but by focusing on what moves the needle now.

  • Smarter Prioritization: Device‑level context trims noise and spotlights the exposures that matter for your business.
  • Faster Decisions: Built‑in ROI turns technical urgency into executive clarity—speeding approvals and action.
  • Practical Execution: Privacy‑conscious endpoint collection and ticketing/export options fit neatly into existing workflows.
  • Better Outcomes: Close the loop faster—discover, prioritize, validate, and mobilize—on the same operating surface.

Committed to innovation

These updates are part of the broader Darktrace release, which also included:

1. Major innovations in cloud security with the launch of the industry’s first fully automated cloud forensics solution, reinforcing Darktrace’s leadership in AI-native security.

2. Darktrace Network Endpoint eXtended Telemetry (NEXT) is revolutionizing NDR with the industry’s first mixed-telemetry agent using Self-Learning AI.

3. Improvements to our OT product, purpose built for industrial infrastructure, Darktrace / OT now brings dedicated OT dashboard, segmentation-aware risk modeling, and expanded visibility into edge assets and automation protocols.

Join our Live Launch Event

When? 

December 9, 2025

What will be covered?

Join our live broadcast to experience how Darktrace is eliminating blind spots for detection and response across your complete enterprise with new innovations in Agentic AI across our ActiveAI Security platform. Industry leaders from IDC will join Darktrace customers to discuss challenges in cross-domain security, with a live walkthrough reshaping the future of Network Detection & Response, Endpoint Detection & Response, Email Security, and SecOps in novel threat detection and autonomous investigations.

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About the author
Kelland Goodin
Product Marketing Specialist
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