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October 10, 2021

AI Uncovered Outlaw's Crypto Mining Operation

Discover how Darktrace AI technology exposed a hidden cryptocurrency mining scheme. Learn about the power of Darktrace AI in cybersecurity.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Oakley Cox
Director of Product
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10
Oct 2021

Infamy is a paradoxical calling for cyber-criminals. While for some, bragging rights are a motivation for cyber-crime in and of themselves, notoriety is usually not a sensible goal for those hoping to avoid detection. This is what threat actors behind the prolific Emotet botnet learned earlier in 2021, for instance, when a coordinated effort was launched by eight national law enforcement agencies to take down their operation. There are, however, certain names which appear again and again in cyber security media and consistently avoid detection – names like Outlaw.

How Outlaw plans an ambush

Despite being active since 2018, very little is known about the hacking group Outlaw, which has staged numerous botnet and crypto-jacking attacks in China and internationally. The group is recognized by a variety of calling cards, be they repeated filenames or a tendency to illicitly mine Monero cryptocurrency, but its success ultimately lies in its tendency to adapt and evolve during months of dormancy between attacks.

Outlaw’s attacks are marked by constant changes and updates, which they work on in relative silence, before targeting security systems which are too-often defeated by the unfamiliarity of the threat.

In 2020, Outlaw gained attention when they updated their botnet toolset to find and eradicate other criminals’ crypto-jacking software, maximizing their own payout from infected devices. While it might come as no surprise that there’s no honor among cyber-thieves, this update also implemented more troubling changes which allowed Outlaw’s malware to evade traditional security defenses.

By switching disguises between each big robbery, and laying low with the loot, Outlaw ensures that traditional security systems which rely on historical attack data will never be ready for them, no matter how much notoriety is attached to their name. When organizations move beyond these systems’ rules-based approaches, however, adopting Self-Learning AI to protect their digital estates, they can begin to turn the tables on groups like Outlaw.

This blog explores how two pre-infected zombie devices in two very different parts of the world were activated by Outlaw’s botnet in the summer of 2021, and how Darktrace was able to detect the activity despite the devices being pre-infected.

Bounty hunting: First signs of attack

Figure 1: Timeline of the attack.

When a new device was added to the network of a Central American telecomms company in July, Darktrace detected a series of regular connections to two suspicious endpoints which it identified as beaconing behavior. The same behavior was noticed independently, but almost simultaneously, at a financial company in the APAC region, which was implementing Darktrace for the first time. Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was able to identify the pre-infected devices by clustering similarly-behaving devices into peer groups within the local digital estates and therefore recognize that both were acting unusually based on a range of behaviors.

The first sign that the zombie devices had been activated by Outlaw was the initiation of cryptocurrency mining. Both devices, despite their geographical distance, were discovered to be connected to a single crypto-account, exemplifying the indiscriminate and exponential nature by which a botnet grows.

Outlaw has in the past restricted its activities to devices within China in what was assumed to be a show of caution, but recent activities like this one speak to a growing confidence.

The botnet recruitment process

The subsequent initiation of Internet Relay Chat (IRC) connections across port 443, a port more often associated with HTTPS activity, was perfectly characteristic of the Outlaw botnet’s earlier activity in 2020. IRC is a tool regularly used for communication between botmasters and zombie devices, but by using port 443 the attacker was attempting to blend into normal Internet traffic.

Soon after this exchange, the devices downloaded a shell script. Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to intercept and recreate this shell script as it passed through the network, revealing its full function. Intriguingly, the script identified and excluded devices utilizing ARM architecture from the botnet. Due to its notably low battery consumption, ARM architecture is used primarily by portable mobile devices.

This selectivity is evidence that malicious crypto-mining remains Outlaw’s primary objective. By circumventing smaller devices which offer limited crypto-mining capabilities, this shell script focuses the botnet on the most high-powered, and therefore profitable, devices, such as desktop computers and servers. In this way, it reduces the Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) left behind by the wider botnet without greatly affecting the scale of its crypto-mining operation.

The two devices in question did not employ ARM architecture, and minutes later received a secondary payload containing a file named dota3[.]tar[.]gz, a sequel of sorts to the previous incarnation of the Outlaw botnet, ‘dota2’, which itself referenced a popular video game of the same name. With the arrival of this file, the devices appear to have been updated with the latest version of Outlaw’s world-spanning botnet.

This download was made possible in part by the attacker’s use of ‘Living off the Land’ tactics. By using only common Linux programs already present on the devices (‘curl’ and ‘Wget’ respectively), Outlaw had avoided having its activity flagged by traditional security systems. Wget, for instance, is ostensibly a reputable program used for retrieving content from web servers, and was never previously recorded as part of Outlaw’s TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures).

By evolving and adapting its approach, Outlaw is continually able to outsmart and outrun rules-based security. Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI, however, kept pace, immediately identifying this Wget connection as suspicious and advising further investigation.

Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst identifies Wget use on the morning of July 15 as suspicious and begins investigating potentially related HTTP connections made on the morning of July 14. In this way, it builds a complete picture of the attack.

The botnet unchained

In the following 36 hours, Darktrace detected over 6 million TCP and SSH connections directed to rare external IP addresses using ports often associated with SSH, such as 22, 2222, and 2022.

Exactly what the botnet was undertaking with these connections can only be speculated on. The devices may have been made part of a DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attack, bruteforce attempts on targeted SSH accounts, or simply have taken up the task of seeking and infecting new targets, further expanding the botnet. Darktrace recognized that neither device had made SSH connections prior to this event and, had Antigena been in active mode, would have enacted measures to stop them.

Figure 3: The behavior on the device before and after the bot was activated on July 14, 2021. The large spike in model breaches shows clear deviation from the established ‘pattern of life’.

Thankfully, the owners of both devices responded to Darktrace’s detection alerts soon enough to prevent any serious damage to their own digital estates. Had these devices remained under the influence of the botnet, the ramifications may have been far graver.

The use of SSH protocol would have allowed Outlaw to pivot into any number of activities, potentially compromising each device’s network further and causing data or monetary loss to their respective organizations.

Call the sheriff: Self-Learning AI

Rules-based security solutions operate much like the ‘wanted’ posters of the old west, looking out for the criminals who came through town last week without preparing for those riding over the hill today. When black hats and outlaws are adopting new looks and employing new techniques with every attack, a new way of responding to threats is needed.

Darktrace doesn’t need to know the name ‘Outlaw’, or the group’s history of evolving attacks, in order to stop them. With its fundamental self-learning approach, Darktrace learns its surroundings from the ground up, and identifies subtle deviations indicative of a cyber-threat. And with Autonomous Response, it will even take targeted action to neutralize the threat at machine speed, without the need for human intervention.

Thanks to Darktrace analyst Jun Qi Wong for his insights on the above threat find.

Learn more about how Cyber AI Analyst sheds light on complex attacks

Technical details

Darktrace model detections

  • Compliance / Crypto Currency Mining Activity
  • Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining [Enhanced Monitoring]
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous File / Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port
  • Device / Increased External Connectivity
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity
  • Compromise / SSH Beacon
  • Compromise / High Frequency SSH Beacon
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Oakley Cox
Director of Product

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March 31, 2026

Phantom Footprints: Tracking GhostSocks Malware

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Why are attackers using residential proxies?

In today's threat landscape, blending in to normal activity is the key to success for attackers and the growing reliance on residential proxies shows a significant shift in how threat actors are attempting to bypass IP detection tools.

The increasing dependency on residential proxies has exposed how prevalent proxy services are and how reliant a diverse range of threat actors are on them. From cybercriminal groups to state‑sponsored actors, the need to bypass IP detection tools is fundamental to the success of these groups. One malware that has quietly become notorious for its ability to avoid anomaly detection is GhostSocks, a malware that turns compromised devices into residential proxies.

What is GhostSocks?

Originally marketed on the Russian underground forum xss[.]is as a Malware‑as‑a‑Service (MaaS), GhostSocks enables threat actors to turn compromised devices into residential proxies, leveraging the victim's internet bandwidth to route malicious traffic through it.

How does Ghostsocks malware work? 

The malware offers the threat actor a “clean” IP address, making it look like it is coming from a household user. This enables the bypassing of geographic restrictions and IP detection tools, a perfect tool for avoiding anomaly detection. It wasn’t until 2024, when a partnership was announced with the infamous information stealer Lumma Stealer, that GhostSocks surged into widespread adoption and alluded to who may be the author of the proxy malware.

Written in GoLang, GhostSocks utilizes the SOCKS5 proxy protocol, creating a SOCKS5 connection on infected devices. It uses a relay‑based C2 implementation, where an intermediary server sits in between the real command-and-control (C2) server and the infected device.

How does Ghostsocks malware evade detection?

To further increase evasion, the Ghostsocks malware wraps its SOCKS5 tunnels in TLS encryption, allowing its malicious traffic to blend into normal network traffic.

Early variants of GhostSocks do not implement a persistence mechanism; however, later versions achieve persistence via registry run keys, ensuring sustained proxy operational time [1].

While proxying is its primary purpose, GhostSocks also incorporates backdoor functionality, enabling malicious actors to run arbitrary commands and download and deploy additional malicious payloads. This was evident with the well‑known ransomware group Black Basta, which reportedly used GhostSocks as a way of maintaining long‑term access to victims’ networks [1].

Darktrace’s detection of GhostSocks Malware

Darktrace observed a steady increase in GhostSocks activity across its customer base from late 2025, with its Threat Research team identifying multiple incidents involving the malware. In one notable case from December 2025, Darktrace detected GhostSocks operating alongside Lumma Stealer, reinforcing that the partnership between Lumma and GhostSocks remains active despite recent attempts to disrupt Lumma’s infrastructure.

Darktrace’s first detection of GhostSocks‑related activity came when a device on the network of a customer in the education sector began making connections to an endpoint with a suspicious self‑signed certificate that had never been seen on the network before.

The endpoint in question, 159.89.46[.]92 with the hostname retreaw[.]click, has been flagged by multiple open‑source intelligence (OSINT) sources as being associated with Lumma Stealer’s C2 infrastructure [2], indicating its likely role in the delivery of malicious payloads.

Darktrace’s detection of suspicious SSL connections to retreaw[.]click, indicating an attempted link to Lumma C2 infrastructure.
Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of suspicious SSL connections to retreaw[.]click, indicating an attempted link to Lumma C2 infrastructure.

Less than two minutes later, Darktrace observed the same device downloading the executable (.exe) file “Renewable.exe” from the IP 86.54.24[.]29, which Darktrace recognized as 100% rare for this network.

Darktrace’s detection of a device downloading the unusual executable file “Renewable.exe”.
Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of a device downloading the unusual executable file “Renewable.exe”.

Both the file MD5 hash and the executable itself have been identified by multiple OSINT vendors as being associated with the GhostSocks malware [3], with the executable likely the backdoor component of the GhostSocks malware, facilitating the distribution of additional malicious payloads [4].

Following this detection, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability recommended a blocking action for the device in an early attempt to stop the malicious file download. In this instance, Darktrace was configured in Human Confirmation Mode, meaning the customer’s security team was required to manually apply any mitigative response actions. Had Autonomous Response been fully enabled at the time of the attack, the connections to 86.54.24[.]29 would have been blocked, rendering the malware ineffective at reaching its C2 infrastructure and halting any further malicious communication.

 Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability suggesting blocking the suspicious connections to the unusual endpoint from which the malicious executable was downloaded.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability suggesting blocking the suspicious connections to the unusual endpoint from which the malicious executable was downloaded.

As the attack was able to progress, two days later the device was detected downloading additional payloads from the endpoint www.lbfs[.]site (23.106.58[.]48), including “Setup.exe”, “,.exe”, and “/vp6c63yoz.exe”.

Darktrace’s detection of a malicious payload being downloaded from the endpoint www.lbfs[.]site.
Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of a malicious payload being downloaded from the endpoint www.lbfs[.]site.

Once again, Darktrace recognized the anomalous nature of these downloads and suggested that a “group pattern of life” be enforced on the offending device in an attempt to contain the activity. By enforcing a pattern of life on a device, Darktrace restricts its activity to connections and behaviors similar to those performed by peer devices within the same group, while still allowing it to carry out its expected activity, effectively preventing deviations indicative of compromise while minimizing disruption. As mentioned earlier, these mitigative actions required manual implementation, so the activity was able to continue. Darktrace proceeded to suggest further actions to contain subsequent malicious downloads, including an attempt to block all outbound traffic to stop the attack from progressing.

An overview of download activity and the Autonomous Response actions recommended by Darktrace to block the downloads.
Figure 5: An overview of download activity and the Autonomous Response actions recommended by Darktrace to block the downloads.

Around the same time, a third executable download was detected, this time from the hostname hxxp[://]d2ihv8ymzp14lr.cloudfront.net/2021-08-19/udppump[.]exe, along with the file “udppump.exe”.While GhostSocks may have been present only to facilitate the delivery of additional payloads, there is no indication that these CloudFront endpoints or files are functionally linked to GhostSocks. Rather, the evidence points to broader malicious file‑download activity.

Shortly after the multiple executable files had been downloaded, Darktrace observed the device initiating a series of repeated successful connections to several rare external endpoints, behavior consistent with early-stage C2 beaconing activity.

Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation

Darktrace’s detection of additional malicious file downloads from malicious CloudFront endpoints.
Figure 7: Darktrace’s detection of additional malicious file downloads from malicious CloudFront endpoints.

Throughout the course of this attack, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst carried out its own autonomous investigation, piecing together seemingly separate events into one wider incident encompassing the first suspicious downloads beginning on December 4, the unusual connectivity to many suspicious IPs that followed, and the successful beaconing activity observed two days later. By analyzing these events in real-time and viewing them as part of the bigger picture, Cyber AI Analyst was able to construct an in‑depth breakdown of the attack to aid the customer’s investigation and remediation efforts.

Cyber AI Analyst investigation detailing the sequence of events on the compromised device, highlighting its extensive connectivity to rare endpoints, the related malicious file‑download activity, and finally the emergence of C2 beaconing behavior.
Figure 8: Cyber AI Analyst investigation detailing the sequence of events on the compromised device, highlighting its extensive connectivity to rare endpoints, the related malicious file‑download activity, and finally the emergence of C2 beaconing behavior.

Conclusion

The versatility offered by GhostSocks is far from new, but its ability to convert compromised devices into residential proxy nodes, while enabling long‑term, covert network access—illustrates how threat actors continue to maximise the value of their victims’ infrastructure. Its growing popularity, coupled with its ongoing partnership with Lumma, demonstrates that infrastructure takedowns alone are insufficient; as long as threat actors remain committed to maintaining anonymity and can rapidly rebuild their ecosystems, related malware activity is likely to persist in some form.

Credit to Isabel Evans (Cyber Analyst), Gernice Lee (Associate Principal Analyst & Regional Consultancy Lead – APJ)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

References

1.    https://bloo.io/research/malware/ghostsocks

2.    https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/retreaw.click/community

3.    https://synthient.com/blog/ghostsocks-from-initial-access-to-residential-proxy

4.    https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/1810568/0/html

5. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/fab6525bf6e77249b74736cb74501a9491109dc7950688b3ae898354eb920413

Darktrace Model Detections

Real-time Detection Models

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL

Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

Compromise / Possible Fast Flux C2 Activity

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

Autonomous Response Models

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique

Resource Development – T1588 - Malware

Initial Access - T1189 - Drive-by Compromise

Persistence – T1112 – Modify Registry

Command and Control – T1071 – Application Layer Protocol

Command and Control – T1095 – Non-application Layer Protocol

Command and Control – T1071 – Web Protocols

Command and Control – T1571 – Non-Standard Port

Command and Control – T1102 – One-Way Communication

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

86.54.24[.]29 - IP - Likely GhostSocks C2

http[://]86.54.24[.]29/Renewable[.]exe - Hostname - GhostSocks Distribution Endpoint

http[://]d2ihv8ymzp14lr.cloudfront[.]net/2021-08-19/udppump[.]exe - CDN - Payload Distribution Endpoint

www.lbfs[.]site - Hostname - Likely C2 Endpoint

retreaw[.]click - Hostname - Lumma C2 Endpoint

alltipi[.]com - Hostname - Possible C2 Endpoint

w2.bruggebogeyed[.]site - Hostname - Possible C2 Endpoint

9b90c62299d4bed2e0752e2e1fc777ac50308534 - SHA1 file hash – Likely GhostSocks payload

3d9d7a7905e46a3e39a45405cb010c1baa735f9e - SHA1 file hash - Likely follow-up payload

10f928e00a1ed0181992a1e4771673566a02f4e3 - SHA1 file hash - Likely follow-up payload

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About the author
Isabel Evans
Cyber Analyst

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March 24, 2026

Darktrace Unites Human Behavior and Threat Detection Across Email, Slack, Teams, and Zoom

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The communication attack surface is expanding

Modern attackers no longer focus solely on inboxes, they target people and the productivity systems where work actually happens. Meanwhile, the boundary between internal and external usage of tools is becoming blurrier everyday – turning the entire workplace into the attack surface. In 2025, identity compromise emerged as the single most consistent threat across the global threat landscape, as observed by Darktrace research across our entire customer base. Over 70% of incidents in the US involved SaaS/M365 account compromise and phishing or email-based social engineering, making credential abuse the single most effective initial access vector.

Despite this upward trend, investment in existing security awareness training (SAT) isn’t moving the needle on reducing risk. 84% of organizations still measure success through completion rates1, even though completion of standard training correlates with less than 2% real improvement in risky behavior.2 By prioritizing completion, organizations reward time spent rather than meaningful engagement, yet time in training doesn’t translate to retention or real-world decision-making. This compliance-first approach has left the workforce unprepared for the threats they actually face.

At the same time, attacks have evolved. Highly personalized, AI-generated campaigns now move fluidly across email, Slack, Teams, Zoom, and beyond, blending channels and even targeting systems directly through techniques like prompt injection. This new reality demands a different approach: one that treats people and the tools they use as a single ecosystem, where behavior and detection continuously inform and strengthen each other.

Only an adaptive communication security system can keep pace with the speed, creativity, and cross channel nature of today’s threats. 

Ushering in the adaptive era of workplace security

With this release, Darktrace brings together our new behavior-driven training solution with email detection, cross-channel visibility, and platform-level insights. Powered by Self-Learning AI, it delivers protection across both people and the communication tools they rely on every day, including email, Slack, Teams, and Zoom.

Each component learns from the others – training adapts to real user behavior, detection evolves across channels, and response is continuously refined – creating a powerful feedback loop that strengthens resilience and improves accuracy against today’s AI-driven threats.

Introducing: Unified training and email security for a self-improving email defense

Our brand new product, Darktrace / Adaptive Human Defense, closes the gap between human behavior and email security to continuously strengthen both people and defenses. Each user receives personalized training that adapts to their own inbox activity and skill level, with learning delivered directly within the flow of their day-to-day email interactions.

By learning from each user’s interactions with security training, it adapts security responses, creating a closed-loop system where training reinforces detection and detection informs training. Let’s look at some of the benefits.

  • Reduce successful phishing at the source with contextual Just in Time coaching: Contextual coaching appears directly in real email threads the moment risky behavior is detected, so habits change where mistakes actually happen. Configurable triggers and group policies target the right users, reducing repeated errors and administrative overhead.
  • Adaptive phishing simulations that progress automatically with each user: Embedded simulations vary in their degree of realism, from generic phishing to generative AI-enabled spear phishing. Users progress through the difficulty levels based on their performance to give an accurate picture of their phishing preparedness.  
  • Native email security integration turns human behavior into quantified risk: The native email security integration allows engagement, links clicked, and question success signals to flow back into / EMAIL recipes and models, so detection and response adapt automatically as users learn.  
  • Actionable risk and trend analytics beyond completion rates: Analytics that surface repeat offenders, high-value targets, and measurable exposure, moving beyond completion metrics to give leaders actionable insights tied to real behavior.

Learn more about / Adaptive Human Defense in the product solution brief.

Industry-first cross-channel full-message analysis for email, Slack, Teams, and Zoom

Darktrace now brings full-message analysis to Email, Slack, Teams, Zoom, and even generative AI prompts. The same leading behavioral analysis from EMAIL extends to every message, tracing intent, tone, relationships, and conversation flow across all communication activity for a complete understanding of every user interaction.

By correlating messaging and collaboration activity with email and account environments, cross-channel analysis reveals multi-domain attack paths and follows both users and threats as a single, continuous narrative – delivering better context to improve detection across the entire organization.

  • Eliminate cross-channel blind spots: Detect phishing, malware, account takeovers, and conversational manipulation across email and collaboration platforms, so attackers can’t exploit Slack, Teams, or Zoom as a new entry point. Unified behavioral analysis gives security teams a coherent, single view, for no more fragmented, channel-specific gaps.
  • Spot generative AI prompt injection attacks before they manipulate assistants: Dedicated models surface threats targeting corporate AI assistants – like ShadowLeak and Hashjack – before they can silently manipulate workflows, reducing risk before static filters catch up.

Learn more about Darktrace’s messaging security offering in the product solution brief.

Industry-first DMARC with bi-directional ASM and email security integration

Darktrace transforms domain protection by linking DMARC, attack surface intelligence, and email security into a single, continuously evolving workflow. Instead of treating domain authentication and exposure as separate tasks, this unified approach shows not just where domains are vulnerable, but how attackers are actively exploiting them.

  • Fix authentication weaknesses faster: SPF, DKIM, DMARC configurations, and external exposure data are analyzed together, giving teams clear guidance to correct weaknesses before they can be abused. Deep bidirectional integration with attack surface intelligence reduces impersonation risk at the source.
  • Accelerate email investigations: DMARC context is embedded directly into email workflows, enriching triage with authentication posture, internal/external sender lists, and seamless pivots between email and domain intelligence for faster, more accurate investigations.

Committed to innovation

These updates are part of a broader Darktrace release, which also includes:

Join our Live Launch Event on April 14, 2026.

Join us for an exclusive announcement event where Darktrace, the leader in AI-native cybersecurity, will be announcing our latest innovations, including  a demo of our new product / Adaptive Human Defense, an exclusive conversation with a Darktrace customer, and a deep dive into the Darktrace ActiveAI Security Portal.  

Register here.

References

[1] 84% of organizations still measure security awareness training success through completion rates, a vanity metric with no correlation to behavior change. (Source:  NIST Awareness Effectiveness Study, Forrester 2025)

[2] 'Limited benefit from embedded phishing training. Using randomized controlled trials and statistical modeling, embedded training provides a statistically-significant reduction in average failure rate, but of only 2%.' Ho, G., Mirian, A., Luo, E., Tong, K., Lee, E., Liu, L., Longhurst, C. A., Dameff, C., Savage, S., & Voelker, G. M. (2025). Understanding the Efficacy of Phishing Training in Practice. Proceedings of the 2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.

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About the author
Carlos Gray
Senior Product Marketing Manager, Email
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