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January 17, 2024

Detecting Trusted Network Relationship Abuse

Discover how Darktrace DETECT and the SOC team responded to a network compromise via a trusted partner relationship with this case study.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Adam Potter
Senior Cyber Analyst
Written by
Taylor Breland
Analyst Team Lead, San Francisco
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17
Jan 2024

Trusted relationships between organizations and third parties have become an increasingly popular target for cyber threat actors to gain access to sensitive networks. These relationships are typically granted by organizations to external or adjacent entities and allow for the access of internal resources for business purposes.1 Trusted network relations can exist between constituent elements of an overarching corporation, IT-service providers and their customers, and even implicitly between IT product vendors and their customers.

Several high-profile compromises have occurred due to the leveraging of privileged network access by such third parties. One prominent example is the 2016 DNC network attack, in which the trust between the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC) was exploited. Supply chain attacks, which also leverage the implicit trust between IT vendors and customers, are also on the rise with some estimates projecting that by 2025, almost half of all organizations will be impact by supply chain compromises.2 These trends may also be attributed to the prevalence of remote work as well as the growth in IT-managed service providers.3

Given the nature of such network relationships and threat techniques, signatures-based detection is heavily disadvantaged in the identification and mitigation of such trust abuses; network administrators cannot as easily use firewalls to block IPs that need access to networks. However, Darktrace DETECT™, and its Self-Learning AI, has proven successful in the identification and mitigation of these compromises. In September 2023, Darktrace observed an incident involving the abuse of such a trusted relationship on the network of a healthcare provider.

Attack Overview

In early September 2023, a Darktrace customer contacted the Darktrace Security Operations Center (SOC) through the Ask the Expert™ (ATE) service requesting assistance with suspicious activity detected on their network. Darktrace had alerted the customer’s security team to an unknown device that had appeared on their network and proceeded to perform a series of unexpected activities, including reconnaissance, lateral movement, and attempted data exfiltration.

Unfortunately for this customer, Darktrace RESPOND™ was not enabled in autonomous response mode at the time of this compromise, meaning any preventative actions suggested by RESPOND had to be applied manually by the customer’s security team after the fact.  Nevertheless, Darktrace’s prompt identification of the suspicious activity and the SOC’s investigation helped to disrupt the intrusion in its early stages, preventing it from developing into a more disruptive compromise.

Initial Access

Darktrace initially observed a new device that appeared within the customers internal network with a Network Address Translated (NAT) IP address that suggested remote access from a former partner organization’s network. Further investigation carried out by the customer revealed that poor credential policies within the partner’s organization had likely been exploited by attackers to gain access to a virtual desktop interface (VDI) machine.

Using the VDI appliance of a trusted associate, the threat actor was then able to gain access to the customer’s environment by utilizing NAT remote access infrastructure. Devices within the customer’s network had previously been utilized for remote access from the partner network when such activity was permitted and expected. Since then, access to this network was thought to have been removed for all parties. However, it became apparent that the remote access functionality remained operational. While the customer also had firewalls within the environment, a misconfiguration at the time of the attack allowed inbound port access to the remote environment resulting in the suspicious device joining the network on August 29, 2023.

Internal Reconnaissance

Shortly after the device joined the network, Darktrace observed it carrying out a string of internal reconnaissance activity. This activity was initiated with internal ICMP address connectivity, followed by internal TCP connection attempts to a range of ports associated with critical services like SMB, RDP, HTTP, RPC, and SSL. The device was also detected attempting to utilize privileged credentials, which were later identified as relating to a generic multi-purpose administrative account. The threat actor proceeded to conduct further internal reconnaissance, including reverse DNS sweeps, while also attempting to use six additional user credentials.

In addition to the widespread internal connectivity, Darktrace observed persistent connection attempts focused on the RDP and SMB protocols. Darktrace also detected additional SMB enumeration during this phase of the attacker’s reconnaissance. This reconnaissance activity largely attempted to access a wide variety of SMB shares, previously unseen by the host to identify available share types and information available for aggregation. As such, the breach host conducted a large spike in SMB writes to the server service (srvsvc) endpoint on a range of internal hosts using the credential: extramedwb. SMB writes to this endpoint traditionally indicate binding attempts.

Beginning on August 31, Darktrace identified a new host associated with the aforementioned NAT IP address. This new host appeared to have taken over as the primary host conducting the reconnaissance and lateral movement on the network taking advantage of the VDI infrastructure. Like the previous host, this one was observed sustaining reconnaissance activity on August 31, featuring elevated SMB enumeration, SMB access failures, RDP connection attempts, and reverse DNS sweeps.  The attackers utilized several credentials to execute their reconnaissance, including generic and possibly default administrative credentials, including “auditor” and “administrator”.

Figure 1: Advanced Search query highlighting anomalous activity from the second observed remote access host over the course of one week surrounding the time of the breach.

Following these initial detections by Darktrace DETECT, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst™ launched an autonomous investigation into the scanning and privileged internal connectivity and linked these seemingly separate events together into one wider internal reconnaissance incident.

Figure 2: Timeline of an AI Analyst investigation carried out between August 29 and August 31, 2023, during which it detected an increased volume of scanning and unusual privileged internal connectivity.

Lateral Movement

Following the reconnaissance activity performed by the new host observed exploiting the remote access infrastructure, Darktrace detected an increase in attempts to move laterally within the customer’s network, particularly via RPC commands and SMB file writes.

Specifically, the threat actor was observed attempting RPC binds to several destination devices, which can be used in the calling of commands and/or the creation of services on destination devices. This activity was highlighted in repeated failed attempts to bind to the ntsvcs named pipe on several destination devices within the network. However, given the large number of connection attempts, Darktrace did also detect a number of successful RPC connections.

Darktrace also detected a spike in uncommon service control (SVCCTL) ExecMethod, Create, and Start service operations from the breach device.

Figure 3: Model breach details noting the affected device performing unsuccessful RPC binds to endpoints not supported on the destination device.

Additional lateral movement activity was performed using the SMB/NTLM protocols. The affected device also conducted a series of anonymous NTLM logins, whereby NTLM authentication attempts occurred without a named client principal, to a range of internal hosts. Such activity is highly indicative of malicious or unauthorized activity on the network. The host also employed the outdated SMB version 1 (SMBv1) protocol during this phase of the kill chain. The use of SMBv1 often represents a compliance issue for most networks due to the high number of exploitable vulnerabilities associated with this version of the protocol.

Lastly, Darktrace identified the internal transfer of uncommon executables, such as ‘TRMtZSqo.exe’, via SMB write. The breach device was observed writing this file to the hidden administrative share (ADMIN$) on a destination server. Darktrace recognized that this activity was highly unusual for the device and may have represented the threat actor transferring a malicious payload to the destination server for further persistence, data aggregation, and/or command and control (C2) operations. Further SMB writes of executable files, and the subsequent delete of these binaries, were observed from the device at this time. For example, the additional executable ‘JAqfhBEB.exe’ was seen being deleted by the breach device. This deletion, paired with the spike in SVCCTL Create and Start operations occurring, suggests the transfer, execution, and removal of persistence and data harvesting binaries within the network.

Figure 4: AI Analyst details highlighting the SMB file writes of the unusual executable from the remote access device during the compromise.

Conclusion

Ultimately, Darktrace was able to successfully identify and alert for suspicious activity being performed by a threat actor who had gained unauthorized access to the customer’s network by abusing one of their trusted relationships.

The identification of scanning, RPC commands and SMB sessions directly assisted the customer in their response to contain and mitigate this intrusion. The investigation carried out by the Darktrace SOC enabled the customer to promptly triage and remediate the attack, mitigating the potential damage and preventing the compromise from escalating further. Had Darktrace RESPOND been enabled in autonomous response mode at the time of the attack, it would have been able to take swift action to inhibit the scanning, share enumerations and file write activity, thereby thwarting the attacker’s network reconnaissance and lateral movement attempts.

By exploiting trusted relationships between organizations, threat actors are often able to bypass traditional signatured-based security methods that have previously been reconfigured to allow and trust connections from and to specific endpoints. Rather than relying on the configurations of specific rules and permitted IP addresses, ports, and devices, Darktrace DETECT’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection meant it was able to identify suspicious network activity at the earliest stage, irrespective of the offending device and whether the domain or relationship was trusted.

Credit to Adam Potter, Cyber Security Analyst, Taylor Breland, Analyst Team Lead, San Francisco.

Darktrace DETECT Model Breach Coverage:

  • Device / ICMP Address Scan
  • Device / Network Scan
  • Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity
  • Device / RDP Scan
  • Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance
  • Device / Reverse DNS Sweep
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Device / Large Number of Model Breaches
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Activity On High Risk Device
  • Unusual Activity / Possible RPC Recon Activity
  • Device / Anonymous NTLM Logins
  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual SMB Version 1 Connectivity
  • Device / Repeated Unknown RPC Service Bind Errors
  • Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control
  • Compliance / SMB Drive Write
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual Internal EXE File Transfer
  • Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

AI Analyst Incidents:

  • Scanning of Multiple Devices
  • Extensive Unusual RDPConnections
  • SMB Write of Suspicious File
  • Suspicious DCE-RPC Activity

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • Tactic: Initial Access
  • Technique: T1199 - Trusted Relationship
  • Tactic: Discovery
  • Technique:
  • T1018 - Remote System Discovery
  • T1046 - Network Service Discovery
  • T1135 - Network Share Discovery
  • T1083 - File and Directory Discovery
  • Tactic: Lateral Movement
  • Technique:
  • T1570 - Lateral Tool Transfer
  • T1021 - Remote Services
  • T1021.002 - SMB/Windows Admin Shares
  • T1021.003 - Distributed Component Object Model
  • T1550 - Use Alternate Authentication Material

References

1https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199/

2https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/insights-supply-chain-attacks/

3https://newsroom.cisco.com/c/r/newsroom/en/us/a/y2023/m09/companies-reliance-on-it-managed-services-increases-in-2023-sector-valued-at-us-472-billion-globally.html#:~:text=IT%20channel%20partners%20selling%20managed,US%24419%20billion%20in%202022.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Adam Potter
Senior Cyber Analyst
Written by
Taylor Breland
Analyst Team Lead, San Francisco

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July 1, 2025

Pre-CVE Threat Detection: 8 Examples Identifying Malicious Activity Prior to Public Disclosure of a Vulnerability

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Can you detect cyber threats before the world knows about them?

Every year, tens of thousands of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) are disclosed, over 40,000 in 2024 alone [1], and a predicted higher number for 2025 by the Forum for Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST).

However, cybercriminals don't wait for disclosure. They exploit zero-days while defenders remain in the dark.

Traditional, signature-based tools struggle to detect these early-stage threats. That’s why anomaly detection is becoming essential for organizations seeking pre-CVE detection.

Understanding the gap between zero-day attacks and public CVE disclosure

When a vulnerability is discovered, the standard practice is to report it to the vendor or the responsible organization, allowing them to develop and distribute a patch or fix before the details are made public. This is known as responsible disclosure.

The gap between exploitation of a zero-day and the disclosure of the vulnerability can sometimes be considerable, and retroactively attempting to identify successful exploitation on your network can be challenging, particularly if taking a signature-based approach.

However, abnormal behaviors in networks or systems, such as unusual login patterns or data transfers, can indicate attempted cyber-attacks, insider threats, or compromised systems.

Detecting threats without relying on CVE disclosure

Since Darktrace does not rely on rules or signatures, it can detect malicious activity that is anomalous even without full context of the specific device or asset in question.

For example, during the Fortinet exploitation late last year, the Darktrace Threat Research team were investigating a different Fortinet vulnerability, namely CVE 2024-23113, for exploitation when Mandiant released a security advisory around CVE 2024-47575, which aligned closely with Darktrace’s findings.

Retrospective analysis like this is used by Darktrace’s threat researchers to better understand detections across the threat landscape and to add additional context.

Below are eight examples from the past year where Darktrace detected malicious activity days or even weeks before a vulnerability was publicly disclosed.

ten examples from the past year where Darktrace detected malicious activity days or even weeks before a vulnerability was publicly disclosed.

Trends in pre-cve exploitation

The attack vs. patch race

In many cases, the disclosure of an exploited vulnerability can be off the back of an incident response investigation related to a compromise by an advanced threat actor using a zero-day. Once the vulnerability is registered and publicly disclosed as having been exploited, it can kick off a race between the attacker and defender.

Skilled nation-state actors

Nation-state actors, highly skilled with significant resources, are known to use a range of capabilities to achieve their target, including zero-day use. Often, pre-CVE activity is “low and slow”, last for months with high operational security.

After CVE disclosure, the barriers to entry lower, allowing less skilled and less resourced attackers, like some ransomware gangs, to exploit the vulnerability and cause harm. This is why two distinct types of activity are often seen: pre and post disclosure of an exploited vulnerability.

Examples of exploitation

Darktrace saw this consistent story line play out during several of the Fortinet and PAN OS threat actor campaigns highlighted above last year, where nation-state actors were seen exploiting vulnerabilities first, followed by ransomware gangs impacting organizations [2].

The same applies with the recent SAP Netweaver exploitations being tied to a China based threat actor earlier this spring with subsequent ransomware incidents being observed [3].

You spotted the anomaly but did you stop the breach?

Anomaly-based detection offers the benefit of identifying malicious activity even before a CVE is disclosed; however, security teams still need to quickly contain and isolate the activity.

For example, during the Ivanti chaining exploitation in the early part of 2025, a customer had Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability enabled on their network. As a result, Darktrace was able to contain the compromise and shut down any ongoing suspicious connectivity by blocking internal connections and enforcing a “pattern of life” on the affected device.

This pre-CVE detection and response by Darktrace occurred 11 days before any public disclosure, demonstrating the value of an anomaly-based approach.

In some cases, customers have even reported that Darktrace stopped malicious exploitation of devices several days before a public disclosure of a vulnerability.

For example, During the ConnectWise exploitation, a customer informed the team that Darktrace had detected malicious software being installed via remote access. Upon further investigation, four servers were found to be impacted, while Autonomous Response had blocked outbound connections and enforced patterns of life on impacted devices.

Conclusion

By continuously analyzing behavioral patterns, systems can spot unusual activities and patterns from users, systems, and networks to detect anomalies that could signify a security breach.

Through ongoing monitoring and learning from these behaviors, anomaly-based security systems can detect threats that traditional signature-based solutions might miss, while also providing detailed insights into threat tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). This type of behavioral intelligence supports pre-CVE detection, allows for a more adaptive security posture, and enables systems to evolve with the ever-changing threat landscape.

Credit to Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO), Emma Fougler (Global Threat Research Operations Lead), Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

References and further reading:

  1. https://www.first.org/blog/20250607-Vulnerability-Forecast-for-2025
  2. https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/fortimanager-zero-day-exploitation-cve-2024-47575
  3. https://thehackernews.com/2025/05/china-linked-hackers-exploit-sap-and.html

Realted Darktrace blogs:

*Self-reported by customer, confirmed afterwards.

**Updated January 2024 blog now reflects current findings

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June 27, 2025

Patch and Persist: Darktrace’s Detection of Blind Eagle (APT-C-36)

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What is Blind Eagle?

Since 2018, APT-C-36, also known as Blind Eagle, has been observed performing cyber-attacks targeting various sectors across multiple countries in Latin America, with a particular focus on Colombian organizations.

Blind Eagle characteristically targets government institutions, financial organizations, and critical infrastructure [1][2].

Attacks carried out by Blind Eagle actors typically start with a phishing email and the group have been observed utilizing various Remote Access Trojans (RAT) variants, which often have in-built methods for hiding command-and-control (C2) traffic from detection [3].

What we know about Blind Eagle from a recent campaign

Since November 2024, Blind Eagle actors have been conducting an ongoing campaign targeting Colombian organizations [1].

In this campaign, threat actors have been observed using phishing emails to deliver malicious URL links to targeted recipients, similar to the way threat actors have previously been observed exploiting CVE-2024-43451, a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows that allows the disclosure of a user’s NTLMv2 password hash upon minimal interaction with a malicious file [4].

Despite Microsoft patching this vulnerability in November 2024 [1][4], Blind Eagle actors have continued to exploit the minimal interaction mechanism, though no longer with the intent of harvesting NTLMv2 password hashes. Instead, phishing emails are sent to targets containing a malicious URL which, when clicked, initiates the download of a malicious file. This file is then triggered by minimal user interaction.

Clicking on the file triggers a WebDAV request, with a connection being made over HTTP port 80 using the user agent ‘Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19044’. WebDAV is a transmission protocol which allows files or complete directories to be made available through the internet, and to be transmitted to devices [5]. The next stage payload is then downloaded via another WebDAV request and malware is executed on the target device.

Attackers are notified when a recipient downloads the malicious files they send, providing an insight into potential targets [1].

Darktrace’s coverage of Blind Eagle

In late February 2025, Darktrace observed activity assessed with medium confidence to be  associated with Blind Eagle on the network of a customer in Colombia.

Within a period of just five hours, Darktrace / NETWORK detected a device being redirected through a rare external location, downloading multiple executable files, and ultimately exfiltrating data from the customer’s environment.

Since the customer did not have Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability enabled on their network, no actions were taken to contain the compromise, allowing it to escalate until the customer’s security team responded to the alerts provided by Darktrace.

Darktrace observed a device on the customer’s network being directed over HTTP to a rare external IP, namely 62[.]60[.]226[.]112, which had never previously been seen in this customer’s environment and was geolocated in Germany. Multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) providers have since linked this endpoint with phishing and malware campaigns [9].

The device then proceeded to download the executable file hxxp://62[.]60[.]226[.]112/file/3601_2042.exe.

Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to an unusual location based in Germany.
Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to an unusual location based in Germany.
Darktrace’s detection of the affected device downloading an executable file from the suspicious endpoint.
Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of the affected device downloading an executable file from the suspicious endpoint.

The device was then observed making unusual connections to the rare endpoint 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com and performing unusual external data activity.

This dynamic DNS endpoint allows a device to access an endpoint using a domain name in place of a changing IP address. Dynamic DNS services ensure the DNS record of a domain name is automatically updated when the IP address changes. As such, malicious actors can use these services and endpoints to dynamically establish connections to C2 infrastructure [6].

Further investigation into this dynamic endpoint using OSINT revealed multiple associations with previous likely Blind Eagle compromises, as well as Remcos malware, a RAT commonly deployed via phishing campaigns [7][8][10].

Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to the suspicious dynamic DNS endpoint, 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to the suspicious dynamic DNS endpoint, 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com.

Shortly after this, Darktrace observed the user agent ‘Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19045’, indicating usage of the aforementioned transmission protocol WebDAV. The device was subsequently observed connected to an endpoint associated with Github and downloading data, suggesting that the device was retrieving a malicious tool or payload. The device then began to communicate to the malicious endpoint diciembrenotasenclub[.]longmusic[.]com over the new TCP port 1512 [11].

Around this time, the device was also observed uploading data to the endpoints 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com and diciembrenotasenclub[.]longmusic[.]com, with transfers of 60 MiB and 5.6 MiB observed respectively.

Figure 4: UI graph showing external data transfer activity.

This chain of activity triggered an Enhanced Monitoring model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK. These high-priority model alerts are designed to trigger in response to higher fidelity indicators of compromise (IoCs), suggesting that a device is performing activity consistent with a compromise.

 Darktrace’s detection of initial attack chain activity.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of initial attack chain activity.

A second Enhanced Monitoring model was also triggered by this device following the download of the aforementioned executable file (hxxp://62[.]60[.]226[.]112/file/3601_2042.exe) and the observed increase in C2 activity.

Following this activity, Darktrace continued to observe the device beaconing to the 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com endpoint.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to correlate each of the individual detections involved in this compromise, identifying them as part of a broader incident that encompassed C2 connectivity, suspicious downloads, and external data transfers.

Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the activity observed on the affected device.
Figure 6: Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the activity observed on the affected device.
Figure 7: Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of the affected device’s broader connectivity throughout the course of the attack.

As the affected customer did not have Darktrace’s Autonomous Response configured at the time, the attack was able to progress unabated. Had Darktrace been properly enabled, it would have been able to take a number of actions to halt the escalation of the attack.

For example, the unusual beaconing connections and the download of an unexpected file from an uncommon location would have been shut down by blocking the device from making external connections to the relevant destinations.

Conclusion

The persistence of Blind Eagle and ability to adapt its tactics, even after patches were released, and the speed at which the group were able to continue using pre-established TTPs highlights that timely vulnerability management and patch application, while essential, is not a standalone defense.

Organizations must adopt security solutions that use anomaly-based detection to identify emerging and adapting threats by recognizing deviations in user or device behavior that may indicate malicious activity. Complementing this with an autonomous decision maker that can identify, connect, and contain compromise-like activity is crucial for safeguarding organizational networks against constantly evolving and sophisticated threat actors.

Credit to Charlotte Thompson (Senior Cyber Analyst), Eugene Chua (Principal Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

IoCs

IoC – Type - Confidence
Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19045 – User Agent

62[.]60[.]226[.]112 – IP – Medium Confidence

hxxp://62[.]60[.]226[.]112/file/3601_2042.exe – Payload Download – Medium Confidence

21ene.ip-ddns[.]com – Dynamic DNS Endpoint – Medium Confidence

diciembrenotasenclub[.]longmusic[.]com  - Hostname – Medium Confidence

Darktrace’s model alert coverage

Anomalous File / Suspicious HTTP Redirect
Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Location
Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint
Device / Anomalous Github Download
Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity
Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
Compromise / Suspicious File and C2
Compromise / Fast Beaconing to DGA
Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections
Device / Large Number of Model Alert

Mitre Attack Mapping:

Tactic – Technique – Technique Name

Initial Access - T1189 – Drive-by Compromise
Initial Access - T1190 – Exploit Public-Facing Application
Initial Access ICS - T0862 – Supply Chain Compromise
Initial Access ICS - T0865 – Spearphishing Attachment
Initial Access ICS - T0817 - Drive-by Compromise
Resource Development - T1588.001 – Malware
Lateral Movement ICS - T0843 – Program Download
Command and Control - T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer
Command and Control - T1095 – Non-Application Layer Protocol
Command and Control - T1571 – Non-Standard Port
Command and Control - T1568.002 – Domain Generation Algorithms
Command and Control ICS - T0869 – Standard Application Layer Protocol
Evasion ICS - T0849 – Masquerading
Exfiltration - T1041 – Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Exfiltration - T1567.002 – Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

References

1)    https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/blind-eagle-and-justice-for-all/

2)    https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmgsites/in/pdf/2025/04/kpmg-ctip-blind-eagle-01-apr-2025.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf

3)    https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-remote-access-trojan/#:~:text=They%20might%20be%20attached%20to,remote%20access%20or%20system%20administration

4)    https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-43451

5)    https://www.ionos.co.uk/digitalguide/server/know-how/webdav/

6)    https://vercara.digicert.com/resources/dynamic-dns-resolution-as-an-obfuscation-technique

7)    https://threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/1437795

8)    https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-malware/remcos-malware/

9)    https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/b3189db6ddc578005cb6986f86e9680e7f71fe69f87f9498fa77ed7b1285e268

10) https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/21ene.ip-ddns.com

11) https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/diciembrenotasenclub.longmusic.com/community

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About the author
Charlotte Thompson
Cyber Analyst
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