Blog
/
Email
/
July 18, 2023

Understanding Email Security & the Psychology of Trust

We explore how psychological research into the nature of trust relates to our relationship with technology - and what that means for AI solutions.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Hanah Darley
Director of Threat Research
Photo showing woman logging into her laptop with username and passwordDefault blog image
18
Jul 2023

When security teams discuss the possibility of phishing attacks targeting their organization, often the first reaction is to assume it is inevitable because of the users. Users are typically referenced in cyber security conversations as organizations’ greatest weaknesses, cited as the causes of many grave cyber-attacks because they click links, open attachments, or allow multi-factor authentication bypass without verifying the purpose.

While for many, the weakness of the user may feel like a fact rather than a theory, there is significant evidence to suggest that users are psychologically incapable of protecting themselves from exploitation by phishing attacks, with or without regular cyber awareness trainings. The psychology of trust and the nature of human reliance on technology make the preparation of users for the exploitation of that trust in technology very difficult – if not impossible.

This Darktrace long read will highlight principles of psychological and sociological research regarding the nature of trust, elements of the trust that relate to technology, and how the human brain is wired to rely on implicit trust. These principles all point to the outcome that humans cannot be relied upon to identify phishing. Email security driven by machine augmentation, such as AI anomaly detection, is the clearest solution to tackle that challenge.

What is the psychology of trust?

Psychological and sociological theories on trust largely centre around the importance of dependence and a two-party system: the trustor and the trustee. Most research has studied the impacts of trust decisions on interpersonal relationships, and the characteristics which make those relationships more or less likely to succeed. In behavioural terms, the elements most frequently referenced in trust decisions are emotional characteristics such as benevolence, integrity, competence, and predictability.1

Most of the behavioural evaluations of trust decisions survey why someone chooses to trust another person, how they made that decision, and how quickly they arrived at their choice. However, these micro-choices about trust require the context that trust is essential to human survival. Trust decisions are rooted in many of the same survival instincts which require the brain to categorize information and determine possible dangers. More broadly, successful trust relationships are essential in maintaining the fabric of human society, critical to every element of human life.

Trust can be compared to dark matter (Rotenberg, 2018), which is the extensive but often difficult to observe material that binds planets and earthly matter. In the same way, trust is an integral but often a silent component of human life, connecting people and enabling social functioning.2

Defining implicit and routine trust

As briefly mentioned earlier, dependence is an essential element of the trusting relationship. Being able to build a routine of trust, based on the maintenance rather than establishment of trust, becomes implicit within everyday life. For example, speaking to a friend about personal issues and life developments is often a subconscious reaction to the events occurring, rather than an explicit choice to trust said friend each time one has new experiences.

Active and passive levels of cognition are important to recognize in decision-making, such as trust choices. Decision-making is often an active cognitive process requiring a lot of resource from the brain. However, many decisions occur passively, especially if they are not new choices e.g. habits or routines. The brain’s focus turns to immediate tasks while relegating habitual choices to subconscious thought processes, passive cognition. Passive cognition leaves the brain open to impacts from inattentional blindness, wherein the individual may be abstractly aware of the choice but it is not the focus of their thought processes or actively acknowledged as a decision. These levels of cognition are mostly referenced as “attention” within the brain’s cognition and processing.3

This idea is essentially a concept of implicit trust, meaning trust which is occurring as background thought processes rather than active decision-making. This implicit trust extends to multiple areas of human life, including interpersonal relationships, but also habitual choice and lifestyle. When combined with the dependence on people and services, this implicit trust creates a haze of cognition where trust is implied and assumed, rather than actively chosen across a myriad of scenarios.

Trust and technology

As researchers at the University of Cambridge highlight in their research into trust and technology, ‘In a fundamental sense, all technology depends on trust.’  The same implicit trust systems which allow us to navigate social interactions by subconsciously choosing to trust, are also true of interactions with technology. The implied trust in technology and services is perhaps most easily explained by a metaphor.

Most people have a favourite brand of soda. People will routinely purchase that soda and drink it without testing it for chemicals or bacteria and without reading reviews to ensure the companies that produce it have not changed their quality standards. This is a helpful, representative example of routine trust, wherein the trust choice is implicit through habitual action and does not mean the person is actively thinking about the ramifications of continuing to use a product and trust it.

The principle of dependence is especially important in trust and technology discussions, because the modern human is entirely reliant on technology and so has no way to avoid trusting it.5   Specifically important in workplace scenarios, employees are given a mandatory set of technologies, from programs to devices and services, which they must interact with on a daily basis. Over time, the same implicit trust that would form between two people forms between the user and the technology. The key difference between interpersonal trust and technological trust is that deception is often much more difficult to identify.

The implicit trust in workplace technology

To provide a bit of workplace-specific context, organizations rely on technology providers for the operation (and often the security) of their devices. The organizations also rely on the employees (users) to use those technologies within the accepted policies and operational guidelines. The employees rely on the organization to determine which products and services are safe or unsafe.

Within this context, implicit trust is occurring at every layer of the organization and its technological holdings, but often the trust choice is only made annually by a small security team rather than continually evaluated. Systems and programs remain in place for years and are used because “that’s the way it’s always been done. Within that context, the exploitation of that trust by threat actors impersonating or compromising those technologies or services is extremely difficult to identify as a human.

For example, many organizations utilize email communications to promote software updates for employees. Typically, it would consist of email prompting employees to update versions from the vendors directly or from public marketplaces, such as App Store on Mac or Microsoft Store for Windows. If that kind of email were to be impersonated, spoofing an update and including a malicious link or attachment, there would be no reason for the employee to question that email, given the explicit trust enforced through habitual use of that service and program.

Inattentional blindness: How the brain ignores change

Users are psychologically predisposed to trust routinely used technologies and services, with most of those trust choices continuing subconsciously. Changes to these technologies would often be subject to inattentional blindness, a psychological phenomenon wherein the brain either overwrites sensory information with what the brain expects to see rather than what is actually perceived.

A great example of inattentional blindness6 is the following experiment, which asks individuals to count the number of times a ball is passed between multiple people. While that is occurring, something else is going on in the background, which, statistically, those tested will not see. The shocking part of this experiment comes after, when the researcher reveals that the event occurring in the background not seen by participants was a person in a gorilla suit moving back and forth between the group. This highlights how significant details can be overlooked by the brain and “overwritten” with other sensory information. When applied to technology, inattentional blindness and implicit trust makes spotting changes in behaviour, or indicators that a trusted technology or service has been compromised, nearly impossible for most humans to detect.

With all this in mind, how can you prepare users to correctly anticipate or identify a violation of that trust when their brains subconsciously make trust decisions and unintentionally ignore cues to suggest a change in behaviour? The short answer is, it’s difficult, if not impossible.

How threats exploit our implicit trust in technology

Most cyber threats are built around the idea of exploiting the implicit trust humans place in technology. Whether it’s techniques like “living off the land”, wherein programs normally associated with expected activities are leveraged to execute an attack, or through more overt psychological manipulation like phishing campaigns or scams, many cyber threats are predicated on the exploitation of human trust, rather than simply avoiding technological safeguards and building backdoors into programs.

In the case of phishing, it is easy to identify the attempts to leverage the trust of users in technology and services. The most common example of this would be spoofing, which is one of the most common tactics observed by Darktrace/Email. Spoofing is mimicking a trusted user or service, and can be accomplished through a variety of mechanisms, be it the creation of a fake domain meant to mirror a trusted link type, or the creation of an email account which appears to be a Human Resources, Internal Technology or Security service.

In the case of a falsified internal service, often dubbed a “Fake Support Spoof”, the user is exploited by following instructions from an accepted organizational authority figure and service provider, whose actions should normally be adhered to. These cases are often difficult to spot when studying the sender’s address or text of the email alone, but are made even more difficult to detect if an account from one of those services is compromised and the sender’s address is legitimate and expected for correspondence. Especially given the context of implicit trust, detecting deception in these cases would be extremely difficult.

How email security solutions can solve the problem of implicit trust

How can an organization prepare for this exploitation? How can it mitigate threats which are designed to exploit implicit trust? The answer is by using email security solutions that leverage behavioural analysis via anomaly detection, rather than traditional email gateways.

Expecting humans to identify the exploitation of their own trust is a high-risk low-reward endeavour, especially when it takes different forms, affects different users or portions of the organization differently, and doesn’t always have obvious red flags to identify it as suspicious. Cue email security using anomaly detection as the key answer to this evolving problem.

Anomaly detection enabled by machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) removes the inattentional blindness that plagues human users and security teams and enables the identification of departures from the norm, even those designed to mimic expected activity. Using anomaly detection mitigates multiple human cognitive biases which might prevent teams from identifying evolving threats, and also guarantees that all malicious behaviour will be detected. Of course, anomaly detection means that security teams may be alerted to benign anomalous activity, but still guarantees that no threat, no matter how novel or cleverly packaged, won’t be identified and raised to the human security team.

Utilizing machine learning, especially unsupervised machine learning, mimics the benefits of human decision making and enables the identification of patterns and categorization of information without the framing and biases which allow trust to be leveraged and exploited.

For example, say a cleverly written email is sent from an address which appears to be a Microsoft affiliate, suggesting to the user that they need to patch their software due to the discovery of a new vulnerability. The sender’s address appears legitimate and there are news stories circulating on major media providers that a new Microsoft vulnerability is causing organizations a lot of problems. The link, if clicked, forwards the user to a login page to verify their Microsoft credentials before downloading the new version of the software. After logging in, the program is available for download, and only requires a few minutes to install. Whether this email was created by a service like ChatGPT (generative AI) or written by a person, if acted upon it would give the threat actor(s) access to the user’s credential and password as well as activate malware on the device and possibly broader network if the software is downloaded.

If we are relying on users to identify this as unusual, there are a lot of evidence points that enforce their implicit trust in Microsoft services that make them want to comply with the email rather than question it. Comparatively, anomaly detection-driven email security would flag the unusualness of the source, as it would likely not be coming from a Microsoft-owned IP address and the sender would be unusual for the organization, which does not normally receive mail from the sender. The language might indicate solicitation, an attempt to entice the user to act, and the link could be flagged as it contains a hidden redirect or tailored information which the user cannot see, whether it is hidden beneath text like “Click Here” or due to link shortening. All of this information is present and discoverable in the phishing email, but often invisible to human users due to the trust decisions made months or even years ago for known products and services.

AI-driven Email Security: The Way Forward

Email security solutions employing anomaly detection are critical weapons for security teams in the fight to stay ahead of evolving threats and varied kill chains, which are growing more complex year on year. The intertwining nature of technology, coupled with massive social reliance on technology, guarantees that implicit trust will be exploited more and more, giving threat actors a variety of avenues to penetrate an organization. The changing nature of phishing and social engineering made possible by generative AI is just a drop in the ocean of the possible threats organizations face, and most will involve a trusted product or service being leveraged as an access point or attack vector. Anomaly detection and AI-driven email security are the most practical solution for security teams aiming to prevent, detect, and mitigate user and technology targeting using the exploitation of trust.

References

1https://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/trust-project/videos/waytz-ep-1.aspx

2Rotenberg, K.J. (2018). The Psychology of Trust. Routledge.

3https://www.cognifit.com/gb/attention

4https://www.trusttech.cam.ac.uk/perspectives/technology-humanity-society-democracy/what-trust-technology-conceptual-bases-common

5Tyler, T.R. and Kramer, R.M. (2001). Trust in organizations : frontiers of theory and research. Thousand Oaks U.A.: Sage Publ, pp.39–49.

6https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00426-006-0072-4

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Hanah Darley
Director of Threat Research

More in this series

No items found.

Blog

/

/

July 9, 2026

When AI Infrastructure Becomes Part of the Attack Surface

ai infrastructure cybersecurityDefault blog imageDefault blog image

AI Infrastructure and the Evolving Attack Surface

As organizations deploy generative AI into production environments, a new layer of infrastructure has emerged inside enterprise cloud environments: AI gateways.

What is an AI gateway?

AI gateways are systems that sit between users, applications, and foundation models, often holding privileged cloud permissions and managing access to AI services at scale.

Because of that role, AI gateways are becoming an increasingly important part of the enterprise attack surface. A compromise may provide attackers with access not only to compute resources, but also to cloud identities, model services, sensitive prompts, and other connected systems.

This blog examines how Darktrace investigated a compromised AI gateway connected to Amazon Bedrock services that was subsequently observed communicating with cryptomining infrastructure. Based on its configuration and associated Identity and Access Management (IAM) role, the instance appeared to function as a gateway to Amazon Bedrock-hosted AI services. Following suspected compromise activity, the host was observed communicating repeatedly with known cryptomining infrastructure before subsequently being shut down. Darktrace detected and escalated the activity through its Enhanced Monitoring and Managed Threat Detection services.

While the ultimate impact in this case appeared to be unauthorized cryptomining, the incident is notable because of where it occurred. The compromised asset sat at the intersection of cloud infrastructure, identity, and AI services. Recent research has highlighted how AI gateways such as LiteLLM can become attractive targets due to their ability to centralize credentials, model access, and cloud permissions. Although Darktrace found no evidence linking this activity directly to publicly disclosed LiteLLM vulnerabilities, the incident demonstrates why organizations should treat AI infrastructure as part of their critical attack surface rather than as a standalone application tier [1].

Why cryptomining remains a common cloud post-compromise activity

Cryptomining can be a lucrative post-compromise activity in cloud environments. After gaining access to a cloud asset, attackers may deploy mining software to abuse the victim’s compute resources for financial gain. This type of activity is likely to be opportunistic, targeting exposed services, weak credentials, leaked access keys, vulnerable applications, or misconfigured cloud workloads.

A typical cloud cryptomining intrusion may involve:

  • Identifying exposed or vulnerable cloud infrastructure
  • Gaining access through exposed services, credentials, or application weaknesses
  • Downloading and executing mining software
  • Establishing repeated outbound connectivity to mining pool infrastructure
  • Continuing to consume compute resources until the activity is detected and disrupted

The notable element in this case is not the cryptomining alone, but where it occurred: on cloud infrastructure supporting AI-related activity. This shows how assets used to enable AI services can still be exposed to familiar cloud compromise risks.

Investigating a compromised AI gateway connected to Amazon Bedrock

On June 12, 2026, Darktrace observed activity consistent with active cryptomining from an Amazon Web Service (AWS) EC2 instance named LiteLLM-Proxy. The instance appeared to support LiteLLM activity and was associated with an instance profile that had access to Amazon Bedrock resources.

AI gateways are designed to centralize access to large language models, often handling authentication, routing, logging, and policy enforcement for AI applications. From a security perspective, they also aggregate cloud permissions, model access, and application workflows into a single control point. As a result, compromise of an AI gateway can have implications beyond the affected host itself.

While the exact initial access vector could not be confirmed, the activity appears to follow a sequence often seen in compromises of internet-facing systems: brute-forced access, payload delivery, and repeated outbound connectivity to mining pool infrastructure.

Stage 1: Internet-exposed SSH enabled initial access

Prior to the observed cryptomining activity, the LiteLLM-Proxy EC2 instance appeared to be externally exposed over SSH, with port 22 open to 0.0.0.0/0.

Figure 1: Darktrace’s misconfiguration alert EC2 instance allowing all inbound traffic to SSH port 22.

Prior to the cryptomining activity, Darktrace observed a large volume of inbound connection attempts to the instance over port 22 from external IP addresses, predominantly from 145.241.123[.]102, suggesting brute-force activity [2]. Many of these connections were short-lived, lasting only a few seconds, indicating scanning or failed login attempts.

Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of unusual incoming connection attempts to the device over port 22.

The available telemetry did not confirm whether any inbound SSH connection resulted in successful authentication, preventing this activity from being confirmed as the initial access vector. However, the combination of public SSH exposure, inbound connections from external IP addresses, and subsequent miner activity suggests that SSH was a plausible access path.

Stage 2: XMRig malware downloaded to the AI gateway

Before the first observed connection to the mining pool, the EC2 instance downloaded 3.42 MB of data over an HTTP connection on port 80 to the external endpoint, 185.62.1[.]8, which appears to host a ZIP file containing XMRig crypto-mining malware [3][4]. As host-level logs were not available, Darktrace could not confirm how the miner was executed or whether the earlier SSH activity directly enabled payload delivery. However, the timing of the download, followed shortly by repeated mining pool connectivity, supported the assessment that the instance had been compromised and was being used for unauthorized compute activity.

Stage 3 – Compromised AI gateway communicates with cryptomining infrastructure

Just a few minutes later, Darktrace observed the LiteLLM-Proxy EC2 instance connecting to the hostname pool.hasvault[.]pro over HTTPs on port 443. Following the initial connection, repeated outbound connectivity to the same hostname was observed. This pattern is consistent with active cryptomining pool communication, where a compromised host communicates with mining infrastructure to receive work and submit results.

This activity triggered the Enhanced Monitoring model “Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining”, which was escalated to the customer by Darktrace’s SOC. The activity was also summarized by Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst, which grouped the relevant events into a single investigation narrative, helping to identify the repeated mining pool connectivity from the affected cloud asset.

Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation of the cryptocurrency mining activity.

The use of HTTPS over port 443 is notable because, when viewed in isolation, this traffic may not appear inherently suspicious. In this case, however, the destination, volume of connections, and lack of similar activity provided the behavioral context needed to identify the communication as suspicious.

Stage 4: Managed Threat Detection identifies active resource abuse

The cryptomining activity was received by Darktrace’s Managed Threat Detection service and reviewed by Darktrace’s SOC. Following review, the activity was escalated to the customer. This escalation provided the customer with timely notification of active resource abuse in the AWS environment.

Stage 5: Suspicious IAM activity suggests possible cloud credential misuse

Separately, on June 13, Darktrace observed suspicious activity originating from an additional IAM user.

Figure 4: Darktrace’s Advanced Search highlighting suspicious activity performed by a second IAM user.

First, the user was observed attempting the “GetSendQuota” event, an action that had not performed by the account within at least the previous three months. Additionally, the source IP address of this command appeared to be 14.176.1[.]47, geolocated in Vietnam, whereas activity for this user had mostly been seen from Amazon IP addresses. Furthermore, the AWS CLI was also observed being used for this activity, which was also unusual for the user. This was detected by the model “IaaS / Unusual Activity / Unusual AWS CLI Activity”.

Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of the “GetSendQuota” event.

Further suspicious activity was observed from the IAM user using the long-term access key. Notably, failed “InvokeModel” and “ListFoundationModels” commands were detected, suggesting attempted interaction with Amazon Bedrock services, including model enumeration or invocation. While this may suggest relation to the LiteLLM compromise observed the previous day, there is insufficient evidence to conclusively link the two events.

The attempted “CreateUser” command was also notable because the requested username appeared low-meaning, which may indicate an attempt to establish persistence by creating a new account. This activity triggered the model “IaaS / Admin / New AWS User Account Creation”.

Figure 6: Darktrace’s detection of the “CreateUser” event.

Even without a confirmed link between the two incidents, the IAM activity remains significant. It demonstrates the importance of incorporating workload both telemetry and control-plane telemetry into cloud compromise investigations. While the EC2 cryptomining activity indicated compute resource abuse, the IAM activity suggested potential credential compromise or misuse involving long-term access keys, along with attempted cloud service abuse.

Key lessons for securing AI infrastructure

This incident was notable not because of the cryptomining activity itself, but because of where it occurred. The compromised system appeared to function as an AI gateway with access to Amazon Bedrock services, placing it at the intersection of cloud infrastructure, identity, and AI operations. As organizations deploy AI capabilities into production environments, these platforms are becoming part of the same attack surface that adversaries already target through exposed services, credential theft, and cloud misconfigurations.

While the exact intrusion path could not be confirmed, and no definitive link was established between the compromised workload and the suspicious IAM activity observed during the investigation, both events reinforce a broader reality: AI infrastructure must be secured as part of the wider cloud environment rather than treated as a separate technology stack.

In this case, the most obvious sign of compromise was communication with cryptomining infrastructure. The more important lesson is that Darktrace’s behavioral analysis revealed risk surrounding a privileged AI-enabled asset before the full scope of the incident was understood. As AI gateways increasingly concentrate cloud permissions, model access, and application workflows, defenders will need to focus less on individual alerts and more on understanding how behaviors connect across workloads, identities, and services.

Credit to Angel Arribas Lopez (Associate Principal Cyber Analyst), Nathaniel Jones (Field CISO/VP Threat Research), Emma Foulger (Global Threat Ops),  and Mark Turner (Security Researcher)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

·       Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining

·       Compromise / Monero Mining

·       Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

·       IaaS / Unusual Activity / Unusual AWS CLI Activity

·       IaaS / Admin / New AWS User Account Creation

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Initial Access – External Remote Services – T1133

Initial Access – Valid Accounts – T1078

Execution – Command and Scripting Interpreter – T1059

Persistence – Create Account – T1136

Discovery – Cloud Service Discovery – T1526

Impact – Resource Hijacking – T1496

References

[1] https://docs.litellm.ai/blog/security-update-march-2026

[2] https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/145.241.123.102

[3] https://urlscan.io/search/#185.62.1.8

[4] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/85de36ff66fae9f4b059cbedf6d36e017ebc26c828f99f911a96e78636f21200/community

Continue reading
About the author
Angel Arribas Lopez
Associate Principal Cyber Analyst

Blog

/

/

July 8, 2026

Securing AI: Analysis of the Complete Security Stack with Governance and Controls

ai security stackDefault blog imageDefault blog image

Why traditional cybersecurity approaches are not enough for AI

AI adoption outpaces most security programs’ ability to adapt.  That gap is now one of the most consequential sources of cyber risk facing enterprises. As organizations embed generative and agentic AI into development workflows, business operations, and security tooling itself, the question is no longer whether AI will introduce risk. The question is whether organizations understand where that risk actually lives and how to manage it operationally.  

Two recent pieces of guidance underscore this shift:

  1. The upcoming Cybersecurity Framework Profile for AI from NIST
  1. The Five Eyes government guidance on the careful adoption of agentic AI services

Taken together, they point to a critical conclusion. AI security cannot be reduced to model hardening or prompt filtering. It requires a defense in depth strategy that treats AI as both a new attack surface and a force multiplier for defense, while accounting for how AI fundamentally changes scale, speed, and autonomy.  

Recent threat research suggests that today's cyber risk is driven less by initial compromise and more by an adversary's ability to blend into normal operations over time. AI systems create the same exposure in a new form: more autonomy, more scale, and more opportunities for risky behavior to blend into normal operations.

How NIST defines the three core pillars of AI security

The NIST profile organizes AI risk across three inseparable focus areas that span all cybersecurity functions, Secure, Defend and Thwart. These areas are not sequential. They exist simultaneously and must be addressed together.

Secure

This treats AI as an attack surface. It includes models, prompts, agents, pipelines, training and inference data, retrieval augmented generation corpora, and the AI supply chain itself. AI systems are opaque, probabilistic, and non-deterministic by design. Some vulnerabilities are inherent in how models are trained or how data is sourced. Traditional patching does not fully mitigate these risks. This is also where many enterprises are weakest today and, critically, where many security programs stop.  

Defend

This is AI as a defensive force multiplier. AI can improve detection speed, scale, correlation, and response, but only if the right models are used and operationalized correctly. Machine-speed behavior-based detection, response and containment becomes critical in defending non-deterministic systems. Accuracy, explainability, governance, testing, validation, and integration into SOC workflows matter as much as capability. Without those controls, hallucination risk, over automation, and misplaced trust become security risks themselves.  

Thwart

This treats AI as an adversarial accelerant. Threat actors are already using AI to generate targeted social engineering attacks, deepfakes, malware, and autonomous attack agents. Asymmetric warfare is highlighting faster vulnerability discovery and exploitation with a lag on patch development, testing and deployment.  

How this looks in practice

Darktrace researchers observed scaled, automated exploitation of the React2Shell vulnerability within days of disclosure. A vulnerable cloud asset was exploited in under 120 seconds of being deployed. Darktrace research team observed an AI/LLM-generated malware sample used in exploitation activity tied to React2Shell. The significance isn't novelty. It is that AI lowers the barrier to producing usable offensive tooling and compresses the time between experimentation and deployment.  

Tactics are getting more and more creative in order to string together steps of an attack kill chain. This creates a dependency on behavior-based detection, autonomous investigation, autonomous containment, training, resilience investment, and recovery planning across the entire enterprise.

Why agentic AI fundamentally changes enterprise cyber risk

The Five Eyes guidance on agentic AI highlights material changes to the cyber risk profile of an organization. Unlike generative AI systems that produce content for human consumption, agentic AI systems reason, plan, and act autonomously across tools, data, and environments. That autonomy, combined with access to real systems, amplifies the impact of traditional cyber failures and introduces new system level risks that are difficult to predict, observe, and contain.  

Risk in agentic systems does not live in the model alone. It emerges from interactions between models, prompts, memory, tools, APIs, identities, privileges, inter-agent trust relationships, and human assumptions baked into design. Vulnerabilities are often introduced through data, connectors, natural language interfaces, protocols, and drift by design.

In supply-chain incidents, attackers did not need sophisticated exploits to scale impact. They abused trusted systems built for automation and implicit access. Agentic AI inherits that model. Once a system can act across tools, data, and workflows, compromise propagates through trust relationships that were never designed for machine autonomy.

The major agentic AI risk classes include the following:  

  • The identity control for non-human identities or autonomous agents makes it difficult to mitigate over-permissioning, limiting access, scope, and duration, as well as access hygiene
  • Agents are frequently over permissioned
  • Compromised tools inherit agent authority
  • Static secrets enable impersonation
  • Implicit trust between agents enables lateral movement

Design and configuration risks compound this, including privileges evaluated once at startup, poor segmentation, unvetted third party tools, reused authorization decisions outside their original context, and guardrail limitations.  

Behavioral risk  

Agents can optimize for goals in unsafe ways, misinterpret ambiguous intent, chain actions into unintended sequences, change behavior during evaluation, and exhibit deceptive or sycophantic responses.  

Structural risk  

Structural risk follows from agentic systems that are tightly coupled, multicomponent ecosystems. Failures can propagate across agents. Hallucinations cascade downstream. Resource exhaustion becomes systemic. Tool misuse enables indirect prompt injection and command execution. Rogue agents can poison peer agents through trust relationships.  

Accountability

Accountability becomes unclear as autonomy increases. Autonomous agents assume human identity permissions, and humans should have clear ownership of these agents, but they don’t, and this model is flawed. Decision paths are opaque and non-deterministic. Logs are fragmented and difficult to interpret. Reproducing an incident will be impossible without explicit design for observability and forensics. An agent compromise is functionally an insider threat, often with better access and fewer behavioral constraints than a human.  

What does defense in depth look like for AI?

Agentic AI runs on software, networks, identities, and data. It must be governed using the same foundational principles that have proven resilient under uncertainty, including secure by design, defense in depth, zero trust, least privilege, continuous monitoring, behavior-based advanced threat detection and containment, and incident response and recovery.

Core components to a Defense in depth Strategy for Securing the use of AI:

  • Strong, precise identity control plane to include an identity per agent (cryptographic, non‑shared)
    • Privilege monitoring and just‑in‑time access
  • Data Governance
  • Secure‑by‑default configurations
    • Security Posture Management  
    • Zero Trust principles  
  • Strong guardrails, deny‑by‑default policies, and isolation
  • Explicit instruction hierarchies and controlled context
  • Behavioral-based detection across entire enterprise to include inputs, tools, and outputs as well as AI used on the endpoint, across the network, cloud, SaaS, email, and OT
    • Runtime anomaly detection and goal‑drift detection
    • Autonomous containment to mitigate risk and minimize damage
  • Hard boundaries on autonomy and delegation
  • Testing, Evaluation, Validation and Verification  
    • Determine when autonomous action and when human in the loop
    • Adversarial training and agent‑specific testing
    • Simulation, red teaming, and chaos testing
  • Kill‑switches, rollback, and containment mechanisms
    • Forensics data captures, interpretability, autonomous containment, and remediation/recovery plans  

Until standards, tooling, and assurance methods mature, organizations should assume agentic AI systems will behave unexpectedly and design deployments around resilience, behavior-based detection, reversibility, and containment, not efficiency.

How security leaders should prepare for enterprise AI adoption

AI security is not model security alone. Data, pipelines, identities, and agents are first class assets. Many AI attacks succeed through standard cyber failures amplified by AI. Identity, data, and supply chain risk dominate. Behavior-based detection and response are critical, not optional. Logging, provenance, versioning, and forensics data capture of detections are mandatory because you cannot investigate or recover from AI incidents without them.  

Risk will often be visible in behavior before it is clearly defined in policy or guidance. The same pattern has been seen in pre-CVE disclosure detection, where abnormal activity appears before the industry has named or described the vulnerability. AI systems introduce that uncertainty by design.

Security leaders should prioritize controls before AI is fully deployed, avoid generic AI security checklists, integrate AI risk into existing cyber programs, and mitigate the risk of non-deterministic technology with continuous oversight, monitoring, behavior analytics, anomaly detection, autonomous investigation, and autonomous containment.

Visibility has a different connotation with AI. Previously, audit logging worked for software/people, but with Generative AI-based systems, interpretability and explainability is difficult to understand, you cannot "undo" what has been done, or see the logic or control a chain of events. This is why behavioral-based detections and containment becomes critical.  

What capabilities should every AI security program include?

If an organization asked “what must be in place before scaling AI?”:

  1. AI Risk board and approval workflow
  1. IAM + PAM for all AI services and agents
  1. AI asset inventory
  1. Prompt/output DLP with sanctioned AI access – This is not just pre- and post- filters, but behavior-based detections of semantic interface as well as behavior-based analysis of output with associated risk context.  
  1. Shadow AI identification
  1. Secure MLOps – This is an entire paper itself
  1. Runtime guardrails and tool restrictions
    • Including AI Gateway/SASE/Zero trust/
  1. Runtime security with behavior-based detections
    • Complete visibility, monitoring, behavior analytics, anomaly detection, risk/intent/context evaluation of anomalies, autonomous investigation and autonomous containment of all AI assets across endpoint, network, SaaS, SASE, cloud, OT, email, and messaging platforms
  1. Secure data pipelines and data governance
  1. SOC workflow changes from malicious classification workflows to behavior-based detection workflows
  1. Remediation plans for AI-related incidents  

Layered Governance and Security Stack for Securing AI  

The following outline considers governance and security tools that should be considered, well-integrated, deployed, tested, operationalized and embedded within security workflows. These tools and controls map to NIST’s CMF for AI.  

These considerations do not need to be implemented in order. Runtime Detect and Respond will help mitigate risk while Governance, Visibility, and Identity mature.

Category Tooling Controls
Governance & Visibility
  • AI asset inventory / AI CMDB
  • Shadow AI discovery
  • SaaS discovery
  • AI usage on non-endpoint managed systems via network or cloud telemetry
  • MCP server/client usage via protocols
  • Browser telemetry
  • Gateway or SASE telemetry
  • Establish a risk board to set up controls
  • Mandatory registration of AI systems
  • Owner, data classification, intended use, and risk tier
  • Supplier disclosure requirements
  • Risk mitigation plan for AI adoption, innovation, or development
Identity, Access & Agent Control

Non-human autonomous agents should not have the full permissions associated with a human user.

  • IAM with workload identities
  • PAM for AI service accounts
  • Secrets management with short-lived tokens
  • Zero Trust principles
  • Identity, permission, and token hygiene
  • Unique identities per model, agent, and pipeline
  • Least privilege for tools, data, and APIs
  • Explicit approval for autonomous actions
Data Security & Privacy
  • Data classification and labeling
  • Enterprise DLP across endpoint, email, network, cloud, and SaaS
  • Forensics data capture after risky detections
  • Prompt-level DLP through behavior-based semantic analysis with risk and intent context
  • Input/interface analysis for risky data requests
  • Output analysis for sensitive data
  • Data integrity evaluation
  • Retention and redaction policies for prompts and responses
Secure MLOps / LLMOps
  • Secure CI/CD with AI-specific gates
  • Model registries with approval workflows
  • Dependency, container, and artifact scanning
  • SBOM/AIBOM generation
  • IaC security scanning
  • Security posture management
  • Misconfiguration identification
  • Hardening recommendations
  • Signed models and prompts
  • Versioned datasets, configurations, logging, and controls
  • Securing data pipelines
  • Controlled promotion
  • Quality assurance
  • Adversarial testing
Runtime Security

Securing runtime goes beyond guardrails and model firewalls to include behavior-based detections, response, and containment.

  • Detection, monitoring, and SOC integration
  • Centralized visibility into prompts, outputs, and tool calls
  • AI-specific detections
  • Behavior-based detection for AI usage patterns
  • Model drift and behavior monitoring
  • Autonomous containment
  • Behavior-based detection of model inputs and outputs
  • Prompt injection detection
  • Model manipulation, including jailbreaking, poisoning, and related attacks
  • Sensitive data access attempts
  • Behavior-based detection across low-code agents, high-code agents, MCP clients and servers, endpoint, network, cloud, email, SaaS, SASE, IoT, and OT
  • Policy enforcement between users, models, tools, agents, SaaS models/tools, and MCP servers/clients
  • Risk, intent, and context evaluation for detections and response actions
Response & Recovery
  • Autonomous containment
  • AI-assisted playbooks
  • Forensics data capture for AI-related events
  • Model rollback mechanisms
  • Backup and restore for models and datasets
  • Kill switch for agents
  • Autonomous response to agents performing risky behaviors
  • Model and dataset rollback
  • Remediation plans
  • Tabletop exercises
  • Supplier coordination plans
  • Post-incident AI performance validation

AI security requires continuous visibility and behavioral detection

AI changes how fast systems move, how decisions are made, and how risk propagates. It does not change the fundamentals of security. Organizations that succeed will be the ones that apply those fundamentals rigorously, assume failure, and build systems that can detect, contain, and recover when AI behaves in ways they did not anticipate. Security is not what AI is allowed to do. It is whether the organization can understand, trust, and control what AI actually does in practice.  

Take this guidance to understand different initiatives that organizations should be considering. Securing AI is the most critical component to AI safety. As organizations invest more in AI adoption, they should be investing in security in order to mitigate the risk of AI adoption. Organizations should be evaluating their governance and security stack to include well-integrated tools that are deployed, tested, operationalized and embedded within security workflows. While organizations mature in governance, visibility and identity access management, they should be investing in behavior-based detection and autonomous containment to mitigate AI risk.  

Continue reading
About the author
Your data. Our AI.
Elevate your network security with Darktrace AI