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November 4, 2020

Mimecast Link Rewriting: A False Sense of Security Exposed

Gain insight into modern email security methods to ensure you avoid pitfalls of traditional email gateways. Learn why rewriting links isn't the best approach.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Dan Fein
VP, Product
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04
Nov 2020

Many organizations feel secure in the knowledge that their email gateway is rewriting all of the harmful links targeting their employees. Link rewriting is a common technique that involves encoding URLs sent via email into a link that redirects the user to the gateway’s own servers. These servers contain some unique codes that then track the user and perform later checks to determine whether the link is malicious.

This blog reveals why the sense of protection this gives is a fallacy, and how rewriting links does not equate to protecting the end user from actual harm. In fact, gateways’ reliance on this technique is actually an indicator of one of their fundamental flaws: their reliance on rules and signatures of previously recognized threats, and their consequent inability to stop threats on the first encounter. The reason these tools pre-emptively rewrite links is so they can make a determination later on: with the link now pointing to their own servers, they can leverage their updated assessment of that link and block a malicious site, once more information has become available (often once ‘patient zero’ has become infected; and the damage is already done).

Email security that recognizes and blocks threats on the first encounter has no need to rewrite every link.

How to measure success

If the sheer number of links rewritten is to be our measure of success, then traditional gateways win every time. For instance, Mimecast will usually rewrite 100% of the harmful links that Antigena Email locks. In fact, it rewrites nearly 100% of all links. That even includes links pointing to trusted websites like LinkedIn and Twitter, and even emails containing links to the recipient’s own website. So when tim.cook[at]apple.com receives a link to apple.com, for example, ‘mimecast.com’ will still dominate the URL.

Some organizations suffering from low first-encounter catch rates with their gateways have responded by increasing employee education: training the human to spot the giveaways of a phishing email. With email attacks getting more targeted and sophisticated, humans should never be considered the last line of defense, and rewriting links makes the situation even worse. If you’re training your users to watch which links they’re clicking, and every one of those links reads ‘mimecast.com’, how are your users supposed to learn what’s good, bad, or sketchy when every URL looks the same?

Moreover, when Mimecast’s URL gateway is down, these rewritten links don’t work (and the same applies to protected attachments). This results in business downtime which is intolerable for businesses in these critical and challenging times.

We can see the effect of blanket rewriting through Darktrace’s user interface, which shows us the frequency of rewritten links over time. Looking back over three days, this particular customer – who was trialing Antigena Email alongside Mimecast, received 155,008 emails containing rewritten links. Of those, 1,478 were anomalous, and Darktrace’s AI acted to immediately lock those links, protecting even the first recipient from harm. The remaining 153,530 links were all unnecessarily rewritten.

Figure 1: Over 155,000 inbound emails contained rewritten Mimecast links

If it comes to actually stopping the threat when a user goes to click that rewritten link, gateway tools fail. Their reliance on legacy checks like reputation, deny-lists, and rules and signatures mean that malicious content will sometimes sit for days or weeks without any meaningful action, as the technology requires at least one – and usually many – ‘patient zeros’ before determining a URL or an attachment as malicious, and updating their deny-lists.

Let’s look at the case of an attack launched from entirely new infrastructure: from a freshly purchased domain, and containing a newly created malicious payload. None of the typical metrics legacy tools search for appear as malicious, and so of course, the threat gets through, and ‘patient zero’ is infected.

Figure 2: ‘Patient Zero’ denotes the first victim of an email attack.

It inevitably takes time for the malicious link to be recognized as malicious, and for that to be reported. By this point, large swathes of the workforce have also become infected. We can call this the ‘time to detection’.

Figure 3: The time to detection

As legacy tools then update their lists in recognition of the attack, the malware continues to infect the organization, with more users engaging in the contents of the email.

Figure 4: The legacy tool reacts

Finally, the legacy tool reacts, updating its deny-list and providing substantive action to protect the end user from harm. By this point, hundreds of users across multiple organizations may have interacted with the links in some way.

Figure 5: Many ‘patient zeros’ are required before the threat is deny-listed

Email gateways’ reliance on rewriting links is directly related to their legacy approach to detection. They do it so that later down the line, when they have updated information about a potential attack, they can take action. Until then, it’s just a rewritten link, and if clicked on, it will bring the user to whatever website was hiding underneath it.

These links are also rewritten in an attempt to grasp an understanding of what user network behavior looks like. But far from giving an accurate or in-depth picture of network activity, this method barely scratches the surface of the wider behaviors of users across the organization.

Alongside Darktrace’s Enterprise Immune System, Antigena Email can pull these insights directly from a unified, central AI engine that has complete and direct visibility over an organization’s entire digital estate – not just links accessed from emails, but network activity as a whole – and not a makeshift version where it is assumed people only visit links through emails. It also pulls insights from user behavior in the cloud and across SaaS applications – from Salesforce to Microsoft Teams.

Taking real action in real time

While gateways rewrite everything in order to leave the door open to make assessments later on, Darktrace is able to take action when it needs to – before the email poses a threat in the inbox. The technology is uniquely able to do this due to its high success rates for malicious emails seen on first encounter. And it’s able to achieve such high success rates because it takes a much more sophisticated approach to detection that uses AI to catch a threat – regardless of whether or not that threat has been seen before.

Darktrace’s understanding of ‘normal’ for the human behind email communications allows it to not only detect subtle deviations that are indicative of a cyber-threat, but respond to that threat at the point of delivery. This response is targeted, proportionate and non-disruptive, and varies according to the nature of the attack. While Darktrace’s unsupervised machine learning can accurately identify deviations from ‘normal’, its supervised machine learning models are able to classify the intention behind the email; what the attacker is trying to do (extort information, solicit a payment, harvest credentials, or convince the user to download a malicious attachment).

Crucially, organizations trialing both approaches to security find that Antigena Email consistently identifies threats that Mimecast and other tools miss. With the scale and sophistication of email attacks growing, the need for a proactive and modern approach to email security is paramount. Organizations need to ensure they are measuring their sense of protection with the right yardstick, and adopt a technology that can take meaningful action before damage is done.

Trial Antigena Email today

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Dan Fein
VP, Product

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March 11, 2026

NetSupport RAT: How Legitimate Tools Can Be as Damaging as Malware

NetSupport RAT: How Legitimate Tools Can Be as Damaging as MalwareDefault blog imageDefault blog image

What is NetSupport Manager?

NetSupport Manager is a legitimate IT tool used by system administrators for remote support, monitoring, and management. In use since 1989, NetSupport Manager enables users to remotely access and navigate systems across different platforms and operating systems [1].

What is NetSupport RAT?

Although NetSupport Manager is a legitimate tool that can be used by IT and security professionals, there has been a rising number of cases in which it is abused to gain unauthorized access to victim systems. This misuse has become so prevalent that, in recent years, security researchers have begun referring to NetSupport as a Remote Access Trojan (RAT), a term typically used for malware that enables a threat actor to remotely access or control an infected device [2][3][4].

NetSupport RAT activity summary

The initial stages of NetSupport RAT infection may vary depending on the source of the initial compromise. Using tactics such as the social engineering tactic ClickFix, threat actors attempt to trick users into inadvertently executing malicious PowerShell commands under the guise of resolving a non-existent issue or completing a fake CAPTCHA verification [5]. Other attack vectors such as phishing emails, fake browser updates, malicious websites, search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning, malvertising and drive-by downloads are also employed to direct users to fraudulent pages and fake reCAPTCHA verification checks, ultimately inducing them to execute malicious PowerShell commands [5][6][7]. This leads to the successful installation of NetSupport Manager on the compromised device, which is often placed in non-standard directories such as AppData, ProgramData, or Downloads [3][8].

Once installed, the adversary is able to gain remote access to the affected machine, monitor user activity, exfiltrate data, communicate with the command-and-control (C2) server, and maintain persistence [5]. External research has also highlighted that post-exploitation of NetSupport RAT has involved the additional download of malicious payloads [2][5].

Attack flow diagram highlighting key events across each phase of the attack phase
Figure 1: Attack flow diagram highlighting key events across each phase of the attack phase [2][5].

Darktrace coverage

In November of 2025, suspicious behavior indicative of the malicious abuse of NetSupport Manager was observed on multiple customers across Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) and the Americas (AMS).

While open-source intelligence (OSINT) has reported that, in a recent campaign, a threat actor impersonated government entities to trick users in organizations in the Information Technology, Government and Financial Services sectors in Central Asia into downloading NetSupport Manager [8], approximately a third of Darktrace’s affected customers in November were based in the US while the rest were based in EMEA. This contrast underscores how widely NetSupport Manager is leveraged by threat actors and highlights its accessibility as an initial access tool.  

The Darktrace customers affected were in sectors including Information and Communication, Manufacturing and Arts, entertainment and recreation.

The ClickFix social engineering tactic typically used to distribute the NetSupport RAT is known to target multiple industries, including Technology, Manufacturing and Energy sectors [9]. It also reflects activity observed in the campaign targeting Central Asia, where the Information Technology sector was among those affected [8].

The prevalence of affected Education customers highlights NetSupport’s marketing focus on the Education sector [10]. This suggests that threat actors are also aware of this marketing strategy and have exploited the trust it creates to deploy NetSupport Manager and gain access to their targets’ systems. While the execution of the PowerShell commands that led to the installation of NetSupport Manager falls outside of Darktrace's purview in cases identified, Darktrace was still able to identify a pattern of devices making connections to multiple rare external domains and IP addresses associated with the NetSupport RAT, using a wide range of ports over the HTTP protocol. A full list of associated domains and IP addresses is provided in the Appendices of this blog.

Although OSINT identifies multiple malicious domains and IP addresses as used as C2 servers, signature-based detections of NetSupport RAT indicators of compromise (IoCs) may miss broader activity, as new malicious websites linked to the RAT continue to appear.

Darktrace’s anomaly‑based approach allows it to establish a normal ‘pattern of life’ for each device on a network and identify when behavior deviates from this baseline, enabling the detection of unusual activity even when it does not match known IoCs or tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).

In one customer environment in late 2025, Darktrace / NETWORK detected a device initiating new connections to the rare external endpoint, thetavaluemetrics[.]com (74.91.125[.]57), along with the use of a previously unseen user agent, which it recognized as highly unusual for the network.

Darktrace’s detection of HTTP POST requests to a suspicious URI and new user agent usage.
Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of HTTP POST requests to a suspicious URI and new user agent usage.

Darktrace identified that user agent present in connections to this endpoint was the ‘NetSupport Manager/1.3’, initially suggesting legitimate NetSupport Manager activity. Subsequent investigation, however, revealed that the endpoint was in fact a malicious NetSupportRAT C2 endpoint [12]. Shortly after, Darktrace detected the same device performing HTTP POST requests to the URI fakeurl[.]htm. This pattern of activity is consistent with OSINT reporting that details communication between compromised devices and NetSupport Connectivity Gateways functioning as C2 servers [11].

Conclusion

As seen not only with NetSupport Manager but with any legitimate or open‑source software used by IT and security professionals, the legitimacy of a tool does not prevent it from being abused by threat actors. Open‑source software, especially tools with free or trial versions such as NetSupport Manager, remains readily accessible for malicious use, including network compromise. In an age where remote work is still prevalent, validating any anomalous use of software and remote management tools is essential to reducing opportunities for unauthorized access.

Darktrace’s anomaly‑based detection enables security teams to identify malicious use of legitimate tools, even when clear signatures or indicators of compromise are absent, helping to prevent further impact on a network.


Credit to George Kim (Analyst Consulting Lead – AMS), Anna Gilbertson (Senior Cyber Analyst)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Alerts

·       Compromise / Suspicious HTTP and Anomalous Activity

·       Compromise / New User Agent and POST

·       Device / New User Agent

·       Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

·       Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

·       Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname

·       Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

·       Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination

·       Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)

·       Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)

·       Compromise / Quick and Regular Windows HTTP Beaconing

·       Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint

·       Compromise / POST and Beacon to Rare External

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Indicator           Type     Description

/fakeurl.htm URI            NetSupportRAT C2 URI

thetavaluemetrics[.]com        Connection hostname              NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

westford-systems[.]icu            Connection hostname              NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

holonisz[.]com                Connection hostname              NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

heaveydutyl[.]com      Connection hostname              NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

nsgatetest1[.]digital   Connection hostname              NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

finalnovel[.]com            Connection hostname              NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

217.91.235[.]17              IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

45.94.47[.]224                 IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

74.91.125[.]57                 IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

88.214.27[.]48                 IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

104.21.40[.]75                 IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

38.146.28[.]242              IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

185.39.19[.]233              IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

45.88.79[.]237                 IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

141.98.11[.]224              IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

88.214.27[.]166              IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

107.158.128[.]84          IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

87.120.93[.]98                 IP             Rhadamanthys C2 Endpoint

References

  1. https://mspalliance.com/netsupport-debuts-netsupport-24-7/
  2. https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2023/11/netsupport-rat-the-rat-king-returns.html
  3. https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/netsupport-manager/
  4. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/8.19/netsupport-manager-execution-from-an-unusual-path.html
  5. https://rewterz.com/threat-advisory/netsupport-rat-delivered-through-spoofed-verification-pages-active-iocs
  6. https://thehackernews.com/2025/11/new-evalusion-clickfix-campaign.html
  7. https://corelight.com/blog/detecting-netsupport-manager-abuse
  8. https://thehackernews.com/2025/11/bloody-wolf-expands-java-based.html
  9. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/preventing-clickfix-attack-vector
  10. https://www.netsupportsoftware.com/education-solutions
  11. https://www.esentire.com/blog/unpacking-netsupport-rat-loaders-delivered-via-clickfix
  12. https://threatfox.abuse.ch/browse/malware/win.netsupportmanager_rat/
  13. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/5fe6936a69c786c9ded9f31ed1242c601cd64e1d90cecd8a7bb03182c47906c2

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About the author
George Kim
Analyst Consulting Lead – AMS

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March 5, 2026

Inside Cloud Compromise: Investigating Attacker Activity with Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation

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Investigating cloud attacks with Darktrace/ Forensic Acquisition & Investigation

Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation™ is the industry’s first truly automated forensic solution purpose-built for the cloud. This blog will demonstrate how an investigation can be carried out against a compromised cloud server in minutes, rather than hours or days.

The compromised server investigated in this case originates from Darktrace’s Cloudypots system, a global honeypot network designed to observe adversary activity in real time across a wide range of cloud services. Whenever an attacker successfully compromises one of these honeypots, a forensic copy of the virtual server's disk is preserved for later analysis. Using Forensic Acquisition & Investigation, analysts can then investigate further and obtain detailed insights into the compromise including complete attacker timelines and root cause analysis.

Forensic Acquisition & Investigation supports importing artifacts from a variety of sources, including EC2 instances, ECS, S3 buckets, and more. The Cloudypots system produces a raw disk image whenever an attack is detected and stores it in an S3 bucket. This allows the image to be directly imported into Forensic Acquisition & Investigation using the S3 bucket import option.

As Forensic Acquisition & Investigation runs cloud-natively, no additional configuration is required to add a specific S3 bucket. Analysts can browse and acquire forensic assets from any bucket that the configured IAM role is permitted to access. Operators can also add additional IAM credentials, including those from other cloud providers, to extend access across multiple cloud accounts and environments.

Figure 1: Forensic Acquisition & Investigation import screen.

Forensic Acquisition & Investigation then retrieves a copy of the file and automatically begins running the analysis pipeline on the artifact. This pipeline performs a full forensic analysis of the disk and builds a timeline of the activity that took place on the compromised asset. By leveraging Forensic Acquisition & Investigation’s cloud-native analysis system, this process condenses hour of manual work into just minutes.

Successful import of a forensic artifact and initiation of the analysis pipeline.
Figure 2: Successful import of a forensic artifact and initiation of the analysis pipeline.

Once processing is complete, the preserved artifact is visible in the Evidence tab, along with a summary of key information obtained during analysis, such as the compromised asset’s hostname, operating system, cloud provider, and key event count.

The Evidence overview showing the acquired disk image.
Figure 3: The Evidence overview showing the acquired disk image.

Clicking on the “Key events” field in the listing opens the timeline view, automatically filtered to show system- generated alarms.

The timeline provides a chronological record of every event that occurred on the system, derived from multiple sources, including:

  • Parsed log files such as the systemd journal, audit logs, application specific logs, and others.
  • Parsed history files such as .bash_history, allowing executed commands to be shown on the timeline.
  • File-specific events, such as files being created, accessed, modified, or executables being run, etc.

This approach allows timestamped information and events from multiple sources to be aggregated and parsed into a single, concise view, greatly simplifying the data review process.

Alarms are created for specific timeline events that match either a built-in system rule, curated by Darktrace’s Threat Research team or an operator-defined rule  created at the project level. These alarms help quickly filter out noise and highlight on events of interest, such as the creation of a file containing known malware, access to sensitive files like Amazon Web Service (AWS) credentials, suspicious arguments or commands, and more.

 The timeline view filtered to alarm_severity: “1” OR alarm_severity: “3”, showing only events that matched an alarm rule.
Figure 4: The timeline view filtered to alarm_severity: “1” OR alarm_severity: “3”, showing only events that matched an alarm rule.

In this case, several alarms were generated for suspicious Base64 arguments being passed to Selenium. Examining the event data, it appears the attacker spawned a Selenium Grid session with the following payload:

"request.payload": "[Capabilities {browserName: chrome, goog:chromeOptions: {args: [-cimport base64;exec(base64...], binary: /usr/bin/python3, extensions: []}, pageLoadStrategy: normal}]"

This is a common attack vector for Selenium Grid. The chromeOptions object is intended to specify arguments for how Google Chrome should be launched; however, in this case the attacker has abused the binary field to execute the Python3 binary instead of Chrome. Combined with the option to specify command-line arguments, the attacker can use Python3’s -c option to execute arbitrary Python code, in this instance, decoding and executing a Base64 payload.

Selenium’s logs truncate the Arguments field automatically, so an alternate method is required to retrieve the full payload. To do this, the search bar can be used to find all events that occurred around the same time as this flagged event.

Pivoting off the previous event by filtering the timeline to events within the same window using timestamp: [“2026-02-18T09:09:00Z” TO “2026-02-18T09:12:00Z”].
Figure 5: Pivoting off the previous event by filtering the timeline to events within the same window using timestamp: [“2026-02-18T09:09:00Z” TO “2026-02-18T09:12:00Z”].

Scrolling through the search results, an entry from Java’s systemd journal can be identified. This log contains the full, unaltered payload. GCHQ’s CyberChef can then be used to decode the Base64 data into the attacker’s script, which will ultimately be executed.

Decoding the attacker’s payload in CyberChef.
Figure 6: Decoding the attacker’s payload in CyberChef.

In this instance, the malware was identified as a variant of a campaign that has been previously documented in depth by Darktrace.

Investigating Perfctl Malware

This campaign deploys a malware sample known as ‘perfctl to the compromised host. The script executed by the attacker downloads a Go binary named “promocioni.php” from 200[.]4.115.1. Its functionality is consistent with previously documented perfctl samples, with only minor changes such as updated filenames and a new command-and-control (C2) domain.

Perfctl is a stealthy malware that has several systems designed  to evade detection. The main binary is packed with UPX, with the header intentionally tampered with to prevent unpacking using regular tools. The binary also avoids executing any malicious code if it detects debugging or tracing activity, or if artifacts left by earlier stages are missing.

To further aid its evasive capabilities, perfctl features a usermode rootkit using an LD preload. This causes dynamically linked executables to load perfctl’s rootkit payload before other system modules, allowing it to override functions, such as intercepting calls to list files and hiding output from the returned list. Perfctl uses this to hide its own files, as well as other files like the ld.so.preload file, preventing users from identifying that a rootkit is present in the first place.

This also makes it difficult to dynamically analyze, as even analysts aware of the rootkit will struggle to get around it due to its aggressiveness in hiding its components. A useful trick is to use the busybox-static utilities, which are statically linked and therefore immune to LD preloading.

Perfctl will attempt to use sudo to escalate its permissions to root if the user it was executed as has the required privileges. Failing this, it will attempt to exploit the vulnerability CVE-2021-4034.

Ultimately, perfctl will attempt to establish a C2 link via Tor and spawn an XMRig miner to mine the Monero cryptocurrency. The traffic to the mining pool is encapsulated within Tor to limit network detection of the mining traffic.

Darktrace’s Cloudypots system has observed 1,959 infections of the perfctl campaign across its honeypot network in the past year, making it one of the most aggressive campaigns seen by Darktrace.

Key takeaways

This blog has shown how Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation equips defenders in the face of a real-world attacker campaign. By using this solution, organizations can acquire forensic evidence and investigate intrusions across multiple cloud resources and providers, enabling defenders to see the full picture of an intrusion on day one. Forensic Acquisition & Investigation’s patented data-processing system takes advantage of the cloud’s scale to rapidly process large amounts of data, allowing triage to take minutes, not hours.

Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation is available as Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) but can also be deployed on-premises as a virtual application or natively in the cloud, providing flexibility between convenience and data sovereignty to suit any use case.

Support for acquiring traditional compute instances like EC2, as well as more exotic and newly targeted platforms such as ECS and Lambda, ensures that attacks taking advantage of Living-off-the-Cloud (LOTC) strategies can be triaged quickly and easily as part of incident response. As attackers continue to develop new techniques, the ability to investigate how they use cloud services to persist and pivot throughout an environment is just as important to triage as a single compromised EC2 instance.

Credit to Nathaniel Bill (Malware Research Engineer)

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About the author
Nathaniel Bill
Malware Research Engineer
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