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August 27, 2024

Decrypting the Matrix: How Darktrace Uncovered a KOK08 Ransomware Attack

In May 2024, a Darktrace customer was affected by KOK08, a ransomware strain commonly used by the Matrix ransomware family. Learn more about the tactics used by this ransomware case, including double extortion, and how Darktrace is able to detect and respond to such threats.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Christina Kreza
Cyber Analyst
Decrypting the Matrix: How Darktrace Uncovered a KOK08 Ransomware AttackDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog image
27
Aug 2024

What is Matrix Ransomware?

Matrix is a ransomware family that first emerged in December 2016, mainly targeting small to medium-sized organizations across the globe in countries including the US, Belgium, Germany, Canada and the UK [1]. Although the reported number of Matrix ransomware attacks has remained relatively low in recent years, it has demonstrated ongoing development and gradual improvements to its tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

How does Matrix Ransomware work?

In earlier versions, Matrix utilized spam email campaigns, exploited Windows shortcuts, and deployed RIG exploit kits to gain initial access to target networks. However, as the threat landscape changed so did Matrix’s approach. Since 2018, Matrix has primarily shifted to brute-force attacks, targeting weak credentials on Windows machines accessible through firewalls. Attackers often exploit common and default credentials, such as “admin”, “password123”, or other unchanged default settings, particularly on systems with Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) enabled [2] [3].

Darktrace observation of Matrix Ransomware tactics

In May 2024, Darktrace observed an instance of KOK08 ransomware, a specific strain of the Matrix ransomware family, in which some of these ongoing developments and evolutions were observed. Darktrace detected activity indicative of internal reconnaissance, lateral movement, data encryption and exfiltration, with the affected customer later confirming that credentials used for Virtual Private Network (VPN) access had been compromised and used as the initial attack vector.

Another significant tactic observed by Darktrace in this case was the exfiltration of data following encryption, a hallmark of double extortion. This method is employed by attacks to increase pressure on the targeted organization, demanding ransom not only for the decryption of files but also threatening to release the stolen data if their demands are not met. These stakes are particularly high for public sector entities, like the customer in question, as the exposure of sensitive information could result in severe reputational damage and legal consequences, making the pressure to comply even more intense.

Darktrace’s Coverage of Matrix Ransomware

Internal Reconnaissance and Lateral Movement

On May 23, 2024, Darktrace / NETWORK identified a device on the customer’s network making an unusually large number of internal connections to multiple internal devices. Darktrace recognized that this unusual behavior was indicative of internal scanning activity. The connectivity observed around the time of the incident indicated that the Nmap attack and reconnaissance tool was used, as evidenced by the presence of the URI “/nice ports, /Trinity.txt.bak”.

Although Nmap is a crucial tool for legitimate network administration and troubleshooting, it can also be exploited by malicious actors during the reconnaissance phase of the attack. This is a prime example of a ‘living off the land’ (LOTL) technique, where attackers use legitimate, pre-installed tools to carry out their objectives covertly. Despite this, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI had been continually monitoring devices across the customers network and was able to identify this activity as a deviation from the device’s typical behavior patterns.

The ‘Device / Attack and Recon Tools’ model alert identifying the active usage of the attack and recon tool, Nmap.
Figure 1: The ‘Device / Attack and Recon Tools’ model alert identifying the active usage of the attack and recon tool, Nmap.
Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst Investigation into the ‘Scanning of Multiple Devices' incident.

Darktrace subsequently observed a significant number of connection attempts using the RDP protocol on port 3389. As RDP typically requires authentication, multiple connection attempts like this often suggest the use of incorrect username and password combinations.

Given the unusual nature of the observed activity, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability would typically have intervened, taking actions such as blocking affected devices from making internal connections on a specific port or restricting connections to a particular device. However, Darktrace was not configured to take autonomous action on the customer’s network, and thus their security team would have had to manually apply any mitigative measures.

Later that day, the same device was observed attempting to connect to another internal location via port 445. This included binding to the server service (srvsvc) endpoint via DCE/RPC with the “NetrShareEnum” operation, which was likely being used to list available SMB shares on a device.

Over the following two days, it became clear that the attackers had compromised additional devices and were actively engaging in lateral movement. Darktrace detected two more devices conducting network scans using Nmap, while other devices were observed making extensive WMI requests to internal systems over DCE/RPC. Darktrace recognized that this activity likely represented a coordinated effort to map the customer’s network and identity further internal devices for exploitation.

Beyond identifying the individual events of the reconnaissance and lateral movement phases of this attack’s kill chain, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to connect and consolidate these activities into one comprehensive incident. This not only provided the customer with an overview of the attack, but also enabled them to track the attack’s progression with clarity.

Furthermore, Cyber AI Analyst added additional incidents and affected devices to the investigation in real-time as the attack unfolded. This dynamic capability ensured that the customer was always informed of the full scope of the attack. The streamlined incident consolidation and real-time updates saved valuable time and resources, enabling quicker, more informed decision-making during a critical response window.

Cyber AI Analyst timeline showing an overview of the scanning related activity, while also connecting the suspicious lateral movement activity.
Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst timeline showing an overview of the scanning related activity, while also connecting the suspicious lateral movement activity.

File Encryption

On May 28, 2024, another device was observed connecting to another internal location over the SMB filesharing protocol and accessing multiple files with a suspicious extension that had never previously been observed on the network. This activity was a clear sign of ransomware infection, with the ransomware altering the files by adding the “KOK08@QQ[.]COM” email address at the beginning of the filename, followed by a specific pattern of characters. The string consistently followed a pattern of 8 characters (a mix of uppercase and lowercase letters and numbers), followed by a dash, and then another 8 characters. After this, the “.KOK08” extension was appended to each file [1][4].

Cyber AI Analyst Investigation Process for the 'Possible Encryption of Files over SMB' incident.
Figure 4: Cyber AI Analyst Investigation Process for the 'Possible Encryption of Files over SMB' incident.
Cyber AI Analyst Encryption Information identifying the ransomware encryption activity,
Figure 5: Cyber AI Analyst Encryption Information identifying the ransomware encryption activity.

Data Exfiltration

Shortly after the encryption event, another internal device on the network was observed uploading an unusually large amount of data to the rare external endpoint 38.91.107[.]81 via SSH. The timing of this activity strongly suggests that this exfiltration was part of a double extortion strategy. In this scenario, the attacker not only encrypts the target’s files but also threatens to leak the stolen data unless a ransom is paid, leveraging both the need for decryption and the fear of data exposure to maximize pressure on the victim.

The full impact of this double extortion tactic became evident around two months later when a ransomware group claimed possession of the stolen data and threatened to release it publicly. This development suggested that the initial Matrix ransomware attackers may have sold the exfiltrated data to a different group, which was now attempting to monetize it further, highlighting the ongoing risk and potential for exploitation long after the initial attack.

External data being transferred from one of the involved internal devices during and after the encryption took place.
Figure 6: External data being transferred from one of the involved internal devices during and after the encryption took place.

Unfortunately, because Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was not enabled at the time, the ransomware attack was able to escalate to the point of data encryption and exfiltration. However, Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) was still able to support the customer through the Security Operations Support service. This allowed the customer to engage directly with Darktrace’s expert analysts, who provided essential guidance for triaging and investigating the incident. The support from Darktrace’s SOC team not only ensured the customer had the necessary information to remediate the attack but also expedited the entire process, allowing their security team to quickly address the issue without diverting significant resources to the investigation.

Conclusion

In this Matrix ransomware attack on a Darktrace customer in the public sector, malicious actors demonstrated an elevated level of sophistication by leveraging compromised VPN credentials to gain initial access to the target network. Once inside, they exploited trusted tools like Nmap for network scanning and lateral movement to infiltrate deeper into the customer’s environment. The culmination of their efforts was the encryption of files, followed by data exfiltration via SSH, suggesting that Matrix actors were employing double extortion tactics where the attackers not only demanded a ransom for decryption but also threatened to leak sensitive information.

Despite the absence of Darktrace’s Autonomous Response at the time, its anomaly-based approach played a crucial role in detecting the subtle anomalies in device behavior across the network that signalled the compromise, even when malicious activity was disguised as legitimate.  By analyzing these deviations, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to identify and correlate the various stages of the Matrix ransomware attack, constructing a detailed timeline. This enabled the customer to fully understand the extent of the compromise and equipped them with the insights needed to effectively remediate the attack.

Credit to Christina Kreza (Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Threat Content Lead)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

·       Device / Network Scan

·       Device / Attack and Recon Tools

·       Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Brute Force

·       Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

·       Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe

·       Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise

·       Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

·       Device / Large Number of Model Breaches from Critical Network Device

·       Device / Multiple C2 Model Breaches

·       Device / Lateral Movement and C2 Activity

·       Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration

·       Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

·       Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

·       Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

·       Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

·       Unusual Activity / SMB Access Failures

·       Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity

·       Compromise / Suspicious SSL Activity

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

·       .KOK08 -  File extension - Extension to encrypted files

·       [KOK08@QQ[.]COM] – Filename pattern – Prefix of the encrypted files

·       38.91.107[.]81 – IP address – Possible exfiltration endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

·       Command and control – Application Layer Protocol – T1071

·       Command and control – Web Protocols – T1071.001

·       Credential Access – Password Guessing – T1110.001

·       Discovery – Network Service Scanning – T1046

·       Discovery – File and Directory Discovery – T1083

·       Discovery – Network Share Discovery – T1135

·       Discovery – Remote System Discovery – T1018

·       Exfiltration – Exfiltration Over C2 Channer – T1041

·       Initial Access – Drive-by Compromise – T1189

·       Initial Access – Hardware Additions – T1200

·       Lateral Movement – SMB/Windows Admin Shares – T1021.002

·       Reconnaissance – Scanning IP Blocks – T1595.001

References

[1] https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/matrix-ransomware/

[2] https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/sophoslabs-matrix-report.pdf

[3] https://cyberenso.jp/en/types-of-ransomware/matrix-ransomware/

[4] https://www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/10728-matrix-ransomware

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Christina Kreza
Cyber Analyst

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September 8, 2025

Unpacking the Salesloft Incident: Insights from Darktrace Observations

solesloft incident Default blog imageDefault blog image

Introduction

On August 26, 2025, Google Threat intelligence Group released a report detailing a widespread data theft campaign targeting the sales automation platform Salesloft, via compromised OAuth tokens used by the third-party Drift AI chat agent [1][2].  The attack has been attributed to the threat actor UNC6395 by Google Threat Intelligence and Mandiant [1].

The attack is believed to have begun in early August 2025 and continued through until mid-August 2025 [1], with the threat actor exporting significant volumes of data from multiple Salesforce instances [1]. Then sifting through this data for anything that could be used to compromise the victim’s environments such as access keys, tokens or passwords. This had led to Google Threat Intelligence Group assessing that the primary intent of the threat actor is credential harvesting, and later reporting that it was aware of in excess of 700 potentially impacted organizations [3].

Salesloft previously stated that, based on currently available data, customers that do not integrate with Salesforce are unaffected by this campaign [2]. However, on August 28, Google Threat Intelligence Group announced that “Based on new information identified by GTIG, the scope of this compromise is not exclusive to the Salesforce integration with Salesloft Drift and impacts other integrations” [2]. Google Threat Intelligence has since advised that any and all authentication tokens stored in or connected to the Drift platform be treated as potentially compromised [1].

This campaign demonstrates how attackers are increasingly exploiting trusted Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) integrations as a pathway into enterprise environment.

By abusing these integrations, threat actors were able to exfiltrate sensitive business data at scale, bypassing traditional security controls. Rather than relying on malware or obvious intrusion techniques, the adversaries leveraged legitimate credentials and API traffic that resembled legitimate Salesforce activity to achieve their goals. This type of activity is far harder to detect with conventional security tools, since it blends in with the daily noise of business operations.

The incident underscores the escalating significance of autonomous coverage within SaaS and third-party ecosystems. As businesses increasingly depend on interconnected platforms, visibility gaps become evident that cannot be managed by conventional perimeter and endpoint defenses.

By developing a behavioral comprehension of each organization's distinct use of cloud services, anomalies can be detected, such as logins from unexpected locations, unusually high volumes of API requests, or unusual document activity. These indications serve as an early alert system, even when intruders use legitimate tokens or accounts, enabling security teams to step in before extensive data exfiltration takes place

What happened?

The campaign is believed to have started on August 8, 2025, with malicious activity continuing until at least August 18. The threat actor, tracked as UNC6395, gained access via compromised OAuth tokens associated with Salesloft Drift integrations into Salesforce [1]. Once tokens were obtained, the attackers were able to issue large volumes of Salesforce API requests, exfiltrating sensitive customer and business data.

Initial Intrusion

The attackers first established access by abusing OAuth and refresh tokens from the Drift integration. These tokens gave them persistent access into Salesforce environments without requiring further authentication [1]. To expand their foothold, the threat actor also made use of TruffleHog [4], an open-source secrets scanner, to hunt for additional exposed credentials. Logs later revealed anomalous IAM updates, including unusual UpdateAccessKey activity, which suggested attempts to ensure long-term persistence and control within compromised accounts.

Internal Reconnaissance & Data Exfiltration

Once inside, the adversaries began exploring the Salesforce environments. They ran queries designed to pull sensitive data fields, focusing on objects such as Cases, Accounts, Users, and Opportunities [1]. At the same time, the attackers sifted through this information to identify secrets that could enable access to other systems, including AWS keys and Snowflake credentials [4]. This phase demonstrated the opportunistic nature of the campaign, with the actors looking for any data that could be repurposed for further compromise.

Lateral Movement

Salesloft and Mandiant investigations revealed that the threat actor also created at least one new user account in early September. Although follow-up activity linked to this account was limited, the creation itself suggested a persistence mechanism designed to survive remediation efforts. By maintaining a separate identity, the attackers ensured they could regain access even if their stolen OAuth tokens were revoked.

Accomplishing the mission

The data taken from Salesforce environments included valuable business records, which attackers used to harvest credentials and identify high-value targets. According to Mandiant, once the data was exfiltrated, the actors actively sifted through it to locate sensitive information that could be leveraged in future intrusions [1]. In response, Salesforce and Salesloft revoked OAuth tokens associated with Drift integrations on August 20 [1], a containment measure aimed at cutting off the attackers’ primary access channel and preventing further abuse.

How did the attack bypass the rest of the security stack?

The campaign effectively bypassed security measures by using legitimate credentials and OAuth tokens through the Salesloft Drift integration. This rendered traditional security defenses like endpoint protection and firewalls ineffective, as the activity appeared non-malicious [1]. The attackers blended into normal operations by using common user agents and making queries through the Salesforce API, which made their activity resemble legitimate integrations and scripts. This allowed them to operate undetected in the SaaS environment, exploiting the trust in third-party connections and highlighting the limitations of traditional detection controls.

Darktrace Coverage

Anomalous activities have been identified across multiple Darktrace deployments that appear associated with this campaign. This included two cases on customers based within the United States who had a Salesforce integration, where the pattern of activities was notably similar.

On August 17, Darktrace observed an account belonging to one of these customers logging in from the rare endpoint 208.68.36[.]90, while the user was seen active from another location. This IP is a known indicator of compromise (IoC) reported by open-source intelligence (OSINT) for the campaign [2].

Cyber AI Analyst Incident summarizing the suspicious login seen for the account.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst Incident summarizing the suspicious login seen for the account.

The login event was associated with the application Drift, further connecting the events to this campaign.

Advanced Search logs showing the Application used to login.
Figure 2: Advanced Search logs showing the Application used to login.

Following the login, the actor initiated a high volume of Salesforce API requests using methods such as GET, POST, and DELETE. The GET requests targeted endpoints like /services/data/v57.0/query and /services/data/v57.0/sobjects/Case/describe, where the former is used to retrieve records based on a specific criterion, while the latter provides metadata for the Case object, including field names and data types [5,6].

Subsequently, a POST request to /services/data/v57.0/jobs/query was observed, likely to initiate a Bulk API query job for extracting large volumes of data from the Ingest Job endpoint [7,8].

Finally, a DELETE request to remove an ingestion job batch, possibly an attempt to obscure traces of prior data access or manipulation.

A case on another US-based customer took place a day later, on August 18. This again began with an account logging in from the rare IP 208.68.36[.]90 involving the application Drift. This was followed by Salesforce GET requests targeting the same endpoints as seen in the previous case, and then a POST to the Ingest Job endpoint and finally a DELETE request, all occurring within one minute of the initial suspicious login.

The chain of anomalous behaviors, including a suspicious login and delete request, resulted in Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability suggesting a ‘Disable user’ action. However, the customer’s deployment configuration required manual confirmation for the action to take effect.

An example model alert for the user, triggered due to an anomalous API DELETE request.
Figure 3: An example model alert for the user, triggered due to an anomalous API DELETE request.
Figure 4: Model Alert Event Log showing various model alerts for the account that ultimately led to an Autonomous Response model being triggered.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this incident underscores the escalating risks of SaaS supply chain attacks, where third-party integrations can become avenues for attacks. It demonstrates how adversaries can exploit legitimate OAuth tokens and API traffic to circumvent traditional defenses. This emphasizes the necessity for constant monitoring of SaaS and cloud activity, beyond just endpoints and networks, while also reinforcing the significance of applying least privilege access and routinely reviewing OAuth permissions in cloud environments. Furthermore, it provides a wider perspective into the evolution of the threat landscape, shifting towards credential and token abuse as opposed to malware-driven compromise.

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

·      SaaS / Access / Unusual External Source for SaaS Credential Use

·      SaaS / Compromise / Login From Rare Endpoint While User Is Active

·      SaaS / Compliance / Anomalous Salesforce API Event

·      SaaS / Unusual Activity / Multiple Unusual SaaS Activities

·      Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Unusual Activity Block

·      Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Suspicious Source Activity Block

Customers should consider integrating Salesforce with Darktrace where possible. These integrations allow better visibility and correlation to spot unusual behavior and possible threats.

IoC List

(IoC – Type)

·      208.68.36[.]90 – IP Address

References

1.     https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/data-theft-salesforce-instances-via-salesloft-drift

2.     https://trust.salesloft.com/?uid=Drift+Security+Update%3ASalesforce+Integrations+%283%3A30PM+ET%29

3.     https://thehackernews.com/2025/08/salesloft-oauth-breach-via-drift-ai.html

4.     https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-compromised-salesforce-instances/

5.     https://developer.salesforce.com/docs/atlas.en-us.api_rest.meta/api_rest/resources_query.htm

6.     https://developer.salesforce.com/docs/atlas.en-us.api_rest.meta/api_rest/resources_sobject_describe.htm

7.     https://developer.salesforce.com/docs/atlas.en-us.api_asynch.meta/api_asynch/get_job_info.htm

8.     https://developer.salesforce.com/docs/atlas.en-us.api_asynch.meta/api_asynch/query_create_job.htm

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About the author
Emma Foulger
Global Threat Research Operations Lead

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September 8, 2025

Cyber Assessment Framework v4.0 Raises the Bar: 6 Questions every security team should ask about their security posture

CAF v4.0 cyber assessment frameworkDefault blog imageDefault blog image

What is the Cyber Assessment Framework?

The Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF) acts as guide for organizations, specifically across essential services, critical national infrastructure and regulated sectors, across the UK for assessing, managing and improving their cybersecurity, cyber resilience and cyber risk profile.

The guidance in the Cyber Assessment Framework aligns with regulations such as The Network and Information Systems Regulations (NIS), The Network and Information Security Directive (NIS2) and the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill.

What’s new with the Cyber Assessment Framework 4.0?

On 6 August 2025, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) released Cyber Assessment Framework 4.0 (CAF v4.0) a pivotal update that reflects the increasingly complex threat landscape and the regulatory need for organisations to respond in smarter, more adaptive ways.

The Cyber Assessment Framework v4.0 introduces significant shifts in expectations, including, but not limited to:

  • Understanding threats in terms of the capabilities, methods and techniques of threat actors and the importance of maintaining a proactive security posture (A2.b)
  • The use of secure software development principles and practices (A4.b)
  • Ensuring threat intelligence is understood and utilised - with a focus on anomaly-based detection (C1.f)
  • Performance of proactive threat hunting with automation where appropriate (C2.a)

This blog post will focus on these components of the framework. However, we encourage readers to get the full scope of the framework by visiting the NCSC website where they can access the full framework here.

In summary, the changes to the framework send a clear signal: the UK’s technical authority now expects organisations to move beyond static rule-based systems and embrace more dynamic, automated defences. For those responsible for securing critical national infrastructure and essential services, these updates are not simply technical preferences, but operational mandates.

At Darktrace, this evolution comes as no surprise. In fact, it reflects the approach we've championed since our inception.

Why Darktrace? Leading the way since 2013

Darktrace was built on the principle that detecting cyber threats in real time requires more than signatures, thresholds, or retrospective analysis. Instead, we pioneered a self-learning approach powered by artificial intelligence, that understands the unique “normal” for every environment and uses this baseline to spot subtle deviations indicative of emerging threats.

From the beginning, Darktrace has understood that rules and lists will never keep pace with adversaries. That’s why we’ve spent over a decade developing AI that doesn't just alert, it learns, reasons, explains, and acts.

With Cyber Assessment Framework v4.0, the bar has been raised to meet this new reality. For technical practitioners tasked with evaluating their organisation’s readiness, there are five essential questions that should guide the selection or validation of anomaly detection capabilities.

6 Questions you should ask about your security posture to align with CAF v4

1. Can your tools detect threats by identifying anomalies?

Cyber Assessment Framework v4.0 principle C1.f has been added in this version and requires that, “Threats to the operation of network and information systems, and corresponding user and system behaviour, are sufficiently understood. These are used to detect cyber security incidents.”

This marks a significant shift from traditional signature-based approaches, which rely on known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) or predefined rules to an expectation that normal user and system behaviour is understood to an extent enabling abnormality detection.

Why this shift?

An overemphasis on threat intelligence alone leaves defenders exposed to novel threats or new variations of existing threats. By including reference to “understanding user and system behaviour” the framework is broadening the methods of threat detection beyond the use of threat intelligence and historical attack data.

While CAF v4.0 places emphasis on understanding normal user and system behaviour and using that understanding to detect abnormalities and as a result, adverse activity. There is a further expectation that threats are understood in terms of industry specific issues and that monitoring is continually updated  

Darktrace uses an anomaly-based approach to threat detection which involves establishing a dynamic baseline of “normal” for your environment, then flagging deviations from that baseline — even when there’s no known IoCs to match against. This allows security teams to surface previously unseen tactics, techniques, and procedures in real time, whether it’s:

  • An unexpected outbound connection pattern (e.g., DNS tunnelling);
  • A first-time API call between critical services;
  • Unusual calls between services; or  
  • Sensitive data moving outside normal channels or timeframes.

The requirement that organisations must be equipped to monitor their environment, create an understanding of normal and detect anomalous behaviour aligns closely with Darktrace’s capabilities.

2. Is threat hunting structured, repeatable, and improving over time?

CAF v4.0 introduces a new focus on structured threat hunting to detect adverse activity that may evade standard security controls or when such controls are not deployable.  

Principle C2.a outlines the need for documented, repeatable threat hunting processes and stresses the importance of recording and reviewing hunts to improve future effectiveness. This inclusion acknowledges that reactive threat hunting is not sufficient. Instead, the framework calls for:

  • Pre-determined and documented methods to ensure threat hunts can be deployed at the requisite frequency;
  • Threat hunts to be converted  into automated detection and alerting, where appropriate;  
  • Maintenance of threat hunt  records and post-hunt analysis to drive improvements in the process and overall security posture;
  • Regular review of the threat hunting process to align with updated risks;
  • Leveraging automation for improvement, where appropriate;
  • Focus on threat tactics, techniques and procedures, rather than one-off indicators of compromise.

Traditionally, playbook creation has been a manual process — static, slow to amend, and limited by human foresight. Even automated SOAR playbooks tend to be stock templates that can’t cover the full spectrum of threats or reflect the specific context of your organisation.

CAF v4.0 sets the expectation that organisations should maintain documented, structured approaches to incident response. But Darktrace / Incident Readiness & Recovery goes further. Its AI-generated playbooks are bespoke to your environment and updated dynamically in real time as incidents unfold. This continuous refresh of “New Events” means responders always have the latest view of what’s happening, along with an updated understanding of the AI's interpretation based on real-time contextual awareness, and recommended next steps tailored to the current stage of the attack.

The result is far beyond checkbox compliance: a living, adaptive response capability that reduces investigation time, speeds containment, and ensures actions are always proportionate to the evolving threat.

3. Do you have a proactive security posture?

Cyber Assessment Framework v4.0 does not want organisations to detect threats, it expects them to anticipate and reduce cyber risk before an incident ever occurs. That is s why principle A2.b calls for a security posture that moves from reactive detection to predictive, preventative action.

A proactive security posture focuses on reducing the ease of the most likely attack paths in advance and reducing the number of opportunities an adversary has to succeed in an attack.

To meet this requirement, organisations could benefit in looking for solutions that can:

  • Continuously map the assets and users most critical to operations;
  • Identify vulnerabilities and misconfigurations in real time;
  • Model likely adversary behaviours and attack paths using frameworks like MITRE ATT&CK; and  
  • Prioritise remediation actions that will have the highest impact on reducing overall risk.

When done well, this approach creates a real-time picture of your security posture, one that reflects the dynamic nature and ongoing evolution of both your internal environment and the evolving external threat landscape. This enables security teams to focus their time in other areas such as  validating resilience through exercises such as red teaming or forecasting.

4. Can your team/tools customize detection rules and enable autonomous responses?

CAF v4.0 places greater emphasis on reducing false positives and acting decisively when genuine threats are detected.  

The framework highlights the need for customisable detection rules and, where appropriate, autonomous response actions that can contain threats before they escalate:

The following new requirements are included:  

  • C1.c.: Alerts and detection rules should be adjustable to reduce false positives and optimise responses. Custom tooling and rules are used in conjunction with off the shelf tooling and rules;
  • C1.d: You investigate and triage alerts from all security tools and take action – allowing for improvement and prioritization of activities;
  • C1.e: Monitoring and detection personnel have sufficient understanding of operational context and deal with workload effectively as well as identifying areas for improvement (alert or triage fatigue is not present);
  • C2.a: Threat hunts should be turned into automated detections and alerting where appropriate and automation should be leveraged to improve threat hunting.

Tailored detection rules improve accuracy, while automation accelerates response, both of which help satisfy regulatory expectations. Cyber AI Analyst allows for AI investigation of alerts and can dramatically reduce the time a security team spends on alerts, reducing alert fatigue, allowing more time for strategic initiatives and identifying improvements.

5. Is your software secure and supported?  

CAF v4.0 introduced a new principle which requires software suppliers to leverage an established secure software development framework. Software suppliers must be able to demonstrate:  

  • A thorough understanding of the composition and provenance of software provided;  
  • That the software development lifecycle is informed by a detailed and up to date understanding of threat; and  
  • They can attest to the authenticity and integrity of the software, including updates and patches.  

Darktrace is committed to secure software development and all Darktrace products and internally developed systems are developed with secure engineering principles and security by design methodologies in place. Darktrace commits to the inclusion of security requirements at all stages of the software development lifecycle. Darktrace is ISO 27001, ISO 27018 and ISO 42001 Certified – demonstrating an ongoing commitment to information security, data privacy and artificial intelligence management and compliance, throughout the organisation.  

6. Is your incident response plan built on a true understanding of your environment and does it adapt to changes over time?

CAF v4.0 raises the bar for incident response by making it clear that a plan is only as strong as the context behind it. Your response plan must be shaped by a detailed, up-to-date understanding of your organisation’s specific network, systems, and operational priorities.

The framework’s updates emphasise that:

  • Plans must explicitly cover the network and information systems that underpin your essential functions because every environment has different dependencies, choke points, and critical assets.
  • They must be readily accessible even when IT systems are disrupted ensuring critical steps and contact paths aren’t lost during an incident.
  • They should be reviewed regularly to keep pace with evolving risks, infrastructure changes, and lessons learned from testing.

From government expectation to strategic advantage

Cyber Assessment Framework v4.0 signals a powerful shift in cybersecurity best practice. The newest version sets a higher standard for detection performance, risk management, threat hunting software development and proactive security posture.

For Darktrace, this is validation of the approach we have taken since the beginning: to go beyond rules and signatures to deliver proactive cyber resilience in real-time.

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Disclaimer:

This document has been prepared on behalf of Darktrace Holdings Limited. It is provided for information purposes only to provide prospective readers with general information about the Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF) in a cyber security context. It does not constitute legal, regulatory, financial or any other kind of professional advice and it has not been prepared with the reader and/or its specific organisation’s requirements in mind. Darktrace offers no warranties, guarantees, undertakings or other assurances (whether express or implied)  that: (i) this document or its content are  accurate or complete; (ii) the steps outlined herein will guarantee compliance with CAF; (iii) any purchase of Darktrace’s products or services will guarantee compliance with CAF; (iv) the steps outlined herein are appropriate for all customers. Neither the reader nor any third party is entitled to rely on the contents of this document when making/taking any decisions or actions to achieve compliance with CAF. To the fullest extent permitted by applicable law or regulation, Darktrace has no liability for any actions or decisions taken or not taken by the reader to implement any suggestions contained herein, or for any third party products, links or materials referenced. Nothing in this document negates the responsibility of the reader to seek independent legal or other advice should it wish to rely on any of the statements, suggestions, or content set out herein.  

The cybersecurity landscape evolves rapidly, and blog content may become outdated or superseded. We reserve the right to update, modify, or remove any content without notice.

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About the author
Mariana Pereira
VP, Field CISO
Your data. Our AI.
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