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August 27, 2024

Decrypting the Matrix: How Darktrace Uncovered a KOK08 Ransomware Attack

In May 2024, a Darktrace customer was affected by KOK08, a ransomware strain commonly used by the Matrix ransomware family. Learn more about the tactics used by this ransomware case, including double extortion, and how Darktrace is able to detect and respond to such threats.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Christina Kreza
Cyber Analyst
Decrypting the Matrix: How Darktrace Uncovered a KOK08 Ransomware AttackDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog image
27
Aug 2024

What is Matrix Ransomware?

Matrix is a ransomware family that first emerged in December 2016, mainly targeting small to medium-sized organizations across the globe in countries including the US, Belgium, Germany, Canada and the UK [1]. Although the reported number of Matrix ransomware attacks has remained relatively low in recent years, it has demonstrated ongoing development and gradual improvements to its tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

How does Matrix Ransomware work?

In earlier versions, Matrix utilized spam email campaigns, exploited Windows shortcuts, and deployed RIG exploit kits to gain initial access to target networks. However, as the threat landscape changed so did Matrix’s approach. Since 2018, Matrix has primarily shifted to brute-force attacks, targeting weak credentials on Windows machines accessible through firewalls. Attackers often exploit common and default credentials, such as “admin”, “password123”, or other unchanged default settings, particularly on systems with Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) enabled [2] [3].

Darktrace observation of Matrix Ransomware tactics

In May 2024, Darktrace observed an instance of KOK08 ransomware, a specific strain of the Matrix ransomware family, in which some of these ongoing developments and evolutions were observed. Darktrace detected activity indicative of internal reconnaissance, lateral movement, data encryption and exfiltration, with the affected customer later confirming that credentials used for Virtual Private Network (VPN) access had been compromised and used as the initial attack vector.

Another significant tactic observed by Darktrace in this case was the exfiltration of data following encryption, a hallmark of double extortion. This method is employed by attacks to increase pressure on the targeted organization, demanding ransom not only for the decryption of files but also threatening to release the stolen data if their demands are not met. These stakes are particularly high for public sector entities, like the customer in question, as the exposure of sensitive information could result in severe reputational damage and legal consequences, making the pressure to comply even more intense.

Darktrace’s Coverage of Matrix Ransomware

Internal Reconnaissance and Lateral Movement

On May 23, 2024, Darktrace / NETWORK identified a device on the customer’s network making an unusually large number of internal connections to multiple internal devices. Darktrace recognized that this unusual behavior was indicative of internal scanning activity. The connectivity observed around the time of the incident indicated that the Nmap attack and reconnaissance tool was used, as evidenced by the presence of the URI “/nice ports, /Trinity.txt.bak”.

Although Nmap is a crucial tool for legitimate network administration and troubleshooting, it can also be exploited by malicious actors during the reconnaissance phase of the attack. This is a prime example of a ‘living off the land’ (LOTL) technique, where attackers use legitimate, pre-installed tools to carry out their objectives covertly. Despite this, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI had been continually monitoring devices across the customers network and was able to identify this activity as a deviation from the device’s typical behavior patterns.

The ‘Device / Attack and Recon Tools’ model alert identifying the active usage of the attack and recon tool, Nmap.
Figure 1: The ‘Device / Attack and Recon Tools’ model alert identifying the active usage of the attack and recon tool, Nmap.
Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst Investigation into the ‘Scanning of Multiple Devices' incident.

Darktrace subsequently observed a significant number of connection attempts using the RDP protocol on port 3389. As RDP typically requires authentication, multiple connection attempts like this often suggest the use of incorrect username and password combinations.

Given the unusual nature of the observed activity, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability would typically have intervened, taking actions such as blocking affected devices from making internal connections on a specific port or restricting connections to a particular device. However, Darktrace was not configured to take autonomous action on the customer’s network, and thus their security team would have had to manually apply any mitigative measures.

Later that day, the same device was observed attempting to connect to another internal location via port 445. This included binding to the server service (srvsvc) endpoint via DCE/RPC with the “NetrShareEnum” operation, which was likely being used to list available SMB shares on a device.

Over the following two days, it became clear that the attackers had compromised additional devices and were actively engaging in lateral movement. Darktrace detected two more devices conducting network scans using Nmap, while other devices were observed making extensive WMI requests to internal systems over DCE/RPC. Darktrace recognized that this activity likely represented a coordinated effort to map the customer’s network and identity further internal devices for exploitation.

Beyond identifying the individual events of the reconnaissance and lateral movement phases of this attack’s kill chain, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to connect and consolidate these activities into one comprehensive incident. This not only provided the customer with an overview of the attack, but also enabled them to track the attack’s progression with clarity.

Furthermore, Cyber AI Analyst added additional incidents and affected devices to the investigation in real-time as the attack unfolded. This dynamic capability ensured that the customer was always informed of the full scope of the attack. The streamlined incident consolidation and real-time updates saved valuable time and resources, enabling quicker, more informed decision-making during a critical response window.

Cyber AI Analyst timeline showing an overview of the scanning related activity, while also connecting the suspicious lateral movement activity.
Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst timeline showing an overview of the scanning related activity, while also connecting the suspicious lateral movement activity.

File Encryption

On May 28, 2024, another device was observed connecting to another internal location over the SMB filesharing protocol and accessing multiple files with a suspicious extension that had never previously been observed on the network. This activity was a clear sign of ransomware infection, with the ransomware altering the files by adding the “KOK08@QQ[.]COM” email address at the beginning of the filename, followed by a specific pattern of characters. The string consistently followed a pattern of 8 characters (a mix of uppercase and lowercase letters and numbers), followed by a dash, and then another 8 characters. After this, the “.KOK08” extension was appended to each file [1][4].

Cyber AI Analyst Investigation Process for the 'Possible Encryption of Files over SMB' incident.
Figure 4: Cyber AI Analyst Investigation Process for the 'Possible Encryption of Files over SMB' incident.
Cyber AI Analyst Encryption Information identifying the ransomware encryption activity,
Figure 5: Cyber AI Analyst Encryption Information identifying the ransomware encryption activity.

Data Exfiltration

Shortly after the encryption event, another internal device on the network was observed uploading an unusually large amount of data to the rare external endpoint 38.91.107[.]81 via SSH. The timing of this activity strongly suggests that this exfiltration was part of a double extortion strategy. In this scenario, the attacker not only encrypts the target’s files but also threatens to leak the stolen data unless a ransom is paid, leveraging both the need for decryption and the fear of data exposure to maximize pressure on the victim.

The full impact of this double extortion tactic became evident around two months later when a ransomware group claimed possession of the stolen data and threatened to release it publicly. This development suggested that the initial Matrix ransomware attackers may have sold the exfiltrated data to a different group, which was now attempting to monetize it further, highlighting the ongoing risk and potential for exploitation long after the initial attack.

External data being transferred from one of the involved internal devices during and after the encryption took place.
Figure 6: External data being transferred from one of the involved internal devices during and after the encryption took place.

Unfortunately, because Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was not enabled at the time, the ransomware attack was able to escalate to the point of data encryption and exfiltration. However, Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) was still able to support the customer through the Security Operations Support service. This allowed the customer to engage directly with Darktrace’s expert analysts, who provided essential guidance for triaging and investigating the incident. The support from Darktrace’s SOC team not only ensured the customer had the necessary information to remediate the attack but also expedited the entire process, allowing their security team to quickly address the issue without diverting significant resources to the investigation.

Conclusion

In this Matrix ransomware attack on a Darktrace customer in the public sector, malicious actors demonstrated an elevated level of sophistication by leveraging compromised VPN credentials to gain initial access to the target network. Once inside, they exploited trusted tools like Nmap for network scanning and lateral movement to infiltrate deeper into the customer’s environment. The culmination of their efforts was the encryption of files, followed by data exfiltration via SSH, suggesting that Matrix actors were employing double extortion tactics where the attackers not only demanded a ransom for decryption but also threatened to leak sensitive information.

Despite the absence of Darktrace’s Autonomous Response at the time, its anomaly-based approach played a crucial role in detecting the subtle anomalies in device behavior across the network that signalled the compromise, even when malicious activity was disguised as legitimate.  By analyzing these deviations, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to identify and correlate the various stages of the Matrix ransomware attack, constructing a detailed timeline. This enabled the customer to fully understand the extent of the compromise and equipped them with the insights needed to effectively remediate the attack.

Credit to Christina Kreza (Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Threat Content Lead)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

·       Device / Network Scan

·       Device / Attack and Recon Tools

·       Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Brute Force

·       Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

·       Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe

·       Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise

·       Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

·       Device / Large Number of Model Breaches from Critical Network Device

·       Device / Multiple C2 Model Breaches

·       Device / Lateral Movement and C2 Activity

·       Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration

·       Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

·       Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

·       Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

·       Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

·       Unusual Activity / SMB Access Failures

·       Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity

·       Compromise / Suspicious SSL Activity

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

·       .KOK08 -  File extension - Extension to encrypted files

·       [KOK08@QQ[.]COM] – Filename pattern – Prefix of the encrypted files

·       38.91.107[.]81 – IP address – Possible exfiltration endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

·       Command and control – Application Layer Protocol – T1071

·       Command and control – Web Protocols – T1071.001

·       Credential Access – Password Guessing – T1110.001

·       Discovery – Network Service Scanning – T1046

·       Discovery – File and Directory Discovery – T1083

·       Discovery – Network Share Discovery – T1135

·       Discovery – Remote System Discovery – T1018

·       Exfiltration – Exfiltration Over C2 Channer – T1041

·       Initial Access – Drive-by Compromise – T1189

·       Initial Access – Hardware Additions – T1200

·       Lateral Movement – SMB/Windows Admin Shares – T1021.002

·       Reconnaissance – Scanning IP Blocks – T1595.001

References

[1] https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/matrix-ransomware/

[2] https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/sophoslabs-matrix-report.pdf

[3] https://cyberenso.jp/en/types-of-ransomware/matrix-ransomware/

[4] https://www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/10728-matrix-ransomware

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Christina Kreza
Cyber Analyst

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September 15, 2025

SEO Poisoning and Fake PuTTY sites: Darktrace’s Investigation into the Oyster backdoor

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What is SEO poisoning?

Search Engine Optimization (SEO) is the legitimate marketing technique of improving the visibility of websites in organic search engine results. Businesses, publishers, and organizations use SEO to ensure their content is easily discoverable by users. Techniques may include optimizing keywords, creating backlinks, or even ensuring mobile compatibility.

SEO poisoning occurs when attackers use these same techniques for malicious purposes. Instead of improving the visibility of legitimate content, threat actors use SEO to push harmful or deceptive websites to the top of search results. This method exploits the common assumption that top-ranking results are trustworthy, leading users to click on URLs without carefully inspecting them.

As part of SEO poisoning, the attacker will first register a typo-squatted domain, slightly misspelled or otherwise deceptive versions of real software sites, such as putty[.]run or puttyy[.]org. These sites are optimized for SEO and often even backed by malicious Google ads, increasing the visibility when users search for download links. To achieve that, threat actors may embed pages with strategically chosen, high-value keywords or replicate content from reputable sources to elevate the domain’s perceived authority in search engine algorithms [4]. In more advanced operations, these tactics are reinforced with paid promotion, such as Google ads, enabling malicious domains to appear above organic search results as sponsored links. This placement not only accelerates visibility but also impacts an unwarranted sense of legitimacy to unsuspected users.

Once a user lands on one of these fake pages, they are presented with what looks like a legitimate software download option. Upon clicking the download indicator, the user will be redirected to another separate domain that actually hosts the payload. This hosting domain is usually unrelated to the nominally referenced software. These third-party sites can involve recently registered domains but may also include legitimate websites that have been recently compromised. By hosting malware on a variety of infrastructure, attackers can prolong the availability of distribution methods for these malicious files before they are taken down.

What is the Oyster backdoor?

Oyster, also known as Broomstick or CleanUpLoader, is a C++ based backdoor malware first identified in July 2023. It enables remote access to infected systems, offering features such as command-line interaction and file transfers.

Oyster has been widely adopted by various threat actors, often as an entry point for ransomware attacks. Notable examples include Vanilla Tempest and Rhysida ransomware groups, both of which have been observed leveraging the Oyster backdoor to enhance their attack capabilities. Vanilla Tempest is known for using Oyster’s stealth persistence to maintain long-term access within targeted networks, often aligning their operations with ransomware deployment [5]. Rhysida has taken this further by deploying Oyster as an initial access tool in ransomware campaigns, using it to conduct reconnaissance and move laterally before executing encryption activities [6].

Once installed, the backdoor gathers basic system information before communicating with a command-and-control (C2) server. The malware largely relies on a ‘cmd.exe’ instance to execute commands and launch other files [1].

In previous SEO poisoning cases, the file downloaded from the fake pages is not just PuTTY, but a trojanized version that includes the stealthy Oyster backdoor. PuTTY is a free and open-source terminal emulator for Windows that allows users to connect to remote servers and devices using protocols like SSH and Telnet. In the recent campaign, once a user visits the fake software download site, ranked highly through SEO poisoning, the malicious payload is downloaded through direct user interaction and subsequently installed on the local device, initiating the compromise. The malware then performs two actions simultaneously: it installs a fully functional version of PuTTY to avoid user suspicion, while silently deploying the Oyster backdoor. Given PuTTY’s nature, it is prominently used by IT administrators with highly privileged account as opposed to standard users in a business, possibly narrowing the scope of the targets.

Oyster’s persistence mechanism involves creating a Windows Scheduled Task that runs every few minutes. Notably, the infection uses Dynamic Link Library (DLL) side loading, where a malicious DLL, often named ‘twain_96.dll’, is executed via the legitimate Windows utility ‘rundll32.exe’, which is commonly used to run DLLs [2]. This technique is frequently used by malicious actors to blend their activity with normal system operations.

Darktrace’s Coverage of the Oyster Backdoor

In June 2025, security analysts at Darktrace identified a campaign leveraging search engine manipulation to deliver malware masquerading as the popular SSH client, PuTTY. Darktrace / NETWORK’s anomaly-based detection identified signs of malicious activity, and when properly configured, its Autonomous Response capability swiftly shut down the threar before it could escalate into a more disruptive attack. Subsequent analysis by Darktrace’s Threat Research team revealed that the payload was a variant of the Oyster backdoor.

The first indicators of an emerging Oyster SEO campaign typically appeared when user devices navigated to a typosquatted domain, such as putty[.]run or putty app[.]naymin[.]com, via a TLS/SSL connection.

Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of a device connecting to the typosquatted domain putty[.]run.

The device would then initiate a connection to a secondary domain that hosts the malicious installer, likely triggered by user interaction with redirect elements on the landing page. This secondary site may not have any immediate connection to PuTTY itself but is instead a hijacked blog, a file-sharing service, or a legitimate-looking content delivery subdomain.

Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of the device making subsequent connections to the payload domain.

Following installation, multiple affected devices were observed attempting outbound connectivity to rare external IP addresses, specifically requesting the ‘/secure’ endpoint as noted within the declared URIs. After the initial callback, the malware continued communicating with additional infrastructure, maintaining its foothold and likely waiting for tasking instructions. Communication patterns included:

·       Endpoints with URIs /api/kcehc and /api/jgfnsfnuefcnegfnehjbfncejfh

·       Endpoints with URI /reg and user agent “WordPressAgent”, “FingerPrint” or “FingerPrintpersistent”

This tactic has been consistently linked to the Oyster backdoor, which has shown similar URI patterns across multiple campaigns [3].

Darktrace analysts also noted the sophisticated use of spoofed user agent strings across multiple investigated customer networks. These headers, which are typically used to identify the application making an HTTP request, are carefully crafted to appear benign or mimic legitimate software. One common example seen in the campaign is the user agent string “WordPressAgent”. While this string references a legitimate web application or plugin, it does not appear to correspond to any known WordPress services or APIs. Its inclusion is most likely designed to mimic background web traffic commonly associated with WordPress-based content management systems.

Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst investigation linking the HTTP C2 activity.

Case-Specific Observations

While the previous section focused on tactics and techniques common across observed Oyster infections, a closer examination reveals notable variations and unique elements in specific cases. These distinct features offer valuable insights into the diverse operational approaches employed by threat actors. These distinct features, from unusual user agent strings to atypical network behavior, offer valuable insights into the diverse operational approaches employed by the threat actors. Crucially, the divergence in post-exploitation activity reflects a broader trend in the use of widely available malware families like Oyster as flexible entry points, rather than fixed tools with a single purpose. This modular use of the backdoor reflects the growing Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) ecosystem, where a single initial infection can be repurposed depending on the operator’s goals.

From Infection to Data Egress

In one observed incident, Darktrace observed an infected device downloading a ZIP file named ‘host[.]zip’ via curl from the URI path /333/host[.]zip, following the standard payload delivery chain. This file likely contained additional tools or payloads intended to expand the attacker’s capabilities within the compromised environment. Shortly afterwards, the device exhibited indicators of probable data exfiltration, with outbound HTTP POST requests featuring the URI pattern: /upload?dir=NAME_FOLDER/KEY_KEY_KEY/redacted/c/users/public.

This format suggests the malware was actively engaged in local host data staging and attempting to transmit files from the target machine. The affected device, identified as a laptop, aligns with the expected target profile in SEO poisoning scenarios, where unsuspecting end users download and execute trojanized software.

Irregular RDP Activity and Scanning Behavior

Several instances within the campaign revealed anomalous or unexpected Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) sessions occurring shortly after DNS requests to fake PuTTY domains. Unusual RDP connections frequently followed communication with Oyster backdoor C2 servers. Additionally, Darktrace detected patterns of RDP scanning, suggesting the attackers were actively probing for accessible systems within the network. This behavior indicates a move beyond initial compromise toward lateral movement and privilege escalation, common objectives once persistence is established.

The presence of unauthorized and administrative RDP sessions following Oyster infections aligns with the malware’s historical role as a gateway for broader impact. In previous campaigns, Oyster has often been leveraged to enable credential theft, lateral movement, and ultimately ransomware deployment. The observed RDP activity in this case suggests a similar progression, where the backdoor is not the final objective but rather a means to expand access and establish control over the target environment.

Cryptic User Agent Strings?

In multiple investigated cases, the user agent string identified in these connections featured formatting that appeared nonsensical or cryptic. One such string containing seemingly random Chinese-language characters translated into an unusual phrase: “Weihe river is where the water and river flow.” Legitimate software would not typically use such wording, suggesting that the string was intended as a symbolic marker rather than a technical necessity. Whether meant as a calling card or deliberately crafted to frame attribution, its presence highlights how subtle linguistic cues can complicate analysis.

Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of malicious connections using a user agent with randomized Chinese-language formatting.

Strategic Implications

What makes this campaign particularly noteworthy is not simply the use of Oyster, but its delivery mechanism. SEO poisoning has traditionally been associated with cybercriminal operations focused on opportunistic gains, such as credential theft and fraud. Its strength lies in casting a wide net, luring unsuspecting users searching for popular software and tricking them into downloading malicious binaries. Unlike other campaigns, SEO poisoning is inherently indiscriminate, given that the attacker cannot control exactly who lands on their poisoned search results. However, in this case, the use of PuTTY as the luring mechanism possibly indicates a narrowed scope - targeting IT administrators and accounts with high privileges due to the nature of PuTTY’s functionalities.

This raises important implications when considered alongside Oyster. As a backdoor often linked to ransomware operations and persistent access frameworks, Oyster is far more valuable as an entry point into corporate or government networks than small-scale cybercrime. The presence of this malware in an SEO-driven delivery chain suggests a potential convergence between traditional cybercriminal delivery tactics and objectives often associated with more sophisticated attackers. If actors with state-sponsored or strategic objectives are indeed experimenting with SEO poisoning, it could signal a broadening of their targeting approaches. This trend aligns with the growing prominence of MaaS and the role of initial access brokers in today’s cybercrime ecosystem.

Whether the operators seek financial extortion through ransomware or longer-term espionage campaigns, the use of such techniques blurs the traditional distinctions. What looks like a mass-market infection vector might, in practice, be seeding footholds for high-value strategic intrusions.

Credit to Christina Kreza (Cyber Analyst) and Adam Potter (Senior Cyber Analyst)

Appendices

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

·       T1071.001 – Command and Control – Web Protocols

·       T1008 – Command and Control – Fallback Channels

·       T0885 – Command and Control – Commonly Used Port

·       T1571 – Command and Control – Non-Standard Port

·       T1176 – Persistence – Browser Extensions

·       T1189 – Initial Access – Drive-by Compromise

·       T1566.002 – Initial Access – Spearphishing Link

·       T1574.001 – Persistence – DLL

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

·       85.239.52[.]99 – IP address

·       194.213.18[.]89/reg – IP address / URI

·       185.28.119[.]113/secure – IP address / URI

·       185.196.8[.]217 – IP address

·       185.208.158[.]119 – IP address

·       putty[.]run – Endpoint

·       putty-app[.]naymin[.]com – Endpoint

·       /api/jgfnsfnuefcnegfnehjbfncejfh

·       /api/kcehc

Darktrace Model Detections

·       Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

·       Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname

·       Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination

·       Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

·       Compromise / Beaconing Activity to External Rare

·       Compromise / Quick and Regular Windows HTTP Beaconing

·       Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

·       Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

·       Device / Suspicious Domain

·       Device / New User Agent

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Breaches Over Time Block

·       Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

References

[1] https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.broomstick

[2] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/malvertising-campaign-delivers-oyster-broomstick-backdoor-via-seo-poisoning-trojanized-tools/

[3] https://hunt.io/blog/oysters-trail-resurgence-infrastructure-ransomware-cybercrime

[4] https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/social-engineering/seo-poisoning/

[5] https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/vanilla-tempest-oyster-backdoor-netsupport-unknown-infostealers-soc-incidents-blackpoint-apg/

[6] https://areteir.com/article/rhysida-using-oyster-backdoor-in-attacks/

The content provided in this blog is published by Darktrace for general informational purposes only and reflects our understanding of cybersecurity topics, trends, incidents, and developments at the time of publication. While we strive to ensure accuracy and relevance, the information is provided “as is” without any representations or warranties, express or implied. Darktrace makes no guarantees regarding the completeness, accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of any information presented and expressly disclaims all warranties.

Nothing in this blog constitutes legal, technical, or professional advice, and readers should consult qualified professionals before acting on any information contained herein. Any references to third-party organizations, technologies, threat actors, or incidents are for informational purposes only and do not imply affiliation, endorsement, or recommendation.

Darktrace, its affiliates, employees, or agents shall not be held liable for any loss, damage, or harm arising from the use of or reliance on the information in this blog.

The cybersecurity landscape evolves rapidly, and blog content may become outdated or superseded. We reserve the right to update, modify, or remove any content without notice.

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Christina Kreza
Cyber Analyst

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September 9, 2025

The benefits of bringing together network and email security

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In many organizations, network and email security operate in isolation. Each solution is tasked with defending its respective environment, even though both are facing the same advanced, multi-domain threats.  

This siloed approach overlooks a critical reality: email remains the most common vector for initiating cyber-attacks, while the network is the primary stage on which those attacks progress. Without direct integration between these two domains, organizations risk leaving blind spots that adversaries can exploit.  

A modern security strategy needs to unify email and network defenses, not just in name, but in how they share intelligence, conduct investigations, and coordinate response actions. Let’s take a look at how this joined-up approach delivers measurable technical, operational, and commercial benefits.

Technical advantages

Pre-alert intelligence: Gathering data before the threat strikes

Most security tools start working when something goes wrong – an unusual login, a flagged attachment, a confirmed compromise. But by then, attackers may already be a step ahead.

By unifying network and email security under a single AI platform (like the Darktrace Active AI Security Platform), you can analyze patterns across both environments in real time, even when there are no alerts. This ongoing monitoring builds a behavioral understanding of every user, device, and domain in your ecosystem.

That means when an email arrives from a suspicious domain, the system already knows whether that domain has appeared on your network before – and whether its behavior has been unusual. Likewise, when new network activity involves a domain first spotted in an email, it’s instantly placed in the right context.

This intelligence isn’t built on signatures or after-the-fact compromise indicators – it’s built on live behavioral baselines, giving your defenses the ability to flag threats before damage is done.

Alert-related intelligence: Connecting the dots in real time

Once an alert does fire, speed and context matter. The Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst can automatically investigate across both environments, piecing together network and email evidence into a single, cohesive incident.

Instead of leaving analysts to sift through fragmented logs, the AI links events like a phishing email to suspicious lateral movement on the recipient’s device, keeping the full attack chain intact. Investigations that might take hours – or even days – can be completed in minutes, with far fewer false positives to wade through.

This is more than a time-saver. It ensures defenders maintain visibility after the first sign of compromise, following the attacker as they pivot into network infrastructure, cloud services, or other targets. That cross-environment continuity is impossible to achieve with disconnected point solutions or siloed workflows.

Operational advantages

Streamlining SecOps across teams

In many organizations, email security is managed by IT, while network defense belongs to the SOC. The result? Critical information is scattered between tools and teams, creating blind spots just when you need clarity.

When email and network data flow into a single platform, everyone is working from the same source of truth. SOC analysts gain immediate visibility into email threats without opening another console or sending a request to another department. The IT team benefits from the SOC’s deeper investigative context.

The outcome is more than convenience: it’s faster, more informed decision-making across the board.

Reducing time-to-meaning and enabling faster response

A unified platform removes the need to manually correlate alerts between tools, reducing time-to-meaning for every incident. Built-in AI correlation instantly ties together related events, guiding analysts toward coordinated responses with higher confidence.

Instead of relying on manual SIEM rules or pre-built SOAR playbooks, the platform connects the dots in real time, and can even trigger autonomous response actions across both environments simultaneously. This ensures attacks are stopped before they can escalate, regardless of where they begin.

Commercial advantages

While purchasing “best-of-breed" for all your different tools might sound appealing, it often leads to a patchwork of solutions with overlapping costs and gaps in coverage. However good a “best-in-breed" email security solution might be in the email realm, it won't be truly effective without visibility across domains and an AI analyst piecing intelligence together. That’s why we think “best-in-suite" is the only “best-in-breed" approach that works – choosing a high-quality platform ensures that every new capability strengthens the whole system.  

On top of that, security budgets are under constant pressure. Managing separate vendors for email and network defense means juggling multiple contracts, negotiating different SLAs, and stitching together different support models.

With a single provider for both, procurement and vendor management become far simpler. You deal with one account team, one support channel, and one unified strategy for both environments. If you choose to layer on managed services, you get consistent expertise across your whole security footprint.

Even more importantly, an integrated AI platform sets the stage for growth. Once email and network are under the same roof, adding coverage for other attack surfaces – like cloud or identity – is straightforward. You’re building on the same architecture, not bolting on new point solutions that create more complexity.

Check out the white paper, The Modern Security Stack: Why Your NDR and Email Security Solutions Need to Work Together, to explore these benefits in more depth, with real-world examples and practical steps for unifying your defenses.

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Mikey Anderson
Product Marketing Manager, Network Detection & Response
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