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March 4, 2026

Inside Cloud Compromise: Investigating Attacker Activity with Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation

Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation automates cloud forensic analysis, enabling rapid investigation of compromised servers via Cloudypots honeypot data. It reveals attacker activity, highlights key events, decodes malicious payloads, and identifies malware campaigns like perfctl, helping defenders accelerate triage and understand cloud-based intrusion techniques.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nathaniel Bill
Malware Research Engineer
Forensic Acquisition and investigationDefault blog image
04
Mar 2026

Investigating cloud attacks with Darktrace/ Forensic Acquisition & Investigation

Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation™ is the industry’s first truly automated forensic solution purpose-built for the cloud. This blog will demonstrate how an investigation can be carried out against a compromised cloud server in minutes, rather than hours or days.

The compromised server investigated in this case originates from Darktrace’s Cloudypots system, a global honeypot network designed to observe adversary activity in real time across a wide range of cloud services. Whenever an attacker successfully compromises one of these honeypots, a forensic copy of the virtual server's disk is preserved for later analysis. Using Forensic Acquisition & Investigation, analysts can then investigate further and obtain detailed insights into the compromise including complete attacker timelines and root cause analysis.

Forensic Acquisition & Investigation supports importing artifacts from a variety of sources, including EC2 instances, ECS, S3 buckets, and more. The Cloudypots system produces a raw disk image whenever an attack is detected and stores it in an S3 bucket. This allows the image to be directly imported into Forensic Acquisition & Investigation using the S3 bucket import option.

As Forensic Acquisition & Investigation runs cloud-natively, no additional configuration is required to add a specific S3 bucket. Analysts can browse and acquire forensic assets from any bucket that the configured IAM role is permitted to access. Operators can also add additional IAM credentials, including those from other cloud providers, to extend access across multiple cloud accounts and environments.

Figure 1: Forensic Acquisition & Investigation import screen.

Forensic Acquisition & Investigation then retrieves a copy of the file and automatically begins running the analysis pipeline on the artifact. This pipeline performs a full forensic analysis of the disk and builds a timeline of the activity that took place on the compromised asset. By leveraging Forensic Acquisition & Investigation’s cloud-native analysis system, this process condenses hour of manual work into just minutes.

Successful import of a forensic artifact and initiation of the analysis pipeline.
Figure 2: Successful import of a forensic artifact and initiation of the analysis pipeline.

Once processing is complete, the preserved artifact is visible in the Evidence tab, along with a summary of key information obtained during analysis, such as the compromised asset’s hostname, operating system, cloud provider, and key event count.

The Evidence overview showing the acquired disk image.
Figure 3: The Evidence overview showing the acquired disk image.

Clicking on the “Key events” field in the listing opens the timeline view, automatically filtered to show system- generated alarms.

The timeline provides a chronological record of every event that occurred on the system, derived from multiple sources, including:

  • Parsed log files such as the systemd journal, audit logs, application specific logs, and others.
  • Parsed history files such as .bash_history, allowing executed commands to be shown on the timeline.
  • File-specific events, such as files being created, accessed, modified, or executables being run, etc.

This approach allows timestamped information and events from multiple sources to be aggregated and parsed into a single, concise view, greatly simplifying the data review process.

Alarms are created for specific timeline events that match either a built-in system rule, curated by Darktrace’s Threat Research team or an operator-defined rule  created at the project level. These alarms help quickly filter out noise and highlight on events of interest, such as the creation of a file containing known malware, access to sensitive files like Amazon Web Service (AWS) credentials, suspicious arguments or commands, and more.

 The timeline view filtered to alarm_severity: “1” OR alarm_severity: “3”, showing only events that matched an alarm rule.
Figure 4: The timeline view filtered to alarm_severity: “1” OR alarm_severity: “3”, showing only events that matched an alarm rule.

In this case, several alarms were generated for suspicious Base64 arguments being passed to Selenium. Examining the event data, it appears the attacker spawned a Selenium Grid session with the following payload:

"request.payload": "[Capabilities {browserName: chrome, goog:chromeOptions: {args: [-cimport base64;exec(base64...], binary: /usr/bin/python3, extensions: []}, pageLoadStrategy: normal}]"

This is a common attack vector for Selenium Grid. The chromeOptions object is intended to specify arguments for how Google Chrome should be launched; however, in this case the attacker has abused the binary field to execute the Python3 binary instead of Chrome. Combined with the option to specify command-line arguments, the attacker can use Python3’s -c option to execute arbitrary Python code, in this instance, decoding and executing a Base64 payload.

Selenium’s logs truncate the Arguments field automatically, so an alternate method is required to retrieve the full payload. To do this, the search bar can be used to find all events that occurred around the same time as this flagged event.

Pivoting off the previous event by filtering the timeline to events within the same window using timestamp: [“2026-02-18T09:09:00Z” TO “2026-02-18T09:12:00Z”].
Figure 5: Pivoting off the previous event by filtering the timeline to events within the same window using timestamp: [“2026-02-18T09:09:00Z” TO “2026-02-18T09:12:00Z”].

Scrolling through the search results, an entry from Java’s systemd journal can be identified. This log contains the full, unaltered payload. GCHQ’s CyberChef can then be used to decode the Base64 data into the attacker’s script, which will ultimately be executed.

Decoding the attacker’s payload in CyberChef.
Figure 6: Decoding the attacker’s payload in CyberChef.

In this instance, the malware was identified as a variant of a campaign that has been previously documented in depth by Darktrace.

Investigating Perfctl Malware

This campaign deploys a malware sample known as ‘perfctl to the compromised host. The script executed by the attacker downloads a Go binary named “promocioni.php” from 200[.]4.115.1. Its functionality is consistent with previously documented perfctl samples, with only minor changes such as updated filenames and a new command-and-control (C2) domain.

Perfctl is a stealthy malware that has several systems designed  to evade detection. The main binary is packed with UPX, with the header intentionally tampered with to prevent unpacking using regular tools. The binary also avoids executing any malicious code if it detects debugging or tracing activity, or if artifacts left by earlier stages are missing.

To further aid its evasive capabilities, perfctl features a usermode rootkit using an LD preload. This causes dynamically linked executables to load perfctl’s rootkit payload before other system modules, allowing it to override functions, such as intercepting calls to list files and hiding output from the returned list. Perfctl uses this to hide its own files, as well as other files like the ld.so.preload file, preventing users from identifying that a rootkit is present in the first place.

This also makes it difficult to dynamically analyze, as even analysts aware of the rootkit will struggle to get around it due to its aggressiveness in hiding its components. A useful trick is to use the busybox-static utilities, which are statically linked and therefore immune to LD preloading.

Perfctl will attempt to use sudo to escalate its permissions to root if the user it was executed as has the required privileges. Failing this, it will attempt to exploit the vulnerability CVE-2021-4034.

Ultimately, perfctl will attempt to establish a C2 link via Tor and spawn an XMRig miner to mine the Monero cryptocurrency. The traffic to the mining pool is encapsulated within Tor to limit network detection of the mining traffic.

Darktrace’s Cloudypots system has observed 1,959 infections of the perfctl campaign across its honeypot network in the past year, making it one of the most aggressive campaigns seen by Darktrace.

Key takeaways

This blog has shown how Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation equips defenders in the face of a real-world attacker campaign. By using this solution, organizations can acquire forensic evidence and investigate intrusions across multiple cloud resources and providers, enabling defenders to see the full picture of an intrusion on day one. Forensic Acquisition & Investigation’s patented data-processing system takes advantage of the cloud’s scale to rapidly process large amounts of data, allowing triage to take minutes, not hours.

Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation is available as Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), but can also be hosted within a customer's cloud environment, with the option to deploy in one Cloud Service Provider (CSP) while maintaining cross-cloud visibility, providing flexibility between convenience and data sovereignty to suit any use case.

Support for acquiring traditional compute instances like EC2, as well as more exotic and newly targeted platforms such as ECS and Lambda, ensures that attacks taking advantage of Living-off-the-Cloud (LOTC) strategies can be triaged quickly and easily as part of incident response. As attackers continue to develop new techniques, the ability to investigate how they use cloud services to persist and pivot throughout an environment is just as important to triage as a single compromised EC2 instance.

Credit to Nathaniel Bill (Malware Research Engineer)

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nathaniel Bill
Malware Research Engineer

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October 14, 2026

CikaBika Bot: Inside a Discord RAT

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Key Takeaways

·      Darktrace malware researchers have found an ongoing malware campaign using a document-themed lure containing a malicious LNK file and a PDF with an embedded payload.

·      The Nim based loader deploys a Rust-based remote access trojan (RAT), using a UAC bypass and DLL search-order hijacking technique targeting Microsoft Edge.

·      The RAT uses Discord for C2, creating dedicated channels to manage infected devices and execute commands.

·      CikaBika Bot supports system reconnaissance, remote command execution, screenshot capture, and file transfers.

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Introduction

In a threat landscape where attackers continue to rely on social engineering techniques to deliver malware, legitimate services are increasingly being abused to support malicious operations. Communications platforms like Discord can provide attackers with a ready-made channel for command-and-control (C2), allowing them to manage compromised devices without establishing dedicated infrastructure.

Malware researchers at Darktrace have identified a campaign distributing CikaBika, a Rust-based RAT that uses Discord for C2. The infection chain begins with a disk image and a malicious Windows shortcut. A Nim loader extracts the final payload and attempts to plant it in Microsoft Edge’s installation directory using a PowerShell UAC bypass. Once running, the RAT collects host information, registers the device with Discord, and accepts commands through a dedicated channel.

Technical Analysis

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Figure 1: Contents of Proposition_Projet.img.

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Initial access and PDF payload

The malware is packaged within a disk image named Proposition_Projet.img. Inside are a PDF titled “Presentation_Generale.pdf.pdf” and a Windows shortcut (LNK) disguised as a Word document, “Proposition_Projet_Personnalisable.docx”. The delivery method has not been confirmed; however, the filenames and document-themed lure are consistent with a phishing campaign.

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Figure 2: PowerShell command embedded in the malicious shortcut.


Opening the shortcut launches a hidden PowerShell process while displaying the PDF as a decoy. The French-language document explains how to produce a written summary or contraction of a text. In the background, PowerShell reads the PDF as bytes and uses the value at offset 239 (0x20) as an XOR key to decode an embedded executable. The resulting payload is written to %TEMP%\IfyuUapz.txt and executed using cmd /c.

Nim loader and UAC bypass

“IfyuUapz.txt” is a Nim-based loader that contains two Base64-encoded blobs: a Rust dynamic-link library (DLL)  and a PowerShell deployment script. Both are decoded and written to temporary files, referenced to within the loader as “dllFile” and “copyPs1”. The loader runs the script through a hidden PowerShell process using an encoded command, then attempts to load the DLL using Nim’s loadLib function. If loading fails, it invokes regsvr32.exe and retries.

Figure 3: Silent DLL deployer.

The PowerShell component is responsible for moving the DLL to C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\dbghelp.dll. It first copies the DLL to C:\Windows\Temp\dbghelp.tmp, then modifies HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command so that launching computerdefaults.exe can trigger a command to move the staged DLL into the protected Edge directory. This is an attempt to bypass User Account Control (UAC), which depends on the target’s Windows configuration.

The script also compiles a small C# helper that calls ShowWindow to hide windows associated with Windows Settings and ApplicationFrameHost. It launches the bypass helper three times, checks for the presence of the destination DLL, and attempts to delete the temporary scripts, intermediate DLL, and associated registry changes.

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Figure 4: Legitimate msedge.exe function to load the legitimate dbghelp.dll.

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The legitimate msedge.exe has a delay-loaded dependency on dbghelp.dll, and the malicious DLL exports a subset of the functions associated with Microsoft’s debugging library. The attacker appears to be exploiting this dependency through DLL search-order hijacking. However, it does not export every function in Edge’s delay-import table, meaning its compatibility with the host is incomplete. The observed code establishes the intended sideloading route, rather than proving that Edge successfully loaded the planted DLL.

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Rust RAT payload

Figure 5: Discord configuration within the RAT.

The malicious dbghelp.dll (IfyuUapz.txt) is a Rust-based RAT. At startup, the RAT registers the compromised device with Discord and begins collecting information about the host. Its reconnaissance routine gathers system details, runs tasklist to enumerate processes, executes ipconfig to obtain network configuration, and attempts to take a screenshot. The resulting artifacts include tasklist_startup.txt, network_info.txt, and screenshot.png.

Figure 6: Network configuration notification in Discord channel.

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Figure 7: Network configuration output from network_info.txt.

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Discord C2

The RAT uses Discord channels to send commands and report results. The operator can send commands to the device’s channel and receive the resulting output in the same conversation. This gives the attacker an interactive command interface without having to operate and maintain a dedicated C2 server.

Figure 8: Commands available in Discord.

The command set includes !shell for remote command execution; !sysinfo and !info for host details; !isOn for status checks; !tasklist and !ps for process enumeration; and !kill for process termination. File-transfer commands include !upload and !download. Additional strings and command handlers reference screenshots (!src), camera access (!camera), streaming (!stream), and broadcasting (!broadcast).

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Figure 9: Device registration in Discord.

During device registration, the malware retrieves the victim’s public IP address using ipify.com. The registration message records the device ID, hostname, registration time, private and public IP addresses, status, uptime, and the Discord channel assigned to that device.

Operator activity and exfiltration

Figure 10: Powershell commands sent through Discord to exfiltrate data.

Once a device is registered, the attacker can issue commands through its dedicated Discord channel. In the observed activity, the attacker compressed a directory into a ZIP and exfiltrated it using ngrok.

Figure 11: Download command to retrieve a document from the target.

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The operator can also use !download to retrieve files from target. The example above displays a request for a specific document on the victim’s desktop. The requested file is then returned through the device’s Discord channel, giving the attacker a direct way to store and access selected data.

Conclusion

CikaBika Bot demonstrates how attackers continue to rely on social engineering techniques to deliver malware. Although the initial distribution method has not been confirmed, the use of a disk image containing a shortcut disguised as a Word document, alongside a legitimate-looking PDF, suggests the campaign was designed for phishing.

While Nim is less commonly encountered than C in Windows malware, it has increasingly appeared in malicious tooling. In this case, Nim is used to unpack and deploy a Rust-based RAT, adding another layer to the infection chain.

Once installed, CikaBika Bot uses Discord as its C2 platform, allowing the attacker to manage compromised devices, execute commands, and retrieve files without maintaining dedicated C2 infrastructure. The observed use of Discord channels for individual victims, alongside additional data exfiltration through ngrok, shows how legitimate services can be repurposed to support malicious operations.

Credit to Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Presentation_Generale.pdf.pdf - eeb52cb95113a131c2c7713c17872da6

Proposition_Projet_Personnalisable.docx.lnk - 62e3e85eca78a0cd7e6669e9f33d936d

dbghelp.dll - c66858718d883bcfb9ce2c19b59f96c9

IfyuUapz.txt - 2deb724a709b0b892248405323350e9b

MITRE ATTACK

T1204.002 – User Execution: Malicious File
T1036.007 – Masquerading: Double File Extension
T1059.001 – PowerShell
T1027 – Obfuscated Files or Information
T1140 – Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1548.002 – Bypass User Account Control
T1112 – Modify Registry
T1574.001 – DLL Search Order Hijacking
T1036.005 – Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
T1082 – System Information Discovery
T1016 – System Network Configuration Discovery
T1057 – Process Discovery
T1113 – Screen Capture
T1059.003 – Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
T1102.002 – Web Service: Bidirectional Communication
T1560.001 – Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
T1567 – Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1070.004 – Indicator Removal: File Deletion
T1218.010 – Regsvr32
T1005 – Data from Local System
T1074.001 – Data Staged: Local Data Staging
T1041 – Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1564.003 – Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
T1027.013 – Encrypted/Encoded File

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About the author
Tara Gould
Malware Research Lead

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October 5, 2026

AI-Assisted Attacks Still Leave a Behavioral Trace  

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Key Insights

  • Darktrace identified behavioral indicators associated with two campaigns linked to AI-assisted threat activity, highlighting the growing role of AI in modern cyber-attacks.
  • Observed activity involved suspicious WebDAV file transfers, disguised executable downloads, beaconing to rare infrastructure, unusual process execution, and communications with C2 infrastructure linked to active intrusion campaigns.

Introduction

Just as organizations are incorporating AI into their operations to take advantage of its benefits, threat actors are doing the same, creating new challenges for defenders.

Much of the discussion around AI risk has focused on the expanding attack surface created by AI systems within organizations. These systems are often granted privileged access and heightened permissions to carry out their duties, introducing new security risks and unintended consequences.

At the same time, threat actors are learning to leverage AI to enable malicious activities such as vulnerability discovery, exploit creation, and progressing through the Cyber Kill Chain more quickly. By accelerating development, adaptation, and scaling, AI enables attackers to operate more efficiently while making some capabilities more accessible to less skilled operators.

Whether AI is the target or the enabler, the resulting activity still manifests through networks, identities, endpoints and cloud services. Those interactions create observable signals that defenders can investigate, regardless of how the attack was developed.

AI as part of the attacker’s workflow

Darktrace has previously documented how threat actors are increasingly incorporating AI into offensive operations [1]. Two recent investigations from open-source intelligence (OSINT) illustrate this. In both cases, researchers identified the role of AI within malicious operations. Separately, Darktrace detected activity in customer environments that aligned with the infrastructure and techniques reported in those campaigns. These perspectives provide a view of both attacker workflow and operational consequences.

Although AI played different roles in each campaign, it did not remove the need for the attackers to interact with their targets. Payloads still had to be delivered, processes executed, and command-and-control (C2) connections established, creating behavioral anomalies that Darktrace was able to identify.

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Case 1: A Mexican government impersonation campaign with LLM-assisted malware development

Rapid7 reported on a malware delivery operation that used generative AI to assist development, testing, documentation and refinement of attacker infrastructure. Between May and June 2026, Darktrace similarly observed two chains of suspicious activity across customer environments in the Americas that exhibited clear similarities in behavior.

In both cases Darktrace observed:

  • WebDAV communication with onedrive[.]cv·138.124.123[.]87, retrieving a file from the path /Downloads/CURP/
  • Transfer of a masqueraded .scr executable
  • Subsequent communication with google.services[.]ug·77.110.127[.]205 over unusual high ports
  • Additional Darktrace detections correlating the unusual behavior seen spanning payload delivery and C2 communication
  • Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability alerted across multiple stages of the attack

The infrastructure and behavior observed by Darktrace closely aligned with a campaign reported by Rapid7, in which a WebDAV malware delivery environment was exposed. Rapid7 assessed that threat actors had used generative AI to support the development, testing, documentation and refinement of the operation. The observed activity also aligned with reporting on a campaign in which impersonation of Mexico’s government Unique Population Registry Code (CURP) identity-record service led to delivery of PureRAT, a .NET-based information stealer and remote access trojan (RAT) [2]. The infrastructure overlap and consistent behavioural sequence provides strong alignment and offers a view of how an AI-assisted development pipeline ultimately manifested inside target environments.

Case 2: A suspected China-linked intrusion campaign with AI-assisted automation

In July 2026, Hunt.io published research into a suspected China-based intrusion operation targeting government and financial services organizations [3]. Material recovered from exposed attacker infrastructure by Hunt.io indicated that Claude Code and DeepSeek-v4-pro were being used as active components of the attacker’s workflow. According to the research, the models supported activities including attack reasoning, script generation, execution, exploit adaptation, and phishing-page development.

The investigation identified 192.229.115[.]229 and 192.229.115[.]230 as infrastructure associated with suspected TencShell operations and a possible second C2 framework known as Gshell [3].

Darktrace identified likely related activity within a financial services customer environment involving a newly observed laptop running the Windows 11 Pro operating system. Over a six-day period in July, the device made repeated outbound connections to 192.229.115[.]229 over port 8083.

Darktrace recognized the destination was highly rare for the environment, and the connectivity exhibited beaconing characteristics. During the same timeframe, Darktrace also identified suspicious process behavior associated with process chains involving svchost.exe and cmd.exe. The device repeatedly communicated with infrastructure identified in the Hunt.io research while exhibiting beaconing characteristics and suspicious process activity, strengthening the assessment that the activity likely was associated with the same operation.

Unlike many previous examples of AI-assisted cybercrime, the Hunt.io investigation provided rare visibility into how large language models were being incorporated directly into operational workflows rather than being used solely for content generation. Darktrace, meanwhile, observed how activity associated with that operation ultimately manifested inside a target environment, providing a complementary view of its operational impact.

Operational consequences of AI-assisted attacks

These investigations provide two complementary perspectives on AI-assisted cyber operations. OSINT research revealed how AI was incorporated into attacker workflows, while Darktrace observed the resulting activity within customer environments.

Although AI played different roles in each campaign, it did not remove the need for attackers to interact with their targets, deliver payloads, execute processes, and communicate with C2, all of which generated observable signals.

In these cases, Darktrace identified suspicious file delivery, unusual process behavior, beaconing activity, and communication with rare external infrastructure that aligned with campaigns later linked to AI-assisted operations. While AI may influence how attacks are developed, adapted, and scaled, it does not make them operationally invisible.

For defenders, the broader lesson extends beyond these specific campaigns. As AI becomes increasingly embedded within both enterprise operations and attacker workflows, understanding what a model was asked to do is often less important than understanding the actions it ultimately took and the consequences those actions produced. Whether the actor is human, AI-assisted, or increasingly autonomous, activity still manifests through identities, endpoints, applications, cloud services and network infrastructure.

Credit to Angel Arribas Lopez (Associate Principal Cyber Analyst), Emma Foulger (Global Threat Research Operations Lead), Nathaniel Jones, SVP Global Threat Intelligence
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

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Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Case 1

Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer from New External Endpoint

Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous File / Script and EXE from Rare External

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed

Compromise / New or Repeated to Unusual SSL Port

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

Antigena / Network / External Threat::Antigena Suspicious File Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly::Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly::Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

Antigena / Network / External Threat::Antigena File then New Outbound Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly::Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly::Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

Case 2

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

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Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

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Case 1

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
IoCTypeDescription + Confidence
onedrive[.]cvHostnameLikely C2 server
138.124.123[.]87IP AddressPossible C2 server
hXXp://onedrive[.]cv/Downloads/CURP/ReportFinal.%E2%80%AE%E1%BA%9D%D4%81%EF%BD%90.scrURIPossible payload
google.services[.]ugHostnameLikely C2 server
77.110.127[.]205IP AddressLikely C2 server
google.services[.]ug:57666Hostname + PortLikely C2 communication
google.services[.]ug:57888Hostname + PortLikely C2 communication
google.services[.]ug:56001Hostname + PortLikely C2 communication

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Case 2

IoC Type Description + Confidence
192.229.115[.]229 IP Address Likely C2 communication
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About the author
Angel Arribas Lopez
Associate Principal Cyber Analyst
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