Botnets: A persistent cyber threat
Since their appearance in the wild over three decades ago, botnets have consistently been the attack vector of choice for many threat actors. The most prevalent of these attack vectors are distributed denial of service (DDoS) and phishing campaigns. Their persistent nature means that even if a compromised device in identified, attackers can continue to operate by using the additional compromised devices they will likely have on the target network. Similarly, command and control (C2) infrastructure can easily be restructured between infected systems, making it increasingly difficult to remove the infection.
MyKings Botnet
One of the most prevalent and sophisticated examples in recent years is the MyKings botnet, also known as Smominru or DarkCloud. Darktrace has observed numerous cases of MyKings botnet compromises across multiple customer environments in several different industries as far back as August 2022. The diverse tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and sophisticated kill chains employed by MyKings botnet may prove a challenge to traditional rule and signature-based detections.
However, Darktrace’s anomaly-centric approach enabled it to successfully detect a wide-range of indicators of compromise (IoCs) related to the MyKings botnet and bring immediate awareness to customer security teams, as it demonstrated on the network of multiple customers between March and August 2023.
Background on MyKings Botnet
MyKings has been active and spreading steadily since 2016 resulting in over 520,000 infections worldwide.[1] Although verified attribution of the botnet remains elusive, the variety of targets and prevalence of crypto-mining software on affected devices suggests the threat group behind the malware is financially motivated. The operators behind MyKings appear to be highly opportunistic, with attacks lacking an obvious specific target industry. Across Darktrace’s customer base, the organizations affected were representative of multiple industries such as entertainment, mining, education, information technology, health, and transportation.
Given its longevity, the MyKings botnet has unsurprisingly evolved since its first appearance years ago. Initial analyses of the botnet showed that the primary crypto-related activity on infected devices was the installation of Monero-mining software. However, in 2019 researchers discovered a new module within the MyKings malware that enabled clipboard-jacking, whereby the malware replaces a user's copied cryptowallet address with the operator's own wallet address in order to siphon funds.[2]
Similar to other botnets such as the Outlaw crypto-miner, the MyKings botnet can also kill running processes of unrelated malware on the compromised hosts that may have resulted from prior infection.[3] MyKings has also developed a comprehensive set of persistence techniques, including: the deployment of bootkits, initiating the botnet immediately after a system reboot, configuring Registry run keys, and generating multiple Scheduled Tasks and WMI listeners.[4] MyKings have also been observed rotating tools and payloads over time to propagate the botnet. For example, some operators have been observed utilizing PCShare, an open-source remote access trojan (RAT) customized to conduct C2 services, execute commands, and download mining software[5].
Darktrace Coverage
Across observed customer networks between March and August 2023, Darktrace identified the MyKings botnet primarily targeting Windows-based servers that supports services like MySQL, MS-SQL, Telnet, SSH, IPC, WMI, and Remote Desktop (RDP). In the initial phase of the attack, the botnet would initiate a variety of attacks against a target including brute-forcing and exploitation of unpatched vulnerabilities on exposed servers. The botnet delivers a variety of payloads to the compromised systems including worm downloaders, trojans, executable files and scripts.
This pattern of activity was detected across the network of one particular Darktrace customer in the education sector in early March 2023. Unfortunately, this customer did not have Darktrace RESPOND™ deployed on their network at the time of the attack, meaning the MyKings botnet was able to move through the cyber kill chain ultimately achieving its goal, which in this case was mining cryptocurrency.
Initial Access
On March 6, Darktrace observed an internet-facing SQL server receiving an unusually large number of incoming MySQL connections from the rare external endpoint 171.91.76[.]31 via port 1433. While it is not possible to confirm whether these suspicious connections represented the exact starting point of the infection, such a sudden influx of SQL connection from a rare external endpoint could be indicative of a malicious attempt to exploit vulnerabilities in the server's SQL database or perform password brute-forcing to gain unauthorized access. Given that MyKings typically spreads primarily through such targeting of internet-exposed devices, the pattern of activity is consistent with potential initial access by MyKings.[6]
Initial Command and Control
The device then proceeded to initiate a series of repeated HTTP connections between March 6 and March 10, to the domain www[.]back0314[.]ru (107.148.239[.]111). These connections included HTTP GET requests featuring URIs such as ‘/back.txt', suggesting potential beaconing and C2 communication. The device continued this connectivity to the external host over the course of four days, primarily utilizing destination ports 80, and 6666. While port 80 is commonly utilized for HTTP connections, port 6666 is a non-standard port for the protocol. Such connectivity over non-standard ports can indicate potential detection evasion and obfuscation tactics by the threat actors. During this time, the device also initiated repeated connections to additional malicious external endpoints with seemingly algorithmically generated hostnames such as pc.pc0416[.]xyz.
Tool Transfer
While this beaconing activity was taking place, the affected device also began to receive potential payloads from unusual external endpoints. On April 29, the device made an HTTP GET request for “/power.txt” to the endpoint 192.236.160[.]237, which was later discovered to have multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) links to malware. Power.txt is a shellcode written in PowerShell which is downloaded and executed with the purpose of disabling Windows Defenders related functions.[7] After the initial script was downloaded (and likely executed), Darktrace went on to detect the device making a series of additional GET requests for several varying compressed and executable files. For example, the device made HTTP requests for '/pld/cmd.txt' to the external endpoint 104.233.224[.]173. In response the external server provided numerous files, including ‘u.exe’, and ‘upsup4.exe’ for download, both of which share file names with previously identified MyKings payloads.
MyKings deploys a diverse array of payloads to expand the botnet and secure a firm position within a compromised system. This multi-faceted approach may render conventional security measures less effective due to the intricacies of and variety of payloads involved in compromises. Darktrace, however, does not rely on static or outdated lists of IoCs in order to detect malicious activity. Instead, DETECT’s Self-Learning AI allows it to identify emerging compromise activity by recognizing the subtle deviations in an affected device’s behavior that could indicate it has fallen into the hands of malicious actors.
Achieving Objectives – Crypto-Mining
Several weeks after the initial payloads were delivered and beaconing commenced, Darktrace finally detected the initiation of crypto-mining operations. On May 27, the originally compromised server connected to the rare domain other.xmrpool[.]ru over port 1081. As seen in the domain name, this endpoint appears to be affiliated with pool mining activity and the domain has various OSINT affiliations with the cryptocurrency Monero coin. During this connection, the host was observed passing Monero credentials, activity which parallels similar mining operations observed on other customer networks that had been compromised by the MyKings botnet.
Although mining activity may not pose an immediate or urgent concern for security unauthorized cryptomining on devices can result in detrimental consequences, such as compromised hardware integrity, elevated energy costs, and reduced productivity, and even potential involvement in money laundering.
Conclusion
Detecting future iterations of the MyKings botnet will likely demand a shift away from an overreliance on traditional rules and signatures and lists of “known bads”, instead requiring organizations to employ AI-driven technology that can identify suspicious activity that represents a deviation from previously established patterns of life.
Despite the diverse range of payloads, malicious endpoints, and intricate activities that constitute a typical MyKing botnet compromise, Darktrace was able successfully detect multiple critical phases within the MyKings kill chain. Given the evolving nature of the MyKings botnet, it is highly probable the botnet will continue to expand and adapt, leveraging new tactics and technologies. By adopting Darktrace’s product of suites, including Darktrace DETECT, organizations are well-positioned to identify these evolving threats as soon as they emerge and, when coupled with the autonomous response technology of Darktrace RESPOND, threats like the MyKings botnet can be stopped in their tracks before they can achieve their ultimate goals.
Credit to: Oluwatosin Aturaka, Analyst Team Lead, Cambridge, Adam Potter, Cyber Analyst
Appendix
IoC Table
IoC - Type - Description + Confidence
162.216.150[.]108- IP - C2 Infrastructure
103.145.106[.]242 - IP - C2 Infrastructure
137.175.56[.]104 - IP - C2 Infrastructure
138.197.152[.]201 - IP - C2 Infrastructure
139.59.74[.]135 - IP - C2 Infrastructure
pc.pc0416[.]xyz - Domain - C2 Infrastructure (DGA)
other.xmrpool[.]ru - Domain - Cryptomining Endpoint
xmrpool[.]ru - Domain - Cryptomining Endpoint
103.145.106[.]55 - IP - Cryptomining Endpoint
ntuser[.]rar - Zipped File - Payload
/xmr1025[.]rar - Zipped File - Payload
/20201117[.]rar - Zipped File - Payload
wmi[.]txt - File - Payload
u[.]exe - Executable File - Payload
back[.]txt - File - Payload
upsupx2[.]exe - Executable File - Payload
cmd[.]txt - File - Payload
power[.]txt - File - Payload
ups[.]html - File - Payload
xmr1025.rar - Zipped File - Payload
171.91.76[.]31- IP - Possible Initial Compromise Endpoint
www[.]back0314[.]ru - Domain - Probable C2 Infrastructure
107.148.239[.]111 - IP - Probable C2 Infrastructure
194.67.71[.]99 - IP- Probable C2 Infrastructure
Darktrace DETECT Model Breaches
- Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise
- Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer (x37)
- Compromise / Large DNS Volume for Suspicious Domain
- Compromise / Fast Beaconing to DGA
- Device / Large Number of Model Breaches
- Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations (x30)
- Compromise / Beacon for 4 Days (x2)
- Anomalous Server Activity / New User Agent from Internet Facing System
- Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
- Anomalous Server Activity / New Internet Facing System
- Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location (x37)
- Device / Large Number of Connections to New Endpoints
- Anomalous Server Activity / Server Activity on New Non-Standard Port (x3)
- Device / Threat Indicator (x3)
- Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity
- Compromise / Crypto Currency Mining Activity (x37)
- Compliance / Internet Facing SQL Server
- Device / Anomalous Scripts Download Followed By Additional Packages
- Device / New User Agent
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
ATT&CK Technique - Technique ID
Reconnaissance – T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning
Resource Development – T1608 Stage Capabilities
Resource Development – T1588.001 Malware
Initial Access – T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
Command and Control – T15568.002 Domain Generated Algorithms
Command and Control – T1571 Non-Standard Port
Execution – T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
Execution – T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter
Persistence – T1542.003 Pre-OS Boot
Impact – T1496 Resource Hijacking
References
[1] https://www.binarydefense.com/resources/threat-watch/mykings-botnet-is-growing-and-remains-under-the-radar/
[2] https://therecord.media/a-malware-botnet-has-made-more-than-24-7-million-since-2019
[3] https://www.darktrace.com/blog/outlaw-returns-uncovering-returning-features-and-new-tactics
[4] https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/pdfs/technical-papers/sophoslabs-uncut-mykings-report.pdf
[5] https://www.antiy.com/response/20190822.html
[6] https://ethicaldebuggers.com/mykings-botnet/
[7] https://ethicaldebuggers.com/mykings-botnet/
![Variation in URLs over time within the same hola[.]org domain, indicating the use of dynamically changing endpoints.](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/626ff4d25aca2edf4325ff97/6a304bdeff111215c0436931_Screenshot%202026-06-15%20at%2012.00.43%E2%80%AFPM.png)
![File transfer event showing the download of an executable from the rare external endpoint 188.241.219[.]55.](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/626ff4d25aca2edf4325ff97/6a304c2468d20aeff16a2721_Screenshot%202026-06-15%20at%2012.01.53%E2%80%AFPM.png)
