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August 2, 2024

Safelink Smuggling: Enhancing Resilience Against Malicious Links

Gain insights into safelink smuggling tactics and learn strategies to protect your organization from the dangers posed by malicious links.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Carlos Gray
Senior Product Marketing Manager, Email
Written by
Stephen Pickman
Senior Vice President, Engineering
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02
Aug 2024

Darktrace security members and researchers have recently seen a rise in what we are calling Safelink Smuggling. Safelinks are URLs rewritten by security solutions to enable additional analysis when the URL is clicked. Once analyzed, they may prompt a user, redirect the browser back to the original URL, or block further access if deemed necessary.

What is Safelink Smuggling?

Safelink Smuggling is a technique that involves an attacker purposely getting their malicious payload rewritten by a security solution’s Safelink capability to then propagate the rewritten URL to others. This technique is a way for attackers to not only avoid detection by traditional email security and other solutions, but also to instill mistrust in all email security solutions. As a result, Safelinks from a range of popular email security providers are often seen in phishing or supply chain attacks. In fact, Darktrace has observed over 300,000 cases of Safelinks being included in unexpected and suspicious contexts over the last 3 months.

How does Safelink Smuggling work?

Safelink Smuggling has two key stages: Getting a malicious link rewritten by an email security solution, then propagating that rewritten link to other victims.

Step one:

Obfuscated a malicious payload through a Safelink capability rewriting the link; Darktrace has seen this attempted through two methods – Compromised Account or Reply-Chain.

  • Method 1: Compromised Account

If an attacker can gain access to a compromised account – whether that’s through brute force, malware or credential theft – they can infiltrate it with malicious links, and then exfiltrate the Safelinks created as the email passes through security filtering. In other words, attackers will send a malicious payload to the compromised inbox, with the intent that the malicious URL gets rewritten. Unlike a normal phishing email where the threat actor wants to avoid having their email blocked, in this case the objective is for the email to get through to the inbox with the link rewritten. As observed by Darktrace, attackers often send the link in isolation as any additional components (i.e., body text or other content in the email) could cause a more severe action such as the email security solution holding the message.

  • Method 2: Reply-Chain

With this method, the attacker sends a malicious link to an email security vendor’s customer in an attempt to solicit a reply from an internal user. This allows them to grab the re-written URL within the reply chain. However, this is a risky tactic which can fail at several points. The attacker has to be confident the initial email won't be blocked outright; they also risk alerting security vendors to the address and the URL intended to be used for the main campaign. They also must be confident that the checks made when the re-written URL is clicked will not lead to a block at the final destination.
Regardless of the method used, the end result will appear as follows:

For example, the original malicious URL may look like this,

faceldu[.]org/Invoice112.zip

(negative surface indicators: recently registered domain, file extension)

And after being rewritten,

securityvevndor[.]com/safe?q=aNDF80dfaAkAH930adbd

(positive surface indicators: established domain, positive reputation, associated with safe content)

Step Two:

Now that the attacker has access to a malicious URL that has been obfuscated by a safe rewrite, attackers can forward or craft an email leveraging that same link. In fact, we have even seen multiple layers of Safelink Smuggling being used to mask a payload further.

The Challenge of Link Rewriting

Traditional email security solutions rewrite all links sent to an organization, but there is an inherent risk to this methodology. Rewriting every link, whether harmless or harmful, leads employees to lose context and creates a false sense of security when interacting with rewritten links in emails. Furthermore, it provides attackers with many opportunities to exploit Safelinks. As demonstrated in Method 2 above, if an email security solution does not rewrite every link, executing such attacks would be significantly more challenging.

Traditionally, rewriting every link made sense from a security perspective, as it allowed servers to thoroughly analyze links for known attack patterns and signatures. However, this approach relies on identifying previously recognized threats. Conversely, Darktrace / EMAIL gathers sufficient information about a link without needing to rewrite it, by analyzing the context and content of the email and the link itself.

In fact, Darktrace is the pioneer in applying selective rewriting to URLs based on suspicious properties or context, a method that other solutions have since adopted. While traditional solutions rewrite links to assess them only after they are clicked, Darktrace / EMAIL takes immediate action to neutralize threats before they reach the inbox.

Darktrace achieves high success rates in detecting malicious links and emails on the first encounter using Self-Learning AI. By understanding 'normal' behavior in email communications, Darktrace identifies subtle deviations indicative of cyber threats and selectively rewrites only those links deemed suspicious, ensuring a targeted, proportionate, and non-disruptive response.

Why do traditional email security solutions miss Safelink attacks?

Traditional security solutions that focus on learning attack patterns will miss Safelink threats as they are often utilized in attacks that have a variety of layers which help the email seem legitimate. Leveraging all the classic techniques seen in a supply chain attack to disguise the sender's intent, taking advantage of the users' inherent trust in familiar sources, the user is more likely to lower their defenses.

For more information: https://darktrace.com/products/email/use-cases/supply-chain-attack

In terms of the URL, if the payload is malicious, why is it difficult for email security solutions to catch it? Primarily, other security vendors will focus on the payload in isolation, attempting to find known attack patterns or signatures such as a domain name or IP with a bad reputation. Unfortunately, with this technique, if the URL has a legitimate domain, it will return a clean track record. Common obfuscation techniques such as captchas, short-links, and click throughs can all be deployed to add layers of complexity to the analysis.

Safelink Smuggling relies heavily on link redirects, which means that web analysis tools will falter as they will only analyze the first redirect. Consequently, when more in-depth analysis on the link itself is performed, the first place the URL takes the user is not the malicious site but rather the default on-click analysis of the vendor in question. Therefore, any traditional browser or link analysis will also return a negative result.

Finally, the context itself is important. In contrast to traditional email security solutions, Darktrace / EMAIL asks who, what, when, where, and why for every single email, and compares it to the pattern of life of both the internal recipient and the external sender, rather than attempting to match patterns with historical threat data. When analyzing an email from an inbound perspective, Darktrace reveals potential deviations from normal, that, when considered sufficiently anomalous, will result in taking a proportional action to the threat assessed.

To illustrate the above, let’s take a look at an example email that Darktrace recently caught.

The following is an email a Darktrace customer received, which Darktrace / EMAIL held before it reached the inbox. In this case, the smuggled Safelink was further obfuscated behind a QR Code. The accompanying document also presented some anomalies in terms of its intent, perceived as a potential social engineering attempt. Finally, the lack of association and low mailing history meant there was no prior context for this email.  

Example of a Safelink Smuggling attack using a popular email security solution’s safelink.
Fig 1: Example of a Safelink Smuggling attack using a popular email security solution’s safelink.

How to mitigate against Safelink Smuggling?

It's difficult for email security vendors to do anything about their links being reused, and reuse should almost be expected by popular operators in the email security space. Therefore, the presence of links from a vendor’s domain in a suspicious email communication rarely indicates a compromise of the link rewrite infrastructure or a compromise of the third-party vendor.

Email security vendors can improve their defense-in-depth, especially around their email provider accounts to avoid Method 1 (Compromised Account attacks) and become more selective with their rewrites to curtail Method 2 (Reply Chain attacks).

Primary protection against Safelink Smuggling should be offered by the email security vendor responsible for inbound email analysis. They need to ensure that techniques such as Safelink Smuggling are not evaded by their detection mechanisms.

Darktrace has long been working on the betterment of security within the email community and innovating our link analysis infrastructure to mitigate against this attack methodology (read more about our major update in 6.2 here), regardless of whether the receiving organization are Darktrace customers.

How does Darktrace deal with Safelink Smuggling today?

Darktrace has been dealing with Safelink Smuggling since launch and has a standardized recommendation for customers who are looking to defend against this threat.

Customers want to avoid being 1) the propagators of this threat and potentially damaging their brand reputation, and 2) being victims of the supply chain attack thereafter.

The principal recommendation to protect customer accounts and consequently their brands is to ensure defense-in-depth. As accounts establish themselves as the crown jewels of any modern enterprise, organizations should vigilantly monitor their account activity with the same rigor they would analyze their network activity. Whether that is through the base account takeover protection offered by Darktrace / EMAIL, or the expanded defense offered by Darktrace / IDENTITY, it is crucial that the accounts themselves have a robust security solution in place.

Secondly, to avoid falling victim to the supply chain attack that leverages a third-party vendor’s link rewrite, it is imperative to use a solution that does not rely on static threat intelligence and link reputation analysis. Rather than chasing attackers by updating rules and signatures, Darktrace leverages Self-Learning AI to learn the communication patterns of both internal and external messages to reveal deviations in both content and context.

Finally, for those customers that already leverage Darktrace / EMAIL we recommend ensuring that lock links are enabled, and that the default warning page is displayed every time a link is rewritten, no matter the perceived severity of the link. This will allow any potential user that clicks on a rewritten Darktrace / EMAIL link to be alerted to the potential nature of the site they are trying to access.

Safelink smuggling example caught by Darktrace

While most cases involve other vendors, analysts recently saw a case where Darktrace's own links were used in this type of attack. A small number of links were leveraged in a campaign targeting both Darktrace and non-Darktrace customers alike. Thankfully, these attempts were all appropriately actioned by those customers that had Darktrace / EMAIL deployed.

In the example below, you will see how Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst describes the example at hand under the Anomaly Indicators section.

Example of Safelink Smuggling attack on Darktrace using the Darktrace Safelink Infrastructure.
Fig 2: Example of Safelink Smuggling attack on Darktrace using the Darktrace Safelink Infrastructure.

First, the display name mismatch can be interpreted as an indicator of social engineering, attempting to deceive the recipient with an IT policy change.

Second, the link itself, which in this case is a hidden redirect to an unusual host for this environment.

Finally, there is a suspected account takeover due to the origin of the email being a long-standing, validated domain that contains a wide variety of suspicious elements.

Darktrace / EMAIL would have held this email from being delivered.

Conclusion

By investigating Safelink Smuggling, Darktrace wants to shine a light on the technique for security teams and help raise awareness of how it can be used to dupe users into lowering their defenses. Challenge your email security vendor on how it deals with link analysis, particularly from trusted senders and applications.

Interested in Darktrace’s approach to defense-in-depth? Check out Darktrace / EMAIL

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Carlos Gray
Senior Product Marketing Manager, Email
Written by
Stephen Pickman
Senior Vice President, Engineering

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July 31, 2026

Building Operational Resilience Across Mission-Critical Marine Services

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Mission-Critical Marine Services

This marine organization supports offshore energy production, export infrastructure, and regional logistics, delivering critical services through its diverse fleet and a regional shorebase footprint. To power rapid mobilization and 24/7 operational readiness, the organization has embraced cloud adoption and digital transformation, reshaping how crews, contractors, and shore-based teams access services.

While technology modernization has enhanced operations, it has also introduced new security complexities.

  • From perimeter to identity: As access becomes more distributed, identity has become the primary security control, elevating the risk of credential compromise and privilege misuse.
  • From confidentiality to availability and resilience: As cloud platforms increasingly underpin fleet and operational systems, cyber incidents can disrupt services and safety.
  • From isolated tools to unified visibility:  Because Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) often intersect, and legacy systems coexist with modern cloud platforms, fragmented monitoring makes it harder to understand risk and respond decisively across domains.
“Our cybersecurity priorities expanded along with our business goals, placing availability and resilience at the forefront. The impact of a potential threat became an operational risk, which elevated cybersecurity from an IT issue to an operational safety and resilience enabler.” - Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Manager.

A Unified, AI-Driven Platform for IT and OT

To strengthen visibility, detection, and response across its highly distributed environment, the customer adopted the Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platform™ in 2022.

Darktrace’s contextual detection capability was a key driver. Unlike traditional tools that rely on known threat signatures, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI learns “normal” behavior to identify emerging threats and correlate visibility across the customer's siloed on-premises and cloud domains.

Today, the customer relies on:

  • Darktrace / EMAIL™ to reduce phishing risk and minimize disruption from legacy mail controls and false positives
  • Darktrace / IDENTITY™ to support identity-centric security as cloud access expands across vessels and shore-based operations
  • Darktrace / NETWORK™ to strengthen oversight across the broader environment, including operational contexts where IT and OT intersect
  • Darktrace / CLOUD™ (Azure), added in 2024, to extend detection and response into Azure and support cloud transformation without treating cloud as a separate security silo
  • Darktrace / Incident Readiness & Recovery to strengthen incident readiness and recovery planning
  • Darktrace Managed Detection and Response Services to provide 24/7/365 monitoring and support

This combination supports a single operating model for the customer: security that can adapt as the environment changes while remaining practical for a lean team responsible for safeguarding both business operations and safety-critical services.

Extending cloud protection without complexity

As the customer accelerated cloud adoption, it expanded coverage in 2024 with Darktrace / CLOUD for Azure to bring cloud workloads under the same AI-driven visibility and response model – without adding operational burden. “This matters in hybrid environments because attacks rarely stay in one place,” explains the ICT Manager. “A compromised identity can trigger activity in the cloud, which can open pathways back into on-premises systems.”

In parallel, Darktrace / CLOUD’s posture management capabilities support governance and audit readiness by surfacing misconfigurations and exposure risks earlier, before they become incidents.

A Stronger, Faster, More Resilient Business

Since adopting Darktrace, the customer has strengthened cyber resilience while reducing operational burden on its small ICT team.

Darktrace continuously analyzes millions of individual events that can contribute to a wider incident. Within a single month, the solution autonomously investigated 88% of all potential threats, taking appropriate action within just 39.4 seconds on average.

Autonomous capabilities ensure threats are stopped and contained until the ICT team can investigate. In one standout instance, Darktrace autonomously blocked malicious links during a mass phishing/spam event before other controls flagged the threat. the ICT Manager later confirmed Microsoft reported the link as malicious, but Darktrace had already acted to prevent delivery and reduce exposure.

“Whether something happens during off hours, while we’re on vacation, or when our attention is focused elsewhere, we’re confident Darktrace will take control and stop a threat before it spreads,” says the ICT Manager.

Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI combines multiple AI methods and advanced techniques to improve threat detection, investigation, and response dramatically reducing alert overload and manual triage. Within a single month, the solution saved the customer's IT group 411 equivalent human investigation hours.

“For a lean team supporting a 24/7 operational footprint, this autonomous action eliminates the constant firefighting and stress, giving us the space to focus on higher-value priorities.”- Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Manager.

Protecting communications without disruption

the customer experienced friction from legacy email and network controls prior to Darktrace, which generated high false positive rates, disrupted legitimate communications, created operational drag, and added workload for ICT. With Darktrace / EMAIL learning normal email behavior and applying context-aware actions, the team reduced unnecessary interruptions while maintaining protection.

“That shift matters in marine services, where business communications directly support coordination across vessels, shore bases, clients, ports, and regulators,” says the ICT Manager. “Darktrace doesn’t just block more threats, it autonomously makes decisions that preserve operational continuity and enable my team to focus on credible threats instead of chasing volume.”

Delivering clarity and confidence

Darktrace has reduced manual triage by correlating activity across email, identity, network, and cloud, providing the context needed to prioritize what matters without requiring the ICT team to stitch together evidence across multiple tools.

“With unified visibility we can identify patterns across domains, make informed decisions about where risk actually exists, and align security actions with operational impact rather than theoretical threats,” explains the ICT Manager. “I can now prioritize effort and investment across our ICT landscape with far greater confidence.”

Regular Executive Threat Reports reinforce operational confidence by giving leadership clear visibility into threats Darktrace has handled autonomously, supporting decisive action when needed and confidence to avoid unnecessary disruption when it isn’t.

Scaling Securely in a Hybrid World

As the customer advances its cloud transformation, the ICT Manager sees the Darktrace partnership evolving into a foundational layer of resilience and assurance, supporting scale, governance, and operational confidence in an increasingly cloud-centric environment.

Key priorities include:

  • Shifting from hybrid visibility to cloud-first resilience, using continuous monitoring and posture insights to reduce exposure earlier
  • Strengthening governance and audit readiness, especially as critical workloads and sensitive data expand in Azure and expectations rise under regulatory and client assurance requirements
  • Increasing reliance on autonomous response and AI investigation as the number of identities, workloads, and access paths grows faster than headcount
  • Deepening cross-domain correlation so cloud signals further enrich decision-making, supporting faster containment and more confident prioritization

“As we accelerate our cloud strategy, Darktrace will play an even more strategic role,” says the ICT Manager, “providing the guidance, technology, and expertise that allow us to grow with confidence and innovate securely.”

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July 28, 2026

Hiding in Plain Sight: Uncovering a Multi-Stage Ransomware Attack Through Behavioral Detection

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Why ransomware has changed

Ransomware attacks have continued to increase globally, with 698 incidents reported in May 2026, representing a 48% rise compared to 472 incidents in May 2025 [1]. At the same time, the ransomware landscape is evolving. Several major ransomware groups, including LockBit [2], have been disrupted by successful joint law enforcement operations, resulting in a shift away from a small number of dominant actors towards a more fragmented and distributed ecosystem. This is increasingly composed of smaller groups who play a specialized role in the attack, such as initial access brokers, affiliates or developers.

As a result, ransomware tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are becoming more diverse and less predictable. On top of this, adversaries are leveraging native tools and legitimate penetration testing frameworks to evade detection. Anomaly-based detection is therefore critical to identify pre-ransomware activity, rather than relying on signatures associated with a handful of well-known ransomware groups.

As these attacks often unfold over several days, there is a critical window for defenders to act. In this context, behavioral-based detection plays a vital role in identifying suspicious pre-ransomware activity, and enabling early intervention before encryption or exfiltration occurs.

Inside a modern ransomware intrusion

In early 2026, Darktrace detected activity within a customer’s environment related to a multi-stage ransomware intrusion from the initial compromise. This activity does not appear to be attributable to a specific ransomware group, and no known ransomware payload was observed until the final stage.

The attack aligns with a broader industry trend in which compromised virtual private network (VPN) credentials are used as an entry point, followed by rapid internal reconnaissance and lateral movement using legitimate administrative tools. This growing preference for native tools and legitimate frameworks in cyber-attacks illustrates that it is increasingly unreliable to depend solely on traditional indicators of compromise such as known malware signatures or exploit detection.

The intrusion also involved the use of Sliver, an open-source adversary emulation framework, which is increasingly observed in real-world attacks. Originally designed for penetration testing and red teaming, Sliver has gained traction among threat actors as a stealthier alternative to more heavily signatured frameworks such as Cobalt Strike. As a legitimate framework, its use further complicates detection for security tools that rely on known malicious signatures.

Darktrace’s detection of a ransomware event in a customer’s environment

The initial compromise appears to have occurred via compromised credentials used over the VPN shortly before, or at the onset of the first indicators of suspicious activity. While it remains unclear as to how or when the threat actors gained access to these credentials, the use of initial access brokers (IABs) is a common feature of modern ransomware operations. This suggests that access to the environment may have been established several days or weeks beforehand.

The intrusion unfolded over three days, presenting multiple opportunities for early detection and intervention before ransomware deployment. The attack progressed through a compressed but structured sequence: initial access and reconnaissance were completed within hours, followed by privilege escalation and lateral movement the next day, and culminating in data exfiltration and encryption shortly thereafter. Throughout each stage, distinct behavioral anomalies emerged across the network providing clear indicators of malicious activity well before the ransomware was deployed.

While Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was enabled within the customer’s environment, it was not fully configured across the impacted devices, allowing the attack to progress to ransomware deployment. Had Autonomous Response been fully deployed across the affected systems, it could have taken targeted action against the earliest stages of malicious activity, potentially disrupting the intrusion before it escalated.

Figure 1: Timeline of the attack progression.

Day 1: Reconnaissance and privilege escalation

The threat actor gained access via compromised VPN credentials and initiated internal reconnaissance. Darktrace detected anomalous scanning behavior, including unusual port scanning activity and widespread network enumeration.

Specifically, Darktrace detected a high volume of east-west scanning activity across a broad range of ports, with TCP connections targeting ports 21, 80, 445, 4899 and 8080. Associated URIs suggested the use of Nmap, a widely used penetration testing tool. This highlights how attackers often leverage legitimate penetration testing tools for malicious reconnaissance, enabling them to blend into normal network activity and evade traditional signature-based detection methods.

Figure 2: Darktrace's detection of a sharp increase in anomalous internal connections, triggering multiple high-severity model alerts associated with reconnaissance activity.

Several devices were observed using administrative credentials to carry out privileged actions in a manner that was highly anomalous for the environment. This activity was accompanied by behavior consistent with SMB authentication scanning, suggesting efforts to identify and access additional systems. As the activity intensified, an increasing number of devices became involved, signalling lateral movement and further spread across the network.

Darktrace also identified privilege escalation through active directory (AD) replication abuse, specifically via the drsuapi::DRSGetNCChanges function. This technique allows an attacker with sufficient privileges to request directory replication data from a domain controller (DC), enabling them to extract credentials, including password hashes, without directly interacting with user accounts. Commonly associated with ‘DCSync’ attacks, this technique is frequently used to obtain highly privileged credentials and enable further escalation within an environment.

Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of anomalous AD replication activity indicative of privilege escalation.

This activity was seen alongside the use of the now obsolete SMBv1, repeated NTLM authentication attempts using multiple variations of ‘Administrator’ credentials, reverse DNS scanning, and large-scale network scanning. Darktrace observed widespread use of SMBv1 across the customer’s environment, exposing a significant security weakness. As a legacy protocol with well-documented weaknesses, SMBv1 can be exploited to facilitate lateral movement, allowing the attackers to expand their access following initial compromise.

Day 3: Lateral Movement, Command & Control, and Exfiltration

Two days later, the attacker escalated privileges and expanded their foothold using living-off-the-land (LOTL) techniques such as PSExec, WMI, and RDP. Concurrently, Darktrace identified command-and-control (C2)-style communications consistent with the Sliver framework, alongside rare outbound connections to cloud infrastructure indicating potential data exfiltration. The volume and severity of observed activity increased as attack behavior intensified.

The device was observed conducting extensive lateral movement, leveraging LOTL techniques to evade detection. Activity included WMI execution (e.g. ExecQuery), DCE-RPC activity, SMB sessions and file writes, most of which were successful, as well as the deployment of PSEXESVC.exe via ADMIN$ shares and prolonged RDP sessions. Darktrace identified this behavior as highly anomalous for the environment. Such activity is commonly associated with the transfer of attacker tooling, remote command execution, and the establishment of persistent access across compromised systems.  

Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of a spike in RPC binding events indicative of potential lateral movement.

On the same day, Darktrace detected C2-style SSL communications originating from multiple internal devices to rare external endpoints. These connections exhibited anomalous characteristics, including invalid SSL certificates and repeated connection patterns resembling beaconing. Analysis of the observed JA3 fingerprint further linked the activity to Sliver, the adversary simulation framework referenced earlier, as the hash has previously been associated with Sliver-related infrastructure [3]. The use of this framework reflects a broader trend of attackers repurposing legitimate offensive security tools for stealthy C2 communications. Connections to 137[.]220[.]59[.]55 (ASN AS20473 AS-VULTR) indicated that the communications were likely routed via a virtual private server (VPS) hosted by Vultr. Attackers often utilize VPS infrastructure from legitimate cloud providers like Vultr to obscure their true origin, blend into benign traffic, and evade IP-based detection mechanisms [4].

Figure 5: Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst detection of two linked unusual connections to Vultr infrastructure.

Darktrace also observed a device initiating SSL connections to safedata.s3[.]wasabisys[.]com, an endpoint associated with Wasabi cloud storage. Darktrace recognized that neither the destination nor the associated IP address had previously been observed within the environment.  More than 200 MB of data was subsequently uploaded externally to endpoints sharing the same JA3 client hash, indicating a sustained transfer session and potential data exfiltration to third-party storage. The apparent exfiltration prior to encryption is consistent with a double-extortion ransomware strategy.

Figure 6: Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst detection of more than 30 rare outbound connections to a Wasabi cloud storage endpoint, indicative of potential data exfiltration

Day 4: Encryption

The attack culminated in ransomware deployment, marking the transition from suspicious network activity to a business-impacting incident. Using SMB-based propagation, the threat actor encrypted thousands of files across the network, affecting multiple systems and disrupting normal operations. Throughout the encryption event, the legacy SMBv1 protocol was used extensively across multiple internal systems, resulting in a significant increase in newly encrypted files.

Figure 7: Darktrace’s detection of abnormal spikes in SMB activity and associated model alerts, indicative of ransomware encryption and propagation.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst automatically investigated and correlated the encryption activity and related events into a single incident narrative, providing the customer with real-time visibility into the attack while significantly reducing investigation time.

Figure 8: Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the encryption activity. AI Analyst incident detailing example encryption activity in real time. Related events are automatically correlated and summarized into a clear narrative, reducing investigation time.

Defender action recommendations

What Could Have Stopped the Attack Earlier?

Although the attack ultimately resulted in ransomware deployment, there were multiple opportunities to detect, contain, and disrupt the intrusion before encryption occurred. The following actions could have significantly reduced the overall impact:

Detect and investigate indicators of reconnaissance and lateral movement

  • Unusual scanning
  • Active Directory replication anomalies consistent with DCSync activity
  • Anomalous use of native tools and processes indicative of LOTL attacks
  • Unusual use of common reconnaissance tools such as Nmap and NetScan

Contain compromised credentials and affected devices

  • Disable and reset compromised VPN credentials
  • Isolate devices performing anomalous scanning and lateral movement activity

Block suspicious external communications and data exfiltration

  • Use anomaly-based detection to detect and block repeated outbound connections to rare external infrastructure
  • Prevent data exfiltration to unauthorized cloud storage services such as Wasabi

Conclusion

The incident highlights the importance of anomaly-based detection, particularly against attacks that primarily use native or legitimate tools to evade traditional security measures. Darktrace identified suspicious activity from the first day of the compromise, providing multiple opportunities to disrupt the intrusion before it progressed to lateral movement and data exfiltration.

In this instance, detection was not the limiting factor; response time was. Prompt investigation and containment of devices exhibiting anomalous behavior could have prevented lateral movement, data exfiltration, and ultimately ransomware deployment.

As adversaries increasingly prioritize stealth over custom malware, relying instead on legitimate tools, valid credentials, and trusted infrastructure, traditional signature-based detection becomes less effective. Identifying subtle behavioral deviations early remains critical to disrupting attacks before they escalate into full-scale ransomware incidents.

Credit to Alexandra Evzona (Cyber Analyst), Priya Thapa (Senior Cyber Analyst)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

References

[1] https://industrialcyber.co/ransomware/check-point-reports-ransomware-attacks-jump-48-year-over-year-despite-decline-in-overall-cyberattack-activity/

[2] https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/law-enforcement-disrupt-worlds-biggest-ransomware-operation

[3] https://fieldeffect.com/blog/field-effect-mitigates-not-so-simplehelp-exploits-enabling-deployment-of-backdoors

[4] https://www.darktrace.com/blog/from-vps-to-phishing-how-darktrace-uncovered-saas-hijacks-through-virtual-infrastructure-abuse

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IP Addresses

  • 137[.]220[.]59[.]55 – Potential C2 infrastructure (Vultr AS20473)
  • 38[.]27[.]106[.]123 – Wasabi cloud storage endpoint associated with potential data exfiltration
  • 38[.]27[.]106[.]128 – Wasabi cloud storage endpoint associated with potential data exfiltration
  • 38[.]27[.]106[.]117 – Wasabi cloud storage endpoint associated with potential data exfiltration

Domains

  • safedata[.]s3[.]wasabisys[.]com – Potential data exfiltration endpoint
  • *.wasabisys[.]com – Associated Wasabi cloud storage infrastructure

JA3 Fingerprint

  • d6828e30ab66774a91a96ae93be4ae4c – Associated with the Sliver adversary emulation framework

Files

  • Delete[.]me – File observed during reconnaissance activity, commonly associated with NetScan

Darktrace Model Coverage

·       Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel

·       Anomalous Connection / Anomalous Remote Registry Service Control

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Windows UDP

·       Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control

·       Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Enumeration

·       Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

·       Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration

·       Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Activity On High Risk Device

·       Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio

·       Anomalous Connection / Sustained MIME Type Conversion

·       Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

·       Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session

·       Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

·       Anomalous Connection / Unusual SMB Version 1 Connectivity

·       Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

·       Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File

·       Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

·       Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

·       Compromise / Ransomware / Possible Ransom Note Read

·       Compromise / Ransomware / Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB

·       Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity

·       Device / Anonymous NTLM Logins

·       Device / Attack and Recon Tools

·       Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

·       Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

·       Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint

·       Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Alerts

·       Device / Network Scan

·       Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe

·       Device / New or Unusual Remote Command Execution

·       Device / New User Agent

·       Device / Possible RPC Lateral Movement

·       Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Brute Force

·       Device / RDP Scan

·       Device / SMB Lateral Movement

·       Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Non-Admin)

·       Device / SMB Version 1 Access Failures

·       Device / Suspicious File Delete Activity

·       Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

·       Device / Unusual SMB Error Detected

·       Device / Unusual SMB To Critical Resource

·       Device / Unusual Winreg Operation

·       Unusual Activity / Multiple Failed Internal Connections

·       Unusual Activity / Possible RPC Recon Activity

·       Unusual Activity / Sustained Anomalous SMB Activity

·       Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

·       Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

·       Unusual Activity / Unusual File Storage Data Transfer

·       Unusual Activity / Unusual Large Internal Transfer

·       User / New Admin Credentials on Client

·       User / NTLM Login from Unauthenticated Device

Autonomous Response Model Alerts

·       Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Ransomware Block

·       Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

·       Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Active Threat SMB Write Block

·       Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Internal Anomalous File Activity

·       Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Large Data Volume Outbound Block

·       Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Network Scan Block

·       Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Unusual Privileged User Activities Block

·       Antigena / Network / Manual / Quarantine Device

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block 100

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

MITRE ATT&CK MAPPING

Command and control - Protocol Tunneling - T1572

Command and control – Web Protocols – T1071.001

Credential Access- Exploitation for Credential Access- T1212

Credential Access- Password Guessing- T1110

Discovery- File and Directory Discovery- T1083

Discovery- Network Service Discovery- T1046

Discovery- Network Share Discovery- T1135

Discovery- Remote System Discovery- T1018

Exfiltration- Exfiltration Over C2 Channel- T1041

Exfiltration- Exfiltration to Cloud Storage- T1567

Impact- Data Encrypted for Impact- T1486

Impact- Data Encrypted for Impact- T1486

Impact- Service Stop - T1489

Initial Access- Public-Facing Application- T1190

Lateral Movement- Exploitation of Remote Services- T1210

Lateral Movement- Remote Desktop Protocol- T1021

Lateral Movement- SMB/Windows Admin Shares- T1021

Lateral Movement- Taint Shared Content- T1080

Persistence- Modify Registry- T1112

Privilege Escalation- Exploitation for Privilege Escalation- T0890

Privilege Escalation- Valid Accounts- T1078

Reconnaissance- Scanning IP Blocks- T1595

Reconnaissance- Vulnerability Scanning- T1595

Resource Development- Malware- T1588

Stealth- File Deletion- T1070

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About the author
Alexandra Evzona
Cyber Analyst
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