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August 2, 2024

Safelink Smuggling: Enhancing Resilience Against Malicious Links

Gain insights into safelink smuggling tactics and learn strategies to protect your organization from the dangers posed by malicious links.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Carlos Gray
Senior Product Marketing Manager, Email
Written by
Stephen Pickman
Chief Technology Officer
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02
Aug 2024

Darktrace security members and researchers have recently seen a rise in what we are calling Safelink Smuggling. Safelinks are URLs rewritten by security solutions to enable additional analysis when the URL is clicked. Once analyzed, they may prompt a user, redirect the browser back to the original URL, or block further access if deemed necessary.

What is Safelink Smuggling?

Safelink Smuggling is a technique that involves an attacker purposely getting their malicious payload rewritten by a security solution’s Safelink capability to then propagate the rewritten URL to others. This technique is a way for attackers to not only avoid detection by traditional email security and other solutions, but also to instill mistrust in all email security solutions. As a result, Safelinks from a range of popular email security providers are often seen in phishing or supply chain attacks. In fact, Darktrace has observed over 300,000 cases of Safelinks being included in unexpected and suspicious contexts over the last 3 months.

How does Safelink Smuggling work?

Safelink Smuggling has two key stages: Getting a malicious link rewritten by an email security solution, then propagating that rewritten link to other victims.

Step one:

Obfuscated a malicious payload through a Safelink capability rewriting the link; Darktrace has seen this attempted through two methods – Compromised Account or Reply-Chain.

  • Method 1: Compromised Account

If an attacker can gain access to a compromised account – whether that’s through brute force, malware or credential theft – they can infiltrate it with malicious links, and then exfiltrate the Safelinks created as the email passes through security filtering. In other words, attackers will send a malicious payload to the compromised inbox, with the intent that the malicious URL gets rewritten. Unlike a normal phishing email where the threat actor wants to avoid having their email blocked, in this case the objective is for the email to get through to the inbox with the link rewritten. As observed by Darktrace, attackers often send the link in isolation as any additional components (i.e., body text or other content in the email) could cause a more severe action such as the email security solution holding the message.

  • Method 2: Reply-Chain

With this method, the attacker sends a malicious link to an email security vendor’s customer in an attempt to solicit a reply from an internal user. This allows them to grab the re-written URL within the reply chain. However, this is a risky tactic which can fail at several points. The attacker has to be confident the initial email won't be blocked outright; they also risk alerting security vendors to the address and the URL intended to be used for the main campaign. They also must be confident that the checks made when the re-written URL is clicked will not lead to a block at the final destination.
Regardless of the method used, the end result will appear as follows:

For example, the original malicious URL may look like this,

faceldu[.]org/Invoice112.zip

(negative surface indicators: recently registered domain, file extension)

And after being rewritten,

securityvevndor[.]com/safe?q=aNDF80dfaAkAH930adbd

(positive surface indicators: established domain, positive reputation, associated with safe content)

Step Two:

Now that the attacker has access to a malicious URL that has been obfuscated by a safe rewrite, attackers can forward or craft an email leveraging that same link. In fact, we have even seen multiple layers of Safelink Smuggling being used to mask a payload further.

The Challenge of Link Rewriting

Traditional email security solutions rewrite all links sent to an organization, but there is an inherent risk to this methodology. Rewriting every link, whether harmless or harmful, leads employees to lose context and creates a false sense of security when interacting with rewritten links in emails. Furthermore, it provides attackers with many opportunities to exploit Safelinks. As demonstrated in Method 2 above, if an email security solution does not rewrite every link, executing such attacks would be significantly more challenging.

Traditionally, rewriting every link made sense from a security perspective, as it allowed servers to thoroughly analyze links for known attack patterns and signatures. However, this approach relies on identifying previously recognized threats. Conversely, Darktrace / EMAIL gathers sufficient information about a link without needing to rewrite it, by analyzing the context and content of the email and the link itself.

In fact, Darktrace is the pioneer in applying selective rewriting to URLs based on suspicious properties or context, a method that other solutions have since adopted. While traditional solutions rewrite links to assess them only after they are clicked, Darktrace / EMAIL takes immediate action to neutralize threats before they reach the inbox.

Darktrace achieves high success rates in detecting malicious links and emails on the first encounter using Self-Learning AI. By understanding 'normal' behavior in email communications, Darktrace identifies subtle deviations indicative of cyber threats and selectively rewrites only those links deemed suspicious, ensuring a targeted, proportionate, and non-disruptive response.

Why do traditional email security solutions miss Safelink attacks?

Traditional security solutions that focus on learning attack patterns will miss Safelink threats as they are often utilized in attacks that have a variety of layers which help the email seem legitimate. Leveraging all the classic techniques seen in a supply chain attack to disguise the sender's intent, taking advantage of the users' inherent trust in familiar sources, the user is more likely to lower their defenses.

For more information: https://darktrace.com/products/email/use-cases/supply-chain-attack

In terms of the URL, if the payload is malicious, why is it difficult for email security solutions to catch it? Primarily, other security vendors will focus on the payload in isolation, attempting to find known attack patterns or signatures such as a domain name or IP with a bad reputation. Unfortunately, with this technique, if the URL has a legitimate domain, it will return a clean track record. Common obfuscation techniques such as captchas, short-links, and click throughs can all be deployed to add layers of complexity to the analysis.

Safelink Smuggling relies heavily on link redirects, which means that web analysis tools will falter as they will only analyze the first redirect. Consequently, when more in-depth analysis on the link itself is performed, the first place the URL takes the user is not the malicious site but rather the default on-click analysis of the vendor in question. Therefore, any traditional browser or link analysis will also return a negative result.

Finally, the context itself is important. In contrast to traditional email security solutions, Darktrace / EMAIL asks who, what, when, where, and why for every single email, and compares it to the pattern of life of both the internal recipient and the external sender, rather than attempting to match patterns with historical threat data. When analyzing an email from an inbound perspective, Darktrace reveals potential deviations from normal, that, when considered sufficiently anomalous, will result in taking a proportional action to the threat assessed.

To illustrate the above, let’s take a look at an example email that Darktrace recently caught.

The following is an email a Darktrace customer received, which Darktrace / EMAIL held before it reached the inbox. In this case, the smuggled Safelink was further obfuscated behind a QR Code. The accompanying document also presented some anomalies in terms of its intent, perceived as a potential social engineering attempt. Finally, the lack of association and low mailing history meant there was no prior context for this email.  

Example of a Safelink Smuggling attack using a popular email security solution’s safelink.
Fig 1: Example of a Safelink Smuggling attack using a popular email security solution’s safelink.

How to mitigate against Safelink Smuggling?

It's difficult for email security vendors to do anything about their links being reused, and reuse should almost be expected by popular operators in the email security space. Therefore, the presence of links from a vendor’s domain in a suspicious email communication rarely indicates a compromise of the link rewrite infrastructure or a compromise of the third-party vendor.

Email security vendors can improve their defense-in-depth, especially around their email provider accounts to avoid Method 1 (Compromised Account attacks) and become more selective with their rewrites to curtail Method 2 (Reply Chain attacks).

Primary protection against Safelink Smuggling should be offered by the email security vendor responsible for inbound email analysis. They need to ensure that techniques such as Safelink Smuggling are not evaded by their detection mechanisms.

Darktrace has long been working on the betterment of security within the email community and innovating our link analysis infrastructure to mitigate against this attack methodology (read more about our major update in 6.2 here), regardless of whether the receiving organization are Darktrace customers.

How does Darktrace deal with Safelink Smuggling today?

Darktrace has been dealing with Safelink Smuggling since launch and has a standardized recommendation for customers who are looking to defend against this threat.

Customers want to avoid being 1) the propagators of this threat and potentially damaging their brand reputation, and 2) being victims of the supply chain attack thereafter.

The principal recommendation to protect customer accounts and consequently their brands is to ensure defense-in-depth. As accounts establish themselves as the crown jewels of any modern enterprise, organizations should vigilantly monitor their account activity with the same rigor they would analyze their network activity. Whether that is through the base account takeover protection offered by Darktrace / EMAIL, or the expanded defense offered by Darktrace / IDENTITY, it is crucial that the accounts themselves have a robust security solution in place.

Secondly, to avoid falling victim to the supply chain attack that leverages a third-party vendor’s link rewrite, it is imperative to use a solution that does not rely on static threat intelligence and link reputation analysis. Rather than chasing attackers by updating rules and signatures, Darktrace leverages Self-Learning AI to learn the communication patterns of both internal and external messages to reveal deviations in both content and context.

Finally, for those customers that already leverage Darktrace / EMAIL we recommend ensuring that lock links are enabled, and that the default warning page is displayed every time a link is rewritten, no matter the perceived severity of the link. This will allow any potential user that clicks on a rewritten Darktrace / EMAIL link to be alerted to the potential nature of the site they are trying to access.

Safelink smuggling example caught by Darktrace

While most cases involve other vendors, analysts recently saw a case where Darktrace's own links were used in this type of attack. A small number of links were leveraged in a campaign targeting both Darktrace and non-Darktrace customers alike. Thankfully, these attempts were all appropriately actioned by those customers that had Darktrace / EMAIL deployed.

In the example below, you will see how Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst describes the example at hand under the Anomaly Indicators section.

Example of Safelink Smuggling attack on Darktrace using the Darktrace Safelink Infrastructure.
Fig 2: Example of Safelink Smuggling attack on Darktrace using the Darktrace Safelink Infrastructure.

First, the display name mismatch can be interpreted as an indicator of social engineering, attempting to deceive the recipient with an IT policy change.

Second, the link itself, which in this case is a hidden redirect to an unusual host for this environment.

Finally, there is a suspected account takeover due to the origin of the email being a long-standing, validated domain that contains a wide variety of suspicious elements.

Darktrace / EMAIL would have held this email from being delivered.

Conclusion

By investigating Safelink Smuggling, Darktrace wants to shine a light on the technique for security teams and help raise awareness of how it can be used to dupe users into lowering their defenses. Challenge your email security vendor on how it deals with link analysis, particularly from trusted senders and applications.

Interested in Darktrace’s approach to defense-in-depth? Check out Darktrace / EMAIL

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Carlos Gray
Senior Product Marketing Manager, Email
Written by
Stephen Pickman
Chief Technology Officer

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September 2, 2026

Botnet Behind the Camera: Mirai Katana Activity on a Video Recording Device

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Key takeaways

  • Darktrace identified a camera device infected with the Mirai/Katana botnet in a sports-sector customer environment, showing how exposed IoT devices can become active participants in wider attack chains.
  • The compromise involved suspicious Wget behavior, file downloads from rare external IPs, unusual incoming HTTP connections to video recorder management interfaces, and large outbound data transfers to infrastructure associated with botnet activity.
  • The incident highlights the importance of extending visibility and response beyond traditional endpoints, as unmanaged or overlooked connected devices can be exploited for command-and-control, malware delivery, and data exfiltration.

Mirai and the Katana variant

Mirai is a botnet that first emerged in August 2016 and is well known for launching large-scale distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, typically targeting exposed Internet of Things (IoT) devices. It identifies vulnerable IoT devices ,often by abusing default credentials or exposed services, and recruiting them into a remotely controlled botnet that can be used in DDoS campaigns [1].

Katana, one of the many variants that arose after Mirai’s source code was released publicly, was first observed in late 2020 and has been seen using more advanced capabilities, including custom command-and-control (C2), persistence mechanisms, and DDoS functionality [2].

In March 2026, research from the Nokia Deepfield Emergency Response Team (ERT) identified Katana as a Mirai-derived DDoS botnet targeting Android-based TV set-top boxes through exposed Android Debug Bridge (ADB) access.  Observed capabilities included custom C2, runtime domain rotation, multiple DDoS methods, and an on-device compiled kernel rootkit used for persistence and stealth [3].

Darktrace’s detection of Mirai Botnet activity on a camera device

In early 2026, Darktrace identified a Network/Digital Video Recorder (NVR/DVR) on the network of a sports-sector customer that had been infected with the Mirai Katana botnet and subsequently used to exfiltrate data from the customer’s environment. Seemingly related follow-up activity was observed on the same device several months later.

In both instances, the Darktrace Security Operations Centre (SOC) alerted the customer as part of the Managed Threat Detection (MTD) service. However, as Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was not fully enabled on the affected device, Darktrace was unable to proactively block the suspicious activity or prevent the compromise from continuing and recurring.

The initial compromise appears to have occurred when the affected device was seen using Wget to download Linux-based Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) files from a rare external IP, 195.177.94[.]105, which had not previously been observed in the customer’s network. Further analysis downloaded file hashes identified files related to the Mirai botnet.

Figure 1: Darktrace’s Real-Time AI Analyst investigation into the unusual outbound connection where the ELF files were downloaded.

Within a few hours, Darktrace detected the device uploading close to 3GB of data to another external IP, 50.7.49[.]4:3017 (ASN AS30058 FDCSERVERS), suggesting that the activity was likely routed via a virtual private server (VPS) hosted by FDC Servers [2]. Attackers often abuse VPS infrastructure from legitimate cloud providers to blend in with legitimate traffic and evade IP reputation and geolocation-based detections.

Figure 2:  Darktrace’s detection of the unusual data upload activity by the affected camera device.

Darktrace continued to observe similar data transfers to multiple rare endpoints  including 171.225.223[.]53, 95.161.128[.]62, 61.7.209[.]88, 95.161.128[.]62, which have been linked to Mirai by open-source intelligence (OSINT).

Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of spikes in unusual external data transfer activity from the camera device.

Exploitation continued

Several months later, Darktrace identified the same exfiltration pattern on the device again, this time with stronger indications of associations with Mirai Katana botnet infection.

The device received incoming HTTP connections from 129.121.114[.]124, an external IP known to be associated with the Katana botnet IP [3]. The connections targeted the ‘/dvr/cmd’ path using the root username and user agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/42.0.2311.135 Safari/537.36 Edge/12.246.

The ‘/dvr/cmd’ path appears to be associated with the affected device’s web management functionality. This API endpoint has historically been targeted by Mirai and other IoT botnets through the exploitation of critical command injection vulnerabilities and automated botnet exploitation [4].

Figure 4: Darktrace’s  detection of HTTP connectivity from the external IP associated with Mirai Katana Botnet.

A few days later, Darktrace observed the Wget utility being used to download ELF files, including “/lil”,  from the IP 129.121.114[.]124. OSINT reporting has since associated this IP address with the Mirai Katana botnet. Notably, the IP observed earlier in the year, 195.177.94[.]105, had also hosted a file named “lil”, indicating a link between the observed activity.

Over the following days, the device received a sudden spike in connections from multiple rare external endpoints, suggesting a possible successful brute force attack. Darktrace also observed the device exfiltrating just under 4GB of data to another Mirai-associated IP address,  66.92.198[.]194, over ports 3344, 954922, and 80. Finally, the device was seen uploading data to the Mirai botnet IP 5.175.249[.]53 over port138 and exhibited an increase in UDP connections to 34.18.28[.]10 over port 9068.

Following both file download events, Darktrace identified spikes in external data transfers and connection attempts to rare destinations. While Darktrace’s Threat Research team could not confirm with high confidence that this to activity was directly associated with Mirai, it may indicate that Mirai Katana includes data exfiltration functionality.

Darktrace’s threat researchers also identified an internet-facing NTP server belonging to a separate customer receiving incoming connection attempts from the same initially observed IP, 195.177.94[.]105,over the port 123. This suggests that Mirai Katana may not exclusively target IoT devices.

Conclusion

This case demonstrates how threat actors can exploit overlooked IoT and OT devices to support broader malicious objectives. Here, a camera device infected with a botnet was used to exfiltrate data from the customer's environment, showing how peripheral assets can become active participants in an attack chain.

This case also reinforces a challenge many organizations face today: extending security visibility beyond traditional endpoints and servers. Cameras, sensors, and other connected devices often operate with limited monitoring and may fall outside established security processes, despite maintaining network connectivity and access to potentially sensitive environments. This is particularly relevant in the sports sector, where growing reliance on connected cameras, smart stadium technologies, and other IoT devices continues to expand the attack surface, as highlighted in Darktrace's Sports Sector Threat Report.

As botnets like Kata and Mirai continue to evolve, defenders need visibility across unmanaged IoT and edge devices, as well as security solutions that can recognize subtle deviations in device behavior that may indicate an emerging compromise.

Credit to Parvatha Ananthakannan (Cyber Analyst), Signe Zaharka (Principal Analyst)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

·      Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

·      Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

·      Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

·      Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

·      Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

·      Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

·      Device / Significant UDP Increase

·      Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration to IP

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

·      Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity

·      Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination

·      Unusual Activity / Unusual DNS

·      Device / External Network Scan

·      Device / Suspicious DNS Activity

·      Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Indicator of Compromise Type Description
195.177.94[.]105 IP C2 endpoint
50.7.49[.]4:30171 IP Possible C2 endpoint
129.121.114[.]124 IP C2 endpoint
hxxp://195.177.94[.]105/n3 URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://195.177.94[.]105/n2 URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/lil URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/HHn URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/JFc URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/jum URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/OaSf URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/OPWg URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/vHwK URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/VLv URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/WbJ URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/zkR URL Possible C2 endpoint
Ab17883ae4c3bc6afa18c439166eeeb4b03186e3093d984e3a95f573e0fcb7d8 SHA-256 Mirai payload
3d587e809dac49d34a3f717e072fd0aebe5e71db63333e45c81577d6b4266f87 SHA-256 Mirai payload
Bf6e81733a7e209d3dce80d15bf3c5d300752d961fae6b45d90c9bbe7f8c89a2 SHA-256 Possible payload
f25488303813ab1ec0eaa71562938601aac185e8aaf93adb84522557f7cf4dd6 SHA-256 Possible payload
0cb4ff6b71f4423184bfa35c34e9090297637208b0e30205d4b224e56abde2ef SHA-256 Possible payload
19c24cbeaf06b2e7697083f33a85521a9315105c784691bde7420fde4cc69410 SHA-256 Likely Mirai payload
1e74f734fff8df91f4f7172d0de10c421eca78aeb800e8a48e16bc5dbde5d20e SHA-256 Possible payload
6e71f7763d1f29d5712106ebb122e281c32787540aa2342b0fe5351d585d18d7 SHA-256 Possible payload
71f4ff7cdb6d6a7d2673c543c5d2535093afbd707b20a5b9ddf735466c1105c1 SHA-256 Possible payload
76db7ee73ebf15e48a3cb24a074d92248671ef2c6ed3bc3e708377341fb7674d SHA-256 Possible payload
da87a65f7beb438e61f0b61964fed8aa305a380f569042f84c55eca8fa7929b8 SHA-256 Possible payload
e15809eb6ba66477175270d62cfa53e4bf278595f69938708c81c4bc457930fe SHA-256 Mirai payload

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic Technique ID Technique / Sub-technique
Initial Access T1659 Content Injection
T1189 Drive-by Compromise
Exfiltration T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
Command and Control T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol
T1571 Non-Standard Port
Reconnaissance T1595.001 Scanning IP Blocks
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About the author
Parvatha Ananthakannan
Cyber Analyst

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August 26, 2026

AI Agents: Securing the Path from Intent to Action

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The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) recently published guidance on managing the cyber risk of agentic AI. While the document is framed as interim advice as more formal guidance is developed, the framing reflects the current state of the industry: organizations are already deploying agents into production environments while standards, controls, and operating models for autonomous systems remain unsettled. Governance is evolving alongside adoption rather than preceding it, a reality which underscores the importance of robust controls.  

The NCSC’s guidance recommends aligning controls to an agent's level of autonomy, assigning distinct identities, limiting permissions, constraining access to systems and data, monitoring activity, maintaining human oversight, and preserving the ability to intervene when necessary. Most of these recommendations will sound familiar to security teams. The challenge is not the novelty of the controls. It is the type of system those controls now need to govern.

The shift from model security to agent security

For several years, AI security discussions have focused heavily on models. Can a model be manipulated? Jailbroken? Trusted? Can it expose information it should not? Those questions remain important, but they capture only part of the problem. A model generating text is one thing. A system connected to identities, applications, tools, workflows, and business data is another.

The difference becomes clearer when comparing a chatbot that answers questions with an agent that can retrieve customer records, update tickets, invoke tools, trigger workflows, and interact with external systems. The underlying model may be identical. Its access is not. The security question begins to shift from what the model knows to what the system can do.

The same theme appears in the Five Eyes statement released earlier this year, describing AI as a force multiplier that is accelerating both offensive and defensive cyber operations. The NCSC guidance explores what that reality looks like when autonomous systems begin operating inside enterprise environments.

Securing AI agents in operation

The NCSC spends relatively little time debating model behavior and considerably more time discussing identity, permissions, monitoring, oversight, containment, and response. Agents are treated as participants within an environment rather than isolated pieces of technology.  

That's broadly consistent with how we think about the problem at Darktrace.

An agent should not be treated as an extension of a user account. It develops its own behavioral patterns. It accesses systems, interacts with data, invokes tools, and moves across workflows in ways that can be observed independently. Understanding what an agent is permitted to do matters. Understanding how it actually behaves once deployed, and whether that behavior aligns with business intent, matters just as much.

Identity provides an obvious example. The NCSC recommends assigning distinct identities to agents rather than allowing them to disappear into surrounding human or service accounts. Most importantly, assigning agents distinct identities enables independent behavioral monitoring.

Development assumptions vs. real-world behavior

The same principle extends to monitoring. NCSC guidance places agent activity within normal security operations rather than treating it as a separate AI governance function. Many of the controls described are put in place before an agent begins operating. Sandboxing, credential design, approval workflows and human oversight all reflect judgments about how the system is expected to behave and what risks it is likely to create.

Actual use may challenge those assumptions. Access patterns change. Workflows expand. Systems begin interacting with resources they have never touched before. Processes that appeared reasonable during design behave differently in production. Human oversight requirements may turn out to be either excessive or inadequate once the system is operating at scale and operating within the context of unique business processes.

The Five Eyes statement points to a similar issue: organizations need confidence that controls continue to work as intended once systems are exposed to real users, data, tools and operational pressures. Often, the question is not whether an agent is technically allowed to perform an action, but whether its behavior remains consistent with the role it was intended to play.

Monitoring and governance of AI agents go hand-in-hand

This problem is exactly why monitoring and governance should be treated as part of the same process. Governance sets the initial parameters for deployment, while monitoring provides evidence about whether those parameters remain appropriate. That evidence should, in turn, inform changes to permissions, controls and oversight.

This matters increasingly as autonomous systems are integrated into business processes. The relevant risk is shaped not only by the model or agent itself, but by what it can access, what actions it can take, and how its behavior changes in practice.

Developing continuous oversight of AI agent behavior

The implication is clear: governance cannot end at deployment. Organizations need a way to understand how agents behave after deployment, test whether controls remain appropriate, and adjust them as conditions change. That requires visibility not just into technical activity, but into whether that activity makes sense in the context of the business process the agent is intended to support.

This is where business-centric behavioral security can become critical. Risk does not emerge from the model itself: it emerges from the actions an autonomous system takes within the enterprise and the downstream consequences of those actions.  

An agent can operate exactly as intended and still create risk if it accesses sensitive information in an unexpected context, exercises permissions in ways that create unintended exposure, or influences business processes in ways that were not anticipated during design and review.

Traditional governance vs. behavioral security

Traditional governance frameworks provide assurance at a point in time. Behavioral security can provide ongoing visibility into how autonomous systems interact with the organization they are meant to serve. Rather than focusing exclusively on model performance or policy compliance, organizations need to understand whether an agent's behavior aligns with business intent, operational expectations, and acceptable risk tolerances as conditions change.

As enterprises move from isolated AI deployments to interconnected ecosystems of agents, visibility into behavior becomes as important as visibility into code. Governance determines what an autonomous system is permitted to do. Behavioral analytics helps determine what it is doing, what business outcomes it is producing, and whether those outcomes remain aligned with the organization's objectives.

[related-resource]

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About the author
Margaret Cunningham, PhD
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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