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August 2, 2024

Safelink Smuggling: Enhancing Resilience Against Malicious Links

Gain insights into safelink smuggling tactics and learn strategies to protect your organization from the dangers posed by malicious links.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Carlos Gray
Senior Product Marketing Manager, Email
Written by
Stephen Pickman
Senior Vice President, Engineering
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02
Aug 2024

Darktrace security members and researchers have recently seen a rise in what we are calling Safelink Smuggling. Safelinks are URLs rewritten by security solutions to enable additional analysis when the URL is clicked. Once analyzed, they may prompt a user, redirect the browser back to the original URL, or block further access if deemed necessary.

What is Safelink Smuggling?

Safelink Smuggling is a technique that involves an attacker purposely getting their malicious payload rewritten by a security solution’s Safelink capability to then propagate the rewritten URL to others. This technique is a way for attackers to not only avoid detection by traditional email security and other solutions, but also to instill mistrust in all email security solutions. As a result, Safelinks from a range of popular email security providers are often seen in phishing or supply chain attacks. In fact, Darktrace has observed over 300,000 cases of Safelinks being included in unexpected and suspicious contexts over the last 3 months.

How does Safelink Smuggling work?

Safelink Smuggling has two key stages: Getting a malicious link rewritten by an email security solution, then propagating that rewritten link to other victims.

Step one:

Obfuscated a malicious payload through a Safelink capability rewriting the link; Darktrace has seen this attempted through two methods – Compromised Account or Reply-Chain.

  • Method 1: Compromised Account

If an attacker can gain access to a compromised account – whether that’s through brute force, malware or credential theft – they can infiltrate it with malicious links, and then exfiltrate the Safelinks created as the email passes through security filtering. In other words, attackers will send a malicious payload to the compromised inbox, with the intent that the malicious URL gets rewritten. Unlike a normal phishing email where the threat actor wants to avoid having their email blocked, in this case the objective is for the email to get through to the inbox with the link rewritten. As observed by Darktrace, attackers often send the link in isolation as any additional components (i.e., body text or other content in the email) could cause a more severe action such as the email security solution holding the message.

  • Method 2: Reply-Chain

With this method, the attacker sends a malicious link to an email security vendor’s customer in an attempt to solicit a reply from an internal user. This allows them to grab the re-written URL within the reply chain. However, this is a risky tactic which can fail at several points. The attacker has to be confident the initial email won't be blocked outright; they also risk alerting security vendors to the address and the URL intended to be used for the main campaign. They also must be confident that the checks made when the re-written URL is clicked will not lead to a block at the final destination.
Regardless of the method used, the end result will appear as follows:

For example, the original malicious URL may look like this,

faceldu[.]org/Invoice112.zip

(negative surface indicators: recently registered domain, file extension)

And after being rewritten,

securityvevndor[.]com/safe?q=aNDF80dfaAkAH930adbd

(positive surface indicators: established domain, positive reputation, associated with safe content)

Step Two:

Now that the attacker has access to a malicious URL that has been obfuscated by a safe rewrite, attackers can forward or craft an email leveraging that same link. In fact, we have even seen multiple layers of Safelink Smuggling being used to mask a payload further.

The Challenge of Link Rewriting

Traditional email security solutions rewrite all links sent to an organization, but there is an inherent risk to this methodology. Rewriting every link, whether harmless or harmful, leads employees to lose context and creates a false sense of security when interacting with rewritten links in emails. Furthermore, it provides attackers with many opportunities to exploit Safelinks. As demonstrated in Method 2 above, if an email security solution does not rewrite every link, executing such attacks would be significantly more challenging.

Traditionally, rewriting every link made sense from a security perspective, as it allowed servers to thoroughly analyze links for known attack patterns and signatures. However, this approach relies on identifying previously recognized threats. Conversely, Darktrace / EMAIL gathers sufficient information about a link without needing to rewrite it, by analyzing the context and content of the email and the link itself.

In fact, Darktrace is the pioneer in applying selective rewriting to URLs based on suspicious properties or context, a method that other solutions have since adopted. While traditional solutions rewrite links to assess them only after they are clicked, Darktrace / EMAIL takes immediate action to neutralize threats before they reach the inbox.

Darktrace achieves high success rates in detecting malicious links and emails on the first encounter using Self-Learning AI. By understanding 'normal' behavior in email communications, Darktrace identifies subtle deviations indicative of cyber threats and selectively rewrites only those links deemed suspicious, ensuring a targeted, proportionate, and non-disruptive response.

Why do traditional email security solutions miss Safelink attacks?

Traditional security solutions that focus on learning attack patterns will miss Safelink threats as they are often utilized in attacks that have a variety of layers which help the email seem legitimate. Leveraging all the classic techniques seen in a supply chain attack to disguise the sender's intent, taking advantage of the users' inherent trust in familiar sources, the user is more likely to lower their defenses.

For more information: https://darktrace.com/products/email/use-cases/supply-chain-attack

In terms of the URL, if the payload is malicious, why is it difficult for email security solutions to catch it? Primarily, other security vendors will focus on the payload in isolation, attempting to find known attack patterns or signatures such as a domain name or IP with a bad reputation. Unfortunately, with this technique, if the URL has a legitimate domain, it will return a clean track record. Common obfuscation techniques such as captchas, short-links, and click throughs can all be deployed to add layers of complexity to the analysis.

Safelink Smuggling relies heavily on link redirects, which means that web analysis tools will falter as they will only analyze the first redirect. Consequently, when more in-depth analysis on the link itself is performed, the first place the URL takes the user is not the malicious site but rather the default on-click analysis of the vendor in question. Therefore, any traditional browser or link analysis will also return a negative result.

Finally, the context itself is important. In contrast to traditional email security solutions, Darktrace / EMAIL asks who, what, when, where, and why for every single email, and compares it to the pattern of life of both the internal recipient and the external sender, rather than attempting to match patterns with historical threat data. When analyzing an email from an inbound perspective, Darktrace reveals potential deviations from normal, that, when considered sufficiently anomalous, will result in taking a proportional action to the threat assessed.

To illustrate the above, let’s take a look at an example email that Darktrace recently caught.

The following is an email a Darktrace customer received, which Darktrace / EMAIL held before it reached the inbox. In this case, the smuggled Safelink was further obfuscated behind a QR Code. The accompanying document also presented some anomalies in terms of its intent, perceived as a potential social engineering attempt. Finally, the lack of association and low mailing history meant there was no prior context for this email.  

Example of a Safelink Smuggling attack using a popular email security solution’s safelink.
Fig 1: Example of a Safelink Smuggling attack using a popular email security solution’s safelink.

How to mitigate against Safelink Smuggling?

It's difficult for email security vendors to do anything about their links being reused, and reuse should almost be expected by popular operators in the email security space. Therefore, the presence of links from a vendor’s domain in a suspicious email communication rarely indicates a compromise of the link rewrite infrastructure or a compromise of the third-party vendor.

Email security vendors can improve their defense-in-depth, especially around their email provider accounts to avoid Method 1 (Compromised Account attacks) and become more selective with their rewrites to curtail Method 2 (Reply Chain attacks).

Primary protection against Safelink Smuggling should be offered by the email security vendor responsible for inbound email analysis. They need to ensure that techniques such as Safelink Smuggling are not evaded by their detection mechanisms.

Darktrace has long been working on the betterment of security within the email community and innovating our link analysis infrastructure to mitigate against this attack methodology (read more about our major update in 6.2 here), regardless of whether the receiving organization are Darktrace customers.

How does Darktrace deal with Safelink Smuggling today?

Darktrace has been dealing with Safelink Smuggling since launch and has a standardized recommendation for customers who are looking to defend against this threat.

Customers want to avoid being 1) the propagators of this threat and potentially damaging their brand reputation, and 2) being victims of the supply chain attack thereafter.

The principal recommendation to protect customer accounts and consequently their brands is to ensure defense-in-depth. As accounts establish themselves as the crown jewels of any modern enterprise, organizations should vigilantly monitor their account activity with the same rigor they would analyze their network activity. Whether that is through the base account takeover protection offered by Darktrace / EMAIL, or the expanded defense offered by Darktrace / IDENTITY, it is crucial that the accounts themselves have a robust security solution in place.

Secondly, to avoid falling victim to the supply chain attack that leverages a third-party vendor’s link rewrite, it is imperative to use a solution that does not rely on static threat intelligence and link reputation analysis. Rather than chasing attackers by updating rules and signatures, Darktrace leverages Self-Learning AI to learn the communication patterns of both internal and external messages to reveal deviations in both content and context.

Finally, for those customers that already leverage Darktrace / EMAIL we recommend ensuring that lock links are enabled, and that the default warning page is displayed every time a link is rewritten, no matter the perceived severity of the link. This will allow any potential user that clicks on a rewritten Darktrace / EMAIL link to be alerted to the potential nature of the site they are trying to access.

Safelink smuggling example caught by Darktrace

While most cases involve other vendors, analysts recently saw a case where Darktrace's own links were used in this type of attack. A small number of links were leveraged in a campaign targeting both Darktrace and non-Darktrace customers alike. Thankfully, these attempts were all appropriately actioned by those customers that had Darktrace / EMAIL deployed.

In the example below, you will see how Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst describes the example at hand under the Anomaly Indicators section.

Example of Safelink Smuggling attack on Darktrace using the Darktrace Safelink Infrastructure.
Fig 2: Example of Safelink Smuggling attack on Darktrace using the Darktrace Safelink Infrastructure.

First, the display name mismatch can be interpreted as an indicator of social engineering, attempting to deceive the recipient with an IT policy change.

Second, the link itself, which in this case is a hidden redirect to an unusual host for this environment.

Finally, there is a suspected account takeover due to the origin of the email being a long-standing, validated domain that contains a wide variety of suspicious elements.

Darktrace / EMAIL would have held this email from being delivered.

Conclusion

By investigating Safelink Smuggling, Darktrace wants to shine a light on the technique for security teams and help raise awareness of how it can be used to dupe users into lowering their defenses. Challenge your email security vendor on how it deals with link analysis, particularly from trusted senders and applications.

Interested in Darktrace’s approach to defense-in-depth? Check out Darktrace / EMAIL

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Carlos Gray
Senior Product Marketing Manager, Email
Written by
Stephen Pickman
Senior Vice President, Engineering

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July 20, 2026

スタジアム運営を任されるAI。セキュリティチームはこれをどう保護すべきか?

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スタジアム運営に使われるAIをどう保護するべきか

主なポイント

  • AIはアクセス管理、群衆管理、チケット発行、設備管理、監視カメラ等、スタジアムの運営に重要な機能に導入されつつある。  
  • シャドーAIやサードパーティAIの利用はスタジアムのセキュリティチームの目の届かないところでリスクを生み出している。
  • セキュリティチームはどのようなAIシステムが存在しているかだけでなく、それらが何にアクセスし、どのようなアクションを実行できるかを理解できなければならない。
  • イベントのレジリエンスにはAI、IT、OT、アイデンティティ、サードパーティ全体に渡る継続的監視と対応が必要。

現代のスタジアムは、他に類を見ないインフラです。以前にも書いたことがありますが、イベント開催日には、スタジアムに生命が吹き込まれ、グッズや食べ物の販売、交通のハブ、広大な通信インフラ、そしてフィールド上のさまざまな技術など、これらが連携した1つの巨大なエコシステムとして機能します。その規模と複雑性により、スタジアムはサイバーセキュリティにとって最も過酷な環境の1つとなっています。その運営に今、AIを導入することで私たちは新たな次元のリスクを負おうとしています。

スタジアム運営にAIを導入することの利点は明らかです。スタジアム運営者はAIを使うことにより、混雑したゲートからファンを安全に誘導し、売店の需要を予測し、生体認証システムを管理し、不審な動きを監視カメラで見つけ、また空調や換気を制御することができます。上手く使えば、イベントをより安全に、迅速に、より効率的にすることができます。

ただし、AIはセキュリティモデルも変化させます。

ダークトレースが最近発表したスポーツを取り巻く脅威状況についての調査では、プロスポーツ組織のサイバーセキュリティプロフェッショナルを対象に、自組織の運用範囲の中でサイバー侵害が最も重大な影響を及ぼすのはどこかという質問をしました。調査対象のプロフェッショナルの最も多い34%が指摘した分野は、スタジアムの運営でした。それと同時に、35%は自組織がすでにスタジアムの運営にAIを使用している、あるいは今後12か月間に導入の予定があると回答しています。

セキュリティチームはもはや、スタジアムを中心とした従来型のITシステムだけを保護しているのではありません。スタジアムの基盤となる重要機能を動かしている、AIシステムの保護も求められるようになっているのです。

承認済みAIとシャドーAIの違い

スタジアムのセキュリティチームが知っているAIと、そうでないAIの間には明確な違いがあります。

承認済みAIとは、審査およびテストされ、施設の運用環境に統合されたAIです。こうしたAIは、監視カメラのアナリティクス、アクセス管理、設備管理、チケット発行、ロジスティクス、放送オペレーション、海賊版対策などに使われているかもしれません。それらのAIには、明確なオーナーシップ、アクセス制御、ログ記録、ベンダーレビュー、データ保護規則などがあるはずです。それによってリスクがなくなるわけではありませんが、セキュリティチームは適切なガバナンスを整備できます。

シャドーAIはそれとは違います。シャドーAIとは、従業員、請負業者、サプライヤーによる承認されていないAIの利用です。多くの場合それは善良な意図で始まります。たとえば、作業をもっと早く進めたいと思う人がいるかもしれません。あるいは、ブリーフィングの原稿を作るためにスタッフが内部情報をパブリックAIにペーストする、開発者がチケット発行プログラムのデバッグのためにAIアシスタントを使用する、サプライヤーがAIスケジューリングツールを配送ルートに接続する、デザイナーがモックアップ作成のために未公開の会場設計図やスポンサーの資料をAIにアップロードするなどの事です。

これらの行動はいずれも、それを行っている人からすればセキュリティ上の判断のようには感じられません。しかし、これらの行為は機密性の高い運営データを、スタジアムが管理していない環境に送出し、隠れたリスクを生みます。

承認済みAIスタックは、セキュリティチームから見えています。シャドーAIスタックは多くの場合そうではありません。

試合開催日に増幅するリスクと影響

通常のエンタープライズ環境であれば、不審なログイン、普段とは異なるデータ転送、予期しないサードパーティサービスへの接続をセキュリティチームが調査するための時間は数時間あるでしょう。スタジアムでは、インシデントが起こる可能性の高い瞬間は、チームに最も余力がなくインシデントが最も大きな影響を及ぼし得るタイミング、つまり試合開催日です。

群衆管理に使われているAIシステムが予期せぬ振る舞いをしたとき、その問題は単に技術上の問題ではありません。それは会場内の物理的な動きに影響を及ぼすかもしれません。

サプライヤーツールが運営データを承認されていないAIプラットフォームに送信すれば、それはデータガバナンスだけの問題ではありません。配送ルートやアクセス制限のスケジュール、スタッフ配備計画などが漏洩するかもしれません。

最も危険なシナリオは必ずしも派手な、劇的な攻撃とは限らず、外部ベンダーがソフトウェア更新でAI機能を追加した、あるいはスタッフのワークフローで未承認のツールが使用されているなど、誰も想定していなかった隠れた依存関係から発生することがあります。

イベントが始まると、これらの隠れたつながりが運営上のリスクになる可能性があります。

サプライチェーンはスタジアムのアタックサーフェス(攻撃対象領域)の一部

すべての大規模スポーツイベントは、さまざまなサプライチェーンとパートナーシップで構築されています。ケータリングサービスや輸送、放送システム、施設管理チームなど、あらゆるピースが必須であり、それぞれがセキュリティチャネルを作り出しています。サプライチェーン侵害のリスクはすでによく知られており私たちが目にしてきたいくつかの有名な侵害事例の原因となっています。マジソン・スクエア・ガーデンを所有するMSG Entertainment社のデータ侵害事例は3月に大きく報道されましたが、これはMSG Entertainment社のバックオフィスシステムで使用されていたOracleのE-Business Suiteから発生していました。また、2018年の平昌冬季オリンピックを標的としたOlympic Destroyer攻撃はこの大会のメインITサービスプロバイダーに対する侵害から始まったと言われています。そして、AIの導入によりこのリスクは増大しつつあります。

スタジアム自体は自社のAIシステムに厳しいルールを設けているかもしれませんが、ベンダーは別のツールを使っている場合があります。スタッフの配備や、配送のタイミング、在庫、顧客とのやり取りの管理にAIを使っている業者もあるでしょう。また、既に使用しているソフトウェアにAI機能が追加されていることに気が付いていないケースもあります。

スタジアムの運営でAIを保護する際の最も難しい問題の1つはこの点です。リスクはスタジアムが選択したツールから来るとは限らないのです。サプライヤーが選択したツールや、有効に設定されていることをサプライヤーが知らなかった機能からリスクが発生する可能性があります。

セキュリティチームは、ベンダーのアクセスを管理するのと同じようにベンダーのAIを扱う必要があります。サプライヤーが何に接続できるか、どのようなデータを見ることができるか、どのようなツールを使っているか、そしてこれらのツールがデータ露出や水平移動(ラテラルムーブメント)の新たな経路を作り出さないかを知る必要があるのです。

サードパーティAIツールがリスクを作り出すのに深いアクセス権は必要ありません。特定の情報が不適切なタイミングで露出するだけでリスクを招きます。

スタジアム運営におけるAIについてセキュリティチームが確認すべき4つの質問

AIがスタジアム運営の一部となるなかで、セキュリティチームは基本的な承認リストの先へ進む必要があります。次の4つの点を問う必要があります:

1.  AIはどこで使われているか?

すぐに思いつくのは、コンピュータービジョン、アクセス管理、チケット発行、ロジスティクス、設備管理等のツールです。しかし、SaaSプラットフォーム、ベンダーツール、ブラウザ拡張、開発者ワークフロー、スマートビルディングシステム、コラボレーションツールにも見えにくい形でAIが含まれています。

2. AIは何にアクセスできるか?

そのAIはインシデントログ、スタジアム設計図、チケット発行データ、ビデオ映像、建物管理、ファン情報、認証情報、サプライヤーシステムを見ることができるでしょうか?それは情報を分析するだけでしょうか、それともアクションを実行することもできるでしょうか?

3. AIは何を実行できるか?

AIエージェントは単なる受動的ツールではありません。APIを呼び出す、記録を更新する、命令を生成する、ワークフローをトリガーする、あるいはユーザーやサービスアカウントの権限を持って行動できるものもあります。スタジアムにおいて、その違いはきわめて重要な意味を持ちます。アクションを提案するAIシステムと、アクションを実行できるAIの間には大きな違いがあります。

4. 何が正常な状態か?

セキュリティアーキテクチャとしては、静的なルールだけでは不十分となるでしょう。AIの使用状況は急激に変化します:既存のプラットフォーム内にAIツールが出現し、ベンダーがAIを使った新しいサービスを追加し、多忙をきわめたスタッフはAIを使った回避策を見つけるかもしれません。セキュリティチームは、何かが変化したときにそれを発見できるよう、人、アイデンティティ、デバイス、ネットワーク、クラウドサービス、サプライヤー、AIツールのすべてにわたって正常な振る舞いを理解している必要があります。

このことは、わずかな異常が重大な意味をもつかもしれない、イベント開催中の環境において特に重要です。未承認のAIサービスへの接続は、ある状況では無害かもしれませんが別の文脈では深刻なものとなる可能性があります。そしてAIエージェントによるアクションの実行は、午前3時にセットアップを行っている状況では予期されたものかもしれませんが、試合開催中にそのアクションが発生した場合、疑わしいものかもしれません。あるアクティビティを意味のあるセキュリティ情報にするのはコンテキストです。また、迅速な対応を可能にするのもコンテキストであると言えます。組織内のAIベースセキュリティシステムが、アクションを実行する必要があることを知るためのリアルタイムのコンテキストを構築できれば、マシンスピードで脅威に対応できます。

AIはスタジアムの安全に貢献できる、ただしAIが安全であることが条件

AIにはスタジアム運営に貢献できる役割があります。観客の混雑をより早期に検知し、ボトルネックを解消し、施設をより効率的に管理し、ファン体験を向上させ、プレッシャーのかかる状況下でイベント運営チームをサポートすることができます。

問題への答えはすべてのAIの導入のペースを落とすことではありません。それが解決策ではありません。答えは、AIを可視化し、管理し、試合日の運営の一部となる前に安全にすることです。

スタジアムの運営チームやイベント主催者にとって、これはAIの使用を会場とサプライヤーエコシステム全体にわたってマッピングすることを意味します。また、各AIシステムが何にアクセスでき、どのようなアクションを実行できるかを理解することです。スタッフの判断で回避策を探すのに任せるのではなく、彼らのニーズを満たす承認済みのツールを提供することも重要です。ベンダーとの契約や監査にAIの利用について明記することも必要です。さらに、わかりやすい主なシステムだけではなく、環境全体で動作を監視することも大事です。スタジアムから見えないものを安全にすることはできません。

AIが、スタジアム内の人の移動、アクセスの制御、設備の管理、サプライヤーのサポート、メディアの権利保護の一部となるとき、それはもはや追加機能ではなく、イベントインフラの一部となるのです。

イベントインフラは、スタジアムのゲートが開く前に入念に準備され、安全でシームレスかつ信頼性の高いイベント体験を実現するのに必要な、オペレーショナルレジリエンスによって維持されなければなりません。

Darktraceはスタジアム運営のためのAIをどう保護できるか

ダークトレースは、10年以上にわたり構築してきたビヘイビアAIの専門技術を、複雑で曖昧な環境で機能するように設計された、組織全体をカバーするプラットフォームで提供しています。2022 FIFAワールドカップカタール大会からF1グランプリまで、Darktraceは世界のさまざまな会場や米国中のスタジアムにおいて運営を支える統合された大規模なITおよびOT環境を保護しています。

他のサイバーセキュリティ技術は、過去の攻撃に基づいて新しい攻撃を予測しようとします。しかし問題は、AIが人間のように動作することです。あらゆるアクションが新たな情報をもたらし、それによってAIの動作は変化するため、予測不可能です。過去に見られた攻撃の戦術はもはや方程式の小さな部分に過ぎません。その結果多くのベンダーは実証されていない技術を買収し、改修することによりAIの保護を行おうとしています。  

ダークトレースのアプローチは他とは根本的に異なります。ダークトレースの適応型AIは、人とAIの振る舞いを学習し続けることにより組織についての理解を構築するため、動作の逸脱が起こった時にそれを検知し自律的に対応することが可能です。ダークトレースの提供するビヘイビアベースの防御プラットフォームは、新たなワークフロー、エージェント、アプリケーションの導入に対応して組織内のAI、人、インフラを保護することにより、大規模なAI変革を可能にします。

AIによって変化する組織の潜在力。Darktraceは組織が自信を持って前へ進むのに役立ちます。ダークトレースはスタジアムインフラ内の人とテクノロジーを保護するセキュリティチームに対し、新たなテクノロジーの導入を保護するのに必要な理解、可視性、自律的アクションを提供し、AI時代を構築するための変革を後押しします。

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Karim Benslimane
VP, Field CISO

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July 15, 2026

Security After Signatures: Operating in a World of Pre‑CVE Disclosure Exploitation, Collapsed Trust Boundaries, and Autonomous Systems

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Three shifts have reshaped what it means to defend an enterprise securely.  

First, exploitation often begins before defenders have a Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier, a security advisory, or an entry in the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog.

Secondly, the trust boundary has moved beyond the network edge into identities, tokens, APIs, and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) workflows.  

Third, an increasing share of business activity is executed through automation, integrations, and AI agent-like systems that can act faster than teams can verify intent.  

If your security model still relies on detecting known bad artefacts, triaging isolated alerts, and waiting for confirmation before acting, you are already behind the threat.  

This is not a failure of security teams; it’s a failure of the operating model to keep pace with how the environment has changed.

A SOC built around alerts and signatures assumes that malicious activity will eventually surface as an event. In real incidents, however, the decisive evidence is rarely a single event. Instead, it is a chain of individually explainable actions that only appears malicious once you connect the dots across identity, non-human identity, cloud, email, SaaS, operational technology (OT), and network telemetry.

The defenders succeeding today observe behaviors, link them into sequences, understand what those sequences mean, and contain impact before the full story unfolds. That is the operating model the current threat environment demands.  

Exploitation before disclosure

The first shift is the straightforward: the time to exploit has dropped to nearly zero.  

In one example, Darktrace observed a sequence of subtle but strategically significant anomalies within a customer environment that later aligned with exploitation of CVE‑2025‑0994 in Trimble Cityworks by likely Chinese-nexus threat actors. Behavioral indicators were visible at least 18 days before public disclosure, with related anomalies emerging 40 to 50 days earlier during the intrusion window.  

This case illustrates a familiar pattern: clusters of weak‑signal anomalies combing to form an actionable picture of intrusion long before a CVE is published. Such activity reflects long‑horizon, option‑preserving operator models often associated with mature state‑linked activity.  

Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of malicious exploitation of CVE 2025-0994, later tied to Chinese-nexus threat actors targeting critical national infrastructure (CNI) in the US, weeks before public disclosure.

Throughout 2025 and 2026, Darktrace has continued to observe the value of anomaly-based detections across a range of incidents.

CVE CVE Public Disclosure Date Darktrace Detection Date Days Between Detection of Exploitation and CVE Public Disclosure
CVE 2025 0994
(Trimble City Works)
2025-02-06 2025-01-19 18 Days
CVE 2025-24183
(Apache)
2025-03-10 2025-02-18 20 days
CVE 2025-10035
(Fortra GoAnywhere)
2025-09-18 2025-09-11 7 days

Identity is the real control plane

The second shift is that identity has replaced perimeter as the primary control plane. As Darktrace’s Annual Threat Report 2026 illustrated, identity remains the main challenge in defending against modern intrusions. A clear example is the Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) case published by Darktrace in December 2025. A phishing email led to the compromise of an Office 365 account. Session hijacking bypassed multi-factor authentication (MFA), and the compromised account was used for follow-on phishing and persistence activities including the creation of malicious email rules.  

Every step in that sequence mattered. A successful login alone does not prove legitimacy. An inbox rule, on its own, may not appear catastrophic. Mail activity, viewed in isolation, may seem operationally normal. But the behavioral chain tells a different story: credential theft, token abuse, persistence, and onward compromise through a trusted identity.  

This is why the question is no longer “Did the user authenticate successfully”. The more important question is, “Does this identity action make sense right now, in this context, given what came before it?” The AiTM case shows how identity can be compromised. In practice, however, attacks rarely remained confined to identity alone.  

In another Darktrace case, a compromised SaaS account triggered activity across the email, SaaS, and network layers, including inbox rule changes, phishing propagation, and connections to suspicious infrastructure. Viewed in isolation, none of these events were decisive. Together, however,  they formed a behavioral sequence that revealed the intrusion, with the full attack story automatically correlated and surfaced to defenders by Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst.  

Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst correlated and appended additional events to the incident, including other users who connected to the suspicious redirect link after outbound phishing emails were sent.

AI accelerates the threat  

The third shift is the one many teams still underestimate: trusted tooling, integrations, and AI agent-like systems can create actions that appear legitimate but are strategically dangerous.  

The shift becomes clearer when examining how governments are now framing AI risk. In 2026, guidance published by CISA, UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and Five Eyes partners warned that agentic systems expand attack surfaces, accumulate privilege, and can behave in ways that are difficult to predict or explain [1]. The advice is simple: assume unexpected behavior and design controls around it.  

The real risk is not AI usage. It is unknown autonomy: systems with credentials, data access, and action paths that can execute workflow steps without sufficient behavioral validation, traceability, or human oversight. Darktrace’s Model Context Protocol (MCP) risk analysis provides a useful framework for understanding this challenge. Over-privileged agents, content injection, and tool abuse become high-consequence risks when connected systems can dynamically retrieve data, execute actions, and communicate externally.  

Whether security teams like it or not, AI is already in the enterprise. It will help drive innovation, but it will also be abused, whether accidentally or maliciously. In each of the cases below, AI either scaled the attacker, built the tooling, or existed within the environment as something to exploit or misuse.

1. AI as an Attack Multiplier

In one campaign targeting Mexican government entities, a single operator used commercial AI platforms to generate exploits, automate reconnaissance, and process large volumes of data, compressing work that would traditionally have required an entire team into a single workflow [2].  

Darktrace is also observing this trend further down the stack. In one case, Darktrace identified AI-generated malware exploiting React2Shell, where an attacker used a Large Language Model (LLM) to produce working exploit code and deploy it at scale.  

[darktrace.com], [darktrace.com]

2. AI as an Attack Surface

Attempted AI exploitation is now appearing within customer environments. In one case involving an automation technology manufacturer, a compromised LLM proxy was seemingly used as a stepping stone to access additional AI services. When that attempt failed, the attacker pivoted to cryptomining.

What is clear is that the AI layer has already become an asset worth probing, exploiting, and pivoting through. It is also clear that defenders benefit from rapidly understanding how these activities connect. In this case, Cyber AI Analyst automatically pieced together the intrusion, while Darktrace’s Managed Threat Detection service alerted to the customer, enabling the activity to be contained before it could progress further.

Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst's investigation into a compromised LLM proxy that was abused for cryptomining activity.

AI as a trusted but dangerous actor

This does not require a cinematic vision of “rogue AI.” The Salesloft incident provides a more grounded example, where AI and automation operate with legitimate access but served malicious intent. In that case, attackers abused compromised OAuth tokens associated with the Drift AI chat agent to export significant volumes of data from Salesforce environments.  

The activity resembled legitimate API usage and relied on trusted SaaS integrations rather than malware or other obvious signs of intrusion. That is precisely the challenge. Traditional security controls are good at detecting forced entry, but far less effective when a trusted application integration behaves in a way that is technically permitted yet operationally harmful.  

In these scenarios, the security challenge shifts from validating access to validating behavior.

This is what that looks like in practice: AI-linked identities executing legitimate actions that require behavioral validation rather than access validation.

Figure 4: Darktrace / SECURE AI highlights anomalous activity across AI identities, surfacing critical behavior that requires validation and containment.

Early observations from Darktrace / SECURE AI deployments reinforce this reality. Across Darktrace's observed fleet, AI service connections per deployment increased 13% during the first half of 2026, reaching over 16 million connections overall. The typical organisation now interacts with seven different AI providers, evidence that AI is no longer operating at the edges of the enterprise. It is increasingly woven into day-to-day business activity.

The most common risks are not compromised models or advanced AI attacks. Instead, they stem from employees and business functions exposing sensitive information through entirely legitimate-looking interactions. Darktrace has observed repeated submission of personally identifiable information (PII), tax information, identification documents, and medical data into LLM prompts, alongside widespread use of unsanctioned (shadow) AI services and growing AI activity from mobile devices.  

For defenders, the challenge is increasingly one of context: understanding when legitimate business use crosses into material risk, while preserving privacy and user trust.

Conclusion

Across all three shifts, the pattern is the same: behavior precedes understanding. Security teams are not losing because adversaries have become invisible. An increasingly outdated security model assumes that malicious activity will reveal itself cleanly and early. It no longer does.  

In 2026 and beyond, defenders win by understanding behavioral sequences, continuously validating trust, and acting before certainty becomes hindsight. That is security after signatures. That is security in the AI era.

Credit to: Daniel Levy, Threat Hunting Data Scientist

Edited by: Ryan Traill, Content Manager

References

[1] https://www.cyber.gov.au/business-government/secure-design/artificial-intelligence/careful-adoption-of-agentic-ai-services  

[2]https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2026-02-26/hacker-used-anthropics-claude-ai-to-steal-mexican-government-data

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Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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