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November 6, 2022

Behind Yanluowang: Unveiling Cyber Threat Tactics

Discover the latest insights into the Yanluowang leak organization, uncovering its members and tactics.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Taisiia Garkava
Security Analyst
Written by
Dillon Ashmore
Security and Research
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06
Nov 2022

Background of Yanluowang

Yanluowang ransomware, also known as Dryxiphia, was first spotted in October 2021 by Symantec’s Threat Hunter Team. However, it has been operational since August 2021, when a threat actor used it to attack U.S. corporations. Said attack shared similar TTPs with ransomware Thieflock, designed by Fivehands ransomware gangs. This connection alluded to a possible link between the two through the presence or influence of an affiliate. The group has been known for successfully ransoming organisations globally, particularly those in the financial, manufacturing, IT services, consultancy, and engineering sectors.

Yanluowang attacks typically begin with initial reconnaissance, followed by credential harvesting and data exfiltration before finally encrypting the victim’s files. Once deployed on compromised networks, Yanluowang halts hypervisor virtual machines, all running processes and encrypts files using the “.yanluowang” extension. A file with name README.txt, containing a ransom note is also dropped. The note also warns victims against contacting law enforcement, recovery companies or attempting to decrypt the files themselves. Failure to follow this advice would result in distributed denial of service attacks against a victim, its employees and business partners. Followed by another attack, a few weeks later, in which all the victim’s files would be deleted.

The group’s name “Yanluowang” was inspired by the Chinese mythological figure Yanluowang, suggesting the group’s possible Chinese origin. However, the recent leak of chat logs belonging to the group, revealed those involved in the organisation spoke Russian. 

 Leak of Yanluowang’s chat logs

 On the 31st of October, a Twitter user named @yanluowangleaks shared the matrix chat and server leaks of the Yanluowang ransomware gang, alongside the builder and decryption source. In total, six files contained internal conversations between the group’s members. From the analysis of these chats, at least eighteen people have been involved in Yanluowang operations.

Twitter account where the leaks and decryption source were shared
Figure 1: Twitter account where the leaks and decryption source were shared

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Potential members: ‘@killanas', '@saint', '@stealer', '@djonny', '@calls', '@felix', '@win32', '@nets', '@seeyousoon', '@shoker', '@ddos', '@gykko', '@loader1', '@guki', '@shiwa', '@zztop', '@al', '@coder1'‍

Most active members: ‘@saint’, ‘@killanas’, ‘@guki’, ‘@felix’, ‘@stealer’. 

To make the most sense out of the data that we analyzed, we combined the findings into two categories: tactics and organization.‍

Tactics ‍

From the leaked chat logs, several insights into the group’s operational security and TTPs were gained. Firstly, members were not aware of each other’s offline identities. Secondly, discussions surrounding security precautions for moving finances were discussed by members @killanas and @felix. The two exchanged recommendations on reliable currency exchange platforms as well as which ones to avoid that were known to leak data to law enforcement. The members also expressed paranoia over being caught with substantial amounts of money and therefore took precautions such as withdrawing smaller amounts of cash or using QR codes for withdrawals.

Additionally, the chat logs exposed the TTPs of Yanluowang. Exchanges between the group’s members @stealer, @calls and @saint, explored the possibilities of conducting attacks against critical infrastructure. One of these members, @call, was also quick to emphasise that Yanluowang would not target the critical infrastructure of former Soviet countries. Beyond targets, the chat logs also highlighted Yanluowang’s use of the ransomware, PayloadBIN but also that attacks that involved it may potentially have been misattributed to another ransomware actor, Evil Corp.

Further insight surrounding Yanluowang’s source code was also gained as it was revealed that it had been previously published on XSS.is as a downloadable file. The conversations surrounding this revealed that two members, @killanas and @saint, suspected @stealer was responsible for the leak. This suspicion was supported by @saint, defending another member whom he had known for eight years. It was later revealed that the code had been shared after a request to purchase it was made by a Chinese national. @saint also used their personal connections to have the download link removed from XSS.is. These connections indicate that some members of Yanluowang are well embedded in the ransomware and wider cybercrime community.

Another insight gained from the leaked chat logs was an expression by @saint in support of Ukraine, stating, “We stand with Ukraine” on the negotiation page of Yanluowang’s website. This action reflects a similar trend observed among threat actors where they have taken sides in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Regarding Yanluowang’s engagement with other groups, it was found that a former member of Conti had joined the group. This inference was made by @saint when a conversation regarding the Conti leak revolved around the possible identification of the now Yanluowang member @guki, in the Conti files. It was also commented that Conti was losing a considerable number of its members who were then looking for new work. Conversations about other ransomware groups were had with the mentioning of the REVIL group by @saint, specifically stating that five arrested members of the gang were former classmates. He backed his statement by attaching the article about it, to which @djonny replies that those are indeed REVIL members and that he knows it from his sources.‍

Organization ‍

When going through the chat logs, several observations were made that can offer some insights into the group's organizational structure. In one of the leaked files, user @saint was the one to publish the requirements for the group's ".onion" website and was also observed instructing other users on the tasks they had to complete. Based on this, @saint could be considered the leader of the group. Additionally, there was evidence indicating that a few users could be in their 30s or 40s, while most participants are in their 20s.

More details regarding Yanluowang's organizational structure were discussed deeper into the leak. The examples indicate various sub-groups within the Yanlouwang group and that a specific person coordinates each group. From the logs, there is a high probability that @killanas is the leader of the development team and has several people working under him. It is also possible that @stealer is on the same level as @killanas and is potentially the supervisor of another team within the group. This was corroborated when @stealer expressed concerns about the absence of certain group members on several occasions. There is also evidence showing that he was one of three people with access to the source code of the group. 

Role delineation within the group was also quite clear, with each user having specific tasks: DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks, social engineering, victim negotiations, pentesting or development, to mention a few. When it came to recruiting new members, mostly pentesters, Yanluowang would recruit through XSS.is and Exploit.in forums.‍

Underground analysis and members’ identification ‍

From the leaked chat logs, several “.onion” URLs were extracted; however, upon further investigation, each site had been taken offline and removed from the TOR hashring. This suggests that Yanluowang may have halted all operations. One of the users on XSS.is posted a picture showing that the Yanluowang onion website was hacked, stating, “CHECKMATE!! YANLUOWANG CHATS HACKED @YANLUOWANGLEAKS TIME’S UP!!”.‍

Figure 2: The screenshot of Yanluowang website on Tor (currently offline)

After learning that Yanluowang used Russian Web Forums, we did an additional search to see what we could find about the group and the mentioned nicknames. 

By searching through XSS.Is we managed to identify the user registered as @yanluowang. The date of the registration on the forum dates to 15 March 2022. Curiously, at the time of analysis, we noticed the user was online. There were in total 20 messages posted by @yanluowang, with a few publications indicating the group is looking for new pentesters.

Figure 3: The screenshot of Yanluowang profile on XSS.is 

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Figure 4: The screenshot of Yanluowang posts about pentester recruitment on XSS.is 

While going through the messages, it was noticed the reaction posted by another user identified as @Sa1ntJohn, which could be the gang member @saint.

‍Figure 5: The screenshot of Sa1ntJohn’s profile on XSS.is

‍Looking further, we identified that user @Ekranoplan published three links to the website doxbin.com containing information about three potential members of the YanLuoWang gang: @killanas/coder, @hardbass and @Joe/Uncle. The profile information was published by the user @Xander2727.‍

Figure 6: The screenshot of Yanlouwang member-profile leak on XSS.is
Figure 7: The screenshot of @hardbass Yanlouwang member profile leak
Figure 8: The screenshot of @killanas/coder Yanlouwang member profile leak.

‍If the provided information is correct, two group members are Russian and in their 30s, while another member is Ukrainian and in his 20s. One of the members, @killanas, who was also referenced in chat logs, is identified as the lead developer of the Yanluowang group; giving the interpretation of the chat leaks a high-level of confidence. Another two members, who were not referenced in the logs, took roles as Cracked Software/Malware provider and English translator/Victim Negotiator.‍

Implications for the wider ransomware landscape‍

To conclude with the potential implications of this leak, we have corroborated the evidence gathered throughout this investigation and employed contrarian analytical techniques. The ascertained implications that follow our mainline judgement, supporting evidence and our current analytical view on the matter can be categorized into three key components of this leak:

‍Impact on the ransomware landscape‍

The leak of Yanluowang’s chat logs has several implications for the broader ransomware landscape. This leak, much like the Conti leak in March, spells the end for Yanluowang operations for the time being, given how much of the group’s inner workings it has exposed. This could have an adverse effect. While Yanluowang did not control as large of a share of the ransomware market as Conti did, their downfall will undoubtedly create a vacuum space for established groups for their market share. The latter being a consequence of the release of their source code and build tools. 

‍Source code‍

The release of Yanluowang’s source code has several outcomes. If the recipients have no malintent, it could aid in reverse engineering the ransomware, like how a decryption tool for Yanluowng was released earlier this year. An alternative scenario is that the publication of the source code will increase the reach and deployment of this ransomware in the future, in adapted or modified versions by other threat actors. Reusing leaked material is notorious among ransomware actors, as seen in the past, when Babuk’s source code was leaked and led to the development of several variants based on this leak, including Rook and Pandora. This could also make it harder to attribute attacks to one specific group.

‍Members‍

The migration of unexposed Yanluowang members to other ransomware gangs could further add to the proliferation of ransomware groups. Such forms of spreading ransomware have been documented in the past when former Conti members repurposed their tactics to join efforts with an initial access broker, UAC-0098. Yet, the absence of evidence from members expressing and/or acting upon this claim requires further investigation and analysis. However, as there is no evidence of absence – this implication is based on the previously observed behavior from members of other ransomware gangs.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Taisiia Garkava
Security Analyst
Written by
Dillon Ashmore
Security and Research

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November 17, 2026

GTA VI Cyber Threats: Fake downloads, ransomware and account hijacking

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Key findings

  • Darktrace detected GTA VI-themed suspicious activity across organizations in multiple sectors ahead of the game’s release, showing how malicious gaming content can reach corporate environments outside the gaming industry.
  • Twelve Darktrace customer environments connected to gta6demo[.]asia, a domain that public threat research has associated with a fake GTA VI demo used to distribute the Vidar infostealer. Seven of the twelve communicated with infrastructure associated with AS56322 ServerAstra Kft as part of this connectivity.
  • Darktrace investigated ransomware activity at two European games companies. One incident involved DireWolf ransomware alongside reported data exfiltration. A separate Qilin incident included Active Directory reconnaissance, new administrative credentials, possible lateral movement and substantial cloud-storage transfers before ransomware deployment.
  • Another incident on a gaming organization involved a SaaS account hijack in which a compromised account authenticated from unusual IP addresses, created a new privileged account and subsequently sent a high volume of suspected malicious email. An administrative account later authenticated from rare endpoints.‍
  • Darktrace's new report highlights how threat actors continue to weaponize launch hype to breach corporate networks and target gaming infrastructure following the guilty plea of hacker Arion Kurtaj. These findings demonstrate that global enterprises remain actively exposed to franchise-related social engineering and exploitation attempts.

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GTA VI gives criminals an audience

Grand Theft Auto VI arrives on November 19 with the kind of attention few entertainment releases command [1]. Before launch, that interest is already being exploited by sites offering supposed demos and downloads.

During September and October 2026, Darktrace detected devices across multiple customer environments connecting to GTA VI-themed sites associated with suspicious activity. The organizations involved were spread across EMEA and the Americas and included Manufacturing, Finance, and Public administration and defense sectors.

Darktrace has also investigated multiple incidents affecting gaming organizations including ransomware and a SaaS account hijack. Those investigations show a separate side of the threat: attackers operating inside corporate infrastructure and accounts, sometimes well before the eventual impact becomes apparent.

Following a fake GTA VI download

On October 7, 2026, Darktrace detected a device making suspicious DNS requests for gta6-play[.]ru, an unofficial Russian-language GTA VI site that had also been flagged as likely malicious in open-source intelligence (OSINT).

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Figure 1: A screenshot of the suspicious endpoint gta6-play[.]ru .

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Figure 2: A screenshot of a “Download Studio” endpoint led to on gta6-play[.]ru.

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The site advertised a GTA VI download. The site led to a separate “Download Studio” page offering a Windows executable. Analysis found the file was packaged using InstallMate, a commercial installation framework, with an embedded .tsuarch section containing a compressed tiz3 archive.


Further examination identified functionality designed to inspect the environment in which the installer was running. This included checking registry entries for installed software and disk devices, enumerating network adapters, inspecting MAC addresses, and searching for running processes and window titles.


The installer also searched for processes associated with virtualization, debugging, and network analysis, including VMware and VirtualBox components, alongside debugging and monitoring utilities such as OllyDbg, WinDbg, Process Hacker, Process Monitor, Wireshark and Fiddler.

The presence of those checks did not prove that the executable was malicious. The installer contained functionality capable of extracting embedded files, but the investigation did not establish that it was being used to deploy a malicious payload. No definitive malicious payload or command-and-control infrastructure was identified. The software appeared to be InstallRex, which is classified by several security vendors as a potentially unwanted program.

That is still a useful finding; A user looking for GTA VI content could move from an unofficial gaming site to an executable that inspected the local environment, including checking for software commonly used by security researchers.

A second GTA VI lure appeared across twelve organizations

During September 2026, Darktrace alerted on HTTP connections to gta6demo[.]asia across twelve customer environments. Seven of the twelve communicated with infrastructure associated with AS56322 ServerAstra Kft as part of this connectivity.

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Figure 3: An example model alert generated due to a suspicious connection to gta6demo[.]asia.

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In a case affecting a UK-based customer, Darktrace’s Real-Time AI Analyst further investigated connections to gta6demo[.]asia and generated an incident due to the highly suspicious nature of the behavior.

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Figure 4: A Real-Time AI Analyst incident highlighting the suspicious activity for further investigation

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Public threat research has associated gta6demo[.]asia with a campaign advertising a fake GTA VI demo. Users clicking "Play Now" were reportedly directed towards an executable containing the Vidar infostealer [2].

There is a practical difference between this activity and an attack against a games company. The users encountering GTA VI-themed infrastructure can work anywhere. Darktrace saw the activity across several sectors outside Gaming, including Finance, Manufacturing, and Public administration and defense.

A major game release can therefore create security exposure well beyond its publisher. A search for a demo or unofficial download on a corporate device is enough to bring gaming-themed infrastructure into an enterprise environment.

Ransomware operators inside the gaming industry

The attacks Darktrace observed against Gaming companies themselves show different patterns.

In August 2026, Darktrace threat research identified possible malicious activity at a European game developer. Ransomware was ultimately deployed and data was exfiltrated, with the DireWolf ransomware group claiming responsibility.

Darktrace observed suspicious file downloads and beaconing from several devices to rare endpoints alongside Monero cryptocurrency mining, Active Directory and network reconnaissance, unusual administrative RDP connections, activity associated with data staging and HTTP-based exfiltration.

Much of the intrusion was therefore visible before ransomware appeared; the environment was already showing evidence of ingress tooling, external command-and-control communications (C2), reconnaissance, unusual administrative access and data movement.

A separate investigation in December 2025 provides a closer view of this pre-ransomware activity. A European games company was targeted by Qilin ransomware with Darktrace observing scanning and LDAP searches involving userAccountControl, which can expose information useful for identifying accounts and Service Principal Names within Active Directory.

New administrative credentials then appeared on a Domain Controller and the Domain Controller also generated scanning, anomalous RPC, SMB, and SSH activity, and NetShareEnum activity through srvsvc. Elsewhere in the environment, long Remote Desktop sessions and SMB enumeration appeared consistent with lateral movement.

Several devices also transferred data to cloud storage services including WebDrive and Amazon Web Services (AWS). In some cases, large downloads preceded subsequent uploads. Darktrace observed the transfer pattern, although the available telemetry does not establish that every transfer represented attacker-controlled exfiltration.

The activity preceding the Qilin deployment included Active Directory reconnaissance, privileged credential use, network and share enumeration, unusual remote access and significant data movement. Each appeared before ransomware became the defining feature of the incident.

SaaS hijacking shifts the attacker evidence

A separate investigation in May 2026 involved the hijacking of a SaaS account at a Gaming organization.

The compromised account authenticated from several IP addresses that were unusual for the organization. It then performed suspicious SaaS group administration, including creating a new privileged account. The account subsequently sent a high volume of emails assessed as likely malicious spam and potentially intended to compromise additional users.

The following day, an administrative SaaS account authenticated from rare endpoints, raising the possibility that further privileged access had been obtained.

The activity presented a different detection problem from the ransomware cases. Authentication from rare infrastructure, administrative changes, creation of a privileged account and subsequent email activity provided the strongest indications that a legitimate identity had been compromised.

For a Gaming company using hosted platforms for development, communication and business operations, a compromised account with the right permissions can provide considerable access without requiring the attacker to reproduce a conventional network intrusion.

Detecting the intrusion before impact

The ransomware investigations show why encryption should not be the first point at which an incident comes into focus. Darktrace observed LDAP and Active Directory-related reconnaissance, new privileged credentials, unusual Domain Controller activity, remote sessions, network enumeration and abnormal data movement before ransomware deployment.

The SaaS case produced different evidence: authentication from rare infrastructure, unexpected administrative changes and activity performed through a compromised account. GTA VI-themed activity required another approach again, following users through unofficial sites and redirects and examining the software offered for download.

GTA VI has put gaming back into the headlines ahead of its November release. The security activity around it is already visible beyond the games industry, while ransomware and account-compromise investigations show attackers operating inside gaming companies through very different routes.

For defenders, those routes leave evidence before the incident reaches its most damaging stage. The practical work is in recognizing those changes early enough to investigate them.

Credit to Gemma Stubberfield (Cyber Analyst), Ahmed Gardezi (Senior Cyber Analyst), Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead), Nathaniel Jones (SVP, Global Threat Intelligence)

References:

1.        https://www.rockstargames.com/VI

2.     https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2026/08/fake-gta-6-extended-look-and-demo-sites-deliver-an-infostealer

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Gemma Stubberfield
Cyber Analyst

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November 17, 2026

How Microsoft and Darktrace Secure the AI-Powered Enterprise

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When legitimate activity creates business risk

AI is making information more accessible and enabling autonomous agents to act across enterprise systems. But legitimate access can still result in sensitive-data exposure, unintended actions, or activity that deviates from business expectations.

Microsoft's evolving security strategy recognizes this shift, emphasizing continuous risk assessment, stronger identity protection, and security that adapts as AI systems operate. For enterprises, the challenge is increasingly about recognizing when trusted activity introduces risk, even when existing controls are functioning as intended.

Where global intelligence meets deep business context

Microsoft brings global threat intelligence and comprehensive security capabilities, helping organizations protect identities, data, applications, and infrastructure. Its integrated approach connects security signals, governance, detection, and response across increasingly complex environments.

Darktrace complements these strengths with deep, organization-specific behavioral understanding. Powered by Adaptive AI, Darktrace continuously learns the patterns and relationships unique to each business, developing a Unique Behavioral Profile for each organization that helps distinguish meaningful threats from legitimate activity. By connecting identity, activity, context, and intent, it adds another dimension to security intelligence.

Together, Microsoft and Darktrace combine global intelligence with deeper knowledge of how each customer operates. Through supported integrations, this behavioral context enriches existing Microsoft security workflows, enabling more informed investigations and precise response.

This complementary approach extends across three interconnected areas of enterprise security- AI, People and Infrastructure. From understanding how AI and agents operate to protecting trusted communications and the infrastructure businesses depend on, Darktrace strengthens Microsoft's security capabilities with behavioral insight specific to each organization.

Understanding AI beyond permissions and policies

As AI moves into business-critical operations, security teams need to understand more than which applications and agents are approved. They need visibility into how AI is used, what information it accesses, and whether its actions remain aligned with business intent.

Microsoft provides extensive AI development, governance, and security capabilities. Darktrace / SECURE AI complements these with behavioral analysis across Shadow AI, prompts, agent identities and actions, and development risk. Policy Manager helps evaluate activity against organizational AI policies, while the announced integration with Microsoft Agent 365 is designed to enrich agent risk assessments with organization-specific behavioral signals. Together, these capabilities help organizations scale AI adoption with greater confidence.

Recognizing risk within trusted relationships

Sophisticated threats increasingly exploit established business relationships, familiar communications, and legitimate accounts. A message from a trusted supplier or an action taken through an authorized identity may appear routine until considered against the organization's normal behavior.

Darktrace / EMAIL complements Microsoft's native email, identity, and data protection capabilities by understanding how people and organizations communicate. This enables more precise detection of targeted phishing, business email compromise, account takeover, and data loss, supported by proportionate response. Integrations such as Unified Quarantine within Microsoft Defender for Office 365 bring this additional protection into existing security workflows.

Seeing the bigger picture behind an attack across domains

Threats rarely unfold within a single security domain. Suspicious identity activity, unexpected cloud connections, and unusual network behavior may appear unrelated until the relationships between them reveal a developing attack.

Darktrace / HYBRID NETWORK complements Microsoft's security capabilities with organization-specific behavioral detection across network, cloud, identity, and operational technology. Real-Time AI Analyst, including Cyber AI Analyst, connects related activity into investigated incidents that can be delivered into Microsoft Sentinel, helping security teams accelerate investigations and support targeted containment across the hybrid enterprise.

Turning security intelligence into business confidence

As AI becomes more deeply integrated into business operations, organizations need security that understands not only what technology can access, but how it behaves within their unique environment.

Microsoft and Darktrace bring complementary strengths to that challenge. By connecting global threat intelligence and integrated security capabilities with deep behavioral understanding, the partnership helps organizations recognize emerging risks, respond with greater precision, and strengthen their existing security investments.

The opportunity is to turn security intelligence into meaningful business context, enabling organizations to innovate and operate AI with confidence.

Darktrace named a 2026 Microsoft Partner of the Year Finalist for ISV Innovation

Darktrace has been named a finalist for the 2026 Microsoft Partner of the Year Award in the ISV Innovation category.  

This recognition reflects our collaboration with Microsoft to bring business context to enterprise security. By connecting Microsoft's global threat intelligence and integrated security capabilities with Darktrace's deep behavioral understanding, we help organizations recognize emerging risks and respond with greater precision across AI, People and Infrastructure.

Thank you to Microsoft, our customers, and our teams for their continued collaboration.

Meet Darktrace at Microsoft Ignite and the Microsoft Frontier Tour

Explore how Darktrace and Microsoft are bringing behavioral security to AI, people, and infrastructure.

Join Darktrace at Microsoft Ignite in San Francisco, November 17–19, or connect with our experts as we join the Microsoft Frontier Tour across 21 cities worldwide.

Meet Darktrace at Microsoft Ignite

Connect with Darktrace at the Microsoft Frontier Tour

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