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November 6, 2022

Behind Yanluowang: Unveiling Cyber Threat Tactics

Discover the latest insights into the Yanluowang leak organization, uncovering its members and tactics.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Taisiia Garkava
Security Analyst
Written by
Dillon Ashmore
Security and Research
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06
Nov 2022

Background of Yanluowang

Yanluowang ransomware, also known as Dryxiphia, was first spotted in October 2021 by Symantec’s Threat Hunter Team. However, it has been operational since August 2021, when a threat actor used it to attack U.S. corporations. Said attack shared similar TTPs with ransomware Thieflock, designed by Fivehands ransomware gangs. This connection alluded to a possible link between the two through the presence or influence of an affiliate. The group has been known for successfully ransoming organisations globally, particularly those in the financial, manufacturing, IT services, consultancy, and engineering sectors.

Yanluowang attacks typically begin with initial reconnaissance, followed by credential harvesting and data exfiltration before finally encrypting the victim’s files. Once deployed on compromised networks, Yanluowang halts hypervisor virtual machines, all running processes and encrypts files using the “.yanluowang” extension. A file with name README.txt, containing a ransom note is also dropped. The note also warns victims against contacting law enforcement, recovery companies or attempting to decrypt the files themselves. Failure to follow this advice would result in distributed denial of service attacks against a victim, its employees and business partners. Followed by another attack, a few weeks later, in which all the victim’s files would be deleted.

The group’s name “Yanluowang” was inspired by the Chinese mythological figure Yanluowang, suggesting the group’s possible Chinese origin. However, the recent leak of chat logs belonging to the group, revealed those involved in the organisation spoke Russian. 

 Leak of Yanluowang’s chat logs

 On the 31st of October, a Twitter user named @yanluowangleaks shared the matrix chat and server leaks of the Yanluowang ransomware gang, alongside the builder and decryption source. In total, six files contained internal conversations between the group’s members. From the analysis of these chats, at least eighteen people have been involved in Yanluowang operations.

Twitter account where the leaks and decryption source were shared
Figure 1: Twitter account where the leaks and decryption source were shared

Potential members: ‘@killanas', '@saint', '@stealer', '@djonny', '@calls', '@felix', '@win32', '@nets', '@seeyousoon', '@shoker', '@ddos', '@gykko', '@loader1', '@guki', '@shiwa', '@zztop', '@al', '@coder1'

Most active members: ‘@saint’, ‘@killanas’, ‘@guki’, ‘@felix’, ‘@stealer’. 

To make the most sense out of the data that we analyzed, we combined the findings into two categories: tactics and organization.

Tactics 

From the leaked chat logs, several insights into the group’s operational security and TTPs were gained. Firstly, members were not aware of each other’s offline identities. Secondly, discussions surrounding security precautions for moving finances were discussed by members @killanas and @felix. The two exchanged recommendations on reliable currency exchange platforms as well as which ones to avoid that were known to leak data to law enforcement. The members also expressed paranoia over being caught with substantial amounts of money and therefore took precautions such as withdrawing smaller amounts of cash or using QR codes for withdrawals.

Additionally, the chat logs exposed the TTPs of Yanluowang. Exchanges between the group’s members @stealer, @calls and @saint, explored the possibilities of conducting attacks against critical infrastructure. One of these members, @call, was also quick to emphasise that Yanluowang would not target the critical infrastructure of former Soviet countries. Beyond targets, the chat logs also highlighted Yanluowang’s use of the ransomware, PayloadBIN but also that attacks that involved it may potentially have been misattributed to another ransomware actor, Evil Corp.

Further insight surrounding Yanluowang’s source code was also gained as it was revealed that it had been previously published on XSS.is as a downloadable file. The conversations surrounding this revealed that two members, @killanas and @saint, suspected @stealer was responsible for the leak. This suspicion was supported by @saint, defending another member whom he had known for eight years. It was later revealed that the code had been shared after a request to purchase it was made by a Chinese national. @saint also used their personal connections to have the download link removed from XSS.is. These connections indicate that some members of Yanluowang are well embedded in the ransomware and wider cybercrime community.

Another insight gained from the leaked chat logs was an expression by @saint in support of Ukraine, stating, “We stand with Ukraine” on the negotiation page of Yanluowang’s website. This action reflects a similar trend observed among threat actors where they have taken sides in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Regarding Yanluowang’s engagement with other groups, it was found that a former member of Conti had joined the group. This inference was made by @saint when a conversation regarding the Conti leak revolved around the possible identification of the now Yanluowang member @guki, in the Conti files. It was also commented that Conti was losing a considerable number of its members who were then looking for new work. Conversations about other ransomware groups were had with the mentioning of the REVIL group by @saint, specifically stating that five arrested members of the gang were former classmates. He backed his statement by attaching the article about it, to which @djonny replies that those are indeed REVIL members and that he knows it from his sources.

Organization 

When going through the chat logs, several observations were made that can offer some insights into the group's organizational structure. In one of the leaked files, user @saint was the one to publish the requirements for the group's ".onion" website and was also observed instructing other users on the tasks they had to complete. Based on this, @saint could be considered the leader of the group. Additionally, there was evidence indicating that a few users could be in their 30s or 40s, while most participants are in their 20s.

More details regarding Yanluowang's organizational structure were discussed deeper into the leak. The examples indicate various sub-groups within the Yanlouwang group and that a specific person coordinates each group. From the logs, there is a high probability that @killanas is the leader of the development team and has several people working under him. It is also possible that @stealer is on the same level as @killanas and is potentially the supervisor of another team within the group. This was corroborated when @stealer expressed concerns about the absence of certain group members on several occasions. There is also evidence showing that he was one of three people with access to the source code of the group. 

Role delineation within the group was also quite clear, with each user having specific tasks: DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks, social engineering, victim negotiations, pentesting or development, to mention a few. When it came to recruiting new members, mostly pentesters, Yanluowang would recruit through XSS.is and Exploit.in forums.

Underground analysis and members’ identification 

From the leaked chat logs, several “.onion” URLs were extracted; however, upon further investigation, each site had been taken offline and removed from the TOR hashring. This suggests that Yanluowang may have halted all operations. One of the users on XSS.is posted a picture showing that the Yanluowang onion website was hacked, stating, “CHECKMATE!! YANLUOWANG CHATS HACKED @YANLUOWANGLEAKS TIME’S UP!!”.

Figure 2: The screenshot of Yanluowang website on Tor (currently offline)

After learning that Yanluowang used Russian Web Forums, we did an additional search to see what we could find about the group and the mentioned nicknames. 

By searching through XSS.Is we managed to identify the user registered as @yanluowang. The date of the registration on the forum dates to 15 March 2022. Curiously, at the time of analysis, we noticed the user was online. There were in total 20 messages posted by @yanluowang, with a few publications indicating the group is looking for new pentesters.

Figure 3: The screenshot of Yanluowang profile on XSS.is 

Figure 4: The screenshot of Yanluowang posts about pentester recruitment on XSS.is 

While going through the messages, it was noticed the reaction posted by another user identified as @Sa1ntJohn, which could be the gang member @saint.

Figure 5: The screenshot of Sa1ntJohn’s profile on XSS.is

Looking further, we identified that user @Ekranoplan published three links to the website doxbin.com containing information about three potential members of the YanLuoWang gang: @killanas/coder, @hardbass and @Joe/Uncle. The profile information was published by the user @Xander2727.

Figure 6: The screenshot of Yanlouwang member-profile leak on XSS.is
Figure 7: The screenshot of @hardbass Yanlouwang member profile leak
Figure 8: The screenshot of @killanas/coder Yanlouwang member profile leak.

If the provided information is correct, two group members are Russian and in their 30s, while another member is Ukrainian and in his 20s. One of the members, @killanas, who was also referenced in chat logs, is identified as the lead developer of the Yanluowang group; giving the interpretation of the chat leaks a high-level of confidence. Another two members, who were not referenced in the logs, took roles as Cracked Software/Malware provider and English translator/Victim Negotiator.

Implications for the wider ransomware landscape

To conclude with the potential implications of this leak, we have corroborated the evidence gathered throughout this investigation and employed contrarian analytical techniques. The ascertained implications that follow our mainline judgement, supporting evidence and our current analytical view on the matter can be categorized into three key components of this leak:

Impact on the ransomware landscape

The leak of Yanluowang’s chat logs has several implications for the broader ransomware landscape. This leak, much like the Conti leak in March, spells the end for Yanluowang operations for the time being, given how much of the group’s inner workings it has exposed. This could have an adverse effect. While Yanluowang did not control as large of a share of the ransomware market as Conti did, their downfall will undoubtedly create a vacuum space for established groups for their market share. The latter being a consequence of the release of their source code and build tools. 

Source code

The release of Yanluowang’s source code has several outcomes. If the recipients have no malintent, it could aid in reverse engineering the ransomware, like how a decryption tool for Yanluowng was released earlier this year. An alternative scenario is that the publication of the source code will increase the reach and deployment of this ransomware in the future, in adapted or modified versions by other threat actors. Reusing leaked material is notorious among ransomware actors, as seen in the past, when Babuk’s source code was leaked and led to the development of several variants based on this leak, including Rook and Pandora. This could also make it harder to attribute attacks to one specific group.

Members

The migration of unexposed Yanluowang members to other ransomware gangs could further add to the proliferation of ransomware groups. Such forms of spreading ransomware have been documented in the past when former Conti members repurposed their tactics to join efforts with an initial access broker, UAC-0098. Yet, the absence of evidence from members expressing and/or acting upon this claim requires further investigation and analysis. However, as there is no evidence of absence – this implication is based on the previously observed behavior from members of other ransomware gangs.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Taisiia Garkava
Security Analyst
Written by
Dillon Ashmore
Security and Research

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June 9, 2025

Modernising UK Cyber Regulation: Implications of the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill

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The need for security and continued cyber resilience

The UK government has made national security a key priority, and the new Cyber Security and Resilience Bill (CSRB) is a direct reflection of that focus. In introducing the Bill, Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, Peter Kyle, recognised that the UK is “desperately exposed” to cyber threats—from criminal groups to hostile nation-states that are increasingly targeting the UK's digital systems and critical infrastructure[1].

Context and timeline for the new legislation

First announced during the King’s Speech of July 2024, and elaborated in a Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) policy statement published in April 2025, the CSRB is expected to be introduced in Parliament during the 2025-26 legislative session.

For now, organisations in the UK remain subject to the 2018 Network and Information Systems (NIS) Regulations – an EU-derived law which was drafted before today’s increasing digitisation of critical services, rise in cloud adoption and emergence of AI-powered threats.

Why modernisation is critical

Without modernisation, the Government believes UK’s infrastructure and economy risks falling behind international peers. The EU, which revised its cybersecurity regulation under the NIS2 Directive, already imposes stricter requirements on a broader set of sectors.

The urgency of the Bill is also underscored by recent high-impact incidents, including the Synnovis attack which targeted the National Health Service (NHS) suppliers and disrupted thousands of patient appointments and procedures[2]. The Government has argued that such events highlight a systemic failure to keep pace with a rapidly evolving threat landscape[3].

What the Bill aims to achieve

This Bill represents a decisive shift. According to the Government, it will modernise and future‑proof the UK’s cyber laws, extending oversight to areas where risk has grown but regulation has not kept pace[4]. While the legislation builds on previous consultations and draws lessons from international frameworks like the EU’s NIS2 directive, it also aims to tailor solutions to the UK’s unique threat environment.

Importantly, the Government is framing cybersecurity not as a barrier to growth, but as a foundation for it. The policy statement emphasises that strong digital resilience will create the stability businesses need to thrive, innovate, and invest[5]. Therefore, the goals of the Bill will not only be to enhance security but also act as an enabler to innovation and economic growth.

Recognition that AI changes cyber threats

The CSRB policy statement recognises that AI is fundamentally reshaping the threat landscape, with adversaries now leveraging AI and commercial cyber tools to exploit vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure and supply chains. Indeed, the NCSC has recently assessed that AI will almost certainly lead to “an increase in the frequency and intensity of cyber threats”[6]. Accordingly, the policy statement insists that the UK’s regulatory framework “must keep pace and provide flexibility to respond to future threats as and when they emerge”[7].

To address the threat, the Bill signals new obligations for MSPs and data centres, timely incident reporting and dynamic guidance that can be refreshed without fresh primary legislation, making it essential for firms to follow best practices.

What might change in day-to-day practice?

New organisations in scope of regulation

Under the existing Network and Information Systems (NIS) Regulations[8], the UK already supervises operators in five critical sectors—energy, transport, drinking water, health (Operators of Essential Services, OES) and digital infrastructure (Relevant Digital Service Providers, RDSPs).

The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill retains this foundation and adds Managed Service Providers (MSPs) and data centres to the scope of regulation to “better recognise the increasing reliance on digital services and the vulnerabilities posed by supply chains”[9]. It also grants the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology the power to add new sectors or sub‑sectors via secondary legislation, following consultation with Parliament and industry.

Managed service providers (MSPs)

MSPs occupy a central position within the UK’s enterprise information‑technology infrastructure. Because they remotely run or monitor clients’ systems, networks and data, they hold privileged, often continuous access to multiple environments. This foothold makes them an attractive target for malicious actors.

The Bill aims to bring MSPs in scope of regulation by making them subject to the same duties as those placed on firms that provide digital services under the 2018 NIS Regulations. By doing so, the Bill seeks to raise baseline security across thousands of customer environments and to provide regulators with better visibility of supply‑chain risk.

The proposed definition for MSPs is a service which:

  1. Is provided to another organisation
  2. Relies on the use of network and information systems to deliver the service
  3. Relates to ongoing management support, active administration and/or monitoring of AI systems, IT infrastructure, applications, and/or IT networks, including for the purpose of activities relating to cyber security.
  4. Involves a network connection and/or access to the customer’s network and information systems.

Data centres

Building on the September 2024 designation of data centres as critical national infrastructure, the CSRB will fold data infrastructure into the NIS-style regime by naming it an “relevant sector" and data centres as “essential service”[10].

About 182 colocation facilities run by 64 operators will therefore come under statutory duties to notify the regulator, maintain proportionate CAF-aligned controls and report significant incidents, regardless of who owns them or what workloads they host.

New requirements for regulated organisations

Incident reporting processes

There could be stricter timelines or broader definitions of what counts as a reportable incident. This might nudge organisations to formalise detection, triage, and escalation procedures.

The Government is proposing to introduce a new two-stage incident reporting process. This would include an initial notification which would be submitted within 24 hours of becoming aware of a significant incident, followed by a full incident report which should be submitted within 72 hours of the same.

Supply chain assurance requirements

Supply chains for the UK's most critical services are becoming increasingly complex and present new and serious vulnerabilities for cyber-attacks. The recent Synnovis ransomware attacks on the NHS[11] exemplify the danger posed by attacks against the supply chains of important services and organisations. This is concerning when reflecting on the latest Cyber Security Breaches survey conducted by DSIT, which highlights that fewer than 25% of large businesses review their supply chain risks[12].

Despite these risks, the UK’s legacy cybersecurity regulatory regime does not explicitly cover supply chain risk management. The UK instead relies on supporting and non-statutory guidance to close this gap, such as the NCSC’s Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF)[13].

The CSRB policy statement acts on this regulatory shortcoming and recognises that “a single supplier’s disruption can have far-reaching impacts on the delivery of essential or digital services”[14].

To address this, the Bill would make in-scope organisations (OES and RDPS) directly accountable for the cybersecurity of their supply chains. Secondary legislation would spell out these duties in detail, ensuring that OES and RDSPs systematically assess and mitigate third-party cyber risks.

Updated and strengthened security requirements

By placing the CAF into a firmer footing and backing it with a statutory Code of Practice, the Government is setting clearer expectations about government expectations on technical standards and methods organisations will need to follow to prove their resilience.

How Darktrace can help support affected organizations

Demonstrate resilience

Darktrace’s Self-Learning AITM continuously monitors your digital estate across cloud, network, OT, email, and endpoint to detect, investigate, and autonomously respond to emerging threats in real time. This persistent visibility and defense posture helps organizations demonstrate cyber resilience to regulators with confidence.

Streamline incident reporting and compliance

Darktrace surfaces clear alerts and automated investigation reports, complete with timeline views and root cause analysis. These insights reduce the time and complexity of regulatory incident reporting and support internal compliance workflows with auditable, AI-generated evidence.

Improve supply chain visibility

With full visibility across connected systems and third-party activity, Darktrace detects early indicators of lateral movement, account compromise, and unusual behavior stemming from vendor or partner access, reducing the risk of supply chain-originated cyber-attacks.

Ensure MSPs can meet new standards

For managed service providers, Darktrace offers native multi-tenant support and autonomous threat response that can be embedded directly into customer environments. This ensures consistent, scalable security standards across clients—helping MSPs address increasing regulatory obligations.

[related-resource]

References

[1] https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/article/2024/jul/29/uk-desperately-exposed-to-cyber-threats-and-pandemics-says-minister

[2] https://www.england.nhs.uk/2024/06/synnovis-cyber-attack-statement-from-nhs-england/

[3] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[4] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[5] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[6] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/impact-ai-cyber-threat-now-2027

[7] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[8] https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/nis-directive-and-nis-regulations-2018

[9] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[10] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[11] https://www.england.nhs.uk/2024/06/synnovis-cyber-attack-statement-from-nhs-england/

[12] https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/cyber-security-breaches-survey-2025/cyber-security-breaches-survey-2025

[13] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cyber-assessment-framework

[14] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

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June 5, 2025

Unpacking ClickFix: Darktrace’s detection of a prolific social engineering tactic

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What is ClickFix and how does it work?

Amid heightened security awareness, threat actors continue to seek stealthy methods to infiltrate target networks, often finding the human end user to be the most vulnerable and easily exploited entry point.

ClickFix baiting is an exploitation of the end user, making use of social engineering techniques masquerading as error messages or routine verification processes, that can result in malicious code execution.

Since March 2024, the simplicity of this technique has drawn attention from a range of threat actors, from individual cybercriminals to Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups such as APT28 and MuddyWater, linked to Russia and Iran respectively, introducing security threats on a broader scale [1]. ClickFix campaigns have been observed affecting organizations in across multiple industries, including healthcare, hospitality, automotive and government [2][3].

Actors carrying out these targeted attacks typically utilize similar techniques, tools and procedures (TTPs) to gain initial access. These include spear phishing attacks, drive-by compromises, or exploiting trust in familiar online platforms, such as GitHub, to deliver malicious payloads [2][3]. Often, a hidden link within an email or malvertisements on compromised legitimate websites redirect the end user to a malicious URL [4]. These take the form of ‘Fix It’ or fake CAPTCHA prompts [4].

From there, users are misled into believing they are completing a human verification step, registering a device, or fixing a non-existent issue such as a webpage display error. As a result, they are guided through a three-step process that ultimately enables the execution of malicious PowerShell commands:

  1. Open a Windows Run dialog box [press Windows Key + R]
  2. Automatically or manually copy and paste a malicious PowerShell command into the terminal [press CTRL+V]
  3. And run the prompt [press ‘Enter’] [2]

Once the malicious PowerShell command is executed, threat actors then establish command and control (C2) communication within the targeted environment before moving laterally through the network with the intent of obtaining and stealing sensitive data [4]. Malicious payloads associated with various malware families, such as XWorm, Lumma, and AsyncRAT, are often deployed [2][3].

Attack timeline of ClickFix cyber attack

Based on investigations conducted by Darktrace’s Threat Research team in early 2025, this blog highlights Darktrace’s capability to detect ClickFix baiting activity following initial access.

Darktrace’s coverage of a ClickFix attack chain

Darktrace identified multiple ClickFix attacks across customer environments in both Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) and the United States. The following incident details a specific attack on a customer network that occurred on April 9, 2025.

Although the initial access phase of this specific attack occurred outside Darktrace’s visibility, other affected networks showed compromise beginning with phishing emails or fake CAPTCHA prompts that led users to execute malicious PowerShell commands.

Darktrace’s visibility into the compromise began when the threat actor initiated external communication with their C2 infrastructure, with Darktrace / NETWORK detecting the use of a new PowerShell user agent, indicating an attempt at remote code execution.

Darktrace / NETWORK's detection of a device making an HTTP connection with new PowerShell user agent, indicating PowerShell abuse for C2 communications.
Figure 1: Darktrace / NETWORK's detection of a device making an HTTP connection with new PowerShell user agent, indicating PowerShell abuse for C2 communications.

Download of Malicious Files for Lateral Movement

A few minutes later, the compromised device was observed downloading a numerically named file. Numeric files like this are often intentionally nondescript and associated with malware. In this case, the file name adhered to a specific pattern, matching the regular expression: /174(\d){7}/. Further investigation into the file revealed that it contained additional malicious code designed to further exploit remote services and gather device information.

Darktrace / NETWORK's detection of a numeric file, one minute after the new PowerShell User Agent alert.
Figure 2: Darktrace / NETWORK's detection of a numeric file, one minute after the new PowerShell User Agent alert.

The file contained a script that sent system information to a specified IP address using an HTTP POST request, which also processed the response. This process was verified through packet capture (PCAP) analysis conducted by the Darktrace Threat Research team.

By analyzing the body content of the HTTP GET request, it was observed that the command converts the current time to Unix epoch time format (i.e., 9 April 2025 13:26:40 GMT), resulting in an additional numeric file observed in the URI: /1744205200.

PCAP highlighting the HTTP GET request that sends information to the specific IP, 193.36.38[.]237, which then generates another numeric file titled per the current time.
Figure 3: PCAP highlighting the HTTP GET request that sends information to the specific IP, 193.36.38[.]237, which then generates another numeric file titled per the current time.

Across Darktrace’s investigations into other customers' affected by ClickFix campaigns, both internal information discovery events and further execution of malicious code were observed.

Data Exfiltration

By following the HTTP stream in the same PCAP, the Darktrace Threat Research Team assessed the activity as indicative of data exfiltration involving system and device information to the same command-and-control (C2) endpoint, , 193.36.38[.]237. This endpoint was flagged as malicious by multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) vendors [5].

PCAP highlighting HTTP POST connection with the numeric file per the URI /1744205200 that indicates data exfiltration to 193.36.38[.]237.
Figure 4: PCAP highlighting HTTP POST connection with the numeric file per the URI /1744205200 that indicates data exfiltration to 193.36.38[.]237.

Further analysis of Darktrace’s Advanced Search logs showed that the attacker’s malicious code scanned for internal system information, which was then sent to a C2 server via an HTTP POST request, indicating data exfiltration

Advanced Search further highlights Darktrace's observation of the HTTP POST request, with the second numeric file representing data exfiltration.
Figure 5: Advanced Search further highlights Darktrace's observation of the HTTP POST request, with the second numeric file representing data exfiltration.

Actions on objectives

Around ten minutes after the initial C2 communications, the compromised device was observed connecting to an additional rare endpoint, 188.34.195[.]44. Further analysis of this endpoint confirmed its association with ClickFix campaigns, with several OSINT vendors linking it to previously reported attacks [6].

In the final HTTP POST request made by the device, Darktrace detected a file at the URI /init1234 in the connection logs to the malicious endpoint 188.34.195[.]44, likely depicting the successful completion of the attack’s objective, automated data egress to a ClickFix C2 server.

Darktrace / NETWORK grouped together the observed indicators of compromise (IoCs) on the compromised device and triggered an Enhanced Monitoring model alert, a high-priority detection model designed to identify activity indicative of the early stages of an attack. These models are monitored and triaged 24/7 by Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) as part of the Managed Threat Detection service, ensuring customers are promptly notified of malicious activity as soon as it emerges.

Darktrace correlated the separate malicious connections that pertained to a single campaign.
Figure 6: Darktrace correlated the separate malicious connections that pertained to a single campaign.

Darktrace Autonomous Response

In the incident outlined above, Darktrace was not configured in Autonomous Response mode. As a result, while actions to block specific connections were suggested, they had to be manually implemented by the customer’s security team. Due to the speed of the attack, this need for manual intervention allowed the threat to escalate without interruption.

However, in a different example, Autonomous Response was fully enabled, allowing Darktrace to immediately block connections to the malicious endpoint (138.199.156[.]22) just one second after the initial connection in which a numerically named file was downloaded [7].

Darktrace Autonomous Response blocked connections to a suspicious endpoint following the observation of the numeric file download.
Figure 7: Darktrace Autonomous Response blocked connections to a suspicious endpoint following the observation of the numeric file download.

This customer was also subscribed to our Managed Detection and Response service, Darktrace’s SOC extended a ‘Quarantine Device’ action that had already been autonomously applied in order to buy their security team additional time for remediation.

Autonomous Response blocked connections to malicious endpoints, including 138.199.156[.]22, 185.250.151[.]155, and rkuagqnmnypetvf[.]top, and also quarantined the affected device. These actions were later manually reinforced by the Darktrace SOC.
Figure 8: Autonomous Response blocked connections to malicious endpoints, including 138.199.156[.]22, 185.250.151[.]155, and rkuagqnmnypetvf[.]top, and also quarantined the affected device. These actions were later manually reinforced by the Darktrace SOC.

Conclusion

ClickFix baiting is a widely used tactic in which threat actors exploit human error to bypass security defenses. By tricking end point users into performing seemingly harmless, everyday actions, attackers gain initial access to systems where they can access and exfiltrate sensitive data.

Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection identifies early indicators of targeted attacks without relying on prior knowledge or IoCs. By continuously learning each device’s unique pattern of life, Darktrace detects subtle deviations that may signal a compromise. In this case, Darktrace's Autonomous Response, when operating in a fully autonomous mode, was able to swiftly contain the threat before it could progress further along the attack lifecycle.

Credit to Keanna Grelicha (Cyber Analyst) and Jennifer Beckett (Cyber Analyst)

Appendices

NETWORK Models

  • Device / New PowerShell User Agent
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous Connection / Powershell to Rare External
  • Device / Suspicious Domain
  • Device / New User Agent and New IP
  • Anomalous File / New User Agent Followed By Numeric File Download (Enhanced Monitoring Model)
  • Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity (Enhanced Monitoring Model)

Autonomous Response Models

  • Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block
  • Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block
  • Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena File then New Outbound Block
  • Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious File Block
  • Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Alerts Over Time Block
  • Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious File Block

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

·       141.193.213[.]11 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       141.193.213[.]10 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       64.94.84[.]217 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       138.199.156[.]22 – IP address – C2 server

·       94.181.229[.]250 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       216.245.184[.]181 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       212.237.217[.]182 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       168.119.96[.]41 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       193.36.38[.]237 – IP address – C2 server

·       188.34.195[.]44 – IP address – C2 server

·       205.196.186[.]70 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       rkuagqnmnypetvf[.]top – Hostname – C2 server

·       shorturl[.]at/UB6E6 – Hostname – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       tlgrm-redirect[.]icu – Hostname – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       diagnostics.medgenome[.]com – Hostname – Compromised Website

·       /1741714208 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1741718928 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1743871488 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1741200416 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1741356624 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /ttt – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1741965536 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1.txt – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1744205184 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1744139920 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1744134352 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1744125600 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1[.]php?s=527 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       34ff2f72c191434ce5f20ebc1a7e823794ac69bba9df70721829d66e7196b044 – SHA-256 Hash – Possible malicious file

·       10a5eab3eef36e75bd3139fe3a3c760f54be33e3 – SHA-1 Hash – Possible malicious file

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique  

Spearphishing Link - INITIAL ACCESS - T1566.002 - T1566

Drive-by Compromise - INITIAL ACCESS - T1189

PowerShell - EXECUTION - T1059.001 - T1059

Exploitation of Remote Services - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1210

Web Protocols - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.001 - T1071

Automated Exfiltration - EXFILTRATION - T1020 - T1020.001

References

[1] https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/emerging-threats/clickfix-another-deceptive-social-engineering-technique/

[2] https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/security-brief-clickfix-social-engineering-technique-floods-threat-landscape

[3] https://cyberresilience.com/threatonomics/understanding-the-clickfix-attack/

[4] https://www.group-ib.com/blog/clickfix-the-social-engineering-technique-hackers-use-to-manipulate-victims/

[5] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/193.36.38.237/detection

[6] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/188.34.195.44/community

[7] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/138.199.156.22/detection

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About the author
Keanna Grelicha
Cyber Analyst
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