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May 25, 2022

Uncovering the Sysrv-Hello Crypto-Jacking Bonet

Discover the cyber kill chain of a Sysrv-hello botnet infection in France and gain insights into the latest TTPs of the botnet in March and April 2022.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Shuh Chin Goh
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25
May 2022

In recent years, the prevalence of crypto-jacking botnets has risen in tandem with the popularity and value of cryptocurrencies. Increasingly crypto-mining malware programs are distributed by botnets as they allow threat actors to harness the cumulative processing power of a large number of machines (discussed in our other Darktrace blogs.1 2 One of these botnets is Sysrv-hello, which in addition to crypto-mining, propagates aggressively across the Internet in a worm-like manner by trolling for Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities and SSH worming from the compromised victim devices. This all has the purpose of expanding the botnet.

First identified in December 2020, Sysrv-hello’s operators constantly update and change the bots’ behavior to evolve and stay ahead of security researchers and law enforcement. As such, infected systems can easily go unnoticed by both users and organizations. This blog examines the cyber kill chain sequence of a Sysrv-hello botnet infection detected at the network level by Darktrace DETECT/Network, as well as the botnet’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in March and April 2022.

Figure 1: Timeline of the attack

Delivery and exploitation

The organization, which was trialing Darktrace, had deployed the technology on March 2, 2022. On the very same day, the initial host infection was seen through the download of a first-stage PowerShell loader script from a rare external endpoint by a device in the internal network. Although initial exploitation of the device happened prior to the installation and was not observed, this botnet is known to target RCE vulnerabilities in various applications such as MySQL, Tomcat, PHPUnit, Apache Solar, Confluence, Laravel, JBoss, Jira, Sonatype, Oracle WebLogic and Apache Struts to gain initial access to internal systems.3 Recent iterations have also been reported to have been deployed via drive-by-downloads from an empty HTML iframe pointing to a malicious executable that downloads to the device from a user visiting a compromised website.4

Initial intrusion

The Sysrv-hello botnet is distributed for both Linux and Windows environments, with the corresponding compatible script pulled based on the architecture of the system. In this incident, the Windows version was observed.

On March 2, 2022 at 15:15:28 UTC, the device made a successful HTTP GET request to a malicious IP address5 that had a rarity score of 100% in the network. It subsequently downloaded a malicious PowerShell script named ‘ldr.ps1'6 onto the system. The associated IP address ‘194.145.227[.]21’ belongs to ‘ASN AS48693 Rices Privately owned enterprise’ and had been identified as a Sysrv-hello botnet command and control (C2) server in April the previous year. 3

Looking at the URI ‘/ldr.ps1?b0f895_admin:admin_81.255.222.82:8443_https’, it appears some form of query was being executed onto the object. The question mark ‘?’ in this URI is used to delimit the boundary between the URI of the queryable object and the set of strings used to express a query onto that object. Conventionally, we see the set of strings contains a list of key/value pairs with equal signs ‘=’, which are separated by the ampersand symbol ‘&’ between each of those parameters (e.g. www.youtube[.]com/watch?v=RdcCjDS0s6s&ab_channel=SANSCyberDefense), though the exact structure of the query string is not standardized and different servers may parse it differently. Instead, this case saw a set of strings with the hexadecimal color code #b0f895 (a light shade of green), admin username and password login credentials, and the IP address ‘81.255.222[.]82’ being applied during the object query (via HTTPS protocol on port 8443). In recent months this French IP has also had reports of abuse from the OSINT community.7

On March 2, 2022 at 15:15:33 UTC, the PowerShell loader script further downloaded second-stage executables named ‘sys.exe’ and ‘xmrig.2 sver.8 9 These have been identified as the worm and cryptocurrency miner payloads respectively.

Establish foothold

On March 2, 2022 at 17:46:55 UTC, after the downloads of the worm and cryptocurrency miner payloads, the device initiated multiple SSL connections in a regular, automated manner to Pastebin – a text storage website. This technique was used as a vector to download/upload data and drop further malicious scripts onto the host. OSINT sources suggest the JA3 client SSL fingerprint (05af1f5ca1b87cc9cc9b25185115607d) is associated with PowerShell usage, corroborating with the observation that further tooling was initiated by the PowerShell script ‘ldr.ps1’.

Continual Pastebin C2 connections were still being made by the device almost two months since the initiation of such connections. These Pastebin C2 connections point to new tactics and techniques employed by Sysrv-hello — reports earlier than May do not appear to mention any usage of the file storage site. These new TTPs serve two purposes: defense evasion using a web service/protocol and persistence. Persistence was likely achieved through scheduling daemons downloaded from this web service and shellcode executions at set intervals to kill off other malware processes, as similarly seen in other botnets.10 Recent reports have seen other malware programs also switch to Pastebin C2 tunnels to deliver subsequent payloads, scrapping the need for traditional C2 servers and evading detection.11

Figure 2: A section of the constant SSL connections that the device was still making to ‘pastebin[.]com’ even in the month of April, which resembles beaconing scheduled activity

Throughout the months of March and April, suspicious SSL connections were made from a second potentially compromised device in the internal network to the infected breach device. The suspicious French IP address ‘81.255.222[.]82’ previously seen in the URI object query was revealed as the value of the Server Name Indicator (SNI) in these SSL connections where, typically, a hostname or domain name is indicated.

After an initial compromise, attackers usually aim to gain long-term remote shell access to continue the attack. As the breach device does not have a public IP address and is most certainly behind a firewall, for it to be directly accessible from the Internet a reverse shell would need to be established. Outgoing connections often succeed because firewalls generally filter only incoming traffic. Darktrace observed the device making continuous outgoing connections to an external host listening on an unusual port, 8443, indicating the presence of a reverse shell for pivoting and remote administration.

Figure 3: SSL connections to server name ‘81.255.222[.]8’ at end of March and start of April

Accomplish mission

On March 4, 2022 at 15:07:04 UTC, the device made a total of 16,029 failed connections to a large volume of external endpoints on the same port (8080). This behavior is consistent with address scanning. From the country codes, it appears that public IP addresses for various countries around the world were contacted (at least 99 unique addresses), with the US being the most targeted.

From 19:44:36 UTC onwards, the device performed cryptocurrency mining using the Minergate mining pool protocol to generate profits for the attacker. A login credential called ‘x’ was observed in the Minergate connections to ‘194.145.227[.]21’ via port 5443. JSON-RPC methods of ‘login’ and ‘submit’ were seen from the connection originator (the infected breach device) and ‘job’ was seen from the connection responder (the C2 server). A high volume of connections using the JSON-RPC application protocol to ‘pool-fr.supportxmr[.]com’ were also made on port 80.

When the botnet was first discovered in December 2020, mining pools MineXMR and F2Pool were used. In February 2021, MineXMR was removed and in March 2021, Nanopool mining pool was added,12 before switching to the present SupportXMR and Minergate mining pools. Threat actors utilize such proxy pools to help hide the actual crypto wallet address where the contributions are made by the crypto-mining activity. From April onwards, the device appears to download the ‘xmrig.exe’ executable from a rare IP address ‘61.103.177[.]229’ in Korea every few days – likely in an attempt to establish persistency and ensure the cryptocurrency mining payload continues to exist on the compromised system for continued mining.

On March 9, 2022 from 18:16:20 UTC onwards, trolling for various RCE vulnerabilities (including but not limited to these four) was observed over HTTP connections to public IP addresses:

  1. Through March, the device made around 5,417 HTTP POSTs with the URI ‘/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php’ to at least 99 unique public IPs. This appears to be related to CVE-2017-9841, which in PHPUnit allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via HTTP POST data beginning with a ‘13 PHPUnit is a common testing framework for PHP, used for performing unit tests during application development. It is used by a variety of popular Content Management Systems (CMS) such as WordPress, Drupal and Prestashop. This CVE has been called “one of the most exploitable CVEs of 2019,” with around seven million attack attempts being observed that year.14 This framework is not designed to be exposed on the critical paths serving web pages and should not be reachable by external HTTP requests. Looking at the status messages of the HTTP POSTs in this incident, some ‘Found’ and ‘OK’ messages were seen, suggesting the vulnerable path could be accessible on some of those endpoints.

Figure 4: PCAP of CVE-2017-9841 vulnerability trolling

Figure 5: The CVE-2017-9841 vulnerable path appears to be reachable on some endpoints

  1. Through March, the device also made around 5,500 HTTP POSTs with the URI ‘/_ignition/execute-solution’ to at least 99 unique public IPs. This appears related to CVE-2021-3129, which allows unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary code using debug mode with Laravel, a PHP web application framework in versions prior to 8.4.2.15 The POST request below makes the variable ‘username’ optional, and the ‘viewFile’ parameter is empty, as a test to see if the endpoint is vulnerable.16

Figure 6: PCAP of CVE-2021-3129 vulnerability trolling

  1. The device made approximately a further 252 HTTP GETs with URIs containing ‘invokefunction&function’ to another minimum of 99 unique public IPs. This appears related to a RCE vulnerability in ThinkPHP, an open-source web framework.17

Figure 7: Some of the URIs associated with ThinkPHP RCE vulnerability

  1. A HTTP header related to a RCE vulnerability for the Jakarta Multipart parser used by Apache struts2 in CVE-2017-563818 was also seen during the connection attempts. In this case the payload used a custom Content-Type header.

Figure 8: PCAP of CVE-2017-5638 vulnerability trolling

Two widely used methods of SSH authentication are public key authentication and password authentication. After gaining a foothold in the network, previous reports3 19 have mentioned that Sysrv-hello harvests private SSH keys from the compromised device, along with identifying known devices. Being a known device means the system can communicate with the other system without any further authentication checks after the initial key exchange. This technique was likely performed in conjunction with password brute-force attacks against the known devices. Starting from March 9, 2022 at 20:31:25 UTC, Darktrace observed the device making a large number of SSH connections and login failures to public IP ranges. For example, between 00:05:41 UTC on March 26 and 05:00:02 UTC on April 14, around 83,389 SSH connection attempts were made to 31 unique public IPs.

Figure 9: Darktrace’s Threat Visualizer shows large spikes in SSH connections by the breach device

Figure 10: Beaconing SSH connections to a single external endpoint, indicating a potential brute-force attack

Darktrace coverage

Cyber AI Analyst was able to connect the events and present them in a digestible, chronological order for the organization. In the aftermath of any security incidents, this is a convenient way for security users to conduct assisted investigations and reduce the workload on human analysts. However, it is good to note that this activity was also easily observed in real time from the model section on the Threat Visualizer due to the large number of escalating model breaches.

Figure 11: Cyber AI Analyst consolidating the events in the month of March into a summary

Figure 12: Cyber AI Analyst shows the progression of the attack through the month of March

As this incident occurred during a trial, Darktrace RESPOND was enabled in passive mode – with a valid license to display the actions that it would have taken, but with no active control performed. In this instance, no Antigena models breached for the initial compromised device as it was not tagged to be eligible for Antigena actions. Nonetheless, Darktrace was able to provide visibility into these anomalous connections.

Had Antigena been deployed in active mode, and the breach device appropriately tagged with Antigena All or Antigena External Threat, Darktrace would have been able to respond and neutralize different stages of the attack through network inhibitors Block Matching Connections and Enforce Group Pattern of Life, and relevant Antigena models such as Antigena Suspicious File Block, Antigena Suspicious File Pattern of Life Block, Antigena Pastebin Block and Antigena Crypto Currency Mining Block. The first of these inhibitors, Block Matching Connections, will block the specific connection and all future connections that matches the same criteria (e.g. all future outbound HTTP connections from the breach device to destination port 80) for a set period of time. Enforce Group Pattern of Life allows a device to only make connections and data transfers that it or any of its peer group typically make.

Conclusion

Resource hijacking results in unauthorized consumption of system resources and monetary loss for affected organizations. Compromised devices can potentially be rented out to other threat actors and botnet operators could switch from conducting crypto-mining to other more destructive illicit activities (e.g. DDoS or dropping of ransomware) whilst changing their TTPs in the future. Defenders are constantly playing catch-up to this continual evolution, and retrospective rules and signatures solutions or threat intelligence that relies on humans to spot future threats will not be able to keep up.

In this case, it appears the botnet operator has added an object query in the URL of the initial PowerShell loader script download, added Pastebin C2 for evasion and persistence, and utilized new cryptocurrency mining pools. Despite this, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was able to identify the threats the moment attackers changed their approach, detecting every step of the attack in the network without relying on known indicators of threat.

Appendix

Darktrace model detections

  • Anomalous File / Script from Rare Location
  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
  • Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)
  • Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Device / External Address Scan
  • Compromise / Crypto Currency Mining Activity
  • Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining
  • Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score
  • Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname
  • Device / Large Number of Model Breaches
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint
  • Anomalous Connection / SSH Brute Force
  • Compromise / SSH Beacon
  • Compliance / SSH to Rare External AWS
  • Compromise / High Frequency SSH Beacon
  • Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination
  • Device / Multiple C2 Model Breaches
  • Anomalous Connection / POST to PHP on New External Host

MITRE ATT&CK techniques observed:

IoCs

Thanks to Victoria Baldie and Yung Ju Chua for their contributions.

Footnotes

1. https://www.darktrace.com/en/blog/crypto-botnets-moving-laterally

2. https://www.darktrace.com/en/blog/how-ai-uncovered-outlaws-secret-crypto-mining-operation

3. https://www.lacework.com/blog/sysrv-hello-expands-infrastructure

4. https://www.riskiq.com/blog/external-threat-management/sysrv-hello-cryptojacking-botnet

5. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/194.145.227.21

6. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/c586845daa2aec275453659f287dcb302921321e04cb476b0d98d731d57c4e83?nocache=1

7. https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/81.255.222.82

8. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/586e271b5095068484446ee222a4bb0f885987a0b77e59eb24511f6d4a774c30

9. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/f5bef6ace91110289a2977cfc9f4dbec1e32fecdbe77326e8efe7b353c58e639

10. https://www.ironnet.com/blog/continued-exploitation-of-cve-2021-26084

11. https://www.zdnet.com/article/njrat-trojan-operators-are-now-using-pastebin-as-alternative-to-central-command-server

12. https://blogs.juniper.net/en-us/threat-research/sysrv-botnet-expands-and-gains-persistence

13. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-9841

14. https://www.imperva.com/blog/the-resurrection-of-phpunit-rce-vulnerability

15. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-3129

16. https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Laravel+v842+exploit+attempts+for+CVE20213129+debug+mode+Remote+code+execution/27758

17. https://securitynews.sonicwall.com/xmlpost/thinkphp-remote-code-execution-rce-bug-is-actively-being-exploited

18. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5638

19. https://sysdig.com/blog/crypto-sysrv-hello-wordpress

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Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Shuh Chin Goh

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November 18, 2026

Microsoft Perception, Agentic Insiders and the Role of Behavioral Security

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This week at Ignite, Microsoft announced that Microsoft Perception is generally available. It is a significant milestone for the industry, and one we welcome as a Microsoft partner. Microsoft is putting an architectural bet at the center of its security strategy: AI has changed the speed of cyber, and defense must change with it.

At Darktrace, we’ve long held the same view, so it’s encouraging to see a partner of Microsoft’s scale articulate it so clearly and bring it to market.

Security gets a team of agents

Perception is Microsoft’s agentic security system. It orchestrates red, blue, and green team agents through playbooks in a closed loop: red agents simulate attacks, blue agents detect, triage and investigate, and green agents fix and remediate. Rather than adding another assistant to the SOC, it creates coordinated teams of agents that share context. Security teams set the guardrails and approve high-impact actions.

Microsoft frames this as a three-layer cyber stack: signals, sensors and actuators; a context layer; and agents, harness and models on top. Together with partner sources, the foundation produces more than 165 trillion signals per day.  

The announcement also makes a second point that matters just as much. Microsoft is treating AI agents themselves as a new insider-risk category. In its words, “Agents are the new insiders.” They work at machine speed, around the clock, with broad access to data, apps, tools and other agents, and like any insider they can make mistakes, be manipulated or be compromised. New capabilities such as Dynamic Agent Risk (now in preview) and dynamic Conditional Access controls are designed to assess and contain that risk as it changes.

Four truths about security in the agentic era

The announcement is built on four ideas, and together they describe the new reality security teams are defending:

  1. Static security can’t keep up. Microsoft validates what many security practitioners have observed; the window between a vulnerability’s discovery and its exploitation is collapsing from months to minutes. Manual triage can’t answer that pace. Autonomous detection and response is now a requirement, not simply a “nice to have”.
  2. Agents must be treated as insiders. The question for security teams is no longer only “who is this user?” but “what is this agent actually doing?” Identity tells you who an agent is. Policy tells you what it is allowed to do. Neither tells you whether its behavior is normal.
  3. Security is moving from signatures to behavior and context. Dynamic Agent Risk looks across identity, data, endpoint, cloud and network signals and asks whether an agent’s actions are drifting from the intent of its task. That is behavioral thinking, and it is philosophically close to the Adaptive AI approach Darktrace has pioneered.
  4. Machine-speed attacks demand machine-speed response. Humans set the objectives and guardrails. Autonomous systems do the work inside them, both detecting and acting. Microsoft’s design has agents investigate, recommend and, within approved boundaries, act, with security teams setting the limits. At this pace, the gap between knowing something is wrong and doing something about it has to close to seconds.

The opportunity: where control plane meets behavioral context

Perception is an extraordinary control plane for agentic security. The question for security leaders is how to make it even more effective in the environments they actually run.

Real enterprises are heterogeneous. They run AWS and Google Cloud alongside Azure, and OT, IoT and third-party identity alongside Entra. Increasingly they also run AI agents and MCP-connected systems that no single vendor’s telemetry fully covers. Microsoft’s architecture recognizes this, with more than 500 connectors into the wider ecosystem.

That is where Darktrace’s role is distinct. The challenge isn’t signal volume, where Microsoft’s scale is unmatched. It’s deeply understanding what is normal for a specific organization, across every system, identity and agent in it. Together, we deliver two complementary layers:

  • Microsoft brings global intelligence and orchestration. It tells you what is known, what it means and what to do about it.
  • Darktrace brings organization-specific behavioral context. It tells you what is unusual here, right now, across the organizations AI, people and infrastructure, even if it has never been seen before.

The difference shows up in the numbers. A large enterprise generates billions of signals. Darktrace turns them into thousands of incidents, narrows those to hundreds of AI-led investigations, and surfaces as few as 20 that merit a human’s attention. For an agentic SOC, that kind of evaluated, prioritized input makes agents faster, not busier.

As enterprises deploy more agents, the hard problem becomes behavior that is technically permitted but unusual, manipulated or inconsistent with the agent’s purpose. Consider an agent that normally reads Salesforce records during US business hours and suddenly starts enumerating SharePoint and opening unusual outbound connections. Each step may use valid access and approved tools, so identity and policy checks can all pass. Spotting it requires knowing the behavior is abnormal for this agent, in this environment, right now.

That is why one principle in Microsoft’s AI Transparency Initiative matters so much: organizations should be able to see what their AI accesses and does, and independently verify those actions.  

  • Identity and permissions answer “should this agent be allowed to do this?”
  • Behavioral defense answers “even though it is allowed, is what it’s doing normal?”

Deterministic controls around non-deterministic AI are the right foundation, and continuously learned baselines are how organizations can verify those controls are working. ‍

What to look for in an agentic SOC architecture

As organizations adopt platforms like Perception, we’d encourage them to look for three capabilities:

  1. Behavioral context in the control plane. Agents work best with high-confidence signals rather than thousands of raw alerts: here is the behavior that materially deviates from this organization’s learned normal.
  2. ‍Behavioral reasoning on demand. During an investigation, agents should be able to ask what changed around a given identity, device or agent in the last 24 hours, and get a clear answer. ‍
  3. Autonomous, coordinated response across the stack. Response should be as fast as the threat without being reckless: acting immediately when confidence is high, constraining or reversing actions when it isn’t, and keeping a human in the loop when it matters. Within policy and human-approval guardrails, it should target the abnormal behavior rather than the whole business process and span identity, endpoint and the wider environment.

These are the areas where we’re focused, and where we look forward to working with Microsoft and the broader ecosystem.

Response is where speed is won or lost

In the AI era, detection and investigation only matter if action follows quickly. Perception brings agentic orchestration to that problem, with security teams setting the guardrails and approving high-impact steps. Autonomous response from Darktrace takes a complementary approach: it responds on behavioral deviation, in a way that is proportionate and targeted. It can interrupt activity that is abnormal for that specific device, identity or agent while leaving normal business activity running.

The two approaches fit together naturally. Behavioral signals can tell an orchestration layer that something has changed and how confident the system is. Orchestrated playbooks can then coordinate wider containment across identity, endpoint and cloud, within the policies customers define.

The bigger picture

The industry’s architecture is converging on identity, policy, telemetry, behavior, autonomous reasoning and machine-speed response. Microsoft is building formidable pieces of that picture, especially identity, policy, telemetry and orchestration.

Behavior is the layer Darktrace is built to provide: an independent intelligence that continuously learns how humans, machines and AI agents normally act, detects the moment reality departs from intent, and can respond to that deviation in a targeted, proportionate way that keeps normal business running. When attacks move at machine speed, understanding what is abnormal and acting on it quickly have to go together.

Perception brings together what Microsoft knows and orchestrates the response across its stack. Darktrace helps organizations understand what is normal for them and act on what isn’t. Customers building their agentic security strategy will need both.

Congratulations to our partners at Microsoft on this milestone. We look forward to helping customers secure the agentic era together.

Learn more about Darktrace Behavioral Defense.

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Kellie Regan
Director, Product Marketing - Cloud Security

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November 18, 2026

Agentic attacks in the wild: Inside three ARTEX investigations

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Key insights

·       Darktrace observed activity in several customer environments involving infrastructure and behaviors associated with reported ARTEX-enabled campaigns, including activity linked to China-nexus espionage and financially motivated attacks.

·       In the higher-confidence cases, known infrastructure appeared alongside beaconing, unusual TLS, reconnaissance, tunneling, script retrieval, SMB activity and external data transfer. One Azure case had no observed network command and control at all, only key listing and application identity activity.

·       ARTEX is now used by actors with different objectives. Identifying the framework can help locate relevant activity, while the behavior around the affected system provides the stronger evidence for understanding compromise and attribution.

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Introduction

Attackers have moved beyond using AI for phishing and are running agentic frameworks; open-source tools like ARTEX, CAIRN, PentAGI and Hexstrike that let AI agents scan, exploit and move through an environment with little human input [1]. ARTEX has moved quickly from an offensive security project into live intrusion activity. Since at least August 2026, the framework has been associated with espionage, financially motivated attacks and opportunistic campaigns across government, financial services, technology, defense, telecommunications and other sectors. The FBI has documented ARTEX activity spanning reconnaissance, exploitation, credential abuse, lateral movement, collection, command and control, and exfiltration [2].

Darktrace has observed activity in customer environments that overlaps with infrastructure, tooling and behaviors reported in several of these campaigns. The cases below highlight how those intrusions appeared on the network, including the activity visible before an analyst can determine which actor or framework may be responsible.

ARTEX as part of the attacker workflow

ARTEX is an open-source, multi-agent offensive security platform that converts high-level objectives into actions carried out by specialized agents [2]. Operators have used it to automate activity across the attack lifecycle, including scanning, exploitation, credential activity and post-compromise operations. Some reported intrusions moved from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours [2].

The framework is now associated with actors pursuing different objectives and using different post-exploitation tooling. The original public repository was removed in October 2026, but archived copies and localized versions remain available. For defenders, ARTEX is more useful as context for an investigation than as an attribution shortcut.

Darktrace observations show the same point at network level. Infrastructure linked to reported ARTEX campaigns appeared alongside beaconing, tunneling, unusual TLS, reconnaissance, file retrieval and lateral activity.

Case 1: Espionage-linked activity

Darktrace observed activity associated with BLOODALCHEMY command-and-control (C2) infrastructure in two customer environments. In one environment, five devices communicated with nginxmysql[.]com and 45.153.126[.]223 between October 23 and November 2. Both indicators had previously been linked to China-nexus espionage activity involving ARTEX [4].

The connections were accompanied by suspicious beaconing, repeated successful connections and unusual self-signed TLS. One system began making suspicious TLS connections to nginxmysql[.]com on October 23. Beaconing followed on October 24, and SMB scanning appeared later in the sequence. Other affected systems subsequently communicated with previously unseen external endpoints.

Prior to the observed C2, Darktrace detected curl requests retrieving executable and script content including /systemd, /wazuh, linux_amd64, u.sh and q.sh. Related telemetry included DRSGetNCChanges activity consistent with DCSync, LDAP enumeration, DNS zone transfers, network scanning, certificate downloads and SMB writes involving start.bat.

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Figure 1: Darktrace investigation showing suspicious network activity associated with infrastructure linked to reported ARTEX activity.

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Figure 2: Darktrace detection showing anomalous self-signed TLS activity during the espionage-linked investigation.

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BLOODALCHEMY has been reported in more than one China-nexus cluster [5]. SoftEther infrastructure observed in one environment provided another point of correlation with reported VAPOR PANDA tradecraft. The moderate-confidence assessment tying this to a Chinese nexus threat actor is based on infrastructure, victim context, tradecraft behavior that followed the initial connection, and public reporting.

Case 2: Financial-sector activity

In early November, Darktrace observed activity in two financial-sector environments that overlap with reported ARTEX infrastructure. On November 5, a server connected to 213.111.150[.]145:8099 and downloaded wisp-agent, associated with WISP C2 activity.

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In a second environment, a device attempted connections to 85.11.167[.]52 on November 1 and 2. The connections occurred alongside beaconing to new and rare destinations, anomalous TLS, possible tunneling and unusual package downloads.

The device also communicated with temp[.]sh, ssh.localhost[.]run, localhost[.]run, termbin[.]com, pastebin[.]com and GitHub-hosted release infrastructure. The sequence showed potential tooling retrieval, C2, tunneling and use of external services capable of staging or moving data.

Figure 3: Darktrace investigation showing connections to new and rare external destinations during the financial-sector activity.

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Case 3: Credential collection in Azure

On October 20, Darktrace observed a sweep of credential collection in a customer’s Azure environment that is consistent with ARTEX use. The intrusion began with connections to the virtual network from 43.98.196[.]73 (Alibaba Cloud). Open-source scanning data associates the address with ARTEX.

A compromised user identity made requests to the Azure Resource Manager API, though how it was compromised is unknown. The requests listed keys and secrets across API Management, web and function apps, Cognitive Services, Event Hubs, storage accounts and a managed Kubernetes cluster. With those credentials the attacker compromised multiple application identities. The attacker then used the application identities and the user identity to retrieve more credentials, change firewall and security rules and run scripts on virtual machines. Microsoft Defender alerts showed attempted execution of scripts related to Mimikatz and Impacket.

In a cloud environment, such privileged and enumerative operations are potentially indistinguishable from legitimate administrative actions. Consequently, the sequence and context of such operations signified more than any specific API call. There was no C2 traffic to match, and listing keys and using application identities are also what administrators and automation do. A compromised user, credential retrieval across several Azure services, new application identities, more credential collection and changes to security controls only made sense together, and by then access was spreading through the cloud environment.

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Figure 4: Darktrace Advanced Search showing Azure AD operation names associated with the activity.

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Figure 5: Darktrace Advanced Search showing the Azure Resource Manager action used to execute scripts.
Figure 6: Darktrace Device Event log window showing the triggered models related to the suspicious Azure activity.

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Shared tooling weakens attribution signals

The three cases looked different on the network: BLOODALCHEMY infrastructure and espionage-consistent tradecraft, WISP infrastructure in financial-sector systems, and Azure identity and control-plane activity with no C2 at all.

Shared tooling has complicated attribution for years, and ARTEX adds to it because the framework carries out more of the attack, so reconnaissance, exploitation attempts and some post-compromise activity can look the same whoever set the objective. Attribution still needs infrastructure, malware, victimology, timing and the sequence of behavior inside the environment, and an ARTEX link is one input to that. Moreover, the behavior and the agent will still be shaped by the biases, preferences, and tradecraft of its operators.

At its core, ARTEX’s planner and worker agents identify and record facts, while exploring intents. However, the way the Large Language Model (LLM) chooses its next steps toward an objective is shaped fundamentally by the skills and tools available in its context. This includes its starting context, as well as various possible Model Context Protocol (MCP) plugins and user-injected context (e.g. user input mid-operation). Operators still have preferred tradecraft, and this preference shapes the pathways the harness will provide to the LLM in context prompts. Even on the same platform, customization based on operator preferences and goals will remain a key facet of campaign and actor identification.

Detection and response

Across the Darktrace cases, the stronger signals came from behavior after the connection: beaconing, abnormal TLS, reconnaissance, unusual authentication, tunneling, script retrieval, SMB activity and outbound transfer. Automated activity also produced compressed bursts of requests, sequential enumeration and repeated attempts with small changes.

With agentic tools reaching privileged access in under three hours, analysts may have only a short window to connect scanning or authentication activity to credential changes, new administrative access, tooling retrieval or lateral movement. Keeping network, identity and cloud telemetry together shows what happened before and after the first match, and whether a connection was noise or an intrusion moving toward privileged access.

In some of these cases, Darktrace's Autonomous Response took or recommended action against the activity, including blocking internal connectivity over specified ports, inhibiting outbound connections with likely C2 endpoints, and/or disabling SaaS/IaaS user accounts. While many of these recommended actions required human confirmation due to deployment configuration preferences, had these actions been applied autonomously at the time of alert, the scope of activity would have been limited, thereby giving analysts time to investigate and respond.

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Figure 7: Autonomous Response blocking suspicious firewall modification activity.

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Figure 8: Autonomous Response summary for affected cloud users during the intrusion.

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Figure 9: Autonomous Response taking action against unusual lateral movement activity on an affected device.

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Figure 10: Autonomous Response summary for affected network users during the time of the intrusion.

ARTEX won’t be the last of these frameworks. The next ones will come with new capabilities and defaults, but an intrusion still must interact with the target environment, and that shows up in how systems, identities and applications behave even after the indicator has aged out. The harder intrusions to catch will have no infrastructure to match, just ordinary API calls and legitimate identities. Detecting those depends on knowing what normal looks like for each identity and device. Containing abnormal activity at machine speed can stop an intrusion progressing while analysts establish impact and its extent. Autonomous Response does not replace that human analysis, but rather augments defender teams' capabilities by extending the window for investigation.

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Credit to Nathaniel Jones (SVP, Global Threat Intelligence), Eugene Chua (Principal Analyst), Sam Lister (Senior Security Researcher), Adam Potter (Associate Principal Cyber Analyst)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace model detections

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname

·       Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed

·       Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL

·       Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

·       Compromise / Suspicious Beaconing Behaviour

·       Compromise / Agent Beacon to New Endpoint

·       Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint

·       Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination

·       Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External

·       Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

·       Device / Anomalous Github Download

·       Device / Anomalous Package Download

·       Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

Indicators of compromise (IoCs)

nginxmysql[.]com

45.153.126[.]223

213.111.150[.]145

wisp-agent

85.11.167[.]52

43.98.196[.]73

192.121.47[.]20

www[.]ddduuuppp[.]com

89.46.234[.]50

sqlserver-sqlite[.]com

199.19.95[.]66

graphics-hook-filter64.dll

graphics-hook_config.bin

References

1.      Google. GTIG AI Threat Tracker - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/agentic-threat-activity-crosses-a-significant-threshold

2.      Federal Bureau of Investigation, Threat Overview of ARTEX Autonomous Penetration Testing Framework, FLASH-20261113-001, 13 November 2026: https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261113.pdf

3.      Microsoft Security Blog, Storm-0940 Uses ARTEX Agentic AI in ConnectWise Supply Chain Compromise: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/21/storm-0940-uses-artex-agentic-ai-connectwise-supply-chain-compromise/

4.      CrowdStrike, VAPOR PANDA Uses ARTEX to Scale Global Campaign: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/vapor-panda-uses-artex-to-scale-global-campaign/

5.      Bitdefender, SilkParasite: Tracking a China-Nexus APT Across Central Asia: https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/silkparasite-tracking-china-nexus-apt-across-central-asia

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
SVP, Global Threat Intelligence
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