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January 30, 2026

ClearFake: From Fake CAPTCHAs to Blockchain-Driven Payload Retrieval

Darktrace detected a potential ClearFake‑related incident involving signs of EtherHiding activity and interactions with blockchain‑based infrastructure. A single device showed repeated suspicious command‑line behavior, primarily involving Microsoft HTML Application Host. The activity occurred over the course of a day and indicated early‑stage attempts to load malicious content associated with the ClearFake campaign.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Vivek Rajan
Cyber Analyst
fake captcha to blockchain driven palyload retrievalDefault blog image
30
Jan 2026

What is ClearFake?

As threat actors evolve their techniques to exploit victims and breach target networks, the ClearFake campaign has emerged as a significant illustration of this continued adaptation. ClearFake is a campaign observed using a malicious JavaScript framework deployed on compromised websites, impacting sectors such as e‑commerce, travel, and automotive. First identified in mid‑2023, ClearFake is frequently leveraged to socially engineer victims into installing fake web browser updates.

In ClearFake compromises, victims are steered toward compromised WordPress sites, often positioned by attackers through search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning. Once on the site, users are presented with a fake CAPTCHA. This counterfeit challenge is designed to appear legitimate while enabling the execution of malicious code. When a victim interacts with the CAPTCHA, a PowerShell command containing a download string is retrieved and executed.

Attackers commonly abuse the legitimate Microsoft HTML Application Host (MSHTA) in these operations. Recent campaigns have also incorporated Smart Chain endpoints, such as “bsc-dataseed.binance[.]org,” to obtain configuration code. The primary payload delivered through ClearFake is typically an information stealer, such as Lumma Stealer, enabling credential theft, data exfiltration, and persistent access [1].

Darktrace’s Coverage of ClearFake

Darktrace / ENDPOINT first detected activity likely associated with ClearFake on a single device on over the course of one day on November 18, 2025. The system observed the execution of “mshta.exe,” the legitimate Microsoft HTML Application Host utility. It also noted a repeated process command referencing “weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru”, indicating suspicious external activity. Subsequent analysis of this endpoint using open‑source intelligence (OSINT) indicated that it was a malicious, domain generation algorithm (DGA) endpoint [2].

The process line referencing weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, as observed by Darktrace / ENDPOINT.
Figure 1: The process line referencing weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, as observed by Darktrace / ENDPOINT.

This activity indicates that mshta.exe was used to contact a remote server, “weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru/rpxacc64mshta,” and execute the associated HTA file to initiate the next stage of the attack. OSINT sources have since heavily flagged this server as potentially malicious [3].

The first argument in this process uses the MSHTA utility to execute the HTA file hosted on the remote server. If successful, MSHTA would then run JavaScript or VBScript to launch PowerShell commands used to retrieve malicious payloads, a technique observed in previous ClearFake campaigns. Darktrace also detected unusual activity involving additional Microsoft executables, including “winlogon.exe,” “userinit.exe,” and “explorer.exe.” Although these binaries are legitimate components of the Windows operating system, threat actors can abuse their normal behavior within the Windows login sequence to gain control over user sessions, similar to the misuse of mshta.exe.

EtherHiding cover

Darktrace also identified additional ClearFake‑related activity, specifically a connection to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org, a legitimate BNB Smart Chain endpoint. This activity was triggered by injected JavaScript on the compromised site www.allstarsuae[.]com, where the script initiated an eth_call POST request to the Smart Chain endpoint.

Example of a fake CAPTCHA on the compromised site www.allstarsuae[.]com.
Figure 2: Example of a fake CAPTCHA on the compromised site www.allstarsuae[.]com.

EtherHiding is a technique in which threat actors leverage blockchain technology, specifically smart contracts, as part of their malicious infrastructure. Because blockchain is anonymous, decentralized, and highly persistent, it provides threat actors with advantages in evading defensive measures and traditional tracking [4].

In this case, when a user visits a compromised WordPress site, injected base64‑encoded JavaScript retrieved an ABI string, which was then used to load and execute a contract hosted on the BNB Smart Chain.

JavaScript hosted on the compromised site www.allstaruae[.]com.
Figure 3: JavaScript hosted on the compromised site www.allstaruae[.]com.

Conducting malware analysis on this instance, the Base64 decoded into a JavaScript loader. A POST request to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org was then used to retrieve a hex‑encoded ABI string that loads and executes the contract. The JavaScript also contained hex and Base64‑encoded functions that decoded into additional JavaScript, which attempted to retrieve a payload hosted on GitHub at “github[.]com/PrivateC0de/obf/main/payload.txt.” However, this payload was unavailable at the time of analysis.

Darktrace’s detection of the POST request to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org.
Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of the POST request to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of the executable file and the malicious hostname.

Autonomous Response

As Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was enabled on this customer’s network, Darktrace was able to take swift mitigative action to contain the ClearFake‑related activity early, before it could lead to potential payload delivery. The affected device was blocked from making external connections to a number of suspicious endpoints, including 188.114.96[.]6, *.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, and neighb0rrol1[.]ru, ensuring that no further malicious connections could be made and no payloads could be retrieved.

Autonomous Response also acted to prevent the executable mshta.exe from initiating HTA file execution over HTTPS from this endpoint by blocking the attempted connections. Had these files executed successfully, the attack would likely have resulted in the retrieval of an information stealer, such as Lumma Stealer.

Autonomous Response’s intervention against the suspicious connectivity observed.
Figure 6: Autonomous Response’s intervention against the suspicious connectivity observed.

Conclusion

ClearFake continues to be observed across multiple sectors, but Darktrace remains well‑positioned to counter such threats. Because ClearFake’s end goal is often to deliver malware such as information stealers and malware loaders, early disruption is critical to preventing compromise. Users should remain aware of this activity and vigilant regarding fake CAPTCHA pop‑ups. They should also monitor unusual usage of MSHTA and outbound connections to domains that mimic formats such as “bsc-dataseed.binance[.]org” [1].

In this case, Darktrace was able to contain the attack before it could successfully escalate and execute. The attempted execution of HTA files was detected early, allowing Autonomous Response to intervene, stopping the activity from progressing. As soon as the device began communicating with weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, an Autonomous Response inhibitor triggered and interrupted the connections.

As ClearFake continues to rise, users should stay alert to social engineering techniques, including ClickFix, that rely on deceptive security prompts.

Credit to Vivek Rajan (Senior Cyber Analyst) and Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Process / New Executable Launched

Endpoint / Anomalous Use of Scripting Process

Endpoint / New Suspicious Executable Launched

Endpoint / Process Connection::Unusual Connection from New Process

Autonomous Response Models

Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

  • weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru – URL - Malicious Domain
  • 188.114.96[.]6 – IP – Suspicious Domain
  • *.neighb0rrol1[.]ru – URL – Malicious Domain

MITRE Tactics

Initial Access, Drive-by Compromise, T1189

User Execution, Execution, T1204

Software Deployment Tools, Execution and Lateral Movement, T1072

Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1059

System Binary Proxy Execution: MSHTA, T1218.005

References

1.        https://www.kroll.com/en/publications/cyber/rapid-evolution-of-clearfake-delivery

2.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/weiss.neighb0rrol1.ru

3.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/1f1aabe87e5e93a8fff769bf3614dd559c51c80fc045e11868f3843d9a004d1e/community

4.        https://www.packetlabs.net/posts/etherhiding-a-new-tactic-for-hiding-malware-on-the-blockchain/

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Vivek Rajan
Cyber Analyst

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July 21, 2026

How to Secure AI in Stadium Operations?

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Key takeaways

  • AI is entering high-impact stadium functions such as access control, crowd management, ticketing, facilities, and surveillance.  
  • Shadow AI and third-party AI use can create risks that stadium security teams cannot readily see.  
  • Security teams must understand not only which AI systems exist, but also what they can access and what actions they can take.  
  • Live-event resilience requires continuous monitoring and response across AI, IT, OT, identities, and third parties.

Modern stadiums are infrastructure unlike any other. I’ve written before on event day sparking stadiums into life with shops and food stands, transport hubs, vast telecommunications infrastructure, field-side technology and beyond, acting as one super-sized, connected ecosystem. Stadiums’ scale and complexity make them some of the toughest environments in cybersecurity. Now, we’re adding AI to those operations and bringing a new dimension of risk.

The benefits of AI in stadium operations are easy to see. It can help stadium operators move fans safely through crowded gates, forecast demand at concession stands, support biometric entry, identify suspicious behavior on CCTV, and manage heating and ventilation. Used well, it can make live events safer, faster, and more efficient.

But it also changes the security model.

In Darktrace’s recent research into the threat landscape surrounding sports, we asked cybersecurity professionals protecting professional sports organizations where in their footprint a cyber compromise would have the greatest impact. The area they named most, highlighted by 34% of the professionals we spoke to, was stadium operations. At the same time, 35% said their organizations are already using AI in stadium operations, or plan to do so in the next 12 months.

Security teams are no longer just protecting traditional IT systems around a stadium. They are increasingly being asked to protect AI systems that are operating in the stadium’s most fundamental functions.

Approved AI vs. shadow AI in stadium operations

There is a clear difference between AI a stadium’s security team knows about and AI it does not.

Approved AI is the AI that has been reviewed, tested, and integrated into the venue’s operating environment. It may support CCTV analytics, access control, facility management, ticketing, logistics, broadcast operations, or anti-piracy monitoring. It should have clear ownership, access controls, logging, vendor review, and data protection rules. That does not make it risk-free, but it allows security teams to institute proper governance.

Shadow AI is different. It is the unapproved use of AI tools by employees, contractors, or suppliers. It often starts with good intent. Someone wants to work faster. A staff member pastes internal information into a public AI tool to draft a briefing. A developer uses an AI assistant to debug ticketing code. A supplier connects an AI scheduling tool to delivery routes. A designer uploads unreleased venue plans or sponsor material to generate a mockup.

None of those actions may feel like a security decision to the person doing them. But each one can move sensitive operational data into an environment the stadium does not control, creating hidden risk.

The approved AI stack may be visible to security teams. The shadow AI stack often is not.

Why game day increases AI cybersecurity risk

In a typical enterprise environment, a security team may have hours to investigate a strange login or an unexpected connection to a third-party service. Within a stadium, the moment an incident is likely to occur is also the moment when teams are at their most stretched and the incident can have the greatest repercussions: game day.

If an AI system used for crowd management behaves unexpectedly, the issue is not only technical. It may affect physical movement inside the venue.

If a supplier tool is sending operational data to an unapproved AI platform, the issue is not only data governance. It may expose delivery routes, restricted access schedules, or staffing plans.

The most dangerous scenario is not always a loud, dramatic attack but a hidden dependency that no one has mapped such as a vendor adding an AI feature through a software update or a staff workflow using an unapproved tool.

By the time the venue is live, those hidden connections can become operational risk.

The supply chain is part of the stadium attack surface

Any major sporting event is made by its supply chain and partnerships: catering firms, transport providers, broadcast systems, facilities teams. Every piece is necessary and each creates a security channel. The risk of supply chain compromise has been well established for some time and has been the source of some of the most high-profile breaches we’ve seen. The data breach at MSG Entertainment, owner of Madison Square Garden, that was widely reported in March, originated in a breach of Oracle’s E-Business Suite, used in MSG Entertainment’s back-office systems, while the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack on the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics reportedly began with the compromise of the main IT service provider for the Games. The addition of AI is heightening the risk.

A stadium can have strict rules for its own AI systems, but its vendors may be using separate tools. Some may use AI to manage staffing, delivery windows, inventory, or customer communications. Others may not realize that AI features have been added into software they already use.

This is one of the hardest parts of securing AI in stadium operations. The risk does not always come from a tool the venue selected. It may come from a tool a supplier selected or a feature the supplier did not know had been turned on.

Security teams need to treat vendor AI the same way they treat vendor access. They need to know what suppliers can connect to, what data they can see, what tools they use, and whether those tools introduce new routes for data exposure or lateral movement.

A third-party AI tool does not need deep access to create risk. Sometimes it only needs the right operational detail at the wrong time.

Four questions for securing AI in stadium operations

As AI becomes part of stadium operations, security teams need to move beyond basic approval lists. There are four questions they need to ask:

1. Where is AI being used?

This includes obvious tools, such as computer vision, access control, ticketing, logistics, and facility management. But it also includes less visible AI inside SaaS platforms, vendor tools, browser extensions, developer workflows, smart building systems, and collaboration tools.

2. What can the AI access?

Can it see incident logs, staffing plans, ticketing data, video feeds, building controls, fan information, credentials, or supplier systems? Can it only analyze information, or can it also trigger actions?

3. What can the AI do?

AI agents are not just passive tools. Some can call APIs, update records, generate instructions, trigger workflows, or act with the permissions of a user or service account. In a stadium, that distinction is critical. There is a big difference between an AI system that recommends an action and one that can take an action.

4. What does normal look like?

In your security architecture, static rules will not be enough. AI use changes quickly: tools appear inside existing platforms, vendors add new services, and staff find workarounds when they are under pressure. Security teams need to understand normal behavior across people, identities, devices, networks, cloud services, suppliers, and AI tools so they can spot when something changes.

That is especially important in live-event environments, where small anomalies can matter. A connection to an unapproved AI service may be harmless in one context and serious in another, and an AI agent taking action at 3 a.m. may be expected during setup but suspicious during a match. Context is what turns raw activity into useful security insight. It’s also what enables rapid response. Your own AI-based security systems can respond to threats at machine speed if they can build the live context to know action needs to be taken.

AI can make stadiums safer, but only if it is secured

AI has a real role to play in stadium operations. It can help teams detect crowd pressure earlier, reduce bottlenecks, manage facilities more efficiently, improve the fan experience, and support event teams during high-pressure moments.

The answer is not to slow all AI adoption. That's not the goal. The answer is to make AI visible, governed, and secure before it becomes part of match-day operations.

For stadium operators and event organizers, that means mapping AI use across the venue and supplier ecosystem. It means understanding what each AI system can access and what actions it can take. It means giving staff approved tools that meet their needs, rather than leaving them to find workarounds. It means writing AI use into vendor contracts and audits. And it means monitoring behavior across the full environment, not only the systems that are easiest to see. A stadium cannot secure what it cannot see.

When AI becomes part of how a stadium moves people, controls access, manages facilities, supports suppliers, and protects media rights, it stops being a side project. It becomes part of the event infrastructure.

Event infrastructure must be thoroughly prepared before venue gates open and sustained with the operational resilience required to support a secure, seamless, and reliable event experience.

How Darktrace helps secure AI in stadium operations

Darktrace brings more than a decade of behavioral AI expertise, built on an enterprise‑wide platform designed to operate in complex, ambiguous environments. We protect the large-scale integrated IT and OT environments that underpin stadium operations from the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar, to Formula 1 Grand Prixes around the world and stadiums across the USA.

Other cybersecurity technologies try to predict each new attack based on historical attacks. The problem is that AI operates like humans do. Every action introduces new information that changes how AI behaves, making it unpredictable in nature. Historical attack tactics are now only a small part of the equation, forcing vendors to retrofit unproven acquisitions to secure AI.  

Darktrace is fundamentally different. Our Adaptive AI continuously learns how your people and AI behave, building an understanding of your organization so it can detect and respond autonomously when behavior deviates. Our Behavioral Defense Platform secures your AI, people, and infrastructure as you onboard new workflows, agents, and applications, enabling your AI transformation at scale.

As AI changes what organizations can do, Darktrace helps them move forward with confidence. We give the security teams defending the people and technology within stadium infrastructure the understanding, visibility, and autonomous action they need to protect new technologies as they are integrated into operations, so their organizations drive the progress that will define the AI era.

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July 15, 2026

Security After Signatures: Operating in a World of Pre‑CVE Disclosure Exploitation, Collapsed Trust Boundaries, and Autonomous Systems

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Three shifts have reshaped what it means to defend an enterprise securely.  

First, exploitation often begins before defenders have a Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier, a security advisory, or an entry in the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog.

Secondly, the trust boundary has moved beyond the network edge into identities, tokens, APIs, and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) workflows.  

Third, an increasing share of business activity is executed through automation, integrations, and AI agent-like systems that can act faster than teams can verify intent.  

If your security model still relies on detecting known bad artefacts, triaging isolated alerts, and waiting for confirmation before acting, you are already behind the threat.  

This is not a failure of security teams; it’s a failure of the operating model to keep pace with how the environment has changed.

A SOC built around alerts and signatures assumes that malicious activity will eventually surface as an event. In real incidents, however, the decisive evidence is rarely a single event. Instead, it is a chain of individually explainable actions that only appears malicious once you connect the dots across identity, non-human identity, cloud, email, SaaS, operational technology (OT), and network telemetry.

The defenders succeeding today observe behaviors, link them into sequences, understand what those sequences mean, and contain impact before the full story unfolds. That is the operating model the current threat environment demands.  

Exploitation before disclosure

The first shift is the straightforward: the time to exploit has dropped to nearly zero.  

In one example, Darktrace observed a sequence of subtle but strategically significant anomalies within a customer environment that later aligned with exploitation of CVE‑2025‑0994 in Trimble Cityworks by likely Chinese-nexus threat actors. Behavioral indicators were visible at least 18 days before public disclosure, with related anomalies emerging 40 to 50 days earlier during the intrusion window.  

This case illustrates a familiar pattern: clusters of weak‑signal anomalies combing to form an actionable picture of intrusion long before a CVE is published. Such activity reflects long‑horizon, option‑preserving operator models often associated with mature state‑linked activity.  

Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of malicious exploitation of CVE 2025-0994, later tied to Chinese-nexus threat actors targeting critical national infrastructure (CNI) in the US, weeks before public disclosure.

Throughout 2025 and 2026, Darktrace has continued to observe the value of anomaly-based detections across a range of incidents.

CVE CVE Public Disclosure Date Darktrace Detection Date Days Between Detection of Exploitation and CVE Public Disclosure
CVE 2025 0994
(Trimble City Works)
2025-02-06 2025-01-19 18 Days
CVE 2025-24183
(Apache)
2025-03-10 2025-02-18 20 days
CVE 2025-10035
(Fortra GoAnywhere)
2025-09-18 2025-09-11 7 days

Identity is the real control plane

The second shift is that identity has replaced perimeter as the primary control plane. As Darktrace’s Annual Threat Report 2026 illustrated, identity remains the main challenge in defending against modern intrusions. A clear example is the Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) case published by Darktrace in December 2025. A phishing email led to the compromise of an Office 365 account. Session hijacking bypassed multi-factor authentication (MFA), and the compromised account was used for follow-on phishing and persistence activities including the creation of malicious email rules.  

Every step in that sequence mattered. A successful login alone does not prove legitimacy. An inbox rule, on its own, may not appear catastrophic. Mail activity, viewed in isolation, may seem operationally normal. But the behavioral chain tells a different story: credential theft, token abuse, persistence, and onward compromise through a trusted identity.  

This is why the question is no longer “Did the user authenticate successfully”. The more important question is, “Does this identity action make sense right now, in this context, given what came before it?” The AiTM case shows how identity can be compromised. In practice, however, attacks rarely remained confined to identity alone.  

In another Darktrace case, a compromised SaaS account triggered activity across the email, SaaS, and network layers, including inbox rule changes, phishing propagation, and connections to suspicious infrastructure. Viewed in isolation, none of these events were decisive. Together, however,  they formed a behavioral sequence that revealed the intrusion, with the full attack story automatically correlated and surfaced to defenders by Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst.  

Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst correlated and appended additional events to the incident, including other users who connected to the suspicious redirect link after outbound phishing emails were sent.

AI accelerates the threat  

The third shift is the one many teams still underestimate: trusted tooling, integrations, and AI agent-like systems can create actions that appear legitimate but are strategically dangerous.  

The shift becomes clearer when examining how governments are now framing AI risk. In 2026, guidance published by CISA, UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and Five Eyes partners warned that agentic systems expand attack surfaces, accumulate privilege, and can behave in ways that are difficult to predict or explain [1]. The advice is simple: assume unexpected behavior and design controls around it.  

The real risk is not AI usage. It is unknown autonomy: systems with credentials, data access, and action paths that can execute workflow steps without sufficient behavioral validation, traceability, or human oversight. Darktrace’s Model Context Protocol (MCP) risk analysis provides a useful framework for understanding this challenge. Over-privileged agents, content injection, and tool abuse become high-consequence risks when connected systems can dynamically retrieve data, execute actions, and communicate externally.  

Whether security teams like it or not, AI is already in the enterprise. It will help drive innovation, but it will also be abused, whether accidentally or maliciously. In each of the cases below, AI either scaled the attacker, built the tooling, or existed within the environment as something to exploit or misuse.

1. AI as an Attack Multiplier

In one campaign targeting Mexican government entities, a single operator used commercial AI platforms to generate exploits, automate reconnaissance, and process large volumes of data, compressing work that would traditionally have required an entire team into a single workflow [2].  

Darktrace is also observing this trend further down the stack. In one case, Darktrace identified AI-generated malware exploiting React2Shell, where an attacker used a Large Language Model (LLM) to produce working exploit code and deploy it at scale.  

[darktrace.com], [darktrace.com]

2. AI as an Attack Surface

Attempted AI exploitation is now appearing within customer environments. In one case involving an automation technology manufacturer, a compromised LLM proxy was seemingly used as a stepping stone to access additional AI services. When that attempt failed, the attacker pivoted to cryptomining.

What is clear is that the AI layer has already become an asset worth probing, exploiting, and pivoting through. It is also clear that defenders benefit from rapidly understanding how these activities connect. In this case, Cyber AI Analyst automatically pieced together the intrusion, while Darktrace’s Managed Threat Detection service alerted to the customer, enabling the activity to be contained before it could progress further.

Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst's investigation into a compromised LLM proxy that was abused for cryptomining activity.

AI as a trusted but dangerous actor

This does not require a cinematic vision of “rogue AI.” The Salesloft incident provides a more grounded example, where AI and automation operate with legitimate access but served malicious intent. In that case, attackers abused compromised OAuth tokens associated with the Drift AI chat agent to export significant volumes of data from Salesforce environments.  

The activity resembled legitimate API usage and relied on trusted SaaS integrations rather than malware or other obvious signs of intrusion. That is precisely the challenge. Traditional security controls are good at detecting forced entry, but far less effective when a trusted application integration behaves in a way that is technically permitted yet operationally harmful.  

In these scenarios, the security challenge shifts from validating access to validating behavior.

This is what that looks like in practice: AI-linked identities executing legitimate actions that require behavioral validation rather than access validation.

Figure 4: Darktrace / SECURE AI highlights anomalous activity across AI identities, surfacing critical behavior that requires validation and containment.

Early observations from Darktrace / SECURE AI deployments reinforce this reality. Across Darktrace's observed fleet, AI service connections per deployment increased 13% during the first half of 2026, reaching over 16 million connections overall. The typical organisation now interacts with seven different AI providers, evidence that AI is no longer operating at the edges of the enterprise. It is increasingly woven into day-to-day business activity.

The most common risks are not compromised models or advanced AI attacks. Instead, they stem from employees and business functions exposing sensitive information through entirely legitimate-looking interactions. Darktrace has observed repeated submission of personally identifiable information (PII), tax information, identification documents, and medical data into LLM prompts, alongside widespread use of unsanctioned (shadow) AI services and growing AI activity from mobile devices.  

For defenders, the challenge is increasingly one of context: understanding when legitimate business use crosses into material risk, while preserving privacy and user trust.

Conclusion

Across all three shifts, the pattern is the same: behavior precedes understanding. Security teams are not losing because adversaries have become invisible. An increasingly outdated security model assumes that malicious activity will reveal itself cleanly and early. It no longer does.  

In 2026 and beyond, defenders win by understanding behavioral sequences, continuously validating trust, and acting before certainty becomes hindsight. That is security after signatures. That is security in the AI era.

Credit to: Daniel Levy, Threat Hunting Data Scientist

Edited by: Ryan Traill, Content Manager

References

[1] https://www.cyber.gov.au/business-government/secure-design/artificial-intelligence/careful-adoption-of-agentic-ai-services  

[2]https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2026-02-26/hacker-used-anthropics-claude-ai-to-steal-mexican-government-data

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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