Learn how cyber criminals evade detection. Darktrace analyses the four ways they operate under the radar. Read here to stay vigilant against cyber attacks.
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Oliver Rochford
Technical Director
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07
Apr 2020
The challenge of reliably attributing cyber-threats has amplified in recent years, as adversaries adopt a collection of techniques to ensure that even if their attacks are caught, they themselves escape detection and avoid punishment.
Detecting a threat is, of course, a very different technical challenge compared to tracing that activity back to a human operator. Nevertheless, at some point after the dust has settled, during the post-hoc incident analysis for example, someone somewhere may need to know who the suspects are. And in spite of all of our other advances, and also some recent successes in attributing offensive and cyber-criminal acts, only three out of every 100,000 cyber-crimes are prosecuted. Put simply, this is still an unsolved set of problems. Many of the successes we do have can be attributed more to operational security fails on the criminals’ end than any other active approaches. In fact, some recent trends have actually made reliable attribution even more challenging.
The four cyber-threat trends that make attribution difficult
There are four related trends in how threat-actors can procure and obtain attack capabilities that have resulted in an increase in complexity when attempting to reliably identify Tools, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) and attributing them to distinct threat-actors.
A Cybercrime-as-a-Service economy and supply chain allowing cyber-criminals to mix and match off the shelf offensive cyber capabilities.
Expansion of ‘Living off the Land’ (LoL) tool usage by threat-actors to evade traditional, signature-based security defenses, and to obfuscate their activity.
While Code Reuse has always existed in the hacker community, copying nation-state-grade attack code has recently become possible.
The barrier to entry for criminally motivated operators has been lowered, providing the means for less technical criminals, who are only limited by time and their imagination.
Figure 1: The four cyber-threat trends
Threat-actors can mix and match attack tools, creating attack stacks that can be tailored for a variety of campaigns.
Between a professional marketplace of cyber-crime tools and services, the increasing adoption of ‘Living off the Land’ techniques, and the reusing of code leaked from nation-state intelligence services, threat-actors with even the most limited technical ability can conduct highly sophisticated criminal campaigns. Prospective cyber-criminals now have four primary types of attack tools to choose from – with three of them brand new or greatly enhanced. Even more importantly, these threat-actors can mix and match attack tools, creating tactically flexible attack stacks that can be tailored for a variety of campaigns against a diverse set of victims.
Off the shelf attacks
The burgeoning and increasingly professional Cybercrime-as-a-Service market (estimated at $1.6B) provides a thriving marketplace of microservices, attack code, and attack platforms. Anyone with a motive and enough bitcoin and enthusiasm can become the next ‘cyber Don Corleone’. Many of these services offer dedicated account management and professional support 24 hours a day. The commercialization of the cyber-crime supply chain has raised the barrier to entry for Cybercrime-as-a-Service vendors, while at the same time lowering it for cyber-criminal operators.
Living off the Land
‘Living off the Land’ (LoL) and “malware-less” attacks have been on the rise for some time now. What makes these attack methods so dangerous is that they leverage standard operating system tools to conduct their nefarious business, making signature-based approaches that look for malware heuristics ineffective – including signature-based Intrusion Protection Systems.
These attacks in particular demonstrate the need for an approach to cyber security that goes beyond looking at what malware is being used. Rather than relying on static blacklists, security teams are instead turning to a more sophisticated approach that learns ‘normal’ for every user and device across an entire business. From that evolving baseline, this approach to defense can identify and contain anomalous activity indicative of a cyber-threat – all in real time.
Code reuse and repurpose
What is new, and unprecedented, is that cyber-criminals are gaining access to intelligence and nation-state grade attack code.
Hackers have always begged, borrowed, and stolen code from others, including attack code – just two notable examples include the Zeus trojan and RIG exploit kit code leaks that provided the code base for much of the current generation of threats. What is new and unprecedented is that, whether through malice or incompetence, cyber-criminals are gaining access to intelligence and nation-state grade attack code. The Shadowbroker leaks that resulted in Wannacry is one recent example of this trend, and one we expect to accelerate – especially with intelligence services actively outing each other’s methods.
Custom and bespoke techniques
The practice of hackers creating their own tools and researching their own exploits has a long and hallowed tradition, with headline-grabbing zero-days becoming more and more common. Nation-state actors in particular often make a distinction between attack operators and attack code developers, with the ability to request tailored and bespoke code and tools – not unlike the model that has been replicated in the Cybercrime-as-a-Service market. Even when developing custom tools, threat-actors frequently integrate code and exploits from other parties.
Figure 2: The four main attack tool types
When determining who is actually behind these attacks, though, what is most important is the ability to combine all four types of attack tools – this provides a further layer of obfuscation against methods that rely on pattern matching for detection whilst causing additional confusion for would-be investigators. An attacker can use any combination and variation of these tool types to create a different “Chimera” attack stack – making it that much more difficult to identify who is really the operator. Telling apart the operator from the Cybercrime-as-a-Service vendor, for example, is difficult when most of the TTPs that are evaluated are technical and derive from the tooling.
Figure 3: The TTP and Attribution Confusion Chain
Conclusion
As the challenge of attribution intensifies, our focus must turn to defending against cyber-attacks themselves.
The combination of the four threat trends outlined above has lowered the barrier to entry for criminally motivated operators. Less technical adversaries are now able to launch attacks at a speed and scale previously confined to the most organized and well-financed cyber-criminal rings. This change in circumstances has made attribution of offensive cyber activity drastically more complex, and it may be some time before the prosecution rate for cyber-crime gets good enough that it can act as a greater disincentive.
As the challenge of attribution intensifies, our focus must turn to defending against cyber-attacks themselves. You may not ever know who is attacking you, but if you can successfully thwart the full range of threats, new and old, your organization can continue to operate as normal.
Fortunately, defenders’ abilities to detect and respond to cyber-threats have significantly advanced in recent years, thanks to the latest developments in AI and machine learning. Over 3,500 organizations now rely on Cyber AI to detect and contain cyber-threats – whether attackers use pre-existing OS tools to masquerade their attacks or use bespoke and entirely new techniques to bypass rules and signatures. When a threat is identified, AI can respond autonomously by enforcing a user or device’s ‘pattern of life’, allowing ‘business as usual’ whilst ensuring the organization is protected from harm.
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Hola VPN Abuse: From Proxy Traffic to Malware and Cryptomining
Introduction
In enterprise environments, non-compliant software traffic can introduce unexpected exposure by creating unmanaged paths for outbound connectivity. Hola VPN is a notable example because of its peer-to-peer design, which can effectively turn user devices into routing or exit nodes for other parties’ traffic, shifting the risk profile from that of a traditional virtual private network (VPN) to something closer to a distributed proxy.
As a result, the appearance of Hola-related activity, whether from prior installation or unintended background connections, should be treated with caution. Such activity may provide a foothold for malicious behavior, including lateral movement or command-and-control communication.
This blog explores how Hola-associated activity appeared as part of broader patterns of suspicious behavior observed across the Darktrace customer base.
The campaign
In February and March 2026, Darktrace observed similar anomalous activity across multiple customer environments, with affected devices showing consistent behavioral patterns. These included connections to multiple *.hola[.]org endpoints using Hola-related user agents, suggesting interaction with Hola infrastructure rather than isolated or incidental traffic.
Following these connections, affected customer environments showed downloads of suspicious executable files from rare external endpoints 188.241.219[.]55 and 184.241.218[.]111. Both endpoints have been flagged as potentially malicious by open-source intelligence (OSINT) [1][2].
These downloads were conducted using consistent user agents across impacted customers, specifically ‘Hola svc_js_win32/1.249.408’ and ‘Hola svc_js_win32/1.251.389’, suggesting a possible association with Hola-related activity.
Notably, this pattern aligns with recent reporting that, in some cases, Hola distributed an undeclared executable component, me[.]exe, which was later assessed to be a likely Monero-mining binary introduced via a compromised delivery pipeline [3].
Case Study 1
Darktrace first observed a new device on January 19, 2026, within a customer environment based in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region. On the same day it appeared on the network, the device communicated with multiple pieces of Hola VPN-linked infrastructure before downloading a binary from a hola[.]org subdomain.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst investigation highlighting Hola VPN service activity potentially associated with subsequent HTTP command-and-control (C2) connections.
Subsequent Darktrace telemetry revealed a recurring pattern of activity from the day the device was first observed through to March 4, 2026. During this period, the device repeatedly issued HTTP GET requests to the URI /bwfile?size=1048576, each returning a 200 OK response, indicating successful file retrieval.
This behavior was accompanied by a POST request to /bwfile, followed by an additional GET request for a significantly larger file at /bwfile?size=26214400, suggesting a deliberate and structured file transfer pattern.
Notably, the binary download activity was not tied to a single static host. Instead, it was observed across multiple URLs that changed over time while remaining within the same hola[.]org domain. This pattern suggests the use of rotating or distributed delivery infrastructure rather than a fixed endpoint.
Figure 2: Variation in URLs over time within the same hola[.]org domain, indicating the use of dynamically changing endpoints.
Across these events, the activity was consistently associated with the user agent Hola svc_js_win32/1.249.408, further linking the traffic to Hola-related service components. Amid these persistent and unusual connections, on February 22, Darktrace observed the device connecting to 188.241.219[.]55/proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe, resulting in the download of an executable file.
Figure 3: File transfer event showing the download of an executable from the rare external endpoint 188.241.219[.]55.
Based on its file hash, the downloaded file was assessed as a likely Trojan downloader [4], with import hash (imphash) values showing similarities to samples linked to Vidar, Rhadamanthys, and Stealc according to OSINT [5]. Overall, this sequence of activity suggests that Hola-related connectivity may have been leveraged as part of a broader malware delivery chain.
Darktrace’s Autonomous Response
Due to the highly unusual activity observed, Darktrace Autonomous Response was triggered by the device’s behavior. However, as the customer deployment was configured in “Human Confirmation” mode, manual approval was required before any action could be taken.
Had the deployment been set to “Fully Autonomous” mode, Darktrace would have automatically:
Blocked connections to the associated ports and external endpoints
Prevented all outgoing network connections from the device
Enforced the device’s established ‘pattern of life’, allowing normal activity to continue while restricting any anomalous behavior
Figure 4: Example of a Darktrace Autonomous Response model highlighting the action that would have been taken, demonstrating how the system identifies anomalous behavior and applies targeted containment measures to restrict suspicious network activity.
Case Study 2
While the first case focused on anomalous activity from a newly observed device, Darktrace also identified cases in which devices had already been communicating with Hola-related endpoints prior to the suspected campaign. This may suggest pre-existing Hola usage within the environment, potentially increasing exposure and creating an avenue for subsequent suspicious activity.
One case involved three devices within a customer network based in the Americas (AMS). In this instance, a different payload was identified: me[.]exe, a potentially malicious cryptocurrency miner also referred to as HolaMonitorService[.]exe [6][7]. The downloads were observed from infrastructure similar to that seen in Case 1, including an IP address within the same 188.241.0.0/16 subnet.
Connections to *.hola[.]org, alongside the use of potential Hola-related user agents consistent with those in Case 1, were also identified, further suggesting a link between the observed activity and Hola-associated infrastructure.
Darktrace observed activity indicative of unusual VPN usage on the first affected device on February 2, followed by telemetry suggesting potential Tor usage. This was later followed by the download of me[.]exe on March 10 from 188.241.218[.]111. Notably, this device was the earliest among the three within the deployment to exhibit the presence of the suspicious executable.
Figure 5: Cyber AI Analyst detection highlighting the download of a suspicious executable from a similar external endpoint in a separate deployment.
On March 5, 2026, the second affected device exhibited a slightly different progression, initiating connections to http-test1[.]hola[.]org using the user agent ‘hola_get’. This activity was followed by the download of me[.]exe from the same endpoint on March 13, consistent with the broader pattern of Hola-related downloads observed across the environment.
Figure 6: Example of Hola VPN-related connectivity observed on the network prior to the suspected campaign, indicating pre-existing usage that may have contributed to subsequent activity.
The final affected device within this customer’s network demonstrated a more limited but related pattern, also downloading me[.]exe on March 17 using the same ‘hola_get’ user agent.
While the earlier Hola VPN usage observed across the deployment may not have been directly related to the suspected malware campaign, it may nonetheless have contributed to reduced visibility. The presence of pre-existing Hola-related traffic could have obscured malicious activity, making it more difficult to distinguish legitimate usage from attacker-driven behavior and, in turn, hindering the timely identification of the emerging compromise.
Darktrace’s Autonomous Response
For this deployment, the customer had their Autonomous Response capability configured in “Fully Autonomous” mode, allowing Darktrace to take action without human intervention. As a result, the system was able to autonomously disrupt the activity as soon as relevant events were identified through model detections.
Figure 7: Darktrace Autonomous Response actions taken against suspicious activity linked to Hola VPN.
Suspected cryptomining activity
As previously noted, some of the observed executable payloads appear to be linked to cryptomining malware. Across a subset of affected customer environments, this assessment was further supported by subsequent device activity consistent with Monero mining. Affected devices established follow-on connections to multiple external endpoints aligned with known mining infrastructure, indicating post-download execution.
Considering the broader sequence of activity, this pattern may point to a wider form of abuse in which legitimate VPN-related traffic is used to mask or facilitate malicious behavior following compromise.
On several devices, the download of executable files, including a newly observed peer[.]exe, was followed by alerts indicative of cryptocurrency mining activity. Mining-related credentials such as ‘x’ were observed using the Minergate protocol to communicate with endpoints within the 89.125.255.0/24 subnet and 188.241.218[.]111, the same endpoint involved in earlier download activity. Additional credentials appeared to reflect device-specific CPU identifiers, for example ‘12th Gen Intel(R) Core (TM) i5-1235U’.
Observed mining methods included login, submit, and job, consistent with active participation in a pool-based mining workflow rather than passive or incidental contact. The login method indicates that the host authenticated to the mining service as a worker, job reflects the assignment of computational tasks, and submit shows completed work being returned to the pool [8]. This sequence suggests that affected devices were actively contributing processing resources as part of an unauthorized distributed mining operation.
The presence of unauthorized cryptominers can lead to degraded system performance and reduced device stability. Beyond the immediate resource impact, such activity often serves as an indicator of a broader compromise rather than an isolated issue. This may increase the risk of further malware deployment, persistence mechanisms, and lateral movement, particularly in environments where the initial intrusion has not been fully contained.
Conclusion
Across affected environments, detections such as unusual VPN usage, connections to Hola infrastructure, anomalous HTTP activity, suspicious file downloads, and subsequent cryptomining behavior were linked into a single, evolving incident narrative. This aggregation provided a clearer view of attack progression, enabling security teams to understand not just isolated alerts, but the full sequence of compromise from initial contact through to post-exploitation.
Ultimately, these activities show that the risk posed by non-compliant software such as Hola VPN can extend far beyond simple policy violations. What began as traffic to Hola-related infrastructure was, in multiple cases, followed by behavior suggesting deliberate misuse, including suspicious executable downloads using Hola-related user agents and, in some instances, evidence of active cryptomining. These were not isolated anomalies, but elements of a broader pattern in which seemingly benign proxy or VPN-related communications may have created a pathway for malicious delivery and unauthorized resource exploitation.
The significance of this activity lies not only in the downloads or mining, but in what it reveals about an attacker’s ability to blend malicious operations into traffic associated with software that may already have a foothold in the environment. When unapproved software operates within an enterprise, it can reduce visibility, blur the distinction between legitimate and malicious traffic, and create opportunities to extend compromise in ways that are persistent and difficult to detect. Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach enables these behavioral distinctions to be identified, regardless of whether the device is new or long established within the network.
Credit to Min Kim (Associate Principal Analyst), Priya Thapa (Senior Cyber Analyst) Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)
Cybersecurity for the Sports Sector: The Threats Facing a Digitized Industry in 2026
Securing sporting events in 2026
When you walk into a stadium on game day, you are entering a small smart city. Ticketing, turnstiles, payments, public Wi-Fi for tens of thousands of fans, CCTV, lighting, even the HVAC all run on connected systems. The experience for fans has become unmatched, but that dependency has created a much larger attack surface than people may realize.
Our latest threat research backs that up. In the past year, a survey that Darktrace commissioned found that 84% of respondents from professional sports organizations had at least one cyber incident, and 57% were hit more than once. For a sector that relies on the impact of the live moment, those numbers translate directly into operational risk.
Why sports is a target for cyber attacks
Sport is a highly visible target with fixed timelines, so attackers know exactly when disruption will have the most impact. It also holds valuable data, athlete medical records, contracts, sponsorship deals, which carry financial, reputational, and regulatory risk if exposed. At the same time, delivery depends on a wide set of third parties: ticketing providers, broadcasters, cloud services, stadium technology. Any of those connections can become an entry point. Put visibility, timing, data, and dependency together, and you get an environment where even a small foothold can turn into a visible, time-critical incident.
How attackers target email and identity
Email and identity remain the front door. From October 2025 through March 2026, Darktrace / EMAIL™ detected more than 116,000 phishing emails aimed at sports organizations across our customer base, and our sports customers received 19% more phishing emails than organizations in other sectors. The numbers tell the story:
BY THE NUMBERS
21% of phishing emails were aimed at VIPs.
37% used novel social engineering.
84% of malicious emails passed DMARC authentication
A large proportion of these emails passed authentication checks, which means traditional security controls are no longer a reliable barrier. Attackers are not relying on spoofed domains – they're using legitimate infrastructure and trusted platforms. Behavior matters. Once an account is compromised, the behavior shifts quickly. Login patterns change, inbox rules are created to hide responses, and accounts start being used for internal discovery or further phishing. These aren’t high-noise events. They sit in normal workflows, which is why they’re often missed.
Ransomware tells a similar story. In one case inside a sports deployment, attackers had quietly been moving data to an outside server for a full two weeks before they triggered encryption. By the time the ransom note appeared, the outcome was already set. That sequence shows up consistently is access first, movement next, disruption last. If detection starts at encryption, it’s already too late.
Why AI is an emerging blind spot in sports
The increasing adoption of AI is expanding the potential attack surface. 72% of the security professionals we surveyed expect AI to increase their cyber risk over the next year, and yet 35% are already using or planning to use it in stadium operations, the most critical functions to protect. In addition to prompt injection and AI build risks, shadow AI is becoming a more immediate issue. Staff are already putting sensitive data—performance metrics, scouting reports, contracts, health data—into tools with little or no governance. The upside is clear, but so is the exposure—and it is happening before most organizations have any visibility or control. At the same time, attackers are using the same technology to scale phishing and social engineering. The net effect is simple: more exposure, at higher speed.
How can cybersecurity professionals prepare
Across high profile events, Darktrace’s experience shows that effective cyber defense includes preparation, real‑time visibility, and the ability to respond dynamically and decisively when timing, complexity, and public exposure converge.
There are a few strategic implications for cybersecurity teams:
Get behavioral visibility across IT and OT, not just corporate systems.
Treat identity as your control plane. Most attacks in this sector start with credentials, not malware. MFA with behavioral detection helps solve that challenge.
Control third party and AI access the same way you control your own environment.
Rehearse response for live conditions, where decisions happen in minutes. Detection and response need to account for non-ideal conditions when engineers are under pressure and time constrained. In sport, timing is what turns small issues into major incidents. The same activity that would be manageable midweek becomes critical during a live event.
Why 2026 raises the cybersecurity stakes for sports
With the 2026 World Cup about to stretch across three countries and dozens of host cities, the attack surface is wide and the schedule is unforgiving.
Geopolitical signaling is raising the threat profile further. Previous international sporting events have demonstrated that nation‑state actors use the cyber domain to signal intent, influence narratives, or retaliate symbolically. In the context of the 2026 World Cup, Russia’s continued exclusion from international sport, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, US defensive support to Ukraine, and Iran’s likely participation in the tournament introduce additional motivations for state‑aligned and non‑traditional affiliated actors to operate below the threshold of armed conflict. This doesn’t require new techniques—just the right timing and visibility.
In practice, this comes down to preparation: knowing what normal looks like across IT and OT, controlling third-party access, and spotting when behavior shifts.
In sport, disruption does not build slowly—it happens in real time and in public. By that point, the groundwork has already been set, long before the whistle goes.
About this research
Findings are based on Darktrace threat-research telemetry across sports-sector customer deployments (Q4 2025–Q1 2026) and a survey of 875 IT cybersecurity professionals in the US, UK, Australia, and Germany, fielded by Opinion Matters between May 28 and June 3, 2026. Read the full report for complete methodology, incident analysis, and strategic recommendations.
![Variation in URLs over time within the same hola[.]org domain, indicating the use of dynamically changing endpoints.](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/626ff4d25aca2edf4325ff97/6a304bdeff111215c0436931_Screenshot%202026-06-15%20at%2012.00.43%E2%80%AFPM.png)
![File transfer event showing the download of an executable from the rare external endpoint 188.241.219[.]55.](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/626ff4d25aca2edf4325ff97/6a304c2468d20aeff16a2721_Screenshot%202026-06-15%20at%2012.01.53%E2%80%AFPM.png)
