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April 6, 2022

How Darktrace Antigena Thwarted Cobalt Strike Attack

Learn how Darktrace's Antigena technology intercepted and delayed a Cobalt Strike intrusion. Discover more cybersecurity news and analyses on Darktrace's blog.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Dylan Evans
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Apr 2022

In December 2021 several CVEs[1] were issued for the Log4j vulnerabilities that sent security teams into a global panic. Threat actors are now continuously scanning external infrastructure for evidence of the vulnerability to deploy crypto-mining malware.[2] However, through December ‘21 – February ‘22, it was ransomware groups that seized the initiative.

Compromise

In January 2022, a Darktrace customer left an external-facing VMware server unpatched allowing Cobalt Strike to be successfully installed. Several IoCs indicate that Cuba Ransomware operators were behind the attack. Thanks to the Darktrace SOC service, the customer was notified of the active threat on their network, and Antigena’s Autonomous Response was able to keep the attackers at bay before encryption events took place.

Initially the VMware server breached two models relating to an anomalous script download and a new user agent both connecting via HTTP. As referenced in an earlier Darktrace blog, both of these models had been seen in previous Log4j exploits. As with all Darktrace models however, the model deck is not designed to detect only one exploit, infection variant, or APT.

Figure 1: Darktrace models breaching due to the malicious script download

Analyst investigation

A PCAP of the downloaded script showed that it contained heavily obfuscated JavaScript. After an OSINT investigation a similar script was uncovered which likely breached the same Yara rules.

Figure 2: PCAP of the Initial HTTP GET request for the Windows Script component

Figure 3: PCAP of the initial HTTP response containing obfuscated JavaScript

Figure 4: A similar script that has been observed installing additional payloads after an initial infection[3]

While not an exact match, this de-obfuscated code shared similarities to those seen when downloading other banking trojans.

Having identified on the Darktrace UI that this was a VMware server, the analyst isolated the incoming external connections to the server shortly prior to the HTTP GET requests and was able to find an IP address associated with Log4j exploit attempts.

Figure 5: Advanced Search logs showing incoming SSL connections from an IP address linked to Log4j exploits

Through Advanced Search the analyst identified spikes shortly prior and immediately after the download. This suggested the files were downloaded and executed by exploiting the Log4j vulnerability.

Antigena response

Figure 6: AI Analyst reveals both the script downloads and the unusual user agent associated with the connections

Figure 7: Antigena blocked all further connections to these endpoints following the downloads

Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike is a popular tool for threat actors as it can be used to perform a swathe of MITRE ATT&CK techniques. In this case the threat actor attempted command and control tactics to pivot through the network, however, Antigena responded promptly when the malware attempted to communicate with external infrastructure.

On Wednesday January 26, the DNS beacon attempted to connect to malicious infrastructure. Antigena responded, and a Darktrace SOC analyst issued an alert.

Figure 8: A Darktrace model detected the suspicious DNS requests and Antigena issued a response

The attacker changed their strategy by switching to a different server “bluetechsupply[.]com” and started issuing commands over TLS. Again, Darktrace detected these connections and AI Analyst reported on the incident (Figure 9, below). OSINT sources subsequently indicated that this destination is affiliated with Cobalt Strike and was only registered 14 days prior to this incident.

Figure 9: AI Analyst summary of the suspicious beaconing activity

Simultaneous to these connections, the device scanned multiple internal devices via an ICMP scan and then scanned the domain controller over key TCP ports including 139 and 445 (SMB). This was followed by an attempt to write an executable file to the domain controller. While Antigena intervened in the file write, another Darktrace SOC analyst was issuing an alert due to the escalation in activity.

Figure 10: AI Analyst summary of the .dll file that Antigena intercepted to the Windows/temp directory of the domain controller

Following the latest round of Antigena blocks, the threat actor attempted to change methods again. The VMware server utilised the Remote Access Tool/Trojan NetSupport Manager in an attempt to install further malware.

Figure 11: Darktrace reveals the attacker changing tactics

Despite this escalation, Darktrace yet again blocked the connection.

Perhaps due to an inability to connect to C2 infrastructure, the attack stopped in its tracks for around 12 hours. Thanks to Antigena and the Darktrace SOC team, the security team had been afforded time to remediate and recover from the active threat in their network. Interestingly, Darktrace detected a final attempt at pivoting from the machine, with an unusual PowerShell Win-RM connection to an internal machine. The modern Win-RM protocol typically utilises port 5985 for HTTP connections however pre-Windows 7 machines may use Windows 7 indicating this server was running an old OS.

Figure 12: Darktrace detects unusual PowerShell usage

Cuba Ransomware

While no active encryption appears to have taken place for this customer, a range of IoCs were identified which indicated that the threat actor was the group being tracked as UNC2596, the operators of Cuba Ransomware.[4]

These IoCs include: one of the initially dropped files (komar2.ps1,[5] revealed by AI Analyst in Figure 6), use of the NetSupport RAT,[6] and Cobalt Strike beaconing.[7] These were implemented to maintain persistence and move laterally across the network.

Cuba Ransomware operators prefer to exfiltrate data to their beacon infrastructure rather than using cloud storage providers, however no evidence of upload activity was observed on the customer’s network.

Concluding thoughts

Unpatched, external-facing VMware servers vulnerable to the Log4j exploit are actively being targeted by threat actors with the aim of ransomware detonation. Without using rules or signatures, Darktrace was able to detect all stages of the compromise. While Antigena delayed the attack, forcing the threat actor to change C2 servers constantly, the Darktrace analyst team relayed their findings to the security team who were able to remediate the compromised machines and prevent a final ransomware payload from detonating.

For Darktrace customers who want to find out more about Cobalt Strike, refer here for an exclusive supplement to this blog.

Appendix

Darktrace model detections

Initial Compromise:

  • Device / New User Agent To Internal Server
  • Anomalous Server Activity / New User Agent from Internet Facing System
  • Experimental / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

Breaches from Critical Devices / DC:

  • Device / Large Number of Model Breaches
  • Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block
  • Device / SMB Lateral Movement
  • Experimental / Unusual SMB Script Write V2
  • Compliance / High Priority Compliance Model Breach
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device
  • Experimental / Possible Cobalt Strike Server IP V2

Lateral Movement:

  • Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Internal Anomalous File Activity
  • Compliance / SMB Drive Write
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Executable Uploaded to DC
  • Experimental / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections
  • Compromise / Suspicious Beaconing Behaviour
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Breaches Over Time Block
  • Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block
  • Anomalous Connection / High Volume of Connections to Rare Domain
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block

Network Scan Activity:

  • Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity
  • Experimental / Network Scan V2
  • Device / ICMP Address Scan
  • Experimental / Possible SMB Scanning Activity
  • Experimental / Possible SMB Scanning Activity V2
  • Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Network Scan Block
  • Device / Network Scan
  • Compromise / DNS / Possible DNS Beacon
  • Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block

DNS / Cobalt Strike Activity:

  • Experimental / Possible Cobalt Strike Server IP
  • Experimental / Possible Cobalt Strike Server IP V2
  • Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block
  • Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location

MITRE ATT&CK techniques observed

IoCs

Thanks to Brianna Leddy, Sam Lister and Marco Alanis for their contributions.

Footnotes

1.

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44228
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44530
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-45046
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-4104

2. https://www.toolbox.com/it-security/threat-reports/news/log4j-vulnerabilities-exploitation-attempts

3. https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/899845845906071553

4. https://www.mandiant.com/resources/unc2596-cuba-ransomware

5. https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2021/211203-2.pdf

6. https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-exploited-cuba-ransomware/178665/

7. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-exchange-servers-hacked-to-deploy-cuba-ransomware/

8. https://gist.github.com/blotus/f87ed46718bfdc634c9081110d243166

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Dylan Evans

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August 10, 2026

Securing AI: Analysis of the Complete Security Stack with Governance and Controls

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Key takeaways

  • Protecting enterprise AI requires defense in depth: Organizations should combine governance, identity and access controls, data security, secure development, runtime monitoring, behavioral detection, containment, and incident response rather than rely on a single control.
  • Agentic AI expands enterprise risk beyond the model: Autonomous agents interact with tools, APIs, identities, data, and other agents, creating identity, behavioral, structural, and accountability risks that can propagate across trusted systems.
  • An effective AI security stack spans multiple layers: Security teams should evaluate governance and visibility, identity and agent controls, data protection, secure MLOps and LLMOps, runtime security, and response and recovery capabilities.
  • Security controls should develop alongside enterprise AI adoption: Organizations should establish ownership, visibility, access controls, testing, monitoring, and recovery capabilities while using behavior-based detection and containment to address risks that static policies may not reveal.

Why traditional cybersecurity approaches are not enough for AI

AI adoption outpaces most security programs’ ability to adapt.  That gap is now one of the most consequential sources of cyber risk facing enterprises. As organizations embed generative and agentic AI into development workflows, business operations, and security tooling itself, the question is no longer whether AI will introduce risk. The question is whether organizations understand where that risk actually lives and how to manage it operationally.  

Two recent pieces of guidance underscore this shift:

  1. The upcoming Cybersecurity Framework Profile for AI from NIST
  1. The Five Eyes government guidance on the careful adoption of agentic AI services

Taken together, they point to a critical conclusion. AI security cannot be reduced to model hardening or prompt filtering. It requires a defense in depth strategy that treats AI as both a new attack surface and a force multiplier for defense, while accounting for how AI fundamentally changes scale, speed, and autonomy.  

Recent threat research suggests that today's cyber risk is driven less by initial compromise and more by an adversary's ability to blend into normal operations over time. AI systems create the same exposure in a new form: more autonomy, more scale, and more opportunities for risky behavior to blend into normal operations.

How NIST defines the three core pillars of AI security

The NIST profile organizes AI risk across three inseparable focus areas that span all cybersecurity functions, Secure, Defend and Thwart. These areas are not sequential. They exist simultaneously and must be addressed together.

Secure

This treats AI as an attack surface. It includes models, prompts, agents, pipelines, training and inference data, retrieval augmented generation corpora, and the AI supply chain itself. AI systems are opaque, probabilistic, and non-deterministic by design. Some vulnerabilities are inherent in how models are trained or how data is sourced. Traditional patching does not fully mitigate these risks. This is also where many enterprises are weakest today and, critically, where many security programs stop.  

Defend

This is AI as a defensive force multiplier. AI can improve detection speed, scale, correlation, and response, but only if the right models are used and operationalized correctly. Machine-speed behavior-based detection, response and containment becomes critical in defending non-deterministic systems. Accuracy, explainability, governance, testing, validation, and integration into SOC workflows matter as much as capability. Without those controls, hallucination risk, over automation, and misplaced trust become security risks themselves.  

Thwart

This treats AI as an adversarial accelerant. Threat actors are already using AI to generate targeted social engineering attacks, deepfakes, malware, and autonomous attack agents. Asymmetric warfare is highlighting faster vulnerability discovery and exploitation with a lag on patch development, testing and deployment.  

How this looks in practice

Darktrace researchers observed scaled, automated exploitation of the React2Shell vulnerability within days of disclosure. A vulnerable cloud asset was exploited in under 120 seconds of being deployed. Darktrace research team observed an AI/LLM-generated malware sample used in exploitation activity tied to React2Shell. The significance isn't novelty. It is that AI lowers the barrier to producing usable offensive tooling and compresses the time between experimentation and deployment.  

Tactics are getting more and more creative in order to string together steps of an attack kill chain. This creates a dependency on behavior-based detection, autonomous investigation, autonomous containment, training, resilience investment, and recovery planning across the entire enterprise.

Why agentic AI fundamentally changes enterprise cyber risk

The Five Eyes guidance on agentic AI highlights material changes to the cyber risk profile of an organization. Unlike generative AI systems that produce content for human consumption, agentic AI systems reason, plan, and act autonomously across tools, data, and environments. That autonomy, combined with access to real systems, amplifies the impact of traditional cyber failures and introduces new system level risks that are difficult to predict, observe, and contain.  

Risk in agentic systems does not live in the model alone. It emerges from interactions between models, prompts, memory, tools, APIs, identities, privileges, inter-agent trust relationships, and human assumptions baked into design. Vulnerabilities are often introduced through data, connectors, natural language interfaces, protocols, and drift by design.

In supply-chain incidents, attackers did not need sophisticated exploits to scale impact. They abused trusted systems built for automation and implicit access. Agentic AI inherits that model. Once a system can act across tools, data, and workflows, compromise propagates through trust relationships that were never designed for machine autonomy.

The major agentic AI risk classes include the following:  

  • The identity control for non-human identities or autonomous agents makes it difficult to mitigate over-permissioning, limiting access, scope, and duration, as well as access hygiene
  • Agents are frequently over permissioned
  • Compromised tools inherit agent authority
  • Static secrets enable impersonation
  • Implicit trust between agents enables lateral movement

Design and configuration risks compound this, including privileges evaluated once at startup, poor segmentation, unvetted third party tools, reused authorization decisions outside their original context, and guardrail limitations.  

Behavioral risk  

Agents can optimize for goals in unsafe ways, misinterpret ambiguous intent, chain actions into unintended sequences, change behavior during evaluation, and exhibit deceptive or sycophantic responses.  

Structural risk  

Structural risk follows from agentic systems that are tightly coupled, multicomponent ecosystems. Failures can propagate across agents. Hallucinations cascade downstream. Resource exhaustion becomes systemic. Tool misuse enables indirect prompt injection and command execution. Rogue agents can poison peer agents through trust relationships.  

Accountability

Accountability becomes unclear as autonomy increases. Autonomous agents assume human identity permissions, and humans should have clear ownership of these agents, but they don’t, and this model is flawed. Decision paths are opaque and non-deterministic. Logs are fragmented and difficult to interpret. Reproducing an incident will be impossible without explicit design for observability and forensics. An agent compromise is functionally an insider threat, often with better access and fewer behavioral constraints than a human.  

What is the most effective way to protect enterprise AI?

The most effective way to protect enterprise AI is through a defense-in-depth strategy that combines governance, identity and access controls, data security, secure AI development, runtime monitoring, behavioral detection, containment, and incident response. No single control can address AI risk across models, agents, data, infrastructure, and enterprise environments.

Agentic AI runs on software, networks, identities, and data. It must be governed using the same foundational principles that have proven resilient under uncertainty, including secure by design, defense in depth, zero trust, least privilege, continuous monitoring, behavior-based advanced threat detection and containment, and incident response and recovery.

Core components to a Defense in depth Strategy for Securing the use of AI:

  • Strong, precise identity control plane to include an identity per agent (cryptographic, non‑shared)
    • Privilege monitoring and just‑in‑time access
  • Data Governance
  • Secure‑by‑default configurations
    • Security Posture Management  
    • Zero Trust principles  
  • Strong guardrails, deny‑by‑default policies, and isolation
  • Explicit instruction hierarchies and controlled context
  • Behavioral-based detection across entire enterprise to include inputs, tools, and outputs as well as AI used on the endpoint, across the network, cloud, SaaS, email, and OT
    • Runtime anomaly detection and goal‑drift detection
    • Autonomous containment to mitigate risk and minimize damage
  • Hard boundaries on autonomy and delegation
  • Testing, Evaluation, Validation and Verification  
    • Determine when autonomous action and when human in the loop
    • Adversarial training and agent‑specific testing
    • Simulation, red teaming, and chaos testing
  • Kill‑switches, rollback, and containment mechanisms
    • Forensics data captures, interpretability, autonomous containment, and remediation/recovery plans  

Until standards, tooling, and assurance methods mature, organizations should assume agentic AI systems will behave unexpectedly and design deployments around resilience, behavior-based detection, reversibility, and containment, not efficiency.

How security leaders should prepare for enterprise AI adoption

AI security is not model security alone. Data, pipelines, identities, and agents are first class assets. Many AI attacks succeed through standard cyber failures amplified by AI. Identity, data, and supply chain risk dominate. Behavior-based detection and response are critical, not optional. Logging, provenance, versioning, and forensics data capture of detections are mandatory because you cannot investigate or recover from AI incidents without them.  

Risk will often be visible in behavior before it is clearly defined in policy or guidance. The same pattern has been seen in pre-CVE disclosure detection, where abnormal activity appears before the industry has named or described the vulnerability. AI systems introduce that uncertainty by design.

Security leaders should prioritize controls before AI is fully deployed, avoid generic AI security checklists, integrate AI risk into existing cyber programs, and mitigate the risk of non-deterministic technology with continuous oversight, monitoring, behavior analytics, anomaly detection, autonomous investigation, and autonomous containment.

Visibility has a different connotation with AI. Previously, audit logging worked for software/people, but with Generative AI-based systems, interpretability and explainability is difficult to understand, you cannot "undo" what has been done, or see the logic or control a chain of events. This is why behavioral-based detections and containment becomes critical.  

What capabilities should every AI security program include?

If an organization asked “what must be in place before scaling AI?”:

  1. AI Risk board and approval workflow
  1. IAM + PAM for all AI services and agents
  1. AI asset inventory
  1. Prompt/output DLP with sanctioned AI access – This is not just pre- and post- filters, but behavior-based detections of semantic interface as well as behavior-based analysis of output with associated risk context.  
  1. Shadow AI identification
  1. Secure MLOps – This is an entire paper itself
  1. Runtime guardrails and tool restrictions
    • Including AI Gateway/SASE/Zero trust/
  1. Runtime security with behavior-based detections
    • Complete visibility, monitoring, behavior analytics, anomaly detection, risk/intent/context evaluation of anomalies, autonomous investigation and autonomous containment of all AI assets across endpoint, network, SaaS, SASE, cloud, OT, email, and messaging platforms
  1. Secure data pipelines and data governance
  1. SOC workflow changes from malicious classification workflows to behavior-based detection workflows
  1. Remediation plans for AI-related incidents  

Layered Governance and Security Stack for Securing AI

An enterprise AI security stack should span six integrated layers: governance and visibility; identity, access, and agent control; data security and privacy; secure MLOps and LLMOps; runtime security; and response and recovery. These layers should work together rather than as a linear maturity sequence, with runtime controls helping manage risk as governance evolves.

These considerations do not need to be implemented in order. Runtime Detect and Respond will help mitigate risk while Governance, Visibility, and Identity mature.

Category Tooling Controls
Governance & Visibility
  • AI asset inventory / AI CMDB
  • Shadow AI discovery
  • SaaS discovery
  • AI usage on non-endpoint managed systems via network or cloud telemetry
  • MCP server/client usage via protocols
  • Browser telemetry
  • Gateway or SASE telemetry
  • Establish a risk board to set up controls
  • Mandatory registration of AI systems
  • Owner, data classification, intended use, and risk tier
  • Supplier disclosure requirements
  • Risk mitigation plan for AI adoption, innovation, or development
Identity, Access & Agent Control

Non-human autonomous agents should not have the full permissions associated with a human user.

  • IAM with workload identities
  • PAM for AI service accounts
  • Secrets management with short-lived tokens
  • Zero Trust principles
  • Identity, permission, and token hygiene
  • Unique identities per model, agent, and pipeline
  • Least privilege for tools, data, and APIs
  • Explicit approval for autonomous actions
Data Security & Privacy
  • Data classification and labeling
  • Enterprise DLP across endpoint, email, network, cloud, and SaaS
  • Forensics data capture after risky detections
  • Prompt-level DLP through behavior-based semantic analysis with risk and intent context
  • Input/interface analysis for risky data requests
  • Output analysis for sensitive data
  • Data integrity evaluation
  • Retention and redaction policies for prompts and responses
Secure MLOps / LLMOps
  • Secure CI/CD with AI-specific gates
  • Model registries with approval workflows
  • Dependency, container, and artifact scanning
  • SBOM/AIBOM generation
  • IaC security scanning
  • Security posture management
  • Misconfiguration identification
  • Hardening recommendations
  • Signed models and prompts
  • Versioned datasets, configurations, logging, and controls
  • Securing data pipelines
  • Controlled promotion
  • Quality assurance
  • Adversarial testing
Runtime Security

Securing runtime goes beyond guardrails and model firewalls to include behavior-based detections, response, and containment.

  • Detection, monitoring, and SOC integration
  • Centralized visibility into prompts, outputs, and tool calls
  • AI-specific detections
  • Behavior-based detection for AI usage patterns
  • Model drift and behavior monitoring
  • Autonomous containment
  • Behavior-based detection of model inputs and outputs
  • Prompt injection detection
  • Model manipulation, including jailbreaking, poisoning, and related attacks
  • Sensitive data access attempts
  • Behavior-based detection across low-code agents, high-code agents, MCP clients and servers, endpoint, network, cloud, email, SaaS, SASE, IoT, and OT
  • Policy enforcement between users, models, tools, agents, SaaS models/tools, and MCP servers/clients
  • Risk, intent, and context evaluation for detections and response actions
Response & Recovery
  • Autonomous containment
  • AI-assisted playbooks
  • Forensics data capture for AI-related events
  • Model rollback mechanisms
  • Backup and restore for models and datasets
  • Kill switch for agents
  • Autonomous response to agents performing risky behaviors
  • Model and dataset rollback
  • Remediation plans
  • Tabletop exercises
  • Supplier coordination plans
  • Post-incident AI performance validation

AI security requires continuous visibility and behavioral detection

AI changes how fast systems move, how decisions are made, and how risk propagates. It does not change the fundamentals of security. Organizations that succeed will be the ones that apply those fundamentals rigorously, assume failure, and build systems that can detect, contain, and recover when AI behaves in ways they did not anticipate. Security is not what AI is allowed to do. It is whether the organization can understand, trust, and control what AI actually does in practice.  

Take this guidance to understand different initiatives that organizations should be considering. Securing AI is the most critical component to AI safety. As organizations invest more in AI adoption, they should be investing in security in order to mitigate the risk of AI adoption. Organizations should be evaluating their governance and security stack to include well-integrated tools that are deployed, tested, operationalized and embedded within security workflows. While organizations mature in governance, visibility and identity access management, they should be investing in behavior-based detection and autonomous containment to mitigate AI risk.  

See how Darktrace / SECURE AI can strengthen the visibility and runtime security layers of your broader AI security program.

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August 11, 2026

Reimagining Your SOC: Overcoming Alert Fatigue with AI-Led Investigations  

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Key takeaways

  • AI-led investigation can help combat SOC alert fatigue by extending automation beyond detection into triage, contextual analysis, prioritization, and investigation, reducing repetitive analyst work while preserving human judgment for critical security decisions.
  • Alert fatigue becomes an operational risk when high alert volumes, fragmented context, manual investigation, and limited analyst capacity prevent SOC teams from efficiently assessing potentially meaningful security activity.
  • Effective alert fatigue solutions should combine automated triage, contextual analysis, intelligent prioritization, and explainable investigation workflows so analysts can understand why activity matters and focus attention on higher-priority incidents.
  • AI-led investigation can improve SOC efficiency by expanding investigation coverage and freeing analysts from repetitive evidence gathering, creating more capacity for threat hunting, recovery activities, strategic decisions, and proactive cyber risk reduction.

The efficiency of a Security Operations Center (SOC) hinges on its ability to detect, analyze and respond to threats effectively. With advancements in AI and automation, key early SOC team metrics such as Mean Time to Detect (MTTD) have seen significant improvements:

  • 96% of defenders believing AI-powered solutions significantly boost the speed and efficiency of prevention, detection, response, and recovery.
  • Organizations leveraging AI and automation can shorten their breach lifecycle by an average of 108 days compared to those without these technologies.

While tool advances have improved performance and effectiveness in the detection phase, this has not been as beneficial to the next step of the process where initial alerts are investigated further to determine their relevance and how they relate to other activities. This is often measured with the metric Mean Time to Analysis (MTTA), although some SOC teams operate a two-level process with teams for initial triage to filter out more obviously uninteresting alerts and for more detailed analysis of the remainder. SOC teams continue to grapple with alert fatigue, overwhelmed analysts, and inefficient triage processes, preventing them from achieving the operational efficiency necessary for a high-performing SOC.

Addressing this core inefficiency requires extending AI's capabilities beyond detection to streamline and optimize the following investigative workflows that underpin effective analysis.

Challenges with SOC alert investigation

Detecting cyber threats is only the beginning of a much broader challenge of SOC efficiency. The real bottleneck often lies in the investigation process.

Detection tools and techniques have evolved significantly with the use of machine learning methods, improving early threat detection. However, after a detection pops up, human analysts still typically step in to evaluate the alert, gather context, and determine whether it’s a true threat or a false alarm and why. If it is a threat, further investigation must be performed to understand the full scope of what may be a much larger problem. This phase, measured by the mean time to analysis, is critical for swift incident response.

Challenges with manual alert investigation:

  • Too many alerts
  • Alerts lack context
  • Cognitive load sits with analysts
  • Insufficient talent in the industry
  • Fierce competition for experienced analysts

For many organizations, investigation is where the struggle of efficiency intensifies. Analysts face overwhelming volumes of alerts, a lack of consolidated context, and the mental strain of juggling multiple systems. With a worldwide shortage of 4 million experienced level two and three SOC analysts, the cognitive burden placed on teams is immense, often leading to alert fatigue and missed threats.

Even with advanced systems in place not all potential detections are investigated. In many cases, only a quarter of initial alerts are triaged (or analyzed). However, the issue runs deeper. Triaging occurs after detection engineering and alert tuning, which often disable many alerts that could potentially reveal true threats but are not accurate enough to justify the time and effort of the security team. This means some potential threats slip through unnoticed.

What are the key stages of detecting and stopping a cyber-attack?

Detecting and stopping a cyber incident involves several connected stages: identifying a trace of suspicious activity, generating a detection, investigating the alert to determine its context and scope, and containing confirmed threats. Each stage affects how quickly a SOC can move from identifying potentially malicious activity to taking effective action.

First we need a trace of an attack…

The attack will produce some sort of digital trace. Novel attacks, insider threats, and attacker techniques such as living-off-the-land can make attacker activities extremely hard to distinguish.

A detection is created…

Then we have to detect the trace, for example some beaconing to a rare domain. Initial detection alerts being raised underpin the MTTD (mean time to detection). Reducing this initial unseen duration is where we have seen significant improvement with modern threat detection tools.

When it comes to threat detection, the possibilities are vast. Your initial lead could come from anything: an alert about unusual network activity, a potential known malware detection, or an odd email. Once that lead comes in, it’s up to your security team to investigate further and determine if this is this a legitimate threat or a false alarm and what the context is behind the alert.

Investigation begins…

It doesn’t just stop at a detection. Typically, humans also need to look at the alert, investigate, understand, analyze, and conclude whether this is a genuine threat that needs a response. We normally measure this as MTTA (mean time to analyze).

Conducting the investigation effectively requires a high degree of skill and efficiency, as every second counts in mitigating potential damage. Security teams must analyze the available data, correlate it across multiple sources, and piece together the timeline of events to understand the full scope of the incident. This process involves navigating through vast amounts of information, identifying patterns, and discerning relevant details. All while managing the pressure of minimizing downtime and preventing further escalation.

Containment begins…

Once we confirm something as a threat, and the human team determines a response is required and understand the scope, we need to contain the incident. That's normally the MTTC (mean time to containment) and can be further split into immediate and more permanent measures.

For more about how AI-led solutions can help in the containment stage read here: Autonomous Response: Streamlining Cybersecurity and Business Operations

The challenge is not only in 1) detecting threats quickly, but also 2) triaging and investigating them rapidly and with precision, and 3) prioritizing the most critical findings to avoid missed opportunities. Effective investigation demands a combination of advanced tools, robust workflows, and the expertise to interpret and act on the insights they generate. Without these, organizations risk delaying critical containment and response efforts, leaving them vulnerable to greater impacts.

While there are further steps (remediation, and of course complete recovery) here we will focus on investigation.

Developing an AI analyst: How Darktrace replicates human investigation

Darktrace has been working on understanding the investigative process of a skilled analyst since 2017. By conducting internal research between Darktrace expert SOC analysts and machine learning engineers, we developed a formalized understanding of investigative processes. This understanding formed the basis of a multi-layered AI system that systematically investigates data, taking advantage of the speed and breadth afforded by machine systems.

With this research we found that the investigative process often revolves around iterating three key steps: hypothesis creation, data collection, and results evaluation.

All these details are crucial for an analyst to determine the nature of a potential threat. Similarly, they are integral components of our Cyber AI Analyst which is an integral component across our product suite. In doing so, Darktrace has been able to replicate the human-driven approach to investigating alerts using machine learning speed and scale.

Here’s how it works:

  • When an initial or third-party alert is triggered, the Cyber AI Analyst initiates a forensic investigation by building multiple hypotheses and gathering relevant data to confirm or refute the nature of suspicious activity, iterating as necessary, and continuously refining the original hypothesis as new data emerges throughout the investigation.
  • Using a combination of machine learning including supervised and unsupervised methods, NLP and graph theory to assess activity, this investigation engine conducts a deep analysis with incidents raised to the human team only when the behavior is deemed sufficiently concerning.
  • After classification, the incident information is organized and processed to generate the analysis summary, including the most important descriptive details, and priority classification, ensuring that critical alerts are prioritized for further action by the human-analyst team.
  • If the alert is deemed unimportant, the complete analysis process is made available to the human team so that they can see what investigation was performed and why this conclusion was drawn.
Darktrace cyber ai analyst workflow, how it works

To illustrate this via example, if a laptop is beaconing to a rare domain, the Cyber AI Analyst would create hypotheses including whether this could be command and control traffic, data exfiltration, or something else. The AI analyst then collects data, analyzes it, makes decisions, iterates, and ultimately raises a new high-level incident alert describing and detailing its findings for human analysts to review and follow up.

Learn more about Darktrace's Cyber AI Analyst

  • Cost savings: Equivalent to adding up to 30 full-time Level 2 analysts without increasing headcount
  • Minimize business risk: Takes on the busy work from human analysts and elevates a team’s overall decision making
  • Improve security outcomes: Identifies subtle, sophisticated threats through holistic investigations

How does AI-led investigation improve SOC efficiency?

AI-led investigation can improve SOC efficiency by shifting repetitive evidence gathering and triage away from analysts while preserving human judgment for higher-value decisions. The operational benefit is broader investigation coverage, faster prioritization, clearer reasoning, and more analyst time for activities such as threat hunting, recovery, and proactive cyber risk reduction.

Every relevant alert is investigated

The Cyber AI Analyst is not a generative AI system, or an XDR or SEIM aggregator that simply prompts you on what to do next. It uses a multi-layered combination of many different specialized AI methods to investigate every relevant alert from across your enterprise, native, 3rd party, and manual triggers, operating at machine speed and scale. This also positively affects detection engineering and alert tuning, because it does not suffer from fatigue when presented with low accuracy but potentially valuable alerts.

Retain and improve analyst skills

Transferring most analysis processes to AI systems can risk team skills if they don't maintain or build them and if the AI doesn't explain its process. This can reduce the ability to challenge or build on AI results and cause issues if the AI is unavailable. The Cyber AI Analyst, by revealing its investigation process, data gathering, and decisions, promotes and improves these skills. Its deep understanding of cyber incidents can be used for skill training and incident response practice by simulating incidents for security teams to handle.

Create time for cyber risk reduction

Human cybersecurity professionals excel in areas that require critical thinking, strategic planning, and nuanced decision-making. With alert fatigue minimized and investigations streamlined, your analysts can avoid the tedious data collection and analysis stages and instead focus on critical decision-making tasks such as implementing recovery actions and performing threat hunting.

Stay tuned for part 3/3

Part 3/3 in the Reimagine your SOC series explores the preventative security solutions market and effective risk management strategies.

Coming soon!

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About the author
Brittany Woodsmall
Product Marketing Manager, AI
Your data. Our AI.
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