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July 26, 2022

Identifying PrivateLoader Network Threats

Learn how Darktrace identifies network-based indicators of compromise for the PrivateLoader malware. Gain insights into advanced threat detection.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher
Written by
Shuh Chin Goh
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26
Jul 2022

Instead of delivering their malicious payloads themselves, threat actors can pay certain cybercriminals (known as pay-per-install (PPI) providers) to deliver their payloads for them. Since January 2022, Darktrace’s SOC has observed several cases of PPI providers delivering their clients’ payloads using a modular malware downloader known as ‘PrivateLoader’.

This blog will explore how these PPI providers installed PrivateLoader onto systems and outline the steps which the infected PrivateLoader bots took to install further malicious payloads. The details provided here are intended to provide insight into the operations of PrivateLoader and to assist security teams in identifying PrivateLoader bots within their own networks.  

Threat Summary 

Between January and June 2022, Darktrace identified the following sequence of network behaviours within the environments of several Darktrace clients. Patterns of activity involving these steps are paradigmatic examples of PrivateLoader activity:

1. A victim’s device is redirected to a page which instructs them to download a password-protected archive file from a file storage service — typically Discord Content Delivery Network (CDN)

2. The device contacts a file storage service (typically Discord CDN) via SSL connections

3. The device either contacts Pastebin via SSL connections, makes an HTTP GET request with the URI string ‘/server.txt’ or ‘server_p.txt’ to 45.144.225[.]57, or makes an HTTP GET request with the URI string ‘/proxies.txt’ to 212.193.30[.]45

4. The device makes an HTTP GET request with the URI string ‘/base/api/statistics.php’ to either 212.193.30[.]21, 85.202.169[.]116, 2.56.56[.]126 or 2.56.59[.]42

5. The device contacts a file storage service (typically Discord CDN) via SSL connections

6. The device makes a HTTP POST request with the URI string ‘/base/api/getData.php’ to either 212.193.30[.]21, 85.202.169[.]116, 2.56.56[.]126 or 2.56.59[.]42

7. The device finally downloads malicious payloads from a variety of endpoints

The PPI Business 

Before exploring PrivateLoader in more detail, the pay-per-install (PPI) business should be contextualized. This consists of two parties:  

1. PPI clients - actors who want their malicious payloads to be installed onto a large number of target systems. PPI clients are typically entry-level threat actors who seek to widely distribute commodity malware [1]

2. PPI providers - actors who PPI clients can pay to install their malicious payloads 

As the smugglers of the cybercriminal world, PPI providers typically advertise their malware delivery services on underground web forums. In some cases, PPI services can even be accessed via Clearnet websites such as InstallBest and InstallShop [2] (Figure 1).  

Figure 1: A snapshot of the InstallBest PPI login page [2]


To utilize a PPI provider’s service, a PPI client must typically specify: 

(A)  the URLs of the payloads which they want to be installed

(B)  the number of systems onto which they want their payloads to be installed

(C)  their geographical targeting preferences. 

Payment of course, is also required. To fulfil their clients’ requests, PPI providers typically make use of downloaders - malware which instructs the devices on which it is running to download and execute further payloads. PPI providers seek to install their downloaders onto as many systems as possible. Follow-on payloads are usually determined by system information garnered and relayed back to the PPI providers’ command and control (C2) infrastructure. PPI providers may disseminate their downloaders themselves, or they may outsource the dissemination to third parties called ‘affiliates’ [3].  

Back in May 2021, Intel 471 researchers became aware of PPI providers using a novel downloader (dubbed ‘PrivateLoader’) to conduct their operations. Since Intel 471’s public disclosure of the downloader back in Feb 2022 [4], several other threat research teams, such as the Walmart Cyber Intel Team [5], Zscaler ThreatLabz [6], and Trend Micro Research [7] have all provided valuable insights into the downloader’s behaviour. 

Anatomy of a PrivateLoader Infection

The PrivateLoader downloader, which is written in C++, was originally monolithic (i.e, consisted of only one module). At some point, however, the downloader became modular (i.e, consisting of multiple modules). The modules communicate via HTTP and employ various anti-analysis methods. PrivateLoader currently consists of the following three modules [8]: 

  • The loader module: Instructs the system on which it is running to retrieve the IP address of the main C2 server and to download and execute the PrivateLoader core module
  • The core module: Instructs the system on which it is running to send system information to the main C2 server, to download and execute further malicious payloads, and to relay information regarding installed payloads back to the main C2 server
  • The service module: Instructs the system on which it is running to keep the PrivateLoader modules running

Kill Chain Deep-Dive 

The chain of activity starts with the user’s browser being redirected to a webpage which instructs them to download a password-protected archive file from a file storage service such as Discord CDN. Discord is a popular VoIP and instant messaging service, and Discord CDN is the service’s CDN infrastructure. In several cases, the webpages to which users’ browsers were redirected were hosted on ‘hero-files[.]com’ (Figure 2), ‘qd-files[.]com’, and ‘pu-file[.]com’ (Figure 3). 

Figure 2: An image of a page hosted on hero-files[.]com - an endpoint which Darktrace observed systems contacting before downloading PrivateLoader from Discord CDN
Figure 3: An image of a page hosted on pu-file[.]com- an endpoint which Darktrace observed systems contacting before downloading PrivateLoader from Discord CDN


On attempting to download cracked/pirated software, users’ browsers were typically redirected to download instruction pages. In one case however, a user’s device showed signs of being infected with the malicious Chrome extension, ChromeBack [9], immediately before it contacted a webpage providing download instructions (Figure 4). This may suggest that cracked software downloads are not the only cause of users’ browsers being redirected to these download instruction pages (Figure 5). 

Figure 4: The event log for this device (taken from the Darktrace Threat Visualiser interface) shows that the device contacted endpoints associated with ChromeBack ('freychang[.]fun') prior to visiting a page ('qd-file[.]com') which instructed the device’s user to download an archive file from Discord CDN
 Figure 5: An image of the website 'crackright[.]com'- a provider of cracked software. Systems which attempted to download software from this website were subsequently led to pages providing instructions to download a password-protected archive from Discord CDN


After users’ devices were redirected to pages instructing them to download a password-protected archive, they subsequently contacted cdn.discordapp[.]com over SSL. The archive files which users downloaded over these SSL connections likely contained the PrivateLoader loader module. Immediately after contacting the file storage endpoint, users’ devices were observed either contacting Pastebin over SSL, making an HTTP GET request with the URI string ‘/server.txt’ or ‘server_p.txt’ to 45.144.225[.]57, or making an HTTP GET request with the URI string ‘/proxies.txt’ to 212.193.30[.]45 (Figure 6).

Distinctive user-agent strings such as those containing question marks (e.g. ‘????ll’) and strings referencing outdated Chrome browser versions were consistently seen in these HTTP requests. The following chrome agent was repeatedly observed: ‘Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/74.0.3729.169 Safari/537.36’.

In some cases, devices also displayed signs of infection with other strains of malware such as the RedLine infostealer and the BeamWinHTTP malware downloader. This may suggest that the password-protected archives embedded several payloads.

Figure 6: This figure, obtained from Darktrace's Advanced Search interface, represents the post-infection behaviour displayed by a PrivateLoader bot. After visiting hero-files[.]com and downloading the PrivateLoader loader module from Discord CDN, the device can be seen making HTTP GET requests for ‘/proxies.txt’ and ‘/server.txt’ and contacting pastebin[.]com

It seems that PrivateLoader bots contact Pastebin, 45.144.225[.]57, and 212.193.30[.]45 in order to retrieve the IP address of PrivateLoader’s main C2 server - the server which provides PrivateLoader bots with payload URLs. This technique used by the operators of PrivateLoader closely mirrors the well-known espionage tactic known as ‘dead drop’.

The dead drop is a method of espionage tradecraft in which an individual leaves a physical object such as papers, cash, or weapons in an agreed hiding spot so that the intended recipient can retrieve the object later on without having to come in to contact with the source. When threat actors host information about core C2 infrastructure on intermediary endpoints, the hosted information is analogously called a ‘Dead Drop Resolver’ or ‘DDR’. Example URLs of DDRs used by PrivateLoader:

  • https://pastebin[.]com/...
  • http://212.193.30[.]45/proxies.txt
  • http://45.144.225[.]57/server.txt
  • http://45.144.255[.]57/server_p.txt

The ‘proxies.txt’ DDR hosted on 212.193.40[.]45 contains a list of 132 IP address / port pairs. The 119th line of this list includes a scrambled version of the IP address of PrivateLoader’s main C2 server (Figures 7 & 8). Prior to June, it seems that the main C2 IP address was ‘212.193.30[.]21’, however, the IP address appears to have recently changed to ‘85.202.169[.]116’. In a limited set of cases, Darktrace also observed PrivateLoader bots retrieving payload URLs from 2.56.56[.]126 and 2.56.59[.]42 (rather than from 212.193.30[.]21 or 85.202.169[.]116). These IP addresses may be hardcoded secondary C2 address which PrivateLoader bots use in cases where they are unable to retrieve the primary C2 address from Pastebin, 212.193.30[.]45 or 45.144.255[.]57 [10]. 

Figure 7: Before June, the 119th entry of the ‘proxies.txt’ file lists '30.212.21.193' -  a scrambling of the ‘212.193.30[.]21’ main C2 IP address
Figure 8: Since June, the 119th entry of the ‘proxies.txt’ file lists '169.85.116.202' - a scrambling of the '85.202.169[.]116' main C2 IP address

Once PrivateLoader bots had retrieved C2 information from either Pastebin, 45.144.225[.]57, or 212.193.30[.]45, they went on to make HTTP GET requests for ‘/base/api/statistics.php’ to either 212.193.30[.]21, 85.202.169[.]116, 2.56.56[.]126, or 2.56.59[.]42 (Figure 9). The server responded to these requests with an XOR encrypted string. The strings were encrypted using a 1-byte key [11], such as 0001101 (Figure 10). Decrypting the string revealed a URL for a BMP file hosted on Discord CDN, such as ‘hxxps://cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/978284851323088960/986671030670078012/PL_Client.bmp’. These encrypted URLs appear to be file download paths for the PrivateLoader core module. 

Figure 9: HTTP response from server to an HTTP GET request for '/base/api/statistics.php'
Figure 10: XOR decrypting the string with the one-byte key, 00011101, outputs a URL in CyberChef

After PrivateLoader bots retrieved the 'cdn.discordapp[.]com’ URL from 212.193.30[.]21, 85.202.169[.]116, 2.56.56[.]126, or 2.56.59[.]42, they immediately contacted Discord CDN via SSL connections in order to obtain the PrivateLoader core module. Execution of this module resulted in the bots making HTTP POST requests (with the URI string ‘/base/api/getData.php’) to the main C2 address (Figures 11 & 12). Both the data which the PrivateLoader bots sent over these HTTP POST requests and the data returned via the C2 server’s HTTP responses were heavily encrypted using a combination of password-based key derivation, base64 encoding, AES encryption, and HMAC validation [12]. 

Figure 11: The above image, taken from Darktrace's Advanced Search interface, shows a PrivateLoader bot carrying out the following steps: contact ‘hero-files[.]com’ --> contact ‘cdn.discordapp[.]com’ --> retrieve ‘/proxies.txt’ from 212.193.30[.]45 --> retrieve ‘/base/api/statistics.php’ from 212.193.30[.]21 --> contact ‘cdn.discordapp[.]com --> make HTTP POST request with the URI ‘base/api/getData.php’ to 212.193.30[.]21
Figure 12: A PCAP of the data sent via the HTTP POST (in red), and the data returned by the C2 endpoint (in blue)

These ‘/base/api/getData.php’ POST requests contain a command, a campaign name and a JSON object. The response may either contain a simple status message (such as “success”) or a JSON object containing URLs of payloads. After making these HTTP connections, PrivateLoader bots were observed downloading and executing large volumes of payloads (Figure 13), ranging from crypto-miners to infostealers (such as Mars stealer), and even to other malware downloaders (such as SmokeLoader). In some cases, bots were also seen downloading files with ‘.bmp’ extensions, such as ‘Service.bmp’, ‘Cube_WW14.bmp’, and ‘NiceProcessX64.bmp’, from 45.144.225[.]57 - the same DDR endpoint from which PrivateLoader bots retrieved main C2 information. These ‘.bmp’ payloads are likely related to the PrivateLoader service module [13]. Certain bots made follow-up HTTP POST requests (with the URI string ‘/service/communication.php’) to either 212.193.30[.]21 or 85.202.169[.]116, indicating the presence of the PrivateLoader service module, which has the purpose of establishing persistence on the device (Figure 14). 

Figure 13: The above image, taken from Darktrace's Advanced Search interface, outlines the plethora of malware payloads downloaded by a PrivateLoader bot after it made an HTTP POST request to the ‘/base/api/getData.php’ endpoint. The PrivateLoader service module is highlighted in red
Figure 14: The event log for a PrivateLoader bot, obtained from the Threat Visualiser interface, shows a device making HTTP POST requests to ‘/service/communication.php’ and connecting to the NanoPool mining pool, indicating successful execution of downloaded payloads

In several observed cases, PrivateLoader bots downloaded another malware downloader called ‘SmokeLoader’ (payloads named ‘toolspab2.exe’ and ‘toolspab3.exe’) from “Privacy Tools” endpoints [14], such as ‘privacy-tools-for-you-802[.]com’ and ‘privacy-tools-for-you-783[.]com’. These “Privacy Tools” domains are likely impersonation attempts of the legitimate ‘privacytools[.]io’ website - a website run by volunteers who advocate for data privacy [15]. 

After downloading and executing malicious payloads, PrivateLoader bots were typically seen contacting crypto-mining pools, such as NanoPool, and making HTTP POST requests to external hosts associated with SmokeLoader, such as hosts named ‘host-data-coin-11[.]com’ and ‘file-coin-host-12[.]com’ [16]. In one case, a PrivateLoader bot went on to exfiltrate data over HTTP to an external host named ‘cheapf[.]link’, which was registered on the 14th March 2022 [17]. The name of the file which the PrivateLoader bot used to exfiltrate data was ‘NOP8QIMGV3W47Y.zip’, indicating information stealing activities by Mars Stealer (Figure 15) [18]. By saving the HTTP stream as raw data and utilizing a hex editor to remove the HTTP header portions, the hex data of the ZIP file was obtained. Saving the hex data using a ‘.zip’ extension and extracting the contents, a file directory consisting of system information and Chrome and Edge browsers’ Autofill data in cleartext .txt file format could be seen (Figure 16).

Figure 15: A PCAP of a PrivateLoader bot’s HTTP POST request to cheapf[.]link, with data sent by the bot appearing to include Chrome and Edge autofill data, as well as system information
Figure 16: File directory structure and files of the ZIP archive 

When left unattended, PrivateLoader bots continued to contact C2 infrastructure in order to relay details of executed payloads and to retrieve URLs of further payloads. 

Figure 17: Timeline of the attack

Darktrace Coverage 

Most of the incidents surveyed for this article belonged to prospective customers who were trialling Darktrace with RESPOND in passive mode, and thus without the ability for autonomous intervention. However in all observed cases, Darktrace DETECT was able to provide visibility into the actions taken by PrivateLoader bots. In one case, despite the infected bot being disconnected from the client’s network, Darktrace was still able to provide visibility into the device’s network behaviour due to the client’s usage of Darktrace/Endpoint. 

If a system within an organization’s network becomes infected with PrivateLoader, it will display a range of anomalous network behaviours before it downloads and executes malicious payloads. For example, it will contact Pastebin or make HTTP requests with new and unusual user-agent strings to rare external endpoints. These network behaviours will generate some of the following alerts on the Darktrace UI:

  • Compliance / Pastebin 
  • Device / New User Agent and New IP
  • Device / New User Agent
  • Device / Three or More New User Agents
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous Connection / POST to PHP on New External Host
  • Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname

Once the infected host obtains URLs for malware payloads from a C2 endpoint, it will likely start to download and execute large volumes of malicious files. These file downloads will usually cause Darktrace to generate some of the following alerts:

  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Numeric Exe Download
  • Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer
  • Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations
  • Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise

If RESPOND is deployed in active mode, Darktrace will be able to autonomously block the download of additional malware payloads onto the target machine and the subsequent beaconing or crypto-mining activities through network inhibitors such as ‘Block matching connections’, ‘Enforce pattern of life’ and ‘Block all outgoing traffic’. The ‘Enforce pattern of life’ action results in a device only being able to make connections and data transfers which Darktrace considers normal for that device. The ‘Block all outgoing traffic’ action will cause all traffic originating from the device to be blocked. If the customer has Darktrace’s Proactive Threat Notification (PTN) service, then a breach of an Enhanced Monitoring model such as ‘Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise’ will result in a Darktrace SOC analyst proactively notifying the customer of the suspicious activity. Below is a list of Darktrace RESPOND (Antigena) models which would be expected to breach due to PrivateLoader activity. Such models can seriously hamper attempts made by PrivateLoader bots to download malicious payloads. 

  • Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Breach
  • Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block 
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Breaches Over Time Block

In one observed case, the infected bot began to download malicious payloads within one minute of becoming infected with PrivateLoader. Since RESPOND was correctly configured, it was able to immediately intervene by autonomously enforcing the device’s pattern of life for 2 hours and blocking all of the device’s outgoing traffic for 10 minutes (Figure 17). When malware moves at such a fast pace, the availability of autonomous response technology, which can respond immediately to detected threats, is key for the prevention of further damage.  

Figure 18: The event log for a Darktrace RESPOND (Antigena) model breach shows Darktrace RESPOND performing inhibitive actions once the PrivateLoader bot begins to download payloads

Conclusion

By investigating PrivateLoader infections over the past couple of months, Darktrace has observed PrivateLoader operators making changes to the downloader’s main C2 IP address and to the user-agent strings which the downloader uses in its C2 communications. It is relatively easy for the operators of PrivateLoader to change these superficial network-based features of the malware in order to evade detection [19]. However, once a system becomes infected with PrivateLoader, it will inevitably start to display anomalous patterns of network behaviour characteristic of the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) discussed in this blog.

Throughout 2022, Darktrace observed overlapping patterns of network activity within the environments of several customers, which reveal the archetypal steps of a PrivateLoader infection. Despite the changes made to PrivateLoader’s network-based features, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was able to continually identify infected bots, detecting every stage of an infection without relying on known indicators of compromise. When configured, RESPOND was able to immediately respond to such infections, preventing further advancement in the cyber kill chain and ultimately preventing the delivery of floods of payloads onto infected devices.

IoCs

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Observed

References

[1], [8],[13] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ldp7eESQotM  

[2] https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/09/01/fake-pirated-software-sites-serve-up-malware-droppers-as-a-service/

[3] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228873118_Measuring_Pay-per Install_The_Commoditization_of_Malware_Distribution 

[4], [15] https://intel471.com/blog/privateloader-malware

[5] https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/privateloader-to-anubis-loader-55d066a2653e 

[6], [10],[11], [12] https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/peeking-privateloader 

[7] https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/e/netdooka-framework-distributed-via-privateloader-ppi.html

[9] https://www.gosecure.net/blog/2022/02/10/malicious-chrome-browser-extension-exposed-chromeback-leverages-silent-extension-loading/

[14] https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/malware-masquerades-privacy-tool 

[16] https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/30513/ 

[17]https://twitter.com/0xrb/status/1515956690642161669

[18] https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Arkei+Variants+From+Vidar+to+Mars+Stealer/28468

[19] http://detect-respond.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-pyramid-of-pain.html

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher
Written by
Shuh Chin Goh

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September 2, 2026

Botnet Behind the Camera: Mirai Katana Activity on a Video Recording Device

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Key takeaways

  • Darktrace identified a camera device infected with the Mirai/Katana botnet in a sports-sector customer environment, showing how exposed IoT devices can become active participants in wider attack chains.
  • The compromise involved suspicious Wget behavior, file downloads from rare external IPs, unusual incoming HTTP connections to video recorder management interfaces, and large outbound data transfers to infrastructure associated with botnet activity.
  • The incident highlights the importance of extending visibility and response beyond traditional endpoints, as unmanaged or overlooked connected devices can be exploited for command-and-control, malware delivery, and data exfiltration.

Mirai and the Katana variant

Mirai is a botnet that first emerged in August 2016 and is well known for launching large-scale distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, typically targeting exposed Internet of Things (IoT) devices. It identifies vulnerable IoT devices ,often by abusing default credentials or exposed services, and recruiting them into a remotely controlled botnet that can be used in DDoS campaigns [1].

Katana, one of the many variants that arose after Mirai’s source code was released publicly, was first observed in late 2020 and has been seen using more advanced capabilities, including custom command-and-control (C2), persistence mechanisms, and DDoS functionality [2].

In March 2026, research from the Nokia Deepfield Emergency Response Team (ERT) identified Katana as a Mirai-derived DDoS botnet targeting Android-based TV set-top boxes through exposed Android Debug Bridge (ADB) access.  Observed capabilities included custom C2, runtime domain rotation, multiple DDoS methods, and an on-device compiled kernel rootkit used for persistence and stealth [3].

Darktrace’s detection of Mirai Botnet activity on a camera device

In early 2026, Darktrace identified a Network/Digital Video Recorder (NVR/DVR) on the network of a sports-sector customer that had been infected with the Mirai Katana botnet and subsequently used to exfiltrate data from the customer’s environment. Seemingly related follow-up activity was observed on the same device several months later.

In both instances, the Darktrace Security Operations Centre (SOC) alerted the customer as part of the Managed Threat Detection (MTD) service. However, as Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was not fully enabled on the affected device, Darktrace was unable to proactively block the suspicious activity or prevent the compromise from continuing and recurring.

The initial compromise appears to have occurred when the affected device was seen using Wget to download Linux-based Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) files from a rare external IP, 195.177.94[.]105, which had not previously been observed in the customer’s network. Further analysis downloaded file hashes identified files related to the Mirai botnet.

Figure 1: Darktrace’s Real-Time AI Analyst investigation into the unusual outbound connection where the ELF files were downloaded.

Within a few hours, Darktrace detected the device uploading close to 3GB of data to another external IP, 50.7.49[.]4:3017 (ASN AS30058 FDCSERVERS), suggesting that the activity was likely routed via a virtual private server (VPS) hosted by FDC Servers [2]. Attackers often abuse VPS infrastructure from legitimate cloud providers to blend in with legitimate traffic and evade IP reputation and geolocation-based detections.

Figure 2:  Darktrace’s detection of the unusual data upload activity by the affected camera device.

Darktrace continued to observe similar data transfers to multiple rare endpoints  including 171.225.223[.]53, 95.161.128[.]62, 61.7.209[.]88, 95.161.128[.]62, which have been linked to Mirai by open-source intelligence (OSINT).

Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of spikes in unusual external data transfer activity from the camera device.

Exploitation continued

Several months later, Darktrace identified the same exfiltration pattern on the device again, this time with stronger indications of associations with Mirai Katana botnet infection.

The device received incoming HTTP connections from 129.121.114[.]124, an external IP known to be associated with the Katana botnet IP [3]. The connections targeted the ‘/dvr/cmd’ path using the root username and user agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/42.0.2311.135 Safari/537.36 Edge/12.246.

The ‘/dvr/cmd’ path appears to be associated with the affected device’s web management functionality. This API endpoint has historically been targeted by Mirai and other IoT botnets through the exploitation of critical command injection vulnerabilities and automated botnet exploitation [4].

Figure 4: Darktrace’s  detection of HTTP connectivity from the external IP associated with Mirai Katana Botnet.

A few days later, Darktrace observed the Wget utility being used to download ELF files, including “/lil”,  from the IP 129.121.114[.]124. OSINT reporting has since associated this IP address with the Mirai Katana botnet. Notably, the IP observed earlier in the year, 195.177.94[.]105, had also hosted a file named “lil”, indicating a link between the observed activity.

Over the following days, the device received a sudden spike in connections from multiple rare external endpoints, suggesting a possible successful brute force attack. Darktrace also observed the device exfiltrating just under 4GB of data to another Mirai-associated IP address,  66.92.198[.]194, over ports 3344, 954922, and 80. Finally, the device was seen uploading data to the Mirai botnet IP 5.175.249[.]53 over port138 and exhibited an increase in UDP connections to 34.18.28[.]10 over port 9068.

Following both file download events, Darktrace identified spikes in external data transfers and connection attempts to rare destinations. While Darktrace’s Threat Research team could not confirm with high confidence that this to activity was directly associated with Mirai, it may indicate that Mirai Katana includes data exfiltration functionality.

Darktrace’s threat researchers also identified an internet-facing NTP server belonging to a separate customer receiving incoming connection attempts from the same initially observed IP, 195.177.94[.]105,over the port 123. This suggests that Mirai Katana may not exclusively target IoT devices.

Conclusion

This case demonstrates how threat actors can exploit overlooked IoT and OT devices to support broader malicious objectives. Here, a camera device infected with a botnet was used to exfiltrate data from the customer's environment, showing how peripheral assets can become active participants in an attack chain.

This case also reinforces a challenge many organizations face today: extending security visibility beyond traditional endpoints and servers. Cameras, sensors, and other connected devices often operate with limited monitoring and may fall outside established security processes, despite maintaining network connectivity and access to potentially sensitive environments. This is particularly relevant in the sports sector, where growing reliance on connected cameras, smart stadium technologies, and other IoT devices continues to expand the attack surface, as highlighted in Darktrace's Sports Sector Threat Report.

As botnets like Kata and Mirai continue to evolve, defenders need visibility across unmanaged IoT and edge devices, as well as security solutions that can recognize subtle deviations in device behavior that may indicate an emerging compromise.

Credit to Parvatha Ananthakannan (Cyber Analyst), Signe Zaharka (Principal Analyst)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

·      Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

·      Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

·      Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

·      Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

·      Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

·      Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

·      Device / Significant UDP Increase

·      Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration to IP

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

·      Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity

·      Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination

·      Unusual Activity / Unusual DNS

·      Device / External Network Scan

·      Device / Suspicious DNS Activity

·      Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Indicator of Compromise Type Description
195.177.94[.]105 IP C2 endpoint
50.7.49[.]4:30171 IP Possible C2 endpoint
129.121.114[.]124 IP C2 endpoint
hxxp://195.177.94[.]105/n3 URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://195.177.94[.]105/n2 URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/lil URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/HHn URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/JFc URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/jum URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/OaSf URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/OPWg URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/vHwK URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/VLv URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/WbJ URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/zkR URL Possible C2 endpoint
Ab17883ae4c3bc6afa18c439166eeeb4b03186e3093d984e3a95f573e0fcb7d8 SHA-256 Mirai payload
3d587e809dac49d34a3f717e072fd0aebe5e71db63333e45c81577d6b4266f87 SHA-256 Mirai payload
Bf6e81733a7e209d3dce80d15bf3c5d300752d961fae6b45d90c9bbe7f8c89a2 SHA-256 Possible payload
f25488303813ab1ec0eaa71562938601aac185e8aaf93adb84522557f7cf4dd6 SHA-256 Possible payload
0cb4ff6b71f4423184bfa35c34e9090297637208b0e30205d4b224e56abde2ef SHA-256 Possible payload
19c24cbeaf06b2e7697083f33a85521a9315105c784691bde7420fde4cc69410 SHA-256 Likely Mirai payload
1e74f734fff8df91f4f7172d0de10c421eca78aeb800e8a48e16bc5dbde5d20e SHA-256 Possible payload
6e71f7763d1f29d5712106ebb122e281c32787540aa2342b0fe5351d585d18d7 SHA-256 Possible payload
71f4ff7cdb6d6a7d2673c543c5d2535093afbd707b20a5b9ddf735466c1105c1 SHA-256 Possible payload
76db7ee73ebf15e48a3cb24a074d92248671ef2c6ed3bc3e708377341fb7674d SHA-256 Possible payload
da87a65f7beb438e61f0b61964fed8aa305a380f569042f84c55eca8fa7929b8 SHA-256 Possible payload
e15809eb6ba66477175270d62cfa53e4bf278595f69938708c81c4bc457930fe SHA-256 Mirai payload

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic Technique ID Technique / Sub-technique
Initial Access T1659 Content Injection
T1189 Drive-by Compromise
Exfiltration T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
Command and Control T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol
T1571 Non-Standard Port
Reconnaissance T1595.001 Scanning IP Blocks
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About the author
Parvatha Ananthakannan
Cyber Analyst

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August 26, 2026

AI Agents: Securing the Path from Intent to Action

Photograph of AI data centerDefault blog imageDefault blog image

The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) recently published guidance on managing the cyber risk of agentic AI. While the document is framed as interim advice as more formal guidance is developed, the framing reflects the current state of the industry: organizations are already deploying agents into production environments while standards, controls, and operating models for autonomous systems remain unsettled. Governance is evolving alongside adoption rather than preceding it, a reality which underscores the importance of robust controls.  

The NCSC’s guidance recommends aligning controls to an agent's level of autonomy, assigning distinct identities, limiting permissions, constraining access to systems and data, monitoring activity, maintaining human oversight, and preserving the ability to intervene when necessary. Most of these recommendations will sound familiar to security teams. The challenge is not the novelty of the controls. It is the type of system those controls now need to govern.

The shift from model security to agent security

For several years, AI security discussions have focused heavily on models. Can a model be manipulated? Jailbroken? Trusted? Can it expose information it should not? Those questions remain important, but they capture only part of the problem. A model generating text is one thing. A system connected to identities, applications, tools, workflows, and business data is another.

The difference becomes clearer when comparing a chatbot that answers questions with an agent that can retrieve customer records, update tickets, invoke tools, trigger workflows, and interact with external systems. The underlying model may be identical. Its access is not. The security question begins to shift from what the model knows to what the system can do.

The same theme appears in the Five Eyes statement released earlier this year, describing AI as a force multiplier that is accelerating both offensive and defensive cyber operations. The NCSC guidance explores what that reality looks like when autonomous systems begin operating inside enterprise environments.

Securing AI agents in operation

The NCSC spends relatively little time debating model behavior and considerably more time discussing identity, permissions, monitoring, oversight, containment, and response. Agents are treated as participants within an environment rather than isolated pieces of technology.  

That's broadly consistent with how we think about the problem at Darktrace.

An agent should not be treated as an extension of a user account. It develops its own behavioral patterns. It accesses systems, interacts with data, invokes tools, and moves across workflows in ways that can be observed independently. Understanding what an agent is permitted to do matters. Understanding how it actually behaves once deployed, and whether that behavior aligns with business intent, matters just as much.

Identity provides an obvious example. The NCSC recommends assigning distinct identities to agents rather than allowing them to disappear into surrounding human or service accounts. Most importantly, assigning agents distinct identities enables independent behavioral monitoring.

Development assumptions vs. real-world behavior

The same principle extends to monitoring. NCSC guidance places agent activity within normal security operations rather than treating it as a separate AI governance function. Many of the controls described are put in place before an agent begins operating. Sandboxing, credential design, approval workflows and human oversight all reflect judgments about how the system is expected to behave and what risks it is likely to create.

Actual use may challenge those assumptions. Access patterns change. Workflows expand. Systems begin interacting with resources they have never touched before. Processes that appeared reasonable during design behave differently in production. Human oversight requirements may turn out to be either excessive or inadequate once the system is operating at scale and operating within the context of unique business processes.

The Five Eyes statement points to a similar issue: organizations need confidence that controls continue to work as intended once systems are exposed to real users, data, tools and operational pressures. Often, the question is not whether an agent is technically allowed to perform an action, but whether its behavior remains consistent with the role it was intended to play.

Monitoring and governance of AI agents go hand-in-hand

This problem is exactly why monitoring and governance should be treated as part of the same process. Governance sets the initial parameters for deployment, while monitoring provides evidence about whether those parameters remain appropriate. That evidence should, in turn, inform changes to permissions, controls and oversight.

This matters increasingly as autonomous systems are integrated into business processes. The relevant risk is shaped not only by the model or agent itself, but by what it can access, what actions it can take, and how its behavior changes in practice.

Developing continuous oversight of AI agent behavior

The implication is clear: governance cannot end at deployment. Organizations need a way to understand how agents behave after deployment, test whether controls remain appropriate, and adjust them as conditions change. That requires visibility not just into technical activity, but into whether that activity makes sense in the context of the business process the agent is intended to support.

This is where business-centric behavioral security can become critical. Risk does not emerge from the model itself: it emerges from the actions an autonomous system takes within the enterprise and the downstream consequences of those actions.  

An agent can operate exactly as intended and still create risk if it accesses sensitive information in an unexpected context, exercises permissions in ways that create unintended exposure, or influences business processes in ways that were not anticipated during design and review.

Traditional governance vs. behavioral security

Traditional governance frameworks provide assurance at a point in time. Behavioral security can provide ongoing visibility into how autonomous systems interact with the organization they are meant to serve. Rather than focusing exclusively on model performance or policy compliance, organizations need to understand whether an agent's behavior aligns with business intent, operational expectations, and acceptable risk tolerances as conditions change.

As enterprises move from isolated AI deployments to interconnected ecosystems of agents, visibility into behavior becomes as important as visibility into code. Governance determines what an autonomous system is permitted to do. Behavioral analytics helps determine what it is doing, what business outcomes it is producing, and whether those outcomes remain aligned with the organization's objectives.

[related-resource]

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About the author
Margaret Cunningham, PhD
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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