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January 4, 2023

BlackMatter's Smash-and-Grab Ransom Attack Incident Analysis

Stay informed on cybersecurity trends! Read about a BlackMatters ransom attack incident and Darktrace's analysis on how RESPOND could have stopped the attack.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
The Darktrace Analyst Team
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04
Jan 2023

Only a few years ago, popular reporting announced that the days of smash-and-grab attacks were over and that a new breed of hackers were taking over with subtler, ‘low-and-slow’ tactics [1]. Although these have undoubtedly appeared, smash-and-grab have quickly become overlooked – perhaps with worrying consequences. Last year, Google saw repeated phishing campaigns using cookie theft malware and most recently, reports of hacktivists using similar techniques have been identified during the 2022 Ukraine Conflict [2 & 3]. Where did their inspiration come from? For larger APT groups such as BlackMatter, which first appeared in the summer of 2021, smash-and-grabs never went out of fashion.

This blog dissects a BlackMatter ransomware attack that hit an organization trialing Darktrace back in 2021. The case reveals what can happen when a security team does not react to high-priority alerts. 

When entire ransomware attacks can be carried out over the course of just 48 hours, there is a high risk to relying on security teams to react to detection notifications and prevent damage before the threat escalates. Although there has been hesitancy in its uptake [4], this blog also demonstrates the need for automated response solutions like Darktrace RESPOND.

The Name Game: Untangling BlackMatter, REvil, and DarkSide

Despite being a short-lived criminal organization on the surface [5], a number of parallels have now been drawn between the TTPs (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) of the newer BlackMatter group and those of the retired REvil and DarkSide organizations [6]. 

Prior to their retirement, DarkSide and REvil were perhaps the biggest names in cyber-crime, responsible for two of last year’s most devastating ransomware attacks. Less than two weeks after the Colonial Pipeline attack, DarkSide announced it was shutting down its operation [7]. Meanwhile the FBI shutdown REvil in January 2022 after its devastating Fourth of July Kaseya attacks and a failed return in September [8]. It is now suspected that members from one or both went on to form BlackMatter.

This rebranding strategy parallels the smash-and-grab attacks these groups now increasingly employ: they make their money, and a lot of noise, and when they’re found out, they disappear before organizations or governments can pull together their threat intelligence and organize an effective response. When they return days, weeks or months later, they do so having implemented enough small changes to render themselves and their attacks unrecognizable. That is how DarkSide can become BlackMatter, and how its attacks can slip through security systems trained on previously encountered threats. 

Attack Details

In September 2021 Darktrace was monitoring a US marketing agency which became the victim of a double extortion ransomware attack that bore hallmarks of a BlackMatter operation. This began when a single domain-authenticated device joined the company’s network. This was likely a pre-infected company device being reconnected after some time offline. 

Only 15 minutes after joining, the device began SMB and ICMP scanning activities towards over 1000 different internal IPs. There was also a large spike of requests for Epmapper, which suggested an intent for RPC-based lateral movement. Although one credential was particularly prominent, multiple were used including labelled admin credentials. Given it’s unexpected nature, this recon quickly triggered a chain of DETECT/Network model breaches which ensured that Darktrace’s SOC were alerted via the Proactive Threat Notification service. Whilst SOC analysts began to triage the activity, the organization failed to act on any of the alerts they received, leaving the detected threat to take root within their digital environment. 

Shortly after, a series of C2 beaconing occurred towards an endpoint associated with Cobalt Strike [9]. This was accompanied by a range of anomalous WMI bind requests to svcctl, SecAddr and further RPC connections. These allowed the initial compromised device to quickly infect 11 other devices. With continued scanning over the next day, valuable data was soon identified. Across several transfers, 230GB of internal data was then exfiltrated from four file servers via SSH port 22. This data was then made unusable to the organization through encryption occurring via SMB Writes and Moves/Renames with the randomly generated extension ‘.qHefKSmfd’. Finally a ransom note titled ‘qHefKSmfd.README.txt’ was dropped.

This ransom note was appended with the BlackMatter ASCII logo:

Figure 1- The ASCII logo which accompanied BlackMatter’s ransom note

Although Darktrace DETECT and Cyber AI Analyst continued to provide live alerting, the actor successfully accomplished their mission.  

There are numerous reasons that an organization may fail to organize a response to a threat, (including resource shortages, out of hours attacks, and groups that simply move too fast). Without Darktrace’s RESPOND capabilities enabled, the threat actors could proceed this attack without obstacles. 

Figure 2- Cyber AI Analyst breaks down the stages of the attack [Note: this screenshot is from V5 of DETECT/Network] 

How would the attack have unfolded with RESPOND?

Armed with Darktrace’s evolving knowledge of ‘self’ for the customer’s unique digital environment, RESPOND would have activated within seconds of the first network scan, which was recognized as highly anomalous. The standard action taken here would usually involve enforcing the standard ‘pattern of life’ for the compromised device over a set time period in order to halt the anomaly while allowing the business to continue operating as normal.

RESPOND constantly re-evaluates threats as attacks unfold. Had the first stage still been successful, it would have continued to take targeted action at each corresponding stage of this attack. RESPOND models would have alerted to block the external connections to C2 servers over port 443, the outbound exfil attempts and crucially the SMB write activity over port 445 related to encryption.

As DETECT and RESPOND feed into one another, Darktrace would have continued to assess its actions as BlackMatter pivoted tactics. These actions buy back critical time for security teams that may not be in operation over the weekend, and stun the attacker into place without applying overly aggressive responses that create more problems than they solve.

Ultimately although this incident did not resolve autonomously, in response to the ransom event, Darktrace offered to enable RESPOND and set it in active mode for ransomware indicators across all client and server devices. This ensured an event like this would not occur again. 

Why does RESPOND work?

Response solutions must be accurate enough to fire only when there is a genuine threat, configurable enough to let the user stay in the driver’s seat, and intelligent enough to know the right action to take to contain only the malicious activity- without disrupting normal business operations. 

This is only possible if you can establish what ‘normal’ is for any one organization. And this is how Darktrace’s RESPOND product family ensures its actions are targeted and proportionate. By feeding off DETECT alerting which highlights subtle or large deviations across the network, cloud and SaaS, RESPOND can provide a measured response to the potential threat. This includes actions such as:

  • Enforcing the device’s ‘pattern of life’ for a given length of time 
  • Enforcing the ‘group pattern of life’ (stopping a device from doing anything its peers haven’t done in the past)
  • Blocking connections of a certain type to a certain destination
  • Logging out of a cloud account 
  • ‘Smart quarantining’ an endpoint device- maintaining access to VPNs and company’s AV solution

Conclusion 

In its report on BlackMatter [10], CISA recommended that organizations invest in network monitoring tools with the capacity to investigate anomalous activity. Picking up on unusual behavior rather than predetermined rules and signatures is an important step in fighting back against new threats. As this particular story shows, however, detection alone is not always enough. Turning on RESPOND, which takes immediate and precise action to contain threats, regardless of when and where they come in, is the best way to counter smash-and-grab attacks and protect organizations’ digital assets. There is little doubt that the threat actors behind BlackMatter will or have already returned with new names and strategies- but organizations with RESPOND will be ready for them.

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections (in order of breach)

Those with the ‘PTN’ prefix were alerted directly to Darktrace’s 24/7 SOC team.

  • Device / ICMP Address Scan
  • Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity
  • (PTN) Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Device / Possible RPC Lateral Movement
  • Device / Active Directory Reconnaissance
  • Unusual Activity / Possible RPC Recon Activity
  • Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance
  • Compliance / Default Credential Usage
  • Device / New or Unusual Remote Command Execution
  • Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control
  • Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe
  • Device / SMB Session Bruteforce
  • Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity
  • (PTN) Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches
  • Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase
  • Compromise / SSL or HTTP Beacon
  • Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint
  • Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Breaches
  • Device / Anomalous RDP Followed By Multiple Model Breaches
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
  • Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External
  • Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint
  • Compliance / SMB Drive Write
  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session
  • Anomalous Connection / High Volume of New or Uncommon Service Control
  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session
  • Device / Suspicious File Writes to Multiple Hidden SMB Shares
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
  • Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination
  • Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound
  • Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain
  • Anomalous Connection / Download and Upload
  • (PTN) Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
  • (PTN) Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity

List of IOCs 

Reference List 

[1] https://www.designnews.com/industrial-machinery/new-age-hackers-are-ditching-smash-and-grab-techniques 

[2] https://cybernews.com/cyber-war/how-do-smash-and-grab-cyberattacks-help-ukraine-in-waging-war/

[3] https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/phishing-campaign-targets-youtube-creators-cookie-theft-malware/

[4] https://www.ukcybersecuritycouncil.org.uk/news-insights/articles/the-benefits-of-automation-to-cyber-security/

[5] https://techcrunch.com/2021/11/03/blackmatter-ransomware-shut-down/ 

[6] https://www.trellix.com/en-us/about/newsroom/stories/research/blackmatter-ransomware-analysis-the-dark-side-returns.html

[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/business/darkside-pipeline-hack.html

[8] https://techcrunch.com/2022/01/14/fsb-revil-ransomware/ 

[9] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/georgiaonsale.com/community

[10] https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-291a

Credit to: Andras Balogh, SOC Analyst and Gabriel Few-Wiegratz, Threat Intelligence Content Production Lead

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
The Darktrace Analyst Team

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January 30, 2026

ClearFake: From Fake CAPTCHAs to Blockchain-Driven Payload Retrieval

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What is ClearFake?

As threat actors evolve their techniques to exploit victims and breach target networks, the ClearFake campaign has emerged as a significant illustration of this continued adaptation. ClearFake is a campaign observed using a malicious JavaScript framework deployed on compromised websites, impacting sectors such as e‑commerce, travel, and automotive. First identified in mid‑2023, ClearFake is frequently leveraged to socially engineer victims into installing fake web browser updates.

In ClearFake compromises, victims are steered toward compromised WordPress sites, often positioned by attackers through search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning. Once on the site, users are presented with a fake CAPTCHA. This counterfeit challenge is designed to appear legitimate while enabling the execution of malicious code. When a victim interacts with the CAPTCHA, a PowerShell command containing a download string is retrieved and executed.

Attackers commonly abuse the legitimate Microsoft HTML Application Host (MSHTA) in these operations. Recent campaigns have also incorporated Smart Chain endpoints, such as “bsc-dataseed.binance[.]org,” to obtain configuration code. The primary payload delivered through ClearFake is typically an information stealer, such as Lumma Stealer, enabling credential theft, data exfiltration, and persistent access [1].

Darktrace’s Coverage of ClearFake

Darktrace / ENDPOINT first detected activity likely associated with ClearFake on a single device on over the course of one day on November 18, 2025. The system observed the execution of “mshta.exe,” the legitimate Microsoft HTML Application Host utility. It also noted a repeated process command referencing “weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru”, indicating suspicious external activity. Subsequent analysis of this endpoint using open‑source intelligence (OSINT) indicated that it was a malicious, domain generation algorithm (DGA) endpoint [2].

The process line referencing weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, as observed by Darktrace / ENDPOINT.
Figure 1: The process line referencing weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, as observed by Darktrace / ENDPOINT.

This activity indicates that mshta.exe was used to contact a remote server, “weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru/rpxacc64mshta,” and execute the associated HTA file to initiate the next stage of the attack. OSINT sources have since heavily flagged this server as potentially malicious [3].

The first argument in this process uses the MSHTA utility to execute the HTA file hosted on the remote server. If successful, MSHTA would then run JavaScript or VBScript to launch PowerShell commands used to retrieve malicious payloads, a technique observed in previous ClearFake campaigns. Darktrace also detected unusual activity involving additional Microsoft executables, including “winlogon.exe,” “userinit.exe,” and “explorer.exe.” Although these binaries are legitimate components of the Windows operating system, threat actors can abuse their normal behavior within the Windows login sequence to gain control over user sessions, similar to the misuse of mshta.exe.

EtherHiding cover

Darktrace also identified additional ClearFake‑related activity, specifically a connection to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org, a legitimate BNB Smart Chain endpoint. This activity was triggered by injected JavaScript on the compromised site www.allstarsuae[.]com, where the script initiated an eth_call POST request to the Smart Chain endpoint.

Example of a fake CAPTCHA on the compromised site www.allstarsuae[.]com.
Figure 2: Example of a fake CAPTCHA on the compromised site www.allstarsuae[.]com.

EtherHiding is a technique in which threat actors leverage blockchain technology, specifically smart contracts, as part of their malicious infrastructure. Because blockchain is anonymous, decentralized, and highly persistent, it provides threat actors with advantages in evading defensive measures and traditional tracking [4].

In this case, when a user visits a compromised WordPress site, injected base64‑encoded JavaScript retrieved an ABI string, which was then used to load and execute a contract hosted on the BNB Smart Chain.

JavaScript hosted on the compromised site www.allstaruae[.]com.
Figure 3: JavaScript hosted on the compromised site www.allstaruae[.]com.

Conducting malware analysis on this instance, the Base64 decoded into a JavaScript loader. A POST request to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org was then used to retrieve a hex‑encoded ABI string that loads and executes the contract. The JavaScript also contained hex and Base64‑encoded functions that decoded into additional JavaScript, which attempted to retrieve a payload hosted on GitHub at “github[.]com/PrivateC0de/obf/main/payload.txt.” However, this payload was unavailable at the time of analysis.

Darktrace’s detection of the POST request to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org.
Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of the POST request to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of the executable file and the malicious hostname.

Autonomous Response

As Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was enabled on this customer’s network, Darktrace was able to take swift mitigative action to contain the ClearFake‑related activity early, before it could lead to potential payload delivery. The affected device was blocked from making external connections to a number of suspicious endpoints, including 188.114.96[.]6, *.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, and neighb0rrol1[.]ru, ensuring that no further malicious connections could be made and no payloads could be retrieved.

Autonomous Response also acted to prevent the executable mshta.exe from initiating HTA file execution over HTTPS from this endpoint by blocking the attempted connections. Had these files executed successfully, the attack would likely have resulted in the retrieval of an information stealer, such as Lumma Stealer.

Autonomous Response’s intervention against the suspicious connectivity observed.
Figure 6: Autonomous Response’s intervention against the suspicious connectivity observed.

Conclusion

ClearFake continues to be observed across multiple sectors, but Darktrace remains well‑positioned to counter such threats. Because ClearFake’s end goal is often to deliver malware such as information stealers and malware loaders, early disruption is critical to preventing compromise. Users should remain aware of this activity and vigilant regarding fake CAPTCHA pop‑ups. They should also monitor unusual usage of MSHTA and outbound connections to domains that mimic formats such as “bsc-dataseed.binance[.]org” [1].

In this case, Darktrace was able to contain the attack before it could successfully escalate and execute. The attempted execution of HTA files was detected early, allowing Autonomous Response to intervene, stopping the activity from progressing. As soon as the device began communicating with weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, an Autonomous Response inhibitor triggered and interrupted the connections.

As ClearFake continues to rise, users should stay alert to social engineering techniques, including ClickFix, that rely on deceptive security prompts.

Credit to Vivek Rajan (Senior Cyber Analyst) and Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Process / New Executable Launched

Endpoint / Anomalous Use of Scripting Process

Endpoint / New Suspicious Executable Launched

Endpoint / Process Connection::Unusual Connection from New Process

Autonomous Response Models

Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

  • weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru – URL - Malicious Domain
  • 188.114.96[.]6 – IP – Suspicious Domain
  • *.neighb0rrol1[.]ru – URL – Malicious Domain

MITRE Tactics

Initial Access, Drive-by Compromise, T1189

User Execution, Execution, T1204

Software Deployment Tools, Execution and Lateral Movement, T1072

Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1059

System Binary Proxy Execution: MSHTA, T1218.005

References

1.        https://www.kroll.com/en/publications/cyber/rapid-evolution-of-clearfake-delivery

2.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/weiss.neighb0rrol1.ru

3.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/1f1aabe87e5e93a8fff769bf3614dd559c51c80fc045e11868f3843d9a004d1e/community

4.        https://www.packetlabs.net/posts/etherhiding-a-new-tactic-for-hiding-malware-on-the-blockchain/

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Vivek Rajan
Cyber Analyst

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January 30, 2026

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector: Six Trends to Watch

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The evolving cybersecurity threat landscape in finance

The financial sector, encompassing commercial banks, credit unions, financial services providers, and cryptocurrency platforms, faces an increasingly complex and aggressive cyber threat landscape. The financial sector’s reliance on digital infrastructure and its role in managing high-value transactions make it a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored threat actors.

Darktrace’s latest threat research, The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector, draws on a combination of Darktrace telemetry data from real-world customer environments, open-source intelligence, and direct interviews with financial-sector CISOs to provide perspective on how attacks are unfolding and how defenders in the sector need to adapt.  

Six cybersecurity trends in the finance sector for 2026

1. Credential-driven attacks are surging

Phishing continues to be a leading initial access vector for attacks targeting confidentiality. Financial institutions are frequently targeted with phishing emails designed to harvest login credentials. Techniques including Adversary-in-The-Middle (AiTM) to bypass Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) and QR code phishing (“quishing”) are surging and are capable of fooling even trained users. In the first half of 2025, Darktrace observed 2.4 million phishing emails within financial sector customer deployments, with almost 30% targeted towards VIP users.  

2. Data Loss Prevention is an increasing challenge

Compliance issues – particularly data loss prevention -- remain a persistent risk. In October 2025 alone, Darktrace observed over 214,000 emails across financial sector customers that contained unfamiliar attachments and were sent to suspected personal email addresses highlighting clear concerns around data loss prevention. Across the same set of customers within the same time frame, more than 351,000 emails containing unfamiliar attachments were sent to freemail addresses (e.g. gmail, yahoo, icloud), highlighting clear concerns around DLP.  

Confidentiality remains a primary concern for financial institutions as attackers increasingly target sensitive customer data, financial records, and internal communications.  

3. Ransomware is evolving toward data theft and extortion

Ransomware is no longer just about locking systems, it’s about stealing data first and encrypting second. Groups such as Cl0p and RansomHub now prioritize exploiting trusted file-transfer platforms to exfiltrate sensitive data before encryption, maximizing regulatory and reputational fallout for victims.  

Darktrace’s threat research identified routine scanning and malicious activity targeting internet-facing file-transfer systems used heavily by financial institutions. In one notable case involving Fortra GoAnywhere MFT, Darktrace detected malicious exploitation behavior six days before the CVE was publicly disclosed, demonstrating how attackers often operate ahead of patch cycles

This evolution underscores a critical reality: by the time a vulnerability is disclosed publicly, it may already be actively exploited.

4. Attackers are exploiting edge devices, often pre-disclosure.  

VPNs, firewalls, and remote access gateways have become high-value targets, and attackers are increasingly exploiting them before vulnerabilities are publicly disclosed. Darktrace observed pre-CVE exploitation activity affecting edge technologies including Citrix, Palo Alto, and Ivanti, enabling session hijacking, credential harvesting, and privileged lateral movement into core banking systems.  

Once compromised, these edge devices allow adversaries to blend into trusted network traffic, bypassing traditional perimeter defenses. CISOs interviewed for the report repeatedly described VPN infrastructure as a “concentrated focal point” for attackers, especially when patching and segmentation lag behind operational demands.

5. DPRK-linked activity is growing across crypto and fintech.  

State-sponsored activity, particularly from DPRK-linked groups affiliated with Lazarus, continues to intensify across cryptocurrency and fintech organizations. Darktrace identified coordinated campaigns leveraging malicious npm packages, previously undocumented BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret malware, and exploitation of React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) for credential theft and persistent backdoor access.  

Targeting was observed across the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Chile, Nigeria, Kenya, and Qatar, highlighting the global scope of these operations.  

6. Cloud complexity and AI governance gaps are now systemic risks.  

Finally, CISOs consistently pointed to cloud complexity, insider risk from new hires, and ungoverned AI usage exposing sensitive data as systemic challenges. Leaders emphasized difficulty maintaining visibility across multi-cloud environments while managing sensitive data exposure through emerging AI tools.  

Rapid AI adoption without clear guardrails has introduced new confidentiality and compliance risks, turning governance into a board-level concern rather than a purely technical one.

Building cyber resilience in a shifting threat landscape

The financial sector remains a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored adversaries. What this research makes clear is that yesterday’s security assumptions no longer hold. Identity attacks, pre-disclosure exploitation, and data-first ransomware require adaptive, behavior-based defenses that can detect threats as they emerge, often ahead of public disclosure.

As financial institutions continue to digitize, resilience will depend on visibility across identity, edge, cloud, and data, combined with AI-driven defense that learns at machine speed.  

Learn more about the threats facing the finance sector, and what your organization can do to keep up in The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector report here.  

Acknowledgements:

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance sector report was authored by Calum Hall, Hugh Turnbull, Parvatha Ananthakannan, Tiana Kelly, and Vivek Rajan, with contributions from Emma Foulger, Nicole Wong, Ryan Traill, Tara Gould, and the Darktrace Threat Research and Incident Management teams.

[related-resource]  

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Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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