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May 25, 2022

Understanding Grief Ransomware Attacks

Discover the latest insights on Grief ransomware and how to protect your organization. Stay informed on evolving cybersecurity threats with the cyber experts.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Oakley Cox
Director of Product
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25
May 2022

The Grief ransomware strain, also referred to as PayOrGrief, quickly gained a reputation for disruption in mid-to-late 2021. The gang behind the malware used quadruple-extortion ransomware tactics and targeted a range of victims including municipalities and school districts.

In July 2021, just weeks after the strain was first reported to cyber security teams, Grief successfully targeted Thessaloniki, the second largest city in Greece. Faced with a $20 million ransom demand, the municipality’s security team was forced to shut down all of its websites and public-facing services and launch a full investigation into the breach.

Double act: Grief and DoppelPaymer

From its emergence in May 2021, Grief used novel malware which confounded security tools trained on historical attacks. By July, however, the sophistication and efficiency of the group’s attacks led many to suspect that Grief’s operators had experience beyond their supposed two months of operation.

Grief is now widely reported to be a rebrand of the DoppelPaymer ransomware gang, which ended its operations in May 2021 and was believed to be affiliated with the Russian ransomware gang Evil Corp. After adopting the new moniker, however, Grief regularly blew past traditional security tools, amassing well over $10 million in ransom payments in just four months.

Adaptations and rebrands are common techniques adopted by criminal gangs using the Ransomware-as-a-Service business model. The success of Grief’s rebrand illustrates how rapidly a ransomware group can update its attacks and render them unrecognizable to signature-based tools.

Revealing Grief’s tricks with Cyber AI Analyst

In July 2021, PayOrGrief targeted a European manufacturing company which had Darktrace deployed across its network. Darktrace’s early detection of the attack, along with the real-time visibility into its lifecycle offered by Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst, meant that each stage of the attack was clear to see.

Figure 1: Timeline of the PayOrGrief attack

The initial intrusion compromised four devices, which Darktrace detected when these devices connected to rare external IPs and downloaded encoded text files. It is likely that the devices were compromised as the result of a targeted phishing campaign, which are often used in Grief attacks as a way of injecting malware such as Dridex onto devices. If deployed within the targeted organization, Antigena Email would have identified the phishing campaign and halted it, before it reached employee inboxes. In this case, however, the attack continued.

Following the initial compromise, C2 (Command and Control) connections were made over an encrypted channel using invalid SSL certificates. An upload of 50MB of data was made from one of the infected devices to the company’s corporate server, which gave the attackers access to the company’s crown jewels: its most sensitive data. From this privileged position, and with keep-alive beacons in place, the attack was ready for detonation.

Several devices were detected attempting to upload data totaling more than 100 GB to the external file storage platform, Mega, using encrypted HTTPS on port 443. However, the attackers did not receive the total package of data they had expected. The organization had deployed Darktrace’s Autonomous Response to protect its key assets and most sensitive data. The AI recognized the anomalous behavior as a significant deviation from the business’s normal ‘pattern of life’ and autonomously blocked uploads from protected devices, preventing exfiltration wherever it was able to do so.

Figure 2: Data exfiltration from a single device, investigated by Cyber AI Analyst

The attackers then continued to spread through the digital environment. Using ‘Living off the Land’ techniques including RDP and SMB, they performed internal reconnaissance, escalated their privileges and moved laterally to additional digital assets. With access to new admin credentials, just ten hours after the initial C2 communications, the attackers commenced ransomware encryption.

It’s highly possible, therefore, that Grief has targeted Darktrace customers previously and been neutralized too early for the attack to be identified and attributed. In this instance, the organization had deployed Autonomous Response only on certain areas of the network, and we are therefore able to see how the attack progressed on unprotected devices.

Unusual suspects

The Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) for Grief ransomware have now been incorporated by many traditional security tools, but this is a short-term solution, and won’t account for further changes in both threat actor tactics and the digital environments they target. Once the Grief moniker has been exhausted, it is more than likely that another will be adopted in its place.

The AI-driven approach to cyber security tackles threats regardless of when and where they arrive, or what name they arrive under. By focusing on developing its sophisticated understanding of the entire digital estate, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response targets specific anomalies with specific, proportionate responses, even when they are part of entirely novel attacks. And when given the freedom to take action against these threats the moment they’re detected, Autonomous Response can ensure that organizations stay protected even when human teams are unavailable.

Thanks to Darktrace analyst Beverly McCann for her insights on the above threat find.

Technical details

Darktrace model detections

  • Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity
  • Device / New User Agents
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
  • Compliance / External Windows Communications
  • Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port
  • Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External
  • Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Compliance / Remote Management Tool on Server
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname
  • Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain
  • Anomalous Connection / Lots of New Connections
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual File Storage Data Transfer
  • Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer [Enhanced Monitoring]
  • Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1GiB Outbound
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Ips
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Multiple Device Correlations / Behavioral Change Across Multiple Devices
  • Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual External Connections
  • Device / ICMP Address Scan
  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session
  • Compliance / SMB Version 1 Usage
  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual SMB Version 1
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
  • Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Move and Write
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity [Enhanced Monitoring]
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio and Unusual SMB
  • Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control
  • Device / New or Unusual Remote Command Execution
  • User / New Admin Credentials On Client
  • Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe
  • Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches [Enhanced Monitoring]
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio
  • Device / SMA Lateral Movement
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual Internal EXE File Transfer
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Unusual Unresponsive Server
  • Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert
  • Multiple Device Correlations / Spreading Unusual SMB Activity
  • Multiple Device Correlations / Multiple Devices Breaching the Same Model

Darktrace Autonomous Response alerts

  • Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Network Scan Block
  • Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Breaches Over Time Block
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly Block
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Breaches over Time Block
  • Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Large Data Volume Outbound Block
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block
  • Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena SMB Enumeration Block
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Breach
  • Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Internal Anomalous File Activity
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block
  • Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Ransomware Block
  • Antigena / Network / External Threat / SMB Ratio Antigena Block

MITRE ATT&CK techniques observed

Reconnaissance
T1595 — Active Scanning

Resource Development
T1608 — Stage Capabilities

Initial Access
T1190 — Exploit Public-Facing Application

Persistence
T1133 — External Remote Services

Defense Evasion
T1079 — Valid Accounts

Discovery
T1046 — Network Service Scanning
T1083 — File and Directory Discovery
T1018 — Remote System Discovery

Lateral Movement
T1210 — Exploitation of Remote Services
T1080 — Taint Shared Content
T1570 — Lateral Tool Transfer
T1021 — Remote Services

Command and Control
T1071 — Application Layer Protocol
T1095 — Non-Application Layer Protocol
T1571 — Non-Standard Port

Exfiltration
T1041 — Exfiltration over C2 Channel
T1567 — Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1029 — Scheduled Transfer


Impact
T1486 — Data Encrypted for Impact
T1489 — Service Stop
T1529 — System Shutdown/Reboot

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Oakley Cox
Director of Product

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June 27, 2025

Patch and Persist: Darktrace’s Detection of Blind Eagle (APT-C-36)

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What is Blind Eagle?

Since 2018, APT-C-36, also known as Blind Eagle, has been observed performing cyber-attacks targeting various sectors across multiple countries in Latin America, with a particular focus on Colombian organizations.

Blind Eagle characteristically targets government institutions, financial organizations, and critical infrastructure [1][2].

Attacks carried out by Blind Eagle actors typically start with a phishing email and the group have been observed utilizing various Remote Access Trojans (RAT) variants, which often have in-built methods for hiding command-and-control (C2) traffic from detection [3].

What we know about Blind Eagle from a recent campaign

Since November 2024, Blind Eagle actors have been conducting an ongoing campaign targeting Colombian organizations [1].

In this campaign, threat actors have been observed using phishing emails to deliver malicious URL links to targeted recipients, similar to the way threat actors have previously been observed exploiting CVE-2024-43451, a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows that allows the disclosure of a user’s NTLMv2 password hash upon minimal interaction with a malicious file [4].

Despite Microsoft patching this vulnerability in November 2024 [1][4], Blind Eagle actors have continued to exploit the minimal interaction mechanism, though no longer with the intent of harvesting NTLMv2 password hashes. Instead, phishing emails are sent to targets containing a malicious URL which, when clicked, initiates the download of a malicious file. This file is then triggered by minimal user interaction.

Clicking on the file triggers a WebDAV request, with a connection being made over HTTP port 80 using the user agent ‘Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19044’. WebDAV is a transmission protocol which allows files or complete directories to be made available through the internet, and to be transmitted to devices [5]. The next stage payload is then downloaded via another WebDAV request and malware is executed on the target device.

Attackers are notified when a recipient downloads the malicious files they send, providing an insight into potential targets [1].

Darktrace’s coverage of Blind Eagle

In late February 2025, Darktrace observed activity assessed with medium confidence to be  associated with Blind Eagle on the network of a customer in Colombia.

Within a period of just five hours, Darktrace / NETWORK detected a device being redirected through a rare external location, downloading multiple executable files, and ultimately exfiltrating data from the customer’s environment.

Since the customer did not have Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability enabled on their network, no actions were taken to contain the compromise, allowing it to escalate until the customer’s security team responded to the alerts provided by Darktrace.

Darktrace observed a device on the customer’s network being directed over HTTP to a rare external IP, namely 62[.]60[.]226[.]112, which had never previously been seen in this customer’s environment and was geolocated in Germany. Multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) providers have since linked this endpoint with phishing and malware campaigns [9].

The device then proceeded to download the executable file hxxp://62[.]60[.]226[.]112/file/3601_2042.exe.

Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to an unusual location based in Germany.
Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to an unusual location based in Germany.
Darktrace’s detection of the affected device downloading an executable file from the suspicious endpoint.
Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of the affected device downloading an executable file from the suspicious endpoint.

The device was then observed making unusual connections to the rare endpoint 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com and performing unusual external data activity.

This dynamic DNS endpoint allows a device to access an endpoint using a domain name in place of a changing IP address. Dynamic DNS services ensure the DNS record of a domain name is automatically updated when the IP address changes. As such, malicious actors can use these services and endpoints to dynamically establish connections to C2 infrastructure [6].

Further investigation into this dynamic endpoint using OSINT revealed multiple associations with previous likely Blind Eagle compromises, as well as Remcos malware, a RAT commonly deployed via phishing campaigns [7][8][10].

Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to the suspicious dynamic DNS endpoint, 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to the suspicious dynamic DNS endpoint, 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com.

Shortly after this, Darktrace observed the user agent ‘Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19045’, indicating usage of the aforementioned transmission protocol WebDAV. The device was subsequently observed connected to an endpoint associated with Github and downloading data, suggesting that the device was retrieving a malicious tool or payload. The device then began to communicate to the malicious endpoint diciembrenotasenclub[.]longmusic[.]com over the new TCP port 1512 [11].

Around this time, the device was also observed uploading data to the endpoints 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com and diciembrenotasenclub[.]longmusic[.]com, with transfers of 60 MiB and 5.6 MiB observed respectively.

Figure 4: UI graph showing external data transfer activity.

This chain of activity triggered an Enhanced Monitoring model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK. These high-priority model alerts are designed to trigger in response to higher fidelity indicators of compromise (IoCs), suggesting that a device is performing activity consistent with a compromise.

 Darktrace’s detection of initial attack chain activity.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of initial attack chain activity.

A second Enhanced Monitoring model was also triggered by this device following the download of the aforementioned executable file (hxxp://62[.]60[.]226[.]112/file/3601_2042.exe) and the observed increase in C2 activity.

Following this activity, Darktrace continued to observe the device beaconing to the 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com endpoint.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to correlate each of the individual detections involved in this compromise, identifying them as part of a broader incident that encompassed C2 connectivity, suspicious downloads, and external data transfers.

Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the activity observed on the affected device.
Figure 6: Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the activity observed on the affected device.
Figure 7: Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of the affected device’s broader connectivity throughout the course of the attack.

As the affected customer did not have Darktrace’s Autonomous Response configured at the time, the attack was able to progress unabated. Had Darktrace been properly enabled, it would have been able to take a number of actions to halt the escalation of the attack.

For example, the unusual beaconing connections and the download of an unexpected file from an uncommon location would have been shut down by blocking the device from making external connections to the relevant destinations.

Conclusion

The persistence of Blind Eagle and ability to adapt its tactics, even after patches were released, and the speed at which the group were able to continue using pre-established TTPs highlights that timely vulnerability management and patch application, while essential, is not a standalone defense.

Organizations must adopt security solutions that use anomaly-based detection to identify emerging and adapting threats by recognizing deviations in user or device behavior that may indicate malicious activity. Complementing this with an autonomous decision maker that can identify, connect, and contain compromise-like activity is crucial for safeguarding organizational networks against constantly evolving and sophisticated threat actors.

Credit to Charlotte Thompson (Senior Cyber Analyst), Eugene Chua (Principal Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

IoCs

IoC – Type - Confidence
Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19045 – User Agent

62[.]60[.]226[.]112 – IP – Medium Confidence

hxxp://62[.]60[.]226[.]112/file/3601_2042.exe – Payload Download – Medium Confidence

21ene.ip-ddns[.]com – Dynamic DNS Endpoint – Medium Confidence

diciembrenotasenclub[.]longmusic[.]com  - Hostname – Medium Confidence

Darktrace’s model alert coverage

Anomalous File / Suspicious HTTP Redirect
Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Location
Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint
Device / Anomalous Github Download
Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity
Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
Compromise / Suspicious File and C2
Compromise / Fast Beaconing to DGA
Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections
Device / Large Number of Model Alert

Mitre Attack Mapping:

Tactic – Technique – Technique Name

Initial Access - T1189 – Drive-by Compromise
Initial Access - T1190 – Exploit Public-Facing Application
Initial Access ICS - T0862 – Supply Chain Compromise
Initial Access ICS - T0865 – Spearphishing Attachment
Initial Access ICS - T0817 - Drive-by Compromise
Resource Development - T1588.001 – Malware
Lateral Movement ICS - T0843 – Program Download
Command and Control - T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer
Command and Control - T1095 – Non-Application Layer Protocol
Command and Control - T1571 – Non-Standard Port
Command and Control - T1568.002 – Domain Generation Algorithms
Command and Control ICS - T0869 – Standard Application Layer Protocol
Evasion ICS - T0849 – Masquerading
Exfiltration - T1041 – Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Exfiltration - T1567.002 – Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

References

1)    https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/blind-eagle-and-justice-for-all/

2)    https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmgsites/in/pdf/2025/04/kpmg-ctip-blind-eagle-01-apr-2025.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf

3)    https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-remote-access-trojan/#:~:text=They%20might%20be%20attached%20to,remote%20access%20or%20system%20administration

4)    https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-43451

5)    https://www.ionos.co.uk/digitalguide/server/know-how/webdav/

6)    https://vercara.digicert.com/resources/dynamic-dns-resolution-as-an-obfuscation-technique

7)    https://threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/1437795

8)    https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-malware/remcos-malware/

9)    https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/b3189db6ddc578005cb6986f86e9680e7f71fe69f87f9498fa77ed7b1285e268

10) https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/21ene.ip-ddns.com

11) https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/diciembrenotasenclub.longmusic.com/community

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Charlotte Thompson
Cyber Analyst

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June 19, 2025

Customer Case Study: Leading Petrochemical Manufacturer

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Headquartered in Saudi Arabia, this industry leading petrochemical manufacturer serves customers in more than 80 countries across diverse markets throughout Europe, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, China, and Southeast Asia.

Cyber resiliency critical to growth strategy

This leading petrochemical manufacturer’s vision is to be one of the major global players in the production and marketing of designated petrochemicals and downstream products. The company aims to significantly increase its capacity to up to a million metric tons within the next few years.

With cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure increasing 30% globally last year, cyber resiliency is essential to supporting the company’s strategic business goals of:

  • Maximizing production through efficient asset utilization
  • Maximizing sales by conducting 90% of its business outside Saudi Arabia
  • Optimizing resources and processes by integrating with UN Global Compact principles for sustainability and efficiency
  • Growing its business portfolio by engaging in joint ventures to diversify production and add value to the economy

However, the industry leader faced several challenges in its drive to fortify its cybersecurity defenses.

Visibility gaps delay response time

The company’s existing security setup provided limited visibility to the in-house security team, hindering its ability to detect anomalous network and user activity in real time. This resulted in delayed responses to potential incidents, making proactive issue resolution difficult and any remediation in the event of a successful attack costly and time-consuming.

Manual detection drains resources

Without automated detection and response capabilities, the organization’s security team had to manually monitor for suspicious activity – a time-consuming and inefficient approach that strained resources and left the organization vulnerable. This made it difficult for the team to stay current with training or acquire new skills and certifications, which are core to the ethos of both the company’s owners and the team itself.

Cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure increasing

The petrochemical manufacturer is part of a broader ecosystem of companies, making the protection of its supply chain – both upstream and downstream – critical. With several manufacturing entities and multiple locations, the customer’s internal structure is complex and challenging to secure. As cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure escalate, it needed a more comprehensive approach to safeguard its business and the wider ecosystem.

Keeping and growing skills and focus in-house

To strengthen its cybersecurity strategy, the company considered two options:

  1. Make a significant initial and ongoing investment in a Security Operations Center (SOC), which would involve skills development outside the company and substantial management overhead.
  2. Use a combination of new, automated tools and an outsourced Managed Detection and Response (MDR) service to reduce the burden on internal security specialists and allow the company to invest in upskilling its staff so they can focus on more strategic tasks.

Faced with this choice between entirely outsourcing security and augmenting the security team with new capabilities, the customer chose the second option, selecting Darktrace to automate the company’s monitoring, detection, and response. Today, the petrochemical manufacturer is using:

Extending the SOC with 24/7 expert support

To alleviate the burden on its lean security team, the company augmented its in-house capabilities with Darktrace’s Managed Detection & Response service. This support acts as an extension of its SOC, providing 24/7 monitoring, investigation, and escalation of high-priority threats. With Darktrace’s global SOC managing alert triage and autonomously containing threats, the organization’s internal team can focus on strategic initiatives. The result is a stronger security posture and increased capacity to proactively address evolving cyber risks – without expanding headcount or sacrificing visibility.

A unique approach to AI

In its search for a new security platform, the company’s Director of Information Technology said Darktrace’s autonomous response capability, coupled with Self-Learning AI-driven threat reduction, were two big reasons for selecting Darktrace over competing products and services.

AI was a huge factor – no one else was doing what Darktrace was doing with [AI].”

Demonstrated visibility

Before Darktrace, the customer had no visibility into the network activity to and from remote worker devices. Some employees need the ability to connect to its networks at any time and from any location, including the Director of Information Technology. The trial deployment of Darktrace / ENDPOINT was a success and gave the team peace of mind that, no matter the location or device, high-value remote workers were protected by Darktrace.

Modular architecture  

Darktrace's modular architecture allowed the company to deploy security controls across its complex, multi-entity environment. The company’s different locations run on segregated networks but are still interconnected and need to be protected. Darktrace / NETWORK provides a unified view and coordinated security response across the organization’s entire network infrastructure, including endpoint devices.

Results

The petrochemical manufacturer is using Darktrace across all of its locations and has achieved total visibility across network and user activity. “Darktrace is increasing in value every day,” said the Director of Information Technology.

I don’t have a big team, and Darktrace makes our lives very, very easy, not least the automation of some of the tasks that require constant manual review.”

Time savings frees analysts to focus on proactive security

Darktrace / NETWORK provides continuous, AI-driven monitoring and analysis of the company’s network activity, user behavior, and threat patterns, establishing a baseline of what normal activity looks like, and then alerting analysts to any deviations from normal traffic, activity, and behaviors. Darktrace’s autonomous response capabilities speed up response to detected threats, meaning intervention from the security team is required for fewer incidents and alerts.

In October 2024 alone, Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst saved the team 810 investigation hours, and autonomously responded to 180 anomalous behaviors that were uncovered during the investigations. With Darktrace managing the majority of threat detection and response efforts, the security team has been able to change its day-to-day activity from manual review of traffic and alerts and belated response to activity, to proactively fortifying its detection and response posture and upskilling to meet evolving requirements.  

Layered email protection reduces phishing threats

The company’s email infrastructure posed a challenge due to petrochemical industry regulations requiring on-premises email servers, with some security delivered via Microsoft Azure. By integrating Darktrace / EMAIL into the Azure stack, the organization has reduced the volume of phishing emails its users receive by 5%.

“Now we have one more layer of security related to email – every email goes through two filters. If something is not being caught or traced by Azure, it is being detected by Darktrace,” said the Director of Information Technology. “As a result, we’re now seeing only about 15% to 20% of the phishing emails we used to receive before implementing Darktrace.”

Preparing for a secure future

The time saved using Darktrace has helped the security team take proactive steps, including preparing for new cyber resilience regulations for Saudi Arabia’s Critical National Infrastructure, as mandated by the National Cybersecurity Authority (NCA).

“The team now has ample time to prepare policies and procedures that meet the new NCA regulations and, in some cases, enhance the requirements of the new law,” said the Director of Information Technology. “All of this is possible because they don’t need to keep watch; Darktrace takes on so much of that task for them.”

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