July 26, 2022

Self-Learning AI for Zero-Day and N-Day Attack Defense

Explore the differences between zero-day and n-day attacks on different customer servers to learn how Darktrace detects and prevents cyber threats effectively.

Written by

Lewis Morgan

Cyber Analyst

Inside the SOC

Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.

Written by

Lewis Morgan

Cyber Analyst

Jul 2022

‍Key Terms:

Zero-day | A recently discovered security vulnerability in computer software that has no currently available fix or patch. Its name come from the reality that vendors have “zero days” to act and respond.

N-day | A vulnerability that emerges in computer software in which a vendor is aware and may have already issued (or are currently working on) a patch or fix. Active exploits often already exist and await abuse by nefarious actors.

Traditional security solutions often apply signature-based-detection when identifying cyber threats, helping to defend against legacy attacks but consequently missing novel ones. Therefore, security teams often lend a lot of focus to ensuring that the risk of zero-day vulnerabilities is reduced [1]. As explored in this blog, however, organizations can face just as much of a risk from n-day attacks, since they invite the most attention from malicious actors [2]. This is due in part to the reduced complexity, cost and time invested in researching and finding new exploits compared with that found when attackers exploit zero-days.

This blog will examine both a zero-day and n-day attack that two different Darktrace customers faced in the fall of 2021. This will include the activity Darktrace detected, along with the steps taken by Darktrace/Network to intervene. It will then compare the incidents, discuss the possible dangers of third-party integrations, and assess the deprecation of legacy security tools.

Revisiting zero-day attacks

Zero-days are among the greatest concerns security teams face in the era of modern technology and networking. Defending critical systems from zero-day compromises is a task most legacy security solutions are often unable to handle. Due to the complexity of uncovering new security flaws and developing elaborate code that can exploit them, these attacks are often carried out by funded or experienced groups such as nation-state actors and APTs. One of history’s most prolific zero-days, ‘Stuxnet’, sent security teams worldwide into a global panic in 2010. This involved a widespread attack on Iranian nuclear infrastructure and was widely accepted to be a result of nation-state actors [3]. The Stuxnet worm took advantage of four zero-day exploits, compromising over 200,000 devices and physically damaging around 10% of the 9,000 critical centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear site.

More recently, 2021 saw the emergence of several critical zero-day vulnerabilities within SonicWall’s product suite [4]. SonicWall is a security hardware manufacturer that provides hardware firewall devices, unified threat management, VPN gateways and network security solutions. Some of these vulnerabilities lie within their Secure Mobile Access (SMA) 100 series (for example, CVE-2019-7481, CVE-2021-20016 and CVE-2021-20038 to name a few). These directly affected VPN devices and often allowed attackers easy remote access to company devices. CVE-2021-20016 in particular incorporates an SQL-Injection vulnerability within SonicWall’s SSL VPN SMA 100 product line [5]. If exploited, this defect would allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to perform their own malicious SQL query in order to access usernames, passwords and other session related information.

The N-day underdog

The shadow cast by zero-day attacks often shrouds that of n-day attacks. N-days, however, often pose an equal - if not greater - risk to the majority of organizations, particularly those in industrial sectors. Since these vulnerabilities have fixes available, all of the hard work around research is already done; malicious actors only need to view proof of concepts (POCs) or, if proficient in coding, reverse-engineer software to reveal code-changes (binary diffing) in order to exploit these security flaws in the wild. These vulnerabilities are typically attributed to opportunistic hackers and script-kiddies, where little research or heavy lifting is required.

August 2021 gave rise to a critical vulnerability in Atlassian Confluence servers, namely CVE-2021-26084 [6]. Confluence is a widely used collaboration wiki tool and knowledge-sharing platform. As introduced and discussed a few months ago in a previous Darktrace blog (Explore Internet-Facing System Vulnerabilities), this vulnerability allows attackers to remotely execute code on internet-facing servers after exploiting injection vulnerabilities in Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL). Whilst Confluence had patches and fixes available to users, attackers still jumped on this opportunity and began scanning the internet for signs of critical devices serving this outdated software [7]. Once identified, they would exploit the vulnerability, often installing crypto mining software onto the device. More recently, Darktrace explored a new vulnerability (CVE-2022-26134), disclosed midway through 2022, that affected Confluence servers and data centers using similar techniques to that found in CVE-2021-26084 [8].

SonicWall in the wild – 1. Zero-day attack

At the beginning of August 2021, Darktrace prevented an attack from taking place within a European automotive customer’s environment (Figure 1). The attack targeted a vulnerable internet-facing SonicWall VPN server, and while the attacker’s motive remains unclear, similar historic events suggest that they intended to perform ransomware encryption or data exfiltration.

Figure 1: Timeline of the SonicWall attack

Darktrace was unable to confirm the definite tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by the attacker to compromise the customer’s environment, as the device was compromised before Darktrace installation and coverage. However, from looking at recently disclosed SonicWall VPN vulnerabilities and patterns of behaviour, it is likely CVE-2021-20016 played a part. At some point after this initial infection, it is also believed the device was able to move laterally to a domain controller (DC) using administrative credentials; it was this server that then initiated the anomalous activity that Darktrace detected and alerted on.

On August 5^th 2021 , Darktrace observed this compromised domain controller engaging in unusual ICMP scanning - a protocol used to discover active devices within an environment and create a map of an organization’s network topology. Shortly after, the infected server began scanning devices for open RDP ports and enumerating SMB shares using unorthodox methods. SMB delete and HTTP requests (over port 445 and 80 respectively) were made for files named delete.me in the root directory of numerous network shares using the user agent Microsoft WebDAV. However, no such files appeared to exist within the environment. This may have been the result of an attacker probing devices in the network in an effort to see their responses and gather information on properties and vulnerabilities they could later exploit.

Soon the infected DC began establishing RDP tunnels back to the VPN server and making requests to an internal DNS server for multiple endpoints relating to exploit kits, likely in an effort to strengthen the attacker’s foothold within the environment. Some of the endpoints requested relate to:

- EternalBlue vulnerability

- Petit Potam NTLM hash attack tool

- Unusual GitHub repositories

- Unusual Python repositories

The DC made outgoing NTLM requests to other internal devices, implying the successful installation of Petit Potam exploitation tools. The server then began performing NTLM reconnaissance, making over 1,000 successful logins under ‘Administrator’ to several other internal devices. Around the same time, the device was also seen making anonymous SMBv1 logins to numerous internal devices, (possibly symptomatic of the attacker probing machines for EternalBlue vulnerabilities).

Interestingly, the device also made numerous failed authentication attempts using a spoofed credential for one of the organization’s security managers. This was likely in an attempt to hide themselves using ‘Living off the Land’ (LotL) techniques. However, whilst the attacker clearly did their research on the company, they failed to acknowledge the typical naming convention used for credentials within the environment. This ultimately backfired and made the compromise more obvious and unusual.

In the morning of the following day, the initially compromised VPN server began conducting further reconnaissance, engaging in similar activity to that observed by the domain controller. Until now, the customer had set Darktrace RESPOND to run in human confirmation mode, meaning interventions were not made autonomously but required confirmation by a member of the internal security team. However, thanks to Proactive Threat Notifications (PTNs) delivered by Darktrace’s dedicated SOC team, the customer was made immediately aware of this unusual behaviour, allowing them to apply manual Darktrace RESPOND blocks to all outgoing connections (Figure 2). This gave the security team enough time to respond and remediate before serious damage could be done.

Figure 2: Darktrace RESPOND model breach showing the manually applied “Quarantine Device” action taken against the compromised VPN server. This screenshot displays the UI from Darktrace version 5.1

Confluence in the wild – 2. N-day attack

Towards the end of 2021, Darktrace saw a European broadcasting customer leave an Atlassian Confluence internet-facing server unpatched and vulnerable to crypto-mining malware using CVE-2021-26084. Thanks to Darktrace, this attack was entirely immobilized within only a few hours of the initial infection, protecting the organization from damage (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Timeline of the Confluence attack

On midday on September 1^st 2021, an unpatched Confluence server was seen receiving SSL connections over port 443 from a suspicious new endpoint, 178.238.226[.]127. The connections were encrypted, meaning Darktrace was unable to view the contents and ascertain what requests were being made. However, with the disclosure of CVE-2021-26084 just 7 days prior to this activity, it is likely that the TTPs used involved injecting OGNL expressions to Confluence server memory; allowing the attacker to remotely execute code on the vulnerable server.

Immediately after successful exploitation of the Confluence server, the infected device was observed making outgoing HTTP GET requests to several external endpoints using a new user agent (curl/7.61.1). Curl was used to silently download and configure multiple suspicious files relating to XMRig cryptocurrency miner, including ld.sh, XMRig and config.json. Subsequent outgoing connections were then made to europe.randomx-hub.miningpoolhub[.]com · 172.105.210[.]117 using the JSON-RPC protocol, seen alongside the mining credential maillocal.confluence (Figure 4). Only 3 seconds after initial compromise, the infected device began attempting to mine cryptocurrency using the Minergate protocol but was instantly and autonomously blocked by Darktrace RESPOND. This prevented the server from abusing system resources and generating profits for the attacker.

Figure 4: A graph showing the frequency of external connections using the JSON-RPC protocol made by the breach device over a 48-hour window. The orange-red dots represent models that breached as a result of this activity, demonstrating the “waterfall” effect commonly seen when a device suffers a compromise. This screenshot displays the UI from Darktrace version 5.1

In the afternoon, the malware persisted with its infection. The compromised server began making successive HTTP GET requests to a new rare endpoint 195.19.192[.]28 using the same curl user agent (Figures 5 & 6). These requests were for executable and dynamic library files associated with Kinsing malware (but fortunately were also blocked by Darktrace RESPOND). Kinsing is a malware strain found in numerous attack campaigns which is often associated with crypto-jacking, and has appeared in previous Darktrace blogs [9].

Figure 5: Cyber AI Analyst summarising the unusual download of Kinsing software using the new curl user agent. This screenshot displays the UI from Darktrace version 5.1

The attacker then began making HTTP POST requests to an IP 185.154.53[.]140, using the same curl user agent; likely a method for the attacker to maintain persistence within the network and establish a foothold using its C2 infrastructure. The Confluence server was then again seen attempting to mine cryptocurrency using the Minergate protocol. It made outgoing JSON-RPC connections to a different new endpoint, 45.129.2[.]107, using the following mining credential: ‘42J8CF9sQoP9pMbvtcLgTxdA2KN4ZMUVWJk6HJDWzixDLmU2Ar47PUNS5XHv4Kmfdh8aA9fbZmKHwfmFo8Wup8YtS5Kdqh2’. This was once again blocked by Darktrace RESPOND (Figure 7).

Figure 6: VirusTotal showing the unusualness of one of these external IPs [10]

Figure 7: Log data showing the action taken by Darktrace RESPOND in response to the device breaching the “Crypto Currency Mining Activity” model. This screenshot displays the UI from Darktrace version 5.1

The final activity seen from this device involved the download of additional shell scripts over HTTP associated with Kinsing, namely spre.sh and unk.sh, from 194.38.20[.]199 and 195.3.146[.]118 respectively (Figure 8). A new user agent (Wget/1.19.5 (linux-gnu)) was used when connecting to the latter endpoint, which also began concurrently initiating repeated connections indicative of C2 beaconing. These scripts help to spread the Kinsing malware laterally within the environment and may have been the attacker's last ditch efforts at furthering their compromise before Darktrace RESPOND blocked all connections from the infected Confluence server [11]. With Darktrace RESPOND's successful actions, the customer’s security team were then able to perform their own response and remediation.

Figure 8: Cyber AI Analyst revealing the last ditch efforts made by the threat actor to download further malicious software. This screenshot displays the UI from Darktrace version 5.1

Darktrace Coverage: N- vs Zero-days

In the SonicWall case the attacker was unable to achieve their actions on objectives (thanks to Darktrace's intervention). However, this incident displayed tactics of a more stealthy and sophisticated attacker - they had an exploited machine but waited for the right moment to execute their malicious code and initiate a full compromise. Due to the lack of visibility over attacker motive, it is difficult to deduce what type of actor led to this intrusion. However, with the disclosure of a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2021-20016) not long before this attack, along with a seemingly dormant initially compromised device, it is highly possible that it was carried out by a sophisticated cyber criminal or gang.

On the other hand, the Confluence case engaged in a slightly more noisy approach; it dropped crypto mining malware on vulnerable devices in the hope that the target’s security team did not maintain visibility over their network or would merely turn a blind eye. The files downloaded and credentials observed alongside the mining activity heavily imply the use of Kinsing malware [11]. Since this vulnerability (CVE-2021-26084) emerged as an n-day attack with likely easily accessible POCs, as well as there being a lack of LotL techniques and the motive being long term monetary gain, it is possible this attack was conducted by a less sophisticated or amateur actor (script-kiddie); one that opportunistically exploits known vulnerabilities in internet-facing devices in order to make a quick profit [12].

Whilst Darktrace RESPOND was enabled in human confirmation mode only during the start of the SonicWall attack, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst still offered invaluable insight into the unusual activity associated with the infected machines during both the Confluence and SonicWall compromises. SOC analysts were able to see these uncharacteristic behaviours and escalate the incident through Darktrace’s PTN and ATE services. Analysts then worked through these tickets with the customers, providing support and guidance and, in the SonicWall case, quickly helping to configure Darktrace RESPOND. In both scenarios, Darktrace RESPOND was able to block abnormal connections and enforce a device’s pattern of life, affording the security team enough time to isolate the infected machines and prevent further threats such as ransomware detonation or data exfiltration.

Concluding thoughts and dangers of third-party integrations

Organizations with internet-facing devices will inevitably suffer opportunistic zero-day and n-day attacks. While little can be done to remove the risk of zero-days entirely, ensuring that organizations keep their systems up to date will at the very least help prevent opportunistic and script-kiddies from exploiting n-day vulnerabilities.

However, it is often not always possible for organizations to keep their systems up to date, especially for those who require continuous availability. This may also pose issues for organizations that rely on, and put their trust in, third party integrations such as those explored in this blog (Confluence and SonicWall), as enforcing secure software is almost entirely out of their hands. Moreover, with the rising prevalence of remote working, it is essential now more than ever that organizations ensure their VPN devices are shielded from external threats, guidance on which has been released by the NSA/CISA [13].

These two case studies have shown that whilst organizations can configure their networks and firewalls to help identify known indicators of compromise (IoC), this ‘rearview mirror’ approach will not account for, or protect against, any new and undisclosed IoCs. With the aid of Self-Learning AI and anomaly detection, Darktrace can detect the slightest deviation from a device’s normal pattern of life and respond autonomously without the need for rules and signatures. This allows for the disruption and prevention of known and novel attacks before irreparable damage is caused- reassuring security teams that their digital estates are secure.

Thanks to Paul Jennings for his contributions to this blog.

Appendices: SonicWall (Zero-day)

Darktrace model detections

· AIA / Suspicious Chain of Administrative Credentials

· Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel

· Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration

· Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Remote Desktop

· Compliance / High Priority Compliance Model Breach

· Compliance / Outgoing NTLM Request from DC

· Device / Anomalous RDP Followed By Multiple Model Breaches

· Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Breaches

· Device / ICMP Address Scan

· Device / Large Number of Model Breaches

· Device / Large Number of Model Breaches from Critical Network Device

· Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches (PTN/Enhanced Monitoring model)

· Device / Network Scan

· Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance

· Device / RDP Scan

· Device / Reverse DNS Sweep

· Device / SMB Session Bruteforce

· Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity (PTN/Enhanced Monitoring model)

· Unusual Activity / Possible RPC Recon Activity

Darktrace RESPOND (Antigena) actions (as displayed in example)

· Antigena / Network / Manual / Quarantine Device

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Observed

IoCs

‍

Appendices: Confluence (N-day)

Darktrace model detections

· Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

· Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname

· Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

· Anomalous File / Script from Rare Location

· Compliance / Crypto Currency Mining Activity

· Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining (PTN/Enhanced Monitoring model)

· Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise (PTN/Enhanced Monitoring model)

· Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

· Device / New User Agent

Darktrace RESPOND (Antigena) actions (displayed in example)

· Antigena / Network / Compliance / Antigena Crypto Currency Mining Block

· Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block

· Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

· Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

· Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Block Enhanced Monitoring

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Observed

IOCs

References:

[1] https://securitybrief.asia/story/why-preventing-zero-day-attacks-is-crucial-for-businesses

[2] https://electricenergyonline.com/energy/magazine/1150/article/Security-Sessions-More-Dangerous-Than-Zero-Days-The-N-Day-Threat.htm

[3] https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/

[4] https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=SonicWall+2021

[5] https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-20016

[6] https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-26084

[7] https://www.zdnet.com/article/us-cybercom-says-mass-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence-vulnerability-ongoing-and-expected-to-accelerate/

[8] https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-26134

[9] https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0599/

[10] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/195.19.192.28/detection

[11] https://sysdig.com/blog/zoom-into-kinsing-kdevtmpfsi/

[12] https://github.com/alt3kx/CVE-2021-26084_PoC

[13] https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Press-Releases-Statements/Press-Release-View/Article/2791320/nsa-cisa-release-guidance-on-selecting-and-hardening-remote-access-vpns/

Written by

Lewis Morgan

Cyber Analyst

Inside the SOC

Written by

Lewis Morgan

Cyber Analyst

Product Marketing Manager, Network Detection & Response

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Network

November 6, 2025

Darktrace Named the Only 2025 Gartner® Peer Insights™ Customers’ Choice for Network Detection and Response

Darktrace: The only Customers’ Choice for NDR in 2025

In a year defined by rapid change across the threat landscape, recognition from those who use and rely on security technology every day means the most.

That’s why we’re proud to share that Darktrace has been named the only Customers’ Choice in the 2025 Gartner® Peer Insights™ Voice of the Customer for Network Detection and Response (NDR).

Out of 11 leading NDR vendors evaluated, Darktrace stood alone as the sole Customers’ Choice, a recognition that we feel reflects not just our innovation, but the trust and satisfaction of the customers who secure their networks with Darktrace every day.

What the Gartner® Peer Insights™ Voice of the Customer means

“Voice of the Customer” is a document that synthesizes Gartner Peer Insights reviews into insights for buyers of technology and services. This aggregated peer perspective, along with the individual detailed reviews, is complementary to Gartner expert research and can play a key role in your buying process. Peers are verified reviewers of a technology product or service, who not only rate the offering, but also provide valuable feedback to consider before making a purchase decision. Vendors placed in the upper-right “Customers’ Choice” quadrant of the “Voice of the Customer” have scores that meet or exceed the market average for both axes (User Interest and Adoption, and Overall Experience).It’s not just a rating. We feel it’s a reflection of genuine customer sentiment and success in the field.

In our view, Customers consistently highlight Darktrace’s ability to:

Detect and respond to unknown threats in real time
Deliver unmatched visibility across IT, OT, and cloud environments
Automate investigations and responses through AI-driven insights

We believe this recognition reinforces what our customers already know: that Darktrace helps them see, understand, and stop attacks others miss.

A rare double: recognized by customers and analysts alike

This distinction follows another major recogniton. Darktrace’s placement as a Leader in the Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for Network Detection and Response earlier this year.

That makes Darktrace the only vendor to achieve both:

A Leader status in the Gartner Magic Quadrant for NDR, and
A Customers’ Choice in Gartner Peer Insights 2025

It’s a rare double that we feel reflects both industry leadership and customer trust, two perspectives that, together, define what great cybersecurity looks like.

A Customers’ Choice across the network and the inbox

To us, this recognition also builds on Darktrace’s momentum across multiple domains. Earlier this year, Darktrace was also named a Customers’ Choice for Email Security Platforms in the Gartner® Peer Insights™ report.

With more than 1,000 verified reviews across Network Detection and Response, Email Security Platforms, and Cyber Physical Systems (CPS), we at Darktrace are proud to be trusted across the full attack surface, from the inbox to the industrial network.

Thank you to our customers

We’re deeply grateful to every customer who shared their experience with Darktrace on Gartner Peer Insights. Your insights drive our innovation and continue to shape how we protect complex, dynamic environments across the world.

Discover why customers choose Darktrace for network and email security.

^{Gartner® Peer Insights™ content consists of the opinions of individual end users based on their own experiences, and should not be construed as statements of fact, nor do they represent the views of Gartner or its affiliates. Gartner does not endorse any vendor, product or service depicted in this content nor makes any warranties, expressed or implied, with respect to this content, about its accuracy or completeness, including any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.}

^{Gartner, Voice of the Customer for Network Detection and Response, By Peer Community Contributor, 30 October 2025}

About the author

Mikey Anderson

Product Marketing Manager, Network Detection & Response

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Network

November 5, 2025

Tracking a Dragon: Investigating a DragonForce-affiliated ransomware attack with Darktrace

What is DragonForce?

DragonForce is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) platform that emerged in late 2023, offering broad-scale capabilities and infrastructure to threat actors. Recently, DragonForce has been linked to attacks targeting the UK retail sector, resulting in several high-profile cases [1][2]. Moreover, the group launched an affiliate program offering a revenue share of roughly 20%, significantly lower than commissions reported across other RaaS platforms [3].

This Darktrace case study examines a DragonForce-linked RaaS infection within the manufacturing industry. The earliest signs of compromise were observed during working hours in August 2025, where an infected device started performing network scans and attempted to brute-force administrative credentials. After eight days of inactivity, threat actors returned and multiple devices began encrypting files via the SMB protocol using a DragonForce-associated file extension. Ransom notes referencing the group were also dropped, suggesting the threat actor is claiming affiliation with DragonForce, though this has not been confirmed.

Despite Darktrace’s detection of the attack in its early stages, the customer’s deployment did not have Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability configured, allowing the threat to progress to data exfiltration and file encryption.

Darktrace's Observations

While the initial access vector was not clearly defined in this case study, it was likely achieved through common methods previously employed out by DragonForce affiliates. These include phishing emails leveraging social engineering tactics, exploitation of public-facing applications with known vulnerabilities, web shells, and/or the abuse of remote management tools.

Darktrace’s analysis identified internal devices performing internal network scanning, brute-forcing credentials, and executing unusual Windows Registry operations. Notably, Windows Registry events involving "Schedule\Taskcache\Tasks" contain subkeys for individual tasks, storing GUIDs that can be used to locate and analyze scheduled tasks. Additionally, Control\WMI\Security holds security descriptors for WMI providers and Event Tracing loggers that use non-default security settings respectively.

Furthermore, Darktrace identified data exfiltration activity over SSH, including connections to an ASN associated with a malicious hosting service geolocated in Russia.

1. Network Scan & Brute Force

Darktrace identified anomalous behavior in late August to early September 2025, originating from a source device engaging in internal network scanning followed by brute-force attempts targeting administrator credential, including “administrator”, “Admin”, “rdpadmin”, “ftpadmin”.

Upon further analysis, one of the HTTP connections seen in this activity revealed the use of the user agent string “OpenVAS-VT”, suggesting that the device was using the OpenVAS vulnerability scanner. Subsequently, additional devices began exhibiting network scanning behavior. During this phase, a file named “delete.me” was deleted by multiple devices using SMB protocol. This file is commonly associated with network scanning and penetration testing tool NetScan.

2. Windows Registry Key Update

Following the scanning phase, Darktrace observed the initial device then performing suspicious Winreg operations. This included the use of the ”BaseRegOpenKey” function across multiple registry paths.

Additional operations such as “BaseRegOpenKey” and “BaseRegQueryValue” were also seen around this time. These operations are typically used to retrieve specific registry key values and allow write operations to registry keys.

The registry keys observed included “SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security” and “Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\Taskcache\Tasks”. These keys can be leveraged by malicious actors to update WMI access controls and schedule malicious tasks, respectively, both of which are common techniques for establishing persistence within a compromised system.

3. New Administrator Credential Usage

Darktrace subsequently detected the device using a highly privileged credential, “administrator”, via a successful Kerberos login for the first time. Shortly after, the same credential was used again for a successful SMB session.

These marked the first instances of authentication using the “administrator” credential across the customer’s environment, suggesting potential malicious use of the credential following the earlier brute-force activity.

Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of administrator credentials being used in Kerberos login events by an infected device.

Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of administrator credentials being used in SMB sessions by an infected device.

4. Data Exfiltration

Prior to ransomware deployment, several infected devices were observed exfiltrating data to the malicious IP 45.135.232[.]229 via SSH connections [7][8]. This was followed by the device downloading data from other internal devices and transferring an unusually large volume of data to the same external endpoint.

The IP address was first seen on the network on September 2, 2025 - the same date as the observed data exfiltration activity preceding ransomware deployment and encryption.

Further analysis revealed that the endpoint was geolocated in Russia and registered to the malicious hosting provider Proton66. Multiple external researchers have reported malicious activity involving the same Proton66 ASN (AS198953 Proton66 OOO) as far back as April 2025. These activities notably included vulnerability scanning, exploitation attempts, and phishing campaigns, which ultimately led to malware [4][5][6].

Data Exfiltration Endpoint details.

Endpoint: 45.135.232[.]229
ASN: AS198953 Proton66 OOO
Transport protocol: TCP
Application protocol: SSH
Destination port: 22

Figure 3: Darktrace’s summary of the external IP 45.135.232[.]229, first detected on September 2, 2025. The right-hand side showcases model alerts triggered related to this endpoint including multiple data exfiltration related model alerts.

Further investigation into the endpoint using open-source intelligence (OSINT) revealed that it led to a Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) Manager console webpage. This interface is typically used to configure and manage web servers. However, threat actors have been known to exploit similar setups, using fake certificate warnings to trick users into downloading malware, or deploying malicious IIS modules to steal credentials.

Figure 4: Live screenshot of the destination (45.135.232[.]229), captured via OSINT sources, displaying a Microsoft IIS Manager console webpage.

5. Ransomware Encryption & Ransom Note

Multiple devices were later observed connecting to internal devices via SMB and performing a range of actions indicative of file encryption. This suspicious activity prompted Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst to launch an autonomous investigation, during which it pieced together associated activity and provided concrete timestamps of events for the customer’s visibility.

During this activity, several devices were seen writing a file named “readme.txt” to multiple locations, including network-accessible webroot paths such as inetpub\ and wwwroot\. This “readme.txt” file, later confirmed to be the ransom note, claimed the threat actors were affiliated with DragonForce.

At the same time, devices were seen performing SMB Move, Write and ReadWrite actions involving files with the “.df_win” extension across other internal devices, suggesting that file encryption was actively occurring.

Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of SMB events (excluding Read events) where the device was seen moving or writing files with the “.df_win” extension.

Figure 6: Darktrace’s detection of a spike in SMB Write events with the filename “readme.txt” on September 9, indicating the start of file encryption.

Conclusion

The rise of Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) and increased attacker customization is fragmenting tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), making it increasingly difficult for security teams to prepare for and defend against each unique intrusion. RaaS providers like DragonForce further complicate this challenge by enabling a wide range of affiliates, each with varying levels of sophistication [9].

In this instance, Darktrace was able to identify several stages of the attack kill chain, including network scanning, the first-time use of privileged credentials, data exfiltration, and ultimately ransomware encryption. Had the customer enabled Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability, it would have taken timely action to interrupt the attack in its early stages, preventing the eventual data exfiltration and ransomware detonation.

Credit to Justin Torres, Senior Cyber Analyst, Nathaniel Jones, VP, Security & AI Strategy, FCISO, & Emma Foulger, Global Threat Research Operations Lead.

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

References:

1. https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/dragonforce-goup-ms-coop-harrods/

2. https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/dragonforce-ransomware-attacks-retail-giants

3. https://blog.checkpoint.com/security/dragonforce-ransomware-redefining-hybrid-extortion-in-2025/

4. https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/proton66-part-1-mass-scanning-and-exploit-campaigns/

5. https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/proton66-part-2-compromised-wordpress-pages-and-malware-campaigns/

6. https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/proton66-infrastructure-tied-to-expanding-malware-campaigns-and-c2-operations

7. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/45.135.232.229

8. https://spur.us/context/45.135.232.229

9. https://www.group-ib.com/blog/dragonforce-ransomware/

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

· 45.135.232[.]229 - Endpoint Associated with Data Exfiltration

· .readme.txt – Ransom Note File Extension

· .df_win – File Encryption Extension Observed

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

DragonForce TTPs vs Darktrace Models

Initial Access:

· Anomalous Connection::Callback on Web Facing Device

Command and Control:

· Compromise::SSL or HTTP Beacon

· Compromise::Beacon to Young Endpoint

· Compromise::Beaconing on Uncommon Port

· Compromise::Suspicious SSL Activity

· Anomalous Connection::Devices Beaconing to New Rare IP

· Compromise::Suspicious HTTP and Anomalous Activity

· DNS Tunnel with TXT Records

Tooling:

· Anomalous File::EXE from Rare External Location

· Anomalous File::Masqueraded File Transfer

· Anomalous File::Numeric File Download

· Anomalous File::Script from Rare External Location

· Anomalous File::Uncommon Microsoft File then Exe

· Anomalous File::Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location

· Anomalous File::Uncommon Microsoft File then Exe

· Anomalous File::Internet Facing System File Download

Reconnaissance:

· Device::Suspicious SMB Query

· Device::ICMP Address Scan

· Anomalous Connection::SMB Enumeration

· Device::Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance

· Anomalous Connection::Possible Share Enumeration Activity

· Device::Possible Active Directory Enumeration

· Anomalous Connection::Large Volume of LDAP Download

· Device::Suspicious LDAP Search Operation

Lateral Movement:

· User::Suspicious Admin SMB Session

· Anomalous Connection::Unusual Internal Remote Desktop

· Anomalous Connection::Unusual Long Remote Desktop Session

· Anomalous Connection::Unusual Admin RDP Session

· User::New Admin Credentials on Client

· User::New Admin Credentials on Server

· Multiple Device Correlations::Spreading New Admin Credentials

· Anomalous Connection::Powershell to Rare External

· Device::New PowerShell User Agent

· Anomalous Active Directory Web Services

· Compromise::Unusual SVCCTL Activity

Evasion:

· Unusual Activity::Anomalous SMB Delete Volume

· Persistence

· Device::Anomalous ITaskScheduler Activity

· Device::AT Service Scheduled Task

· Actions on Objectives

· Compromise::Ransomware::Suspicious SMB Activity (EM)

· Anomalous Connection::Sustained MIME Type Conversion

· Compromise::Ransomware::SMB Reads then Writes with Additional Extensions

· Compromise::Ransomware::Possible Ransom Note Write

· Data Sent to Rare Domain

· Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

· Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst Coverage/Investigation Events:

· Web Application Vulnerability Scanning of Multiple Devices

· Port Scanning

· Large Volume of SMB Login Failures

· Unusual RDP Connections

· Widespread Web Application Vulnerability Scanning

· Unusual SSH Connections

· Unusual Repeated Connections

· Possible Application Layer Reconnaissance Activity

· Unusual Administrative Connections

· Suspicious Remote WMI Activity

· Extensive Unusual Administrative Connections

· Suspicious Directory Replication Service Activity

· Scanning of Multiple Devices

· Unusual External Data Transfer

· SMB Write of Suspicious File

· Suspicious Remote Service Control Activity

· Access of Probable Unencrypted Password Files

· Internal Download and External Upload

· Possible Encryption of Files over SMB

· SMB Writes of Suspicious Files to Multiple Devices

_{The content provided in this blog is published by Darktrace for general informational purposes only and reflects our understanding of cybersecurity topics, trends, incidents, and developments at the time of publication. While we strive to ensure accuracy and relevance, the information is provided “as is” without any representations or warranties, express or implied. Darktrace makes no guarantees regarding the completeness, accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of any information presented and expressly disclaims all warranties.}

_{Nothing in this blog constitutes legal, technical, or professional advice, and readers should consult qualified professionals before acting on any information contained herein. Any references to third-party organizations, technologies, threat actors, or incidents are for informational purposes only and do not imply affiliation, endorsement, or recommendation.}

_{Darktrace, its affiliates, employees, or agents shall not be held liable for any loss, damage, or harm arising from the use of or reliance on the information in this blog.}

_{The cybersecurity landscape evolves rapidly, and blog content may become outdated or superseded. We reserve the right to update, modify, or remove any content.}

About the author

Justin Torres

Cyber Analyst

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Self-Learning AI for Zero-Day and N-Day Attack Defense

Revisiting zero-day attacks

The N-day underdog

SonicWall in the wild – 1. Zero-day attack

Confluence in the wild – 2. N-day attack

Darktrace Coverage: N- vs Zero-days

Concluding thoughts and dangers of third-party integrations

Appendices: SonicWall (Zero-day)

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Observed

IoCs

Appendices: Confluence (N-day)

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Observed

IOCs

Tracking a Dragon: Investigating a DragonForce-affiliated ransomware attack with Darktrace

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Conclusion

Appendices

References:

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping