Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Justin Fier
SVP, Red Team Operations
Share
04
Aug 2019
By all accounts, Capital One defended its customers’ data with the imposing array of cyber security tools that you’d expect from one of the largest banks in the United States. And yet a lone hacker managed to bypass those tools and obtain the sensitive personal information of more than one hundred million people, a breach that will likely cost the bank well over a hundred million dollars when all is said and done.
The hacker — a former employee of Amazon Web Services, which hosted the data that was exfiltrated — gained access to the sensitive files by exploiting a misconfiguration in one of Capital One’s application firewalls. This firewall was meant to secure a Capital One web application and when the hacker found the misconfiguration vulnerability, they were able to steal critical passwords. This initial credential compromise allowed the threat actor to escalate privileges and consequently gain access to the valuable AWS-hosted data.
Such customer-side cloud security misconfigurations have become a favorite target for cyber-criminals. In fact, Gartner predicts that 99% of cloud security failures through 2023 will have occurred in the customer’s portion of the Shared Responsibility Model.
The fundamental flaw
At a time when virtually all enterprises have adopted cloud infrastructures that expand and evolve as needed, configuring firewalls and other endpoint protections to remain properly positioned can be a daunting challenge. Moreover, modern developers now have the ability to spin up a cloud instance in minutes, often without having to consult their firm’s security team. As a consequence of the speed, scale, and complexity of development in cloud ecosystems, the overwhelming majority of organizations lack visibility over their own cloud environments.
While nearly half of organizations don’t even bother looking for malware on the cloud, Capital One had a relatively mature cloud security posture — at least by traditional standards. It is therefore all the more alarming that the bank didn’t become aware of the breach until more than three months after the fact, when it received a tip from an outsider who’d stumbled upon the stolen data. That a major financial institution was blind to this level of compromise demonstrates the urgency of rethinking cloud security.
Cloud platforms are changing the network perimeter paradigm, complexifying digital borders and creating new threat surfaces. Meanwhile, cloud security controls that offer a static, rules-based approach fail to respond to this new landscape and protect against today’s attacks.
Of course, there is no silver bullet when it comes to cyber defense — and that goes double for the cloud. Motivated attackers will inevitably find a way inside the dynamic perimeters of IaaS and SaaS environments, whether via insider knowledge, critical misconfigurations, personalized phishing emails, or mechanisms that have yet to be seen. The path forward, then, is to use artificial intelligence to understand how users behave across digital infrastructure, an understanding that shines a light on the subtle behavioral shifts indicative of a threat.
Demystifying the cloud
The latest Cyber AI security tools aim to do just that: observing traffic activity across AWS and other CSPs to learn an evolving sense how each unique company uses their cloud environment. Indeed, this ability to distinguish between normal and abnormal behavior proved decisive when a financial services company using Darktrace AI to secure their cloud ecosystem faced an attack strikingly similar to the Capital One breach. The firm was hosting a number of critical applications on virtual machines in the cloud — some of which were meant to be public-facing, some of which were not. When configuring its native cloud controls, however, the firm mistakenly left one of its private applications exposed to the Internet, rather than isolated behind a firewall.
The exposed application was eventually discovered and targeted by cyber-criminals who were scanning the Internet via Shodan, a search engine that locates Internet-connected assets. Within seconds, Darktrace’s AI detected that the application was receiving an unusual amount of incoming connection attempts from a wide range of rare external sources and alerted the security team — which had been unaware of the misconfiguration. This “unusual” volume of “rare” connections might well have been normal for a different company, application or virtual machine, but Cyber AI’s bespoke knowledge of ‘self’ for the organization revealed the activity to be anomalous in this exact case.
By employing such AI systems, we can gain the necessary knowledge of complex cloud environments to catch threats in their nascent stages — before they escalate into crises. Ultimately, the cloud promises to unlock new heights of efficiency and novel forms of collaboration, so long as we’re willing to adopt equally innovative security tools. Because while there may never be a silver bullet for safeguarding cloud services, AI does offer hope for a silver lining.
Correction: An earlier version of this blog characterized cloud infrastructure as ‘borderless’; it has since been edited with attention to the complexity of the changing network perimeter paradigm presented by cloud infrastructure.
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
SEO Poisoning and Fake PuTTY sites: Darktrace’s Investigation into the Oyster backdoor
What is SEO poisoning?
Search Engine Optimization (SEO) is the legitimate marketing technique of improving the visibility of websites in organic search engine results. Businesses, publishers, and organizations use SEO to ensure their content is easily discoverable by users. Techniques may include optimizing keywords, creating backlinks, or even ensuring mobile compatibility.
SEO poisoning occurs when attackers use these same techniques for malicious purposes. Instead of improving the visibility of legitimate content, threat actors use SEO to push harmful or deceptive websites to the top of search results. This method exploits the common assumption that top-ranking results are trustworthy, leading users to click on URLs without carefully inspecting them.
As part of SEO poisoning, the attacker will first register a typo-squatted domain, slightly misspelled or otherwise deceptive versions of real software sites, such as putty[.]run or puttyy[.]org. These sites are optimized for SEO and often even backed by malicious Google ads, increasing the visibility when users search for download links. To achieve that, threat actors may embed pages with strategically chosen, high-value keywords or replicate content from reputable sources to elevate the domain’s perceived authority in search engine algorithms [4]. In more advanced operations, these tactics are reinforced with paid promotion, such as Google ads, enabling malicious domains to appear above organic search results as sponsored links. This placement not only accelerates visibility but also impacts an unwarranted sense of legitimacy to unsuspected users.
Once a user lands on one of these fake pages, they are presented with what looks like a legitimate software download option. Upon clicking the download indicator, the user will be redirected to another separate domain that actually hosts the payload. This hosting domain is usually unrelated to the nominally referenced software. These third-party sites can involve recently registered domains but may also include legitimate websites that have been recently compromised. By hosting malware on a variety of infrastructure, attackers can prolong the availability of distribution methods for these malicious files before they are taken down.
What is the Oyster backdoor?
Oyster, also known as Broomstick or CleanUpLoader, is a C++ based backdoor malware first identified in July 2023. It enables remote access to infected systems, offering features such as command-line interaction and file transfers.
Oyster has been widely adopted by various threat actors, often as an entry point for ransomware attacks. Notable examples include Vanilla Tempest and Rhysida ransomware groups, both of which have been observed leveraging the Oyster backdoor to enhance their attack capabilities. Vanilla Tempest is known for using Oyster’s stealth persistence to maintain long-term access within targeted networks, often aligning their operations with ransomware deployment [5]. Rhysida has taken this further by deploying Oyster as an initial access tool in ransomware campaigns, using it to conduct reconnaissance and move laterally before executing encryption activities [6].
Once installed, the backdoor gathers basic system information before communicating with a command-and-control (C2) server. The malware largely relies on a ‘cmd.exe’ instance to execute commands and launch other files [1].
In previous SEO poisoning cases, the file downloaded from the fake pages is not just PuTTY, but a trojanized version that includes the stealthy Oyster backdoor. PuTTY is a free and open-source terminal emulator for Windows that allows users to connect to remote servers and devices using protocols like SSH and Telnet. In the recent campaign, once a user visits the fake software download site, ranked highly through SEO poisoning, the malicious payload is downloaded through direct user interaction and subsequently installed on the local device, initiating the compromise. The malware then performs two actions simultaneously: it installs a fully functional version of PuTTY to avoid user suspicion, while silently deploying the Oyster backdoor. Given PuTTY’s nature, it is prominently used by IT administrators with highly privileged account as opposed to standard users in a business, possibly narrowing the scope of the targets.
Oyster’s persistence mechanism involves creating a Windows Scheduled Task that runs every few minutes. Notably, the infection uses Dynamic Link Library (DLL) side loading, where a malicious DLL, often named ‘twain_96.dll’, is executed via the legitimate Windows utility ‘rundll32.exe’, which is commonly used to run DLLs [2]. This technique is frequently used by malicious actors to blend their activity with normal system operations.
Darktrace’s Coverage of the Oyster Backdoor
In June 2025, security analysts at Darktrace identified a campaign leveraging search engine manipulation to deliver malware masquerading as the popular SSH client, PuTTY. Darktrace / NETWORK’s anomaly-based detection identified signs of malicious activity, and when properly configured, its Autonomous Response capability swiftly shut down the threar before it could escalate into a more disruptive attack. Subsequent analysis by Darktrace’s Threat Research team revealed that the payload was a variant of the Oyster backdoor.
The first indicators of an emerging Oyster SEO campaign typically appeared when user devices navigated to a typosquatted domain, such as putty[.]run or putty app[.]naymin[.]com, via a TLS/SSL connection.
Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of a device connecting to the typosquatted domain putty[.]run.
The device would then initiate a connection to a secondary domain that hosts the malicious installer, likely triggered by user interaction with redirect elements on the landing page. This secondary site may not have any immediate connection to PuTTY itself but is instead a hijacked blog, a file-sharing service, or a legitimate-looking content delivery subdomain.
Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of the device making subsequent connections to the payload domain.
Following installation, multiple affected devices were observed attempting outbound connectivity to rare external IP addresses, specifically requesting the ‘/secure’ endpoint as noted within the declared URIs. After the initial callback, the malware continued communicating with additional infrastructure, maintaining its foothold and likely waiting for tasking instructions. Communication patterns included:
· Endpoints with URIs /api/kcehc and /api/jgfnsfnuefcnegfnehjbfncejfh
· Endpoints with URI /reg and user agent “WordPressAgent”, “FingerPrint” or “FingerPrintpersistent”
This tactic has been consistently linked to the Oyster backdoor, which has shown similar URI patterns across multiple campaigns [3].
Darktrace analysts also noted the sophisticated use of spoofed user agent strings across multiple investigated customer networks. These headers, which are typically used to identify the application making an HTTP request, are carefully crafted to appear benign or mimic legitimate software. One common example seen in the campaign is the user agent string “WordPressAgent”. While this string references a legitimate web application or plugin, it does not appear to correspond to any known WordPress services or APIs. Its inclusion is most likely designed to mimic background web traffic commonly associated with WordPress-based content management systems.
Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst investigation linking the HTTP C2 activity.
Case-Specific Observations
While the previous section focused on tactics and techniques common across observed Oyster infections, a closer examination reveals notable variations and unique elements in specific cases. These distinct features offer valuable insights into the diverse operational approaches employed by threat actors. These distinct features, from unusual user agent strings to atypical network behavior, offer valuable insights into the diverse operational approaches employed by the threat actors. Crucially, the divergence in post-exploitation activity reflects a broader trend in the use of widely available malware families like Oyster as flexible entry points, rather than fixed tools with a single purpose. This modular use of the backdoor reflects the growing Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) ecosystem, where a single initial infection can be repurposed depending on the operator’s goals.
From Infection to Data Egress
In one observed incident, Darktrace observed an infected device downloading a ZIP file named ‘host[.]zip’ via curl from the URI path /333/host[.]zip, following the standard payload delivery chain. This file likely contained additional tools or payloads intended to expand the attacker’s capabilities within the compromised environment. Shortly afterwards, the device exhibited indicators of probable data exfiltration, with outbound HTTP POST requests featuring the URI pattern: /upload?dir=NAME_FOLDER/KEY_KEY_KEY/redacted/c/users/public.
This format suggests the malware was actively engaged in local host data staging and attempting to transmit files from the target machine. The affected device, identified as a laptop, aligns with the expected target profile in SEO poisoning scenarios, where unsuspecting end users download and execute trojanized software.
Irregular RDP Activity and Scanning Behavior
Several instances within the campaign revealed anomalous or unexpected Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) sessions occurring shortly after DNS requests to fake PuTTY domains. Unusual RDP connections frequently followed communication with Oyster backdoor C2 servers. Additionally, Darktrace detected patterns of RDP scanning, suggesting the attackers were actively probing for accessible systems within the network. This behavior indicates a move beyond initial compromise toward lateral movement and privilege escalation, common objectives once persistence is established.
The presence of unauthorized and administrative RDP sessions following Oyster infections aligns with the malware’s historical role as a gateway for broader impact. In previous campaigns, Oyster has often been leveraged to enable credential theft, lateral movement, and ultimately ransomware deployment. The observed RDP activity in this case suggests a similar progression, where the backdoor is not the final objective but rather a means to expand access and establish control over the target environment.
Cryptic User Agent Strings?
In multiple investigated cases, the user agent string identified in these connections featured formatting that appeared nonsensical or cryptic. One such string containing seemingly random Chinese-language characters translated into an unusual phrase: “Weihe river is where the water and river flow.” Legitimate software would not typically use such wording, suggesting that the string was intended as a symbolic marker rather than a technical necessity. Whether meant as a calling card or deliberately crafted to frame attribution, its presence highlights how subtle linguistic cues can complicate analysis.
Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of malicious connections using a user agent with randomized Chinese-language formatting.
Strategic Implications
What makes this campaign particularly noteworthy is not simply the use of Oyster, but its delivery mechanism. SEO poisoning has traditionally been associated with cybercriminal operations focused on opportunistic gains, such as credential theft and fraud. Its strength lies in casting a wide net, luring unsuspecting users searching for popular software and tricking them into downloading malicious binaries. Unlike other campaigns, SEO poisoning is inherently indiscriminate, given that the attacker cannot control exactly who lands on their poisoned search results. However, in this case, the use of PuTTY as the luring mechanism possibly indicates a narrowed scope - targeting IT administrators and accounts with high privileges due to the nature of PuTTY’s functionalities.
This raises important implications when considered alongside Oyster. As a backdoor often linked to ransomware operations and persistent access frameworks, Oyster is far more valuable as an entry point into corporate or government networks than small-scale cybercrime. The presence of this malware in an SEO-driven delivery chain suggests a potential convergence between traditional cybercriminal delivery tactics and objectives often associated with more sophisticated attackers. If actors with state-sponsored or strategic objectives are indeed experimenting with SEO poisoning, it could signal a broadening of their targeting approaches. This trend aligns with the growing prominence of MaaS and the role of initial access brokers in today’s cybercrime ecosystem.
Whether the operators seek financial extortion through ransomware or longer-term espionage campaigns, the use of such techniques blurs the traditional distinctions. What looks like a mass-market infection vector might, in practice, be seeding footholds for high-value strategic intrusions.
Credit to Christina Kreza (Cyber Analyst) and Adam Potter (Senior Cyber Analyst)
Appendices
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
· T1071.001 – Command and Control – Web Protocols
· T1008 – Command and Control – Fallback Channels
· T0885 – Command and Control – Commonly Used Port
· T1571 – Command and Control – Non-Standard Port
· T1176 – Persistence – Browser Extensions
· T1189 – Initial Access – Drive-by Compromise
· T1566.002 – Initial Access – Spearphishing Link
· T1574.001 – Persistence – DLL
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
· 85.239.52[.]99 – IP address
· 194.213.18[.]89/reg – IP address / URI
· 185.28.119[.]113/secure – IP address / URI
· 185.196.8[.]217 – IP address
· 185.208.158[.]119 – IP address
· putty[.]run – Endpoint
· putty-app[.]naymin[.]com – Endpoint
· /api/jgfnsfnuefcnegfnehjbfncejfh
· /api/kcehc
Darktrace Model Detections
· Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
· Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname
· Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination
· Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections
· Compromise / Beaconing Activity to External Rare
· Compromise / Quick and Regular Windows HTTP Beaconing
· Device / Large Number of Model Alerts
· Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity
· Device / Suspicious Domain
· Device / New User Agent
· Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Breaches Over Time Block
The content provided in this blog is published by Darktrace for general informational purposes only and reflects our understanding of cybersecurity topics, trends, incidents, and developments at the time of publication. While we strive to ensure accuracy and relevance, the information is provided “as is” without any representations or warranties, express or implied. Darktrace makes no guarantees regarding the completeness, accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of any information presented and expressly disclaims all warranties.
Nothing in this blog constitutes legal, technical, or professional advice, and readers should consult qualified professionals before acting on any information contained herein. Any references to third-party organizations, technologies, threat actors, or incidents are for informational purposes only and do not imply affiliation, endorsement, or recommendation.
Darktrace, its affiliates, employees, or agents shall not be held liable for any loss, damage, or harm arising from the use of or reliance on the information in this blog.
The cybersecurity landscape evolves rapidly, and blog content may become outdated or superseded. We reserve the right to update, modify, or remove any content without notice.
The benefits of bringing together network and email security
In many organizations, network and email security operate in isolation. Each solution is tasked with defending its respective environment, even though both are facing the same advanced, multi-domain threats.
This siloed approach overlooks a critical reality: email remains the most common vector for initiating cyber-attacks, while the network is the primary stage on which those attacks progress. Without direct integration between these two domains, organizations risk leaving blind spots that adversaries can exploit.
A modern security strategy needs to unify email and network defenses, not just in name, but in how they share intelligence, conduct investigations, and coordinate response actions. Let’s take a look at how this joined-up approach delivers measurable technical, operational, and commercial benefits.
Technical advantages
Pre-alert intelligence: Gathering data before the threat strikes
Most security tools start working when something goes wrong – an unusual login, a flagged attachment, a confirmed compromise. But by then, attackers may already be a step ahead.
By unifying network and email security under a single AI platform (like the Darktrace Active AI Security Platform), you can analyze patterns across both environments in real time, even when there are no alerts. This ongoing monitoring builds a behavioral understanding of every user, device, and domain in your ecosystem.
That means when an email arrives from a suspicious domain, the system already knows whether that domain has appeared on your network before – and whether its behavior has been unusual. Likewise, when new network activity involves a domain first spotted in an email, it’s instantly placed in the right context.
This intelligence isn’t built on signatures or after-the-fact compromise indicators – it’s built on live behavioral baselines, giving your defenses the ability to flag threats before damage is done.
Alert-related intelligence: Connecting the dots in real time
Once an alert does fire, speed and context matter. The Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst can automatically investigate across both environments, piecing together network and email evidence into a single, cohesive incident.
Instead of leaving analysts to sift through fragmented logs, the AI links events like a phishing email to suspicious lateral movement on the recipient’s device, keeping the full attack chain intact. Investigations that might take hours – or even days – can be completed in minutes, with far fewer false positives to wade through.
This is more than a time-saver. It ensures defenders maintain visibility after the first sign of compromise, following the attacker as they pivot into network infrastructure, cloud services, or other targets. That cross-environment continuity is impossible to achieve with disconnected point solutions or siloed workflows.
Operational advantages
Streamlining SecOps across teams
In many organizations, email security is managed by IT, while network defense belongs to the SOC. The result? Critical information is scattered between tools and teams, creating blind spots just when you need clarity.
When email and network data flow into a single platform, everyone is working from the same source of truth. SOC analysts gain immediate visibility into email threats without opening another console or sending a request to another department. The IT team benefits from the SOC’s deeper investigative context.
The outcome is more than convenience: it’s faster, more informed decision-making across the board.
Reducing time-to-meaning and enabling faster response
A unified platform removes the need to manually correlate alerts between tools, reducing time-to-meaning for every incident. Built-in AI correlation instantly ties together related events, guiding analysts toward coordinated responses with higher confidence.
Instead of relying on manual SIEM rules or pre-built SOAR playbooks, the platform connects the dots in real time, and can even trigger autonomous response actions across both environments simultaneously. This ensures attacks are stopped before they can escalate, regardless of where they begin.
Commercial advantages
While purchasing “best-of-breed" for all your different tools might sound appealing, it often leads to a patchwork of solutions with overlapping costs and gaps in coverage. However good a “best-in-breed" email security solution might be in the email realm, it won't be truly effective without visibility across domains and an AI analyst piecing intelligence together. That’s why we think “best-in-suite" is the only “best-in-breed" approach that works – choosing a high-quality platform ensures that every new capability strengthens the whole system.
On top of that, security budgets are under constant pressure. Managing separate vendors for email and network defense means juggling multiple contracts, negotiating different SLAs, and stitching together different support models.
With a single provider for both, procurement and vendor management become far simpler. You deal with one account team, one support channel, and one unified strategy for both environments. If you choose to layer on managed services, you get consistent expertise across your whole security footprint.
Even more importantly, an integrated AI platform sets the stage for growth. Once email and network are under the same roof, adding coverage for other attack surfaces – like cloud or identity – is straightforward. You’re building on the same architecture, not bolting on new point solutions that create more complexity.