How VPC Traffic Mirroring Boosts Darktrace Security
Find out how Amazon VPC Traffic Mirroring enhances Darktrace's cloud security. Learn about its impact on advanced threat detection and management.
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Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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09
Mar 2021
Darktrace's Cyber AI brings real-time visibility and adaptive, autonomous defense to your AWS cloud security strategy.
The platform continuously learns what normal behavior looks like for every user, device, and workload in your AWS environment. With this deep understanding of usual ‘patterns of life,’ Darktrace can recognize the subtle deviations that point to a threat, from account takeovers to critical misconfigurations.
This bespoke, real-time knowledge of usual activity allows Darktrace to spot the unknown and unpredictable threats that get through policy-based defenses – all without relying on any rules, signatures, or prior assumptions.
With Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC) Traffic Mirroring, Darktrace’s self-learning AI can seamlessly access granular packet data in AWS cloud environments, helping the platform build a rich understanding of context. AWS’s recent announcement of the extension of VPC Traffic Mirroring to non-Nitro instance types now allows our customers to gain agentless Cyber AI defense across these instances as well.
Expanding VPC traffic mirroring to non-Nitro instances
Amazon VPC Traffic Mirroring replicates the network traffic from EC2 instances within VPCs and allows customers to leverage this traffic for Darktrace’s AI-driven threat detection and investigation. Darktrace’s Cyber AI learns ‘on the job’ what normal activity looks like in customer AWS environments, in part using the real-time visibility provided by VPC Traffic Mirroring. The platform continuously adapts as each customer’s business evolves, a critical feature given the speed and scale of development in the cloud.
Previously, customers could only enable VPC Traffic Mirroring on their Nitro-based EC2 instances. Now, AWS has announced that this seamless access to hundreds of features from network traffic is extended to select non-Nitro instance types, supporting Darktrace’s ability to easily learn the bespoke behavioral patterns of our customers’ Amazon VPCs.
Customers can now enable VPC Traffic Mirroring on additional instances types such as C4, D2, G3, G3s, H1, I3, M4, P2, P3, R4, X1 and X1e that use the Xen-based hypervisor.* This feature is available in all 20 regions where VPC Traffic Mirroring is currently supported.
VPC Traffic Mirroring supports many of Darktrace’s extensive use cases across AWS, which include:
Data exfiltration and destruction: Detects anomalous device connections and user access, as well as unusual resource deletion, modification, and movement;
Critical misconfigurations: Catches open S3 buckets, anomalous permission changes, and unusual activity around compliance-related data and devices;
Compromised credentials: Spots unusual logins, including brute force attempts and unusual login source/time, as well as unusual user behavior, from rule changes to password resets;
Insider threat and admin abuse: Identifies the subtle signs of malicious insiders – including sensitive file access, resource modification, role changes, and adding/deleting users.
Figure 1: Darktrace illuminates activity in AWS
Autonomous investigation and response for AWS cloud environments
The Darktrace Security Module for AWS provides additional visibility across AWS environments via interaction with AWS CloudTrail, allowing for AI-powered monitoring of management and administration activity. With this deep knowledge of how your business operates in the cloud, Darktrace delivers total coverage across all your AWS services, including:
EC2
IAM
S3
VPC
Lambda
Athena
DynamoDB
Route 53
ACM
RDS
The recently announced Version 5 of the Darktrace, which focuses on protecting the cloud and the remote workforce, further augments Darktrace’s coverage of AWS environments. Among many other exciting new features, Version 5 extends the reach of Cyber AI Analyst and Darktrace RESPOND to cloud environments like AWS VPCs.
Cyber AI Analyst augments the work of security teams by autonomously reporting on the full scope of security incidents and reduces triage time by up to 92%. Cyber AI Analyst can now also conduct on-demand investigations into users and devices of interest, ingest third-party alerts to trigger new investigations, and automatically feed AI-generated Incident Reports to any SIEM, SOAR, or downstream ticketing system.
Meanwhile, Darktrace RESPOND brings Autonomous Response to the critical infrastructure which AWS VPCs provide. Darktrace's responses are surgically precise and intelligently maintain normal business operations while stopping emerging threats in real time.**
“Darktrace's innovations are outstanding and have really meshed with our current needs as a security team, from the flexibility of our new cloud-delivered deployment to the extended visibility of the Darktrace Client Sensors.”
– CISO, Real Estate
We have also launched a dedicated user interface for visualization and intuitive analysis of cloud-based threats identified across AWS via the Darktrace Security Module.
Self-Learning AI defense across the enterprise
Darktrace offers AI-driven defense of cloud infrastructure in AWS, as well as across SaaS applications, email, corporate networks, industrial systems, and remote endpoints. Taking a fundamentally unique approach, Darktrace provides the industry’s only self-learning platform that gives complete coverage and visibility across the organization.
This is a critical benefit, as businesses and workforces today are increasingly complex and dynamic. Darktrace can connect the dots between unusual behavior in disparate infrastructure areas and ensure cloud security is not siloed from the monitoring of the rest of the organization.
Darktrace’s adaptive and unified approach allows the solution to detect, investigate, and respond to the full range of threats facing the enterprise – even those unpredictable threats that move across dynamic and diverse environments.
* VPC Traffic Mirroring is not supported on the T2, R3 and I2 instance types and previous generation instances. ** This product is only available in AWS for customers who leverage Darktrace osSensors.
No items found.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Hola VPN Abuse: From Proxy Traffic to Malware and Cryptomining
Introduction
In enterprise environments, non-compliant software traffic can introduce unexpected exposure by creating unmanaged paths for outbound connectivity. Hola VPN is a notable example because of its peer-to-peer design, which can effectively turn user devices into routing or exit nodes for other parties’ traffic, shifting the risk profile from that of a traditional virtual private network (VPN) to something closer to a distributed proxy.
As a result, the appearance of Hola-related activity, whether from prior installation or unintended background connections, should be treated with caution. Such activity may provide a foothold for malicious behavior, including lateral movement or command-and-control communication.
This blog explores how Hola-associated activity appeared as part of broader patterns of suspicious behavior observed across the Darktrace customer base.
The campaign
In February and March 2026, Darktrace observed similar anomalous activity across multiple customer environments, with affected devices showing consistent behavioral patterns. These included connections to multiple *.hola[.]org endpoints using Hola-related user agents, suggesting interaction with Hola infrastructure rather than isolated or incidental traffic.
Following these connections, affected customer environments showed downloads of suspicious executable files from rare external endpoints 188.241.219[.]55 and 184.241.218[.]111. Both endpoints have been flagged as potentially malicious by open-source intelligence (OSINT) [1][2].
These downloads were conducted using consistent user agents across impacted customers, specifically ‘Hola svc_js_win32/1.249.408’ and ‘Hola svc_js_win32/1.251.389’, suggesting a possible association with Hola-related activity.
Notably, this pattern aligns with recent reporting that, in some cases, Hola distributed an undeclared executable component, me[.]exe, which was later assessed to be a likely Monero-mining binary introduced via a compromised delivery pipeline [3].
Case Study 1
Darktrace first observed a new device on January 19, 2026, within a customer environment based in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region. On the same day it appeared on the network, the device communicated with multiple pieces of Hola VPN-linked infrastructure before downloading a binary from a hola[.]org subdomain.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst investigation highlighting Hola VPN service activity potentially associated with subsequent HTTP command-and-control (C2) connections.
Subsequent Darktrace telemetry revealed a recurring pattern of activity from the day the device was first observed through to March 4, 2026. During this period, the device repeatedly issued HTTP GET requests to the URI /bwfile?size=1048576, each returning a 200 OK response, indicating successful file retrieval.
This behavior was accompanied by a POST request to /bwfile, followed by an additional GET request for a significantly larger file at /bwfile?size=26214400, suggesting a deliberate and structured file transfer pattern.
Notably, the binary download activity was not tied to a single static host. Instead, it was observed across multiple URLs that changed over time while remaining within the same hola[.]org domain. This pattern suggests the use of rotating or distributed delivery infrastructure rather than a fixed endpoint.
Figure 2: Variation in URLs over time within the same hola[.]org domain, indicating the use of dynamically changing endpoints.
Across these events, the activity was consistently associated with the user agent Hola svc_js_win32/1.249.408, further linking the traffic to Hola-related service components. Amid these persistent and unusual connections, on February 22, Darktrace observed the device connecting to 188.241.219[.]55/proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe, resulting in the download of an executable file.
Figure 3: File transfer event showing the download of an executable from the rare external endpoint 188.241.219[.]55.
Based on its file hash, the downloaded file was assessed as a likely Trojan downloader [4], with import hash (imphash) values showing similarities to samples linked to Vidar, Rhadamanthys, and Stealc according to OSINT [5]. Overall, this sequence of activity suggests that Hola-related connectivity may have been leveraged as part of a broader malware delivery chain.
Darktrace’s Autonomous Response
Due to the highly unusual activity observed, Darktrace Autonomous Response was triggered by the device’s behavior. However, as the customer deployment was configured in “Human Confirmation” mode, manual approval was required before any action could be taken.
Had the deployment been set to “Fully Autonomous” mode, Darktrace would have automatically:
Blocked connections to the associated ports and external endpoints
Prevented all outgoing network connections from the device
Enforced the device’s established ‘pattern of life’, allowing normal activity to continue while restricting any anomalous behavior
Figure 4: Example of a Darktrace Autonomous Response model highlighting the action that would have been taken, demonstrating how the system identifies anomalous behavior and applies targeted containment measures to restrict suspicious network activity.
Case Study 2
While the first case focused on anomalous activity from a newly observed device, Darktrace also identified cases in which devices had already been communicating with Hola-related endpoints prior to the suspected campaign. This may suggest pre-existing Hola usage within the environment, potentially increasing exposure and creating an avenue for subsequent suspicious activity.
One case involved three devices within a customer network based in the Americas (AMS). In this instance, a different payload was identified: me[.]exe, a potentially malicious cryptocurrency miner also referred to as HolaMonitorService[.]exe [6][7]. The downloads were observed from infrastructure similar to that seen in Case 1, including an IP address within the same 188.241.0.0/16 subnet.
Connections to *.hola[.]org, alongside the use of potential Hola-related user agents consistent with those in Case 1, were also identified, further suggesting a link between the observed activity and Hola-associated infrastructure.
Darktrace observed activity indicative of unusual VPN usage on the first affected device on February 2, followed by telemetry suggesting potential Tor usage. This was later followed by the download of me[.]exe on March 10 from 188.241.218[.]111. Notably, this device was the earliest among the three within the deployment to exhibit the presence of the suspicious executable.
Figure 5: Cyber AI Analyst detection highlighting the download of a suspicious executable from a similar external endpoint in a separate deployment.
On March 5, 2026, the second affected device exhibited a slightly different progression, initiating connections to http-test1[.]hola[.]org using the user agent ‘hola_get’. This activity was followed by the download of me[.]exe from the same endpoint on March 13, consistent with the broader pattern of Hola-related downloads observed across the environment.
Figure 6: Example of Hola VPN-related connectivity observed on the network prior to the suspected campaign, indicating pre-existing usage that may have contributed to subsequent activity.
The final affected device within this customer’s network demonstrated a more limited but related pattern, also downloading me[.]exe on March 17 using the same ‘hola_get’ user agent.
While the earlier Hola VPN usage observed across the deployment may not have been directly related to the suspected malware campaign, it may nonetheless have contributed to reduced visibility. The presence of pre-existing Hola-related traffic could have obscured malicious activity, making it more difficult to distinguish legitimate usage from attacker-driven behavior and, in turn, hindering the timely identification of the emerging compromise.
Darktrace’s Autonomous Response
For this deployment, the customer had their Autonomous Response capability configured in “Fully Autonomous” mode, allowing Darktrace to take action without human intervention. As a result, the system was able to autonomously disrupt the activity as soon as relevant events were identified through model detections.
Figure 7: Darktrace Autonomous Response actions taken against suspicious activity linked to Hola VPN.
Suspected cryptomining activity
As previously noted, some of the observed executable payloads appear to be linked to cryptomining malware. Across a subset of affected customer environments, this assessment was further supported by subsequent device activity consistent with Monero mining. Affected devices established follow-on connections to multiple external endpoints aligned with known mining infrastructure, indicating post-download execution.
Considering the broader sequence of activity, this pattern may point to a wider form of abuse in which legitimate VPN-related traffic is used to mask or facilitate malicious behavior following compromise.
On several devices, the download of executable files, including a newly observed peer[.]exe, was followed by alerts indicative of cryptocurrency mining activity. Mining-related credentials such as ‘x’ were observed using the Minergate protocol to communicate with endpoints within the 89.125.255.0/24 subnet and 188.241.218[.]111, the same endpoint involved in earlier download activity. Additional credentials appeared to reflect device-specific CPU identifiers, for example ‘12th Gen Intel(R) Core (TM) i5-1235U’.
Observed mining methods included login, submit, and job, consistent with active participation in a pool-based mining workflow rather than passive or incidental contact. The login method indicates that the host authenticated to the mining service as a worker, job reflects the assignment of computational tasks, and submit shows completed work being returned to the pool [8]. This sequence suggests that affected devices were actively contributing processing resources as part of an unauthorized distributed mining operation.
The presence of unauthorized cryptominers can lead to degraded system performance and reduced device stability. Beyond the immediate resource impact, such activity often serves as an indicator of a broader compromise rather than an isolated issue. This may increase the risk of further malware deployment, persistence mechanisms, and lateral movement, particularly in environments where the initial intrusion has not been fully contained.
Conclusion
Across affected environments, detections such as unusual VPN usage, connections to Hola infrastructure, anomalous HTTP activity, suspicious file downloads, and subsequent cryptomining behavior were linked into a single, evolving incident narrative. This aggregation provided a clearer view of attack progression, enabling security teams to understand not just isolated alerts, but the full sequence of compromise from initial contact through to post-exploitation.
Ultimately, these activities show that the risk posed by non-compliant software such as Hola VPN can extend far beyond simple policy violations. What began as traffic to Hola-related infrastructure was, in multiple cases, followed by behavior suggesting deliberate misuse, including suspicious executable downloads using Hola-related user agents and, in some instances, evidence of active cryptomining. These were not isolated anomalies, but elements of a broader pattern in which seemingly benign proxy or VPN-related communications may have created a pathway for malicious delivery and unauthorized resource exploitation.
The significance of this activity lies not only in the downloads or mining, but in what it reveals about an attacker’s ability to blend malicious operations into traffic associated with software that may already have a foothold in the environment. When unapproved software operates within an enterprise, it can reduce visibility, blur the distinction between legitimate and malicious traffic, and create opportunities to extend compromise in ways that are persistent and difficult to detect. Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach enables these behavioral distinctions to be identified, regardless of whether the device is new or long established within the network.
Credit to Min Kim (Associate Principal Analyst), Priya Thapa (Senior Cyber Analyst) Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)
![Variation in URLs over time within the same hola[.]org domain, indicating the use of dynamically changing endpoints.](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/626ff4d25aca2edf4325ff97/6a304bdeff111215c0436931_Screenshot%202026-06-15%20at%2012.00.43%E2%80%AFPM.png)
![File transfer event showing the download of an executable from the rare external endpoint 188.241.219[.]55.](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/626ff4d25aca2edf4325ff97/6a304c2468d20aeff16a2721_Screenshot%202026-06-15%20at%2012.01.53%E2%80%AFPM.png)
