CVE公開前の脅威検知脆弱性が公開される前に悪意あるアクティビティを識別した10件の事例

DarktraceはAI駆動の異常検知を利用してCVEが公開される前にサイバー脅威を識別することができます。動作のパターンを分析することにより、Darktraceは組織がゼロデイエクスプロイトを初期段階で検知し封じ込めるのに役立ちます。このプロアクティブなアプローチにより、国家レベルの脅威アクター、ランサムウェアギャング、そして脅威ランドスケープ全体にわたり進化し続ける脅威に対してサイバーセキュリティ体制を強化することができます。
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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02
Jul 2025

CVEの追跡だけでは不十分:コンテキストがきわめて重要である理由

脆弱性とは、攻撃者が不正にアクセスを取得したり、正常なオペレーションを妨害したりするために悪用することのできる、システム内のウィークポイントです。CVE(Common  Vulnerabilities and  Exposures)とは、公開されているサイバーセキュリティ脆弱性のリストであり、サイバーセキュリティコミュニティはこれを追跡してリスクを緩和します。

脆弱性が発見されると、標準的な手順としてはこれをベンダーまたは対応する組織に報告することにより、彼らはパッチまたは修正を作成して配布し、その後詳細を公開するというものです。これは、責任ある開示と呼ばれている方法です。

2024年には記録を塗り替える40,000件のCVEが報告され、Forum for Incident Response and  Security Teams (FIRST) によれば2025年にはそれを上回る件数が予測されている[1]  なかで、異常検知はこれらの潜在的リスクを識別するために不可欠です。ゼロデイのエクスプロイトと脆弱性の公開の間のギャップはかなり大きい場合もあり、ネットワーク上でエクスプロイトが行われていないかを遡及的に見つけ出そうとすることは、特にシグネチャベースのアプローチをとっている場合非常に困難です。

CVE公開に頼ることなく脅威を検知

普段とは異なるログインのパターンやデータ転送など、ネットワークやシステム内で発生した異常な動作は、サイバー攻撃が試みられている、内部関係者による脅威、あるいはシステムが侵害されている兆候である場合があります。Darktraceはルールやシグネチャに依存しないため、問題のデバイスまたはアセットについての完全なコンテキストがなくても、異常から悪意あるアクティビティを検知することができます。

たとえば、昨年末のFortinetに対するエクスプロイト攻撃発生時に、Darktraceの脅威リサーチチームはさまざまなFortinet脆弱性のエクスプロイト、特にCVE  2024-23113について調査していました。その頃MandiantがCVE  2024-47575に関するセキュリティアドバイザリを発行しましたが、その内容はDarktraceの調査結果と非常によく一致していました。

Darktraceの脅威調査チームはこのような回顧的分析によりさまざまな検知結果を広範な脅威ランドスケープに照らして理解し、さらなるコンテキストを追加するために利用しています。

以下は、脆弱性が公開される何日も前、場合によっては何週間も前にDarktraceが検知した昨年の10件の事例です。

ten examples from the past year where Darktrace detected malicious activity days or even weeks before a vulnerability was publicly disclosed.

CVE公開前のエクスプロイトの傾向

多くの場合、エクスプロイトされた脆弱性の開示は、高度な脅威アクターによるゼロデイを使った侵害に対する、インシデント対応調査の結果として行われます。脆弱性が登録され、エクスプロイトされたことが公表されると、攻撃者と防御者による攻撃  vs. パッチの競争が始まります。

高いスキルと豊富なリソースを持った国家アクターは、その目的を達成するためにさまざまな能力を駆使することで知られていますが、それにはゼロデイの利用も含まれます。多くのケースで、CVE公開前のアクティビティはローアンドスロー型で数か月も継続し、オペレーションの安全性は高い傾向にあります。CVE公開後は参入障壁が下がり、よりスキルの低い、リソースをあまり持たない攻撃者、たとえばランサムウェアギャングのようなグループでもその脆弱性を悪用することができ、大きな被害が発生します。エクスプロイトされた脆弱性の公開前、公開後において、異なる2つのタイプのアクティビティがみられることが多いのはそのためです。

ダークトレースはこの一連の流れを、昨年、前述のFortinetおよびPAN  OS脅威アクターによる攻撃のいくつかにおいても確認しています。国家アクターによる脆弱性のエクスプロイトが見られた後、ランサムウェアギャングが多くの組織に被害をもたらしていました  [2]

今年の春発生した、中国の脅威アクターが関係するSAP  Netweaverエクスプロイトでも、それに続いてランサムウェアインシデントが観測されており、同じ傾向がみられます[3]

自律遮断

異常ベースの検知は、CVE公開前であっても悪意あるアクティビティを識別できるという利点があります。しかし、セキュリティチームにはすばやく封じ込めアクティビティを隔離するという仕事が残っています。

たとえば、2025年前半に起こったIvanti連鎖エクスプロイト事案において、ある顧客は自社ネットワーク上でDarktraceの自律遮断機能を有効に設定していました。その結果、Darktraceは内部の接続をブロックし、影響を受けたデバイスに対して「生活パターン」を強制することにより、疑わしい接続をシャットダウンして攻撃を封じ込めることができました。

このDarktraceによる検知および対処はCVE公開の11日前に実行されており、異常ベースのアプローチの利点を実証しています。    

一部のケースでは、Darktraceがデバイスに対する悪意あるエクスプロイトを脆弱性が公開される数日前に阻止したことが報告されています。

たとえば、ConnectWiseに対するエクスプロイト攻撃発生時、ある顧客において、リモートアクセスを介して悪意あるソフトウェアがインストールされたことをDarktraceが検知しました。さらに調査を進めると4台のサーバーが影響を受けていることが判明し、その間、自律遮断機能がアウトバウンド接続をブロックし、影響を受けたデバイスに対して生活パターンを強制しました。

シグネチャを超えて:CVE公開前に異常を見つける

動作パターンを分析し続けることにより、ユーザー、システム、ネットワークから通常と異なるアクティビティを見つけ出し、セキュリティ侵害かもしれない異常を検知することができます。

継続的な監視とこれらの動作からの学習を通じて、異常ベースのセキュリティシステムは、従来のシグネチャベースのソリューションでは見過ごされてしまうかもしれない脅威を検知することができ、同時に脅威のTTP(Tactics,  Techniques and  Procedures)についての詳細な情報を提供することができます。このようなビヘイビアインテリジェンスによりCVE公開前の検知が可能になり、より適応性の高いセキュリティ体制の構築、および変化し続ける脅威ランドスケープに応じたシステムの進化が可能になります。

Darktraceの自己学習型AIアプローチ

10年以上にわたりサイバーセキュリティAIをリードしてきたDarktraceは、適切なAIを組み合わせて最適な結果を得るための専門技術を有しています。Darktraceの自己学習型AIは多層的なAIアプローチを使用して、それぞれの組織から学習することにより、脆弱性が公開される前、多くの場合何日も、あるいは何週間も前に、悪意あるアクティビティを検知し対処することができます。

機械学習、深層学習、LLM、自然言語処理を含む多様なAIテクニックを戦略的に組み合わせ、連続的、階層的に統合することにより、Darktraceの多層的AIアプローチはそれぞれの組織専用の、変化する脅威ランドスケープに適応する強力な防御メカニズムを提供します。

ベイズ学習やビヘイビアクラスタリングといったテクニックを用いて、Darktraceはさまざまなモデルを適応的に評価し、エンティティの動作を正確に理解することが可能です。このビヘイビア分析のレイヤーにより、特定のデバイスやシステムからのまばらなデータであっても、類似のエンティティの持つパターンを検知し動作を予測することが可能になります。AIはこの基準枠を絶えず調整し続け、動的な環境での有効性を維持します。

DarktraceのAIについてさらに詳しく知るには、サイバーセキュリティに対するAIのさまざまな応用を解説した AI  Arsenal (多層的AI装備)ホワイトペーパーをご覧ください。

参考資料:

  1. https://www.first.org/blog/20250607-Vulnerability-Forecast-for-2025
  2. https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/fortimanager-zero-day-exploitation-cve-2024-47575
  3. https://thehackernews.com/2025/05/china-linked-hackers-exploit-sap-and.html

関連するDarktraceのブログ:

*顧客による報告後確認されたもの

**2024年1月に更新されたブログは最新データを反映

This report explores the latest trends shaping the cybersecurity landscape and what defenders need to know in 2026.

This report explores the latest trends shaping the cybersecurity landscape and what defenders need to know in 2026.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO

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July 28, 2026

Hiding in Plain Sight: Uncovering a Multi-Stage Ransomware Attack Through Behavioral Detection

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Why ransomware has changed

Ransomware attacks have continued to increase globally, with 698 incidents reported in May 2026, representing a 48% rise compared to 472 incidents in May 2025 [1]. At the same time, the ransomware landscape is evolving. Several major ransomware groups, including LockBit [2], have been disrupted by successful joint law enforcement operations, resulting in a shift away from a small number of dominant actors towards a more fragmented and distributed ecosystem. This is increasingly composed of smaller groups who play a specialized role in the attack, such as initial access brokers, affiliates or developers.

As a result, ransomware tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are becoming more diverse and less predictable. On top of this, adversaries are leveraging native tools and legitimate penetration testing frameworks to evade detection. Anomaly-based detection is therefore critical to identify pre-ransomware activity, rather than relying on signatures associated with a handful of well-known ransomware groups.

As these attacks often unfold over several days, there is a critical window for defenders to act. In this context, behavioral-based detection plays a vital role in identifying suspicious pre-ransomware activity, and enabling early intervention before encryption or exfiltration occurs.

Inside a modern ransomware intrusion

In early 2026, Darktrace detected activity within a customer’s environment related to a multi-stage ransomware intrusion from the initial compromise. This activity does not appear to be attributable to a specific ransomware group, and no known ransomware payload was observed until the final stage.

The attack aligns with a broader industry trend in which compromised virtual private network (VPN) credentials are used as an entry point, followed by rapid internal reconnaissance and lateral movement using legitimate administrative tools. This growing preference for native tools and legitimate frameworks in cyber-attacks illustrates that it is increasingly unreliable to depend solely on traditional indicators of compromise such as known malware signatures or exploit detection.

The intrusion also involved the use of Sliver, an open-source adversary emulation framework, which is increasingly observed in real-world attacks. Originally designed for penetration testing and red teaming, Sliver has gained traction among threat actors as a stealthier alternative to more heavily signatured frameworks such as Cobalt Strike. As a legitimate framework, its use further complicates detection for security tools that rely on known malicious signatures.

Darktrace’s detection of a ransomware event in a customer’s environment

The initial compromise appears to have occurred via compromised credentials used over the VPN shortly before, or at the onset of the first indicators of suspicious activity. While it remains unclear as to how or when the threat actors gained access to these credentials, the use of initial access brokers (IABs) is a common feature of modern ransomware operations. This suggests that access to the environment may have been established several days or weeks beforehand.

The intrusion unfolded over three days, presenting multiple opportunities for early detection and intervention before ransomware deployment. The attack progressed through a compressed but structured sequence: initial access and reconnaissance were completed within hours, followed by privilege escalation and lateral movement the next day, and culminating in data exfiltration and encryption shortly thereafter. Throughout each stage, distinct behavioral anomalies emerged across the network providing clear indicators of malicious activity well before the ransomware was deployed.

While Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was enabled within the customer’s environment, it was not fully configured across the impacted devices, allowing the attack to progress to ransomware deployment. Had Autonomous Response been fully deployed across the affected systems, it could have taken targeted action against the earliest stages of malicious activity, potentially disrupting the intrusion before it escalated.

Figure 1: Timeline of the attack progression.

Day 1: Reconnaissance and privilege escalation

The threat actor gained access via compromised VPN credentials and initiated internal reconnaissance. Darktrace detected anomalous scanning behavior, including unusual port scanning activity and widespread network enumeration.

Specifically, Darktrace detected a high volume of east-west scanning activity across a broad range of ports, with TCP connections targeting ports 21, 80, 445, 4899 and 8080. Associated URIs suggested the use of Nmap, a widely used penetration testing tool. This highlights how attackers often leverage legitimate penetration testing tools for malicious reconnaissance, enabling them to blend into normal network activity and evade traditional signature-based detection methods.

Figure 2: Darktrace's detection of a sharp increase in anomalous internal connections, triggering multiple high-severity model alerts associated with reconnaissance activity.

Several devices were observed using administrative credentials to carry out privileged actions in a manner that was highly anomalous for the environment. This activity was accompanied by behavior consistent with SMB authentication scanning, suggesting efforts to identify and access additional systems. As the activity intensified, an increasing number of devices became involved, signalling lateral movement and further spread across the network.

Darktrace also identified privilege escalation through active directory (AD) replication abuse, specifically via the drsuapi::DRSGetNCChanges function. This technique allows an attacker with sufficient privileges to request directory replication data from a domain controller (DC), enabling them to extract credentials, including password hashes, without directly interacting with user accounts. Commonly associated with ‘DCSync’ attacks, this technique is frequently used to obtain highly privileged credentials and enable further escalation within an environment.

Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of anomalous AD replication activity indicative of privilege escalation.

This activity was seen alongside the use of the now obsolete SMBv1, repeated NTLM authentication attempts using multiple variations of ‘Administrator’ credentials, reverse DNS scanning, and large-scale network scanning. Darktrace observed widespread use of SMBv1 across the customer’s environment, exposing a significant security weakness. As a legacy protocol with well-documented weaknesses, SMBv1 can be exploited to facilitate lateral movement, allowing the attackers to expand their access following initial compromise.

Day 3: Lateral Movement, Command & Control, and Exfiltration

Two days later, the attacker escalated privileges and expanded their foothold using living-off-the-land (LOTL) techniques such as PSExec, WMI, and RDP. Concurrently, Darktrace identified command-and-control (C2)-style communications consistent with the Sliver framework, alongside rare outbound connections to cloud infrastructure indicating potential data exfiltration. The volume and severity of observed activity increased as attack behavior intensified.

The device was observed conducting extensive lateral movement, leveraging LOTL techniques to evade detection. Activity included WMI execution (e.g. ExecQuery), DCE-RPC activity, SMB sessions and file writes, most of which were successful, as well as the deployment of PSEXESVC.exe via ADMIN$ shares and prolonged RDP sessions. Darktrace identified this behavior as highly anomalous for the environment. Such activity is commonly associated with the transfer of attacker tooling, remote command execution, and the establishment of persistent access across compromised systems.  

Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of a spike in RPC binding events indicative of potential lateral movement.

On the same day, Darktrace detected C2-style SSL communications originating from multiple internal devices to rare external endpoints. These connections exhibited anomalous characteristics, including invalid SSL certificates and repeated connection patterns resembling beaconing. Analysis of the observed JA3 fingerprint further linked the activity to Sliver, the adversary simulation framework referenced earlier, as the hash has previously been associated with Sliver-related infrastructure [3]. The use of this framework reflects a broader trend of attackers repurposing legitimate offensive security tools for stealthy C2 communications. Connections to 137[.]220[.]59[.]55 (ASN AS20473 AS-VULTR) indicated that the communications were likely routed via a virtual private server (VPS) hosted by Vultr. Attackers often utilize VPS infrastructure from legitimate cloud providers like Vultr to obscure their true origin, blend into benign traffic, and evade IP-based detection mechanisms [4].

Figure 5: Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst detection of two linked unusual connections to Vultr infrastructure.

Darktrace also observed a device initiating SSL connections to safedata.s3[.]wasabisys[.]com, an endpoint associated with Wasabi cloud storage. Darktrace recognized that neither the destination nor the associated IP address had previously been observed within the environment.  More than 200 MB of data was subsequently uploaded externally to endpoints sharing the same JA3 client hash, indicating a sustained transfer session and potential data exfiltration to third-party storage. The apparent exfiltration prior to encryption is consistent with a double-extortion ransomware strategy.

Figure 6: Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst detection of more than 30 rare outbound connections to a Wasabi cloud storage endpoint, indicative of potential data exfiltration

Day 4: Encryption

The attack culminated in ransomware deployment, marking the transition from suspicious network activity to a business-impacting incident. Using SMB-based propagation, the threat actor encrypted thousands of files across the network, affecting multiple systems and disrupting normal operations. Throughout the encryption event, the legacy SMBv1 protocol was used extensively across multiple internal systems, resulting in a significant increase in newly encrypted files.

Figure 7: Darktrace’s detection of abnormal spikes in SMB activity and associated model alerts, indicative of ransomware encryption and propagation.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst automatically investigated and correlated the encryption activity and related events into a single incident narrative, providing the customer with real-time visibility into the attack while significantly reducing investigation time.

Figure 8: Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the encryption activity. AI Analyst incident detailing example encryption activity in real time. Related events are automatically correlated and summarized into a clear narrative, reducing investigation time.

Defender action recommendations

What Could Have Stopped the Attack Earlier?

Although the attack ultimately resulted in ransomware deployment, there were multiple opportunities to detect, contain, and disrupt the intrusion before encryption occurred. The following actions could have significantly reduced the overall impact:

Detect and investigate indicators of reconnaissance and lateral movement

  • Unusual scanning
  • Active Directory replication anomalies consistent with DCSync activity
  • Anomalous use of native tools and processes indicative of LOTL attacks
  • Unusual use of common reconnaissance tools such as Nmap and NetScan

Contain compromised credentials and affected devices

  • Disable and reset compromised VPN credentials
  • Isolate devices performing anomalous scanning and lateral movement activity

Block suspicious external communications and data exfiltration

  • Use anomaly-based detection to detect and block repeated outbound connections to rare external infrastructure
  • Prevent data exfiltration to unauthorized cloud storage services such as Wasabi

Conclusion

The incident highlights the importance of anomaly-based detection, particularly against attacks that primarily use native or legitimate tools to evade traditional security measures. Darktrace identified suspicious activity from the first day of the compromise, providing multiple opportunities to disrupt the intrusion before it progressed to lateral movement and data exfiltration.

In this instance, detection was not the limiting factor; response time was. Prompt investigation and containment of devices exhibiting anomalous behavior could have prevented lateral movement, data exfiltration, and ultimately ransomware deployment.

As adversaries increasingly prioritize stealth over custom malware, relying instead on legitimate tools, valid credentials, and trusted infrastructure, traditional signature-based detection becomes less effective. Identifying subtle behavioral deviations early remains critical to disrupting attacks before they escalate into full-scale ransomware incidents.

Credit to Alexandra Evzona (Cyber Analyst), Priya Thapa (Senior Cyber Analyst)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

References

[1] https://industrialcyber.co/ransomware/check-point-reports-ransomware-attacks-jump-48-year-over-year-despite-decline-in-overall-cyberattack-activity/

[2] https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/law-enforcement-disrupt-worlds-biggest-ransomware-operation

[3] https://fieldeffect.com/blog/field-effect-mitigates-not-so-simplehelp-exploits-enabling-deployment-of-backdoors

[4] https://www.darktrace.com/blog/from-vps-to-phishing-how-darktrace-uncovered-saas-hijacks-through-virtual-infrastructure-abuse

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IP Addresses

  • 137[.]220[.]59[.]55 – Potential C2 infrastructure (Vultr AS20473)
  • 38[.]27[.]106[.]123 – Wasabi cloud storage endpoint associated with potential data exfiltration
  • 38[.]27[.]106[.]128 – Wasabi cloud storage endpoint associated with potential data exfiltration
  • 38[.]27[.]106[.]117 – Wasabi cloud storage endpoint associated with potential data exfiltration

Domains

  • safedata[.]s3[.]wasabisys[.]com – Potential data exfiltration endpoint
  • *.wasabisys[.]com – Associated Wasabi cloud storage infrastructure

JA3 Fingerprint

  • d6828e30ab66774a91a96ae93be4ae4c – Associated with the Sliver adversary emulation framework

Files

  • Delete[.]me – File observed during reconnaissance activity, commonly associated with NetScan

Darktrace Model Coverage

·       Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel

·       Anomalous Connection / Anomalous Remote Registry Service Control

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Windows UDP

·       Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control

·       Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Enumeration

·       Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

·       Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration

·       Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Activity On High Risk Device

·       Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio

·       Anomalous Connection / Sustained MIME Type Conversion

·       Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

·       Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session

·       Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

·       Anomalous Connection / Unusual SMB Version 1 Connectivity

·       Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

·       Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File

·       Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

·       Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

·       Compromise / Ransomware / Possible Ransom Note Read

·       Compromise / Ransomware / Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB

·       Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity

·       Device / Anonymous NTLM Logins

·       Device / Attack and Recon Tools

·       Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

·       Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

·       Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint

·       Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Alerts

·       Device / Network Scan

·       Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe

·       Device / New or Unusual Remote Command Execution

·       Device / New User Agent

·       Device / Possible RPC Lateral Movement

·       Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Brute Force

·       Device / RDP Scan

·       Device / SMB Lateral Movement

·       Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Non-Admin)

·       Device / SMB Version 1 Access Failures

·       Device / Suspicious File Delete Activity

·       Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

·       Device / Unusual SMB Error Detected

·       Device / Unusual SMB To Critical Resource

·       Device / Unusual Winreg Operation

·       Unusual Activity / Multiple Failed Internal Connections

·       Unusual Activity / Possible RPC Recon Activity

·       Unusual Activity / Sustained Anomalous SMB Activity

·       Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

·       Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

·       Unusual Activity / Unusual File Storage Data Transfer

·       Unusual Activity / Unusual Large Internal Transfer

·       User / New Admin Credentials on Client

·       User / NTLM Login from Unauthenticated Device

Autonomous Response Model Alerts

·       Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Ransomware Block

·       Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

·       Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Active Threat SMB Write Block

·       Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Internal Anomalous File Activity

·       Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Large Data Volume Outbound Block

·       Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Network Scan Block

·       Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Unusual Privileged User Activities Block

·       Antigena / Network / Manual / Quarantine Device

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block 100

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

MITRE ATT&CK MAPPING

Command and control - Protocol Tunneling - T1572

Command and control – Web Protocols – T1071.001

Credential Access- Exploitation for Credential Access- T1212

Credential Access- Password Guessing- T1110

Discovery- File and Directory Discovery- T1083

Discovery- Network Service Discovery- T1046

Discovery- Network Share Discovery- T1135

Discovery- Remote System Discovery- T1018

Exfiltration- Exfiltration Over C2 Channel- T1041

Exfiltration- Exfiltration to Cloud Storage- T1567

Impact- Data Encrypted for Impact- T1486

Impact- Data Encrypted for Impact- T1486

Impact- Service Stop - T1489

Initial Access- Public-Facing Application- T1190

Lateral Movement- Exploitation of Remote Services- T1210

Lateral Movement- Remote Desktop Protocol- T1021

Lateral Movement- SMB/Windows Admin Shares- T1021

Lateral Movement- Taint Shared Content- T1080

Persistence- Modify Registry- T1112

Privilege Escalation- Exploitation for Privilege Escalation- T0890

Privilege Escalation- Valid Accounts- T1078

Reconnaissance- Scanning IP Blocks- T1595

Reconnaissance- Vulnerability Scanning- T1595

Resource Development- Malware- T1588

Stealth- File Deletion- T1070

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About the author
Alexandra Evzona
Cyber Analyst

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July 24, 2026

Darktrace / EMAIL Expands Behavioral Defense Across Email and Collaboration Workflows

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Email and collaboration tools do more than carry messages. They are where organizations approve payments, share sensitive data, reset credentials, and make thousands of everyday decisions. Increasingly, they are interfaces through which humans direct AI agents in their daily activity. Email, Slack and Teams are high volume, rich with sensitive data, and an easy place to hide malicious activity.

The opportunity isn’t lost on bad actors. Darktrace / EMAIL detected more than 32 million high-confidence phishing emails globally in 2025, and 70% of those messages passed DMARC authentication.  Phishing is increasingly difficult to detect and familiar trust signals alone are not enough. People and security teams need to understand how a message fits the normal behavior of the sender, recipient, and organization. They also need to correlate activity across platforms to spot threats that span multiple channels.

To effectively secure against today’s evolved threats, security teams need to act at two levels: they need to help each employee make a safer decision ‘in the moment’, and they need to understand the wider patterns that may expose the business to risk.

Darktrace is introducing four new capabilities in Darktrace / EMAIL to address both challenges. The new features explain suspicious content more clearly to end users, strengthen the capabilities of Darktrace / Adaptive Human Defense with richer guidance, let organizations define their own patterns for detecting sensitive data in messages, and give security teams a process-level view of risk across email and collaboration workflows.

Darktrace / EMAIL Inbox Analysis highlights risky content within your emails

A warning is more useful when it explains what the user should look at. To help do that, we’ve expanded Darktrace / EMAIL’s Inbox Analysis Add-In to highlight potentially dangerous content within the body of emails that Darktrace / EMAIL flags as potentially suspicious or high risk.  

The add-in can highlight language designed to create urgency, financial references, requests for payment, suspicious links, and content that is unusual for the sender. Each highlighted element includes a pop up that explains why it may be suspicious. Instead of asking an employee to accept a verdict without context, the analysis helps them examine the message and make a more informed decision.

Enhanced Just-In-Time Training Banners in Darktrace / Adaptive Human Defense

Enhanced Just-In-Time Training Banners build on the same principle. The banners now include a contextual header, actionable advice, and specific detection context. This gives employees more useful guidance at the point of risk without adding unnecessary information or cognitive load.

Together, the capabilities help turn a warning into a short learning moment. Employees can see what looks unusual, understand what action to take, and build their judgment.

Custom Sensitive Data Detection in Darktrace / EMAIL - Data Loss Prevention

Sensitive data is different for every business. Standard categories such as payment card details or government identifiers matter, but organizations also have their own customer codes, project names, research formats, account structures, and internal identifiers.

Custom Sensitive Data Detection in Darktrace / EMAIL - Data Loss Prevention allows administrators to write custom expressions for the data their organization needs to protect. Matched content can trigger existing model actions and data loss prevention (DLP) workflows, extending Darktrace's DLP capabilities.

This extends data loss detection beyond a fixed library of common data types. Security teams can apply controls to information that is sensitive in the context of their own organization and adapt those controls as the business changes.

Introducing Email and Collaboration Workflow Risk Posture Dashboards

Some of the most important risks are not isolated events. They are repeated ways of working that create an opening for error, misuse, or attack. For example, a payment request may be one suspicious message, but a recurring approval workflow that relies on weak verification is a business process risk.

The new Email and Collaboration Workflow Risk Posture Dashboard analyzes email and collaboration data across Email, Microsoft Teams, Slack and Zoom to provide a process-level view of risk in the organization. These may include financial authorization workflows, sensitive data sharing patterns, and activity that could expose credentials.

The dashboard brings these patterns into a view and provides actionable recommendations. This helps security teams determine where to investigate or strengthen controls, where ownership needs to be clarified, and where the business may need to change a risky process. It gives CISOs a clearer view of how human and communication risk is embedded in everyday operations, not only where individual alerts occur.

Behavior connects the individual decision to the wider risk

These capabilities build on Darktrace’s unique behavioral approach to security. We use Adaptive AI to learn how people and AI normally behave within an organization, creating the context needed to recognize when activity changes.

Within the Darktrace Behavioral Defense Platform, Darktrace / EMAIL helps protect people against phishing, account takeover, data exfiltration, and human risk across email and collaboration tools. The new capabilities extend that protection in both directions. They give employees clearer context for the decision in front of them, while giving security leaders a broader view of the workflows and behavior that create risk across the organization.

The result is not simply more alerts. It is a better understanding of why something is risky, what action to take, and where the organization can reduce risk before a familiar process becomes an easy route for an attacker.

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About the author
Carlos Gray
Senior Product Marketing Manager, Email
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