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December 12, 2022

ML Integration for Third-Party EDR Alerts

The advantages and benefits of combining EDR technologies with Darktrace: how this integration can enhance your cybersecurity strategy.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO
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12
Dec 2022

This blog demonstrates how we use EDR integration in Darktrace for detection & investigation. We’ll look at four key features, which are summarized with an example below:  

1)    Contextualizing existing Darktrace information – E.g. ‘There was a Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) alert 5 minutes after Darktrace saw the device beacon to an unusual destination on the internet. Let me pivot back into the Defender UI’
2)    Cross-data detection engineering
‘Darktrace, create an alert or trigger a response if you see a specific MDE alert and a native Darktrace detection on the same entity over a period of time’
3)    Applying unsupervised machine learning to third-party EDR alerts
‘Darktrace, create an alert or trigger a response if there is a specific MDE alert that is unusual for the entity, given the context’
4)    Use third-party EDR alerts to trigger AI Analyst
‘AI Analyst, this low-fidelity MDE alert flagged something on the endpoint. Please take a deep look at that device at the time of the Defender alert, conduct an investigation on Darktrace data and share your conclusions about whether there is more to it or not’ 

MDE is used as an example above, but Darktrace’s EDR integration capabilities extend beyond MDE to other EDRs as well, for example to Sentinel One and CrowdStrike EDR.

Darktrace brings its Self-Learning AI to your data, no matter where it resides. The data can be anywhere – in email environments, cloud, SaaS, OT, endpoints, or the network, for example. Usually, we want to get as close to the raw data as possible to get the maximum context for our machine learning. 

We will explain how we leverage high-value integrations from our technology partners to bring further context to Darktrace, but also how we apply our Self-Learning AI to third-party data. While there are a broad range of integrations and capabilities available, we will primarily look at Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, CrowdStrike, and SentinelOne and focus on detection in this blog post. 

The Nuts and Bolts – Setting up the Integration

Darktrace is an open platform – almost everything it does is API-driven. Our system and machine learning are flexible enough to ingest new types of data & combine it with already existing information.  

The EDR integrations mentioned here are part of our 1-click integrations. All it requires is the right level of API access from the EDR solutions and the ability for Darktrace to communicate with the EDR’s API. This type of integration can be setup within minutes – it currently doesn’t require additional Darktrace licenses.

Figure 1: Set-up of Darktrace Graph Security API integration

As soon as the setup is complete, it enables various additional capabilities. 
Let’s look at some of the key detection & investigation-focussed capabilities step-by-step.

Contextualizing Existing Darktrace Information

The most basic, but still highly-useful integration is enriching existing Darktrace information with EDR alerts. Darktrace shows a chronological history of associated telemetry and machine learning for each entity observed in the entities event log. 

With an EDR integration enabled, we now start to see EDR alerts for the respective entities turn up in the entity’s event log at the correct point in time – with a ton of context and a 1-click pivot back to the native EDR console: 

Figure 2: A pivot from the Darktrace Threat Visualizer to Microsoft Defender

This context is extremely useful to have in a single screen during investigations. Context is king – it reduces time-to-meaning and skill required to understand alerts.

Cross-Data Detection Engineering

When an EDR integration is activated, Darktrace enables an additional set of detections that leverage the new EDR alerts. This comes out of the box and doesn’t require any further detection engineering. It is worth mentioning though that the new EDR information is being made available in the background for bespoke detection engineering, if advanced users want to leverage these as custom metrics.

The trick here is that the added context provided by the additional EDR alerts allows for more refined detections – primarily to detect malicious activity with higher confidence. A network detection showing us beaconing over an unusual protocol or port combination to a rare destination on the internet is great – but seeing within Darktrace that CrowdStrike detected a potentially hostile file or process three minutes prior to the beaconing detection on the same device will greatly help to prioritize the detections and aid a subsequent investigation.

Here is an example of what this looks like in Darktrace:

Figure 3: A combined model breach in the Threat Visualizer

Applying Unsupervised Machine Learning to Third-Party EDR Alerts


Once we start seeing EDR alerts in Darktrace, we can start treating it like any other data – by applying unsupervised machine learning to it. This means we can then understand how unusual a given EDR detection is for each device in question. This is extremely powerful – it allows to reduce noisy alerts without requiring ongoing EDR alert tuning and opens a whole world of new detection capabilities.

As an example – let’s imagine a low-level malware alert keeps appearing from the EDR on a specific device. This might be a false-positive in the EDR, or just not of interest for the security team, but they may not have the resources or knowledge to further tune their EDR and get rid of this noisy alert.

While Darktrace keeps adding this as contextual information in the device’s event log, it could, depending on the context of the device, the EDR alert, and the overall environment, stop alerting on this particular EDR malware alert on this specific device if it stops being unusual. Over time, noise is reduced across the environment – but if that particular EDR alert appears on another device, or on the same device in a different context, it might get flagged again, as it now is unusual in the given context.

Darktrace then goes a step further, taking those unusual EDR alerts and combining them with unusual activity seen in other Darktrace coverage areas, like the network for example. Combining an unusual EDR alert with an unusual lateral movement attempt, for example, allows it to find these combined, high-precision, cross-data set anomalous events that are highly indicative of an active cyber-attack – without having to pre-define the exact nature of what ‘unusual’ looks like.

Figure 4: Combined EDR & network detection using unsupervised machine learning in Darktrace

Use Third-Party EDR Alerts to Trigger AI Analyst

Everything we discussed so far is great for improving precision in initial detections, adding context, and cutting through alert-noise. We don’t stop there though – we can also now use the third-party EDR alerts to trigger our investigation engine, the AI Analyst.

Cyber AI Analyst replicates and automates typical level 1 and level 2 Security Operations Centre (SOC) workflows. It is usually triggered by every native Darktrace detection. This is not a SOAR where playbooks are statically defined – AI Analyst builds hypotheses, gathers data, evaluates the data & reports on its findings based on the context of each individual scenario & investigation. 

Darktrace can use EDR alerts as starting points for its investigation, with every EDR alert ingested now triggering AI Analyst. This is similar to giving a (low-level) EDR alert to a human analyst and telling them: ‘Go and take a look at information in Darktrace and try to conclude whether there is more to this EDR alert or not.’

The AI Analyst subsequently looks at the entity which had triggered the EDR alert and investigates all available Darktrace data on that entity, over a period of time, in light of that EDR alert. It does not pivot outside Darktrace itself for that investigation (e.g. back into the Microsoft console) but looks at all of the context natively available in Darktrace. If concludes that there is more to this EDR alert – e.g. a bigger incident – it will report on that and clearly flag it. The report can of course be directly downloaded as a PDF to be shared with other stakeholders.

This comes in handy for a variety of reasons – primarily to further automate security operations and alleviate pressure from human teams. AI Analyst’s investigative capabilities sit on top of everything we discussed so far (combining EDR detections with detections from other coverage areas, applying unsupervised machine learning to EDR detections, …).

However, it can also come in handy to follow up on low-severity EDR alerts for which you might not have the human resources to do so.

The below screenshot shows an example of a concluded AI Analyst investigation that was triggered by an EDR alert:

Figure 5: An AI Analyst incident trained on third-party data

The Impact of EDR Integrations

The purpose behind all of this is to augment human teams, save them time and drive further security automation.

By ingesting third-party endpoint alerts, combining it with our existing intelligence and applying unsupervised machine learning to it, we achieve that further security automation. 

Analysts don’t have to switch between consoles for investigations. They can leverage our high-fidelity detections that look for unusual endpoint alerts, in combination with our already powerful detections across cloud and email systems, zero trust architecture, IT and OT networks, and more. 

In our experience, this pinpoints the needle in the haystack – it cuts through noise and reduces the mean-time-to-detect and mean-time-to-investigate drastically.

All of this is done out of the box in Darktrace once the endpoint integrations are enabled. It does not need a data scientist to make the machine learning work. Nor does it need a detection engineer or threat hunter to create bespoke, meaningful detections. We want to reduce the barrier to entry for using detection and investigation solutions – in terms of skill and experience required. The system is still flexible, transparent, and open, meaning that advanced users can create their own combined detections, leveraging unsupervised machine learning across different data sets with a few clicks.

There are of course more endpoint integration capabilities available than what we covered here, and we will explore these in future blog posts.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO

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July 10, 2025

Crypto Wallets Continue to be Drained in Elaborate Social Media Scam

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Overview

Continued research by Darktrace has revealed that cryptocurrency users are being targeted by threat actors in an elaborate social engineering scheme that continues to evolve. In December 2024, Cado Security Labs detailed a campaign targeting Web 3 employees in the Meeten campaign. The campaign included threat actors setting up meeting software companies to trick users into joining meetings and installing the information stealer Realst disguised as video meeting software.

The latest research from Darktrace shows that this campaign is still ongoing and continues to trick targets to download software to drain crypto wallets. The campaign features:

  • Threat actors creating fake startup companies with AI, gaming, video meeting software, web3 and social media themes.
  • Use of compromised X (formerly Twitter) accounts for the companies and employees - typically with verification to contact victims and create a facade of a legitimate company.
  • Notion, Medium, Github used to provide whitepapers, project roadmaps and employee details.
  • Windows and macOS versions.
  • Stolen software signing certificates in Windows versions for credibility and defense evasion.
  • Anti-analysis techniques including obfuscation, and anti-sandboxing.

To trick as many victims as possible, threat actors try to make the companies look as legitimate as possible. To achieve this, they make use of sites that are used frequently with software companies such as Twitter, Medium, Github and Notion. Each company has a professional looking website that includes employees, product blogs, whitepapers and roadmaps. X is heavily used to contact victims, and to increase the appearance of legitimacy. Some of the observed X accounts appear to be compromised accounts that typically are verified and have a higher number of followers and following, adding to the appearance of a real company.

Example of a compromised X account to create a “BuzzuAI” employee.
Figure 1: Example of a compromised X account to create a “BuzzuAI” employee.

The threat actors are active on these accounts while the campaign is active, posting about developments in the software, and product marketing. One of the fake companies part of this campaign, “Eternal Decay”, a blockchain-powered game, has created fake pictures pretending to be presenting at conferences to post on social media, while the actual game doesn’t exist.

From the Eternal Decay X account, threat actors have altered a photo from an Italian exhibition (original on the right) to make it look like Eternal Decay was presented.
Figure 2: From the Eternal Decay X account, threat actors have altered a photo from an Italian exhibition (original on the right) to make it look like Eternal Decay was presented.

In addition to X, Medium is used to post blogs about the software. Notion has been used in various campaigns with product roadmap details, as well as employee lists.

Notion project team page for Swox.
Figure 3: Notion project team page for Swox.

Github has been used to detail technical aspects of the software, along with Git repositories containing stolen open-source projects with the name changed in order to make the code look unique. In the Eternal Decay example, Gitbook is used to detail company and software information. The threat actors even include company registration information from Companies House, however they have linked to a company with a similar name and are not a real registered company.

 From the Eternal Decay Gitbook linking to a company with a similar name on Companies House.
Figure 4: From the Eternal Decay Gitbook linking to a company with a similar name on Companies House.
Gitbook for “Eternal Decay” listing investors.
Figure 5: Gitbook for “Eternal Decay” listing investors.
Gameplay images are stolen from a different game “Zombie Within” and posted pretending to be Eternal Decay gameplay.
Figure 6: Gameplay images are stolen from a different game “Zombie Within” and posted pretending to be Eternal Decay gameplay.

In some of the fake companies, fake merchandise stores have even been set up. With all these elements combined, the threat actors manage to create the appearance of a legitimate start-up company, increasing their chances of infection.

Each campaign typically starts with a victim being contacted through X messages, Telegram or Discord. A fake employee of the company will contact a victim asking to test out their software in exchange for a cryptocurrency payment. The victim will be directed to the company website download page, where they need to enter a registration code, provided by the employee to download a binary. Depending on their operating system, the victim will be instructed to download a macOS DMG (if available) or a Windows Electron application.

Example of threat actor messaging a victim on X with a registration code.
Figure 7: Example of threat actor messaging a victim on X with a registration code.

Windows Version

Similar to the aforementioned Meeten campaign, the Windows version being distributed by the fake software companies is an Electron application. Electron is an open-source framework used to run Javascript apps as a desktop application. Once the user follows directions sent to them via message, opening the application will bring up a Cloudflare verification screen.

Cloudflare verification screen.
Figure 8: Cloudflare verification screen.

The malware begins by profiling the system, gathering information like the username, CPU and core count, RAM, operating system, MAC address, graphics card, and UUID.

Code from the Electron app showing console output of system profiling.
Figure 9: Code from the Electron app showing console output of system profiling.

A verification process occurs with a captcha token extracted from the app-launcher URL and sent along with the system info and UUID. If the verification is successful, an executable or MSI file is downloaded and executed quietly. Python is also retrieved and stored in /AppData/Temp, with Python commands being sent from the command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.

Code from the Electron app looping through Python objects.
Figure 10: Code from the Electron app looping through Python objects.

As there was no valid token, this process did not succeed. However, based on previous campaigns and reports from victims on social media, an information stealer targeting crypto wallets is executed at this stage. A common tactic in the observed campaigns is the use of stolen code signing certificates to evade detection and increase the appearance of legitimate software. The certificates of two legitimate companies Jiangyin Fengyuan Electronics Co., Ltd. and Paperbucketmdb ApS (revoked as of June 2025) were used during this campaign.

MacOS Version

For companies that have a macOS version of the malware, the user is directed to download a DMG. The DMG contains a bash script and a multiarch macOS binary. The bash script is obfuscated with junk, base64 and is XOR’d.

Obfuscated Bash script.
Figure 11: Obfuscated Bash script.

After decoding, the contents of the script are revealed showing that AppleScript is being used. The script looks for disk drives, specifically for the mounted DMG “SwoxApp” and moves the hidden .SwoxApp binary to /tmp/ and makes it executable. This type of AppleScript is commonly used in macOS malware, such as Atomic Stealer.

AppleScript used to mount the malware and make it executable.
Figure 12: AppleScript used to mount the malware and make it executable.

The SwoxApp binary is the prominent macOS information stealer Atomic Stealer. Once executed the malware performs anti-analysis checks for QEMU, VMWare and Docker-OSX, the script exits if these return true.  The main functionality of Atomic Stealer is to steal data from stores including browser data, crypto wallets, cookies and documents. This data is compressed into /tmp/out.zip and sent via POST request to 45[.]94[.]47[.]167/contact. An additional bash script is retrieved from 77[.]73[.]129[.]18:80/install.sh.

Additional Bash script ”install.sh”.
Figure 13: Additional Bash script ”install.sh”.

Install.sh, as shown in Figure 13, retrieves another script install_dynamic.sh from the server https://mrajhhosdoahjsd[.]com. Install_dynamic.sh downloads and extracts InstallerHelper.app, then sets up persistence via Launch Agent to run at login.

Persistence added via Plist configuration.
Figure 14: Persistence added via Plist configuration.

This plist configuration installs a macOS LaunchAgent that silently runs the app at user login. RunAtLoad and KeepAlive keys are used to ensure the app starts automatically and remains persistent.

The retrieved binary InstallerHelper is an Objective-C/Swift binary that logs active application usage, window information, and user interaction timestamps. This data is written to local log files and periodically transmits the contents to https://mrajhhoshoahjsd[.]com/collect-metrics using scheduled network requests.

List of known companies

Darktrace has identified a number of the fake companies used in this scam. These can be found in the list below:

Pollens AI
X: @pollensapp, @Pollens_app
Website: pollens.app, pollens.io, pollens.tech
Windows: 02a5b35be82c59c55322d2800b0b8ccc
Notes: Posing as an AI software company with a focus on “collaborative creation”.

Buzzu
X: @BuzzuApp, @AI_Buzzu, @AppBuzzu, @BuzzuApp
Website: Buzzu.app, Buzzu.us, buzzu.me, Buzzu.space
Windows: 7d70a7e5661f9593568c64938e06a11a
Mac: be0e3e1e9a3fda76a77e8c5743dd2ced
Notes: Same as Pollens including logo but with a different name.

Cloudsign
X: @cloudsignapp
Windows: 3a3b13de4406d1ac13861018d74bf4b2
Notes: Claims to be a document signing platform.

Swox
X: @SwoxApp, @Swox_AI, @swox_app, @App_Swox, @AppSwox, @SwoxProject, @ProjectSwox
Website: swox.io, swox.app, swox.cc, swoxAI.com, swox.us
Windows: d50393ba7d63e92d23ec7d15716c7be6
Mac: 81996a20cfa56077a3bb69487cc58405ced79629d0c09c94fb21ba7e5f1a24c9
Notes: Claims to be a “Next gen social network in the WEB3”. Same GitHub code as Pollens.

KlastAI
X: Links to Pollens X account
Website: Links to pollens.tech
Notes: Same as Pollens, still shows their branding on its GitHub readme page.

Wasper
X: @wasperAI, @WasperSpace
Website: wasper.pro, wasper.app, wasper.org, wasper.space
Notes: Same logo and GitHub code as Pollens.

Lunelior
Website: lunelior.net, Lunelior.app, lunelior.io, lunelior.us
Windows: 74654e6e5f57a028ee70f015ef3a44a4
Mac: d723162f9197f7a548ca94802df74101

BeeSync
X: @BeeSyncAI, @AIBeeSync
Website: beesync.ai, beesync.cc
Notes: Previous alias of Buzzu, Git repo renamed January 2025.

Slax
X: @SlaxApp, @Slax_app, @slaxproject
Website: slax.tech, slax.cc, slax.social, slaxai.app

Solune
X: @soluneapp
Website: solune.io, solune.me
Windows: 22b2ea96be9d65006148ecbb6979eccc

Eternal Decay
X: @metaversedecay
Website: eternal-decay.xyz
Windows: 558889183097d9a991cb2c71b7da3c51
Mac: a4786af0c4ffc84ff193ff2ecbb564b8

Dexis
X: @DexisApp
Website: dexis.app
Notes: Same branding as Swox.

NexVoo
X: @Nexvoospace
Website: nexvoo.app, Nexvoo.net, Nexvoo.us

NexLoop
X: @nexloopspace
Website: nexloop.me

NexoraCore
Notes: Rename of the Nexloop Git repo.

YondaAI
X: @yondaspace
Website: yonda.us

Traffer Groups

A “traffer” malware group is an organized cybercriminal operation that specializes in directing internet users to malicious content typically information-stealing malware through compromised or deceptive websites, ads, and links. They tend to operate in teams with hierarchical structures with administrators recruiting “traffers” (or affiliates) to generate traffic and malware installs via search engine optimization (SEO), YouTube ads, fake software downloads, or owned sites, then monetize the stolen credentials and data via dedicated marketplaces.

A prominent traffer group “CrazyEvil” was identified by Recorded Future in early 2025. The group, who have been active since at least 2021, specialize in social engineering attacks targeted towards cryptocurrency users, influencers, DeFi professionals, and gaming communities. As reported by Recorded Future, CrazyEvil are estimated to have made millions of dollars in revenue from their malicious activity. CrazyEvil and their sub teams create fake software companies, similar to the ones described in this blog, making use of Twitter and Medium to target victims. As seen in this campaign, CrazyEvil instructs users to download their software which is an info stealer targeting both macOS and Windows users.

While it is unclear if the campaigns described in this blog can be attributed to CrazyEvil or any sub teams, the techniques described are similar in nature. This campaign highlights the efforts that threat actors will go to make these fake companies look legitimate in order to steal cryptocurrency from victims, in addition to use of newer evasive versions of malware.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Manboon[.]com

https://gaetanorealty[.]com

Troveur[.]com

Bigpinellas[.]com

Dsandbox[.]com

Conceptwo[.]com

Aceartist[.]com

turismoelcasco[.]com

Ekodirect[.]com

https://mrajhhosdoahjsd[.]com

https://isnimitz.com/zxc/app[.]zip

http://45[.]94[.]47[.]112/contact

45[.]94[.]47[.]167/contact

77[.]73[.]129[.]18:80

Domain Keys associated with the C2s

YARA Rules

rule Suspicious_Electron_App_Installer

{

  meta:

      description = "Detects Electron apps collecting HWID, MAC, GPU info and executing remote EXEs/MSIs"

      date = "2025-06-18"

  strings:

      $electron_require = /require\(['"]electron['"]\)/

      $axios_require = /require\(['"]axios['"]\)/

      $exec_use = /exec\(.*?\)/

      $url_token = /app-launcher:\/\/.*token=/

      $getHWID = /(Get-CimInstance Win32_ComputerSystemProduct).UUID/

      $getMAC = /details\.mac && details\.mac !== '00:00:00:00:00:00'/

      $getGPU = /wmic path win32_VideoController get name/

      $getInstallDate = /InstallDate/

      $os_info = /os\.cpus\(\)\[0\]\.model/

      $downloadExe = /\.exe['"]/

      $runExe = /msiexec \/i.*\/quiet \/norestart/

      $zipExtraction = /AdmZip\(.*\.extractAllTo/

  condition:

      (all of ($electron_require, $axios_require, $exec_use) and

       3 of ($getHWID, $getMAC, $getGPU, $getInstallDate, $os_info) and

       2 of ($downloadExe, $runExe, $zipExtraction, $url_token))

}

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About the author
Tara Gould
Threat Researcher

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July 9, 2025

Defending the Cloud: Stopping Cyber Threats in Azure and AWS with Darktrace

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Real-world intrusions across Azure and AWS

As organizations pursue greater scalability and flexibility, cloud platforms like Microsoft Azure and Amazon Web Services (AWS) have become essential for enabling remote operations and digitalizing corporate environments. However, this shift introduces a new set of security risks, including expanding attack surfaces, misconfigurations, and compromised credentials frequently exploited by threat actors.

This blog dives into three instances of compromise within a Darktrace customer’s Azure and AWS environment which Darktrace.

  1. The first incident took place in early 2024 and involved an attacker compromising a legitimate user account to gain unauthorized access to a customer’s Azure environment.
  2. The other two incidents, taking place in February and March 2025, targeted AWS environments. In these cases, threat actors exfiltrated corporate data, and in one instance, was able to detonate ransomware in a customer’s environment.

Case 1 - Microsoft Azure

Simplified timeline of the attack on a customer’s Azure environment.
Figure 1: Simplified timeline of the attack on a customer’s Azure environment.

In early 2024, Darktrace identified a cloud compromise on the Azure cloud environment of a customer in the Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA) region.

Initial access

In this case, a threat actor gained access to the customer’s cloud environment after stealing access tokens and creating a rogue virtual machine (VM). The malicious actor was found to have stolen access tokens belonging to a third-party external consultant’s account after downloading cracked software.

With these stolen tokens, the attacker was able to authenticate to the customer’s Azure environment and successfully modified a security rule to allow inbound SSH traffic from a specific IP range (i.e., securityRules/AllowCidrBlockSSHInbound). This was likely performed to ensure persistent access to internal cloud resources.

Detection and investigation of the threat

Darktrace / IDENTITY recognized that this activity was highly unusual, triggering the “Repeated Unusual SaaS Resource Creation” alert.

Cyber AI Analyst launched an autonomous investigation into additional suspicious cloud activities occurring around the same time from the same unusual location, correlating the individual events into a broader account hijack incident.

Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into unusual cloud activity performed by the compromised account.
Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into unusual cloud activity performed by the compromised account.
Figure 2: Surrounding resource creation events highlighted by Cyber AI Analyst.
Figure 3: Surrounding resource creation events highlighted by Cyber AI Analyst.
Figure 4: Surrounding resource creation events highlighted by Cyber AI Analyst.

“Create resource service limit” events typically indicate the creation or modification of service limits (i.e., quotas) for a specific Azure resource type within a region. Meanwhile, “Registers the Capacity Resource Provider” events refer to the registration of the Microsoft Capacity resource provider within an Azure subscription, responsible for managing capacity-related resources, particularly those related to reservations and service limits. These events suggest that the threat actor was looking to create new cloud resources within the environment.

Around ten minutes later, Darktrace detected the threat actor creating or modifying an Azure disk associated with a virtual machine (VM), suggesting an attempt to create a rogue VM within the environment.

Threat actors can leverage such rogue VMs to hijack computing resources (e.g., by running cryptomining malware), maintain persistent access, move laterally within the cloud environment, communicate with command-and-control (C2) infrastructure, and stealthily deliver and deploy malware.

Persistence

Several weeks later, the compromised account was observed sending an invitation to collaborate to an external free mail (Google Mail) address.

Darktrace deemed this activity as highly anomalous, triggering a compliance alert for the customer to review and investigate further.

The next day, the threat actor further registered new multi-factor authentication (MFA) information. These actions were likely intended to maintain access to the compromised user account. The customer later confirmed this activity by reviewing the corresponding event logs within Darktrace.

Case 2 – Amazon Web Services

Simplified timeline of the attack on a customer’s AWS environment
Figure 5: Simplified timeline of the attack on a customer’s AWS environment

In February 2025, another cloud-based compromised was observed on a UK-based customer subscribed to Darktrace’s Managed Detection and Response (MDR) service.

How the attacker gained access

The threat actor was observed leveraging likely previously compromised credential to access several AWS instances within customer’s Private Cloud environment and collecting and exfiltrating data, likely with the intention of deploying ransomware and holding the data for ransom.

Darktrace alerting to malicious activity

This observed activity triggered a number of alerts in Darktrace, including several high-priority Enhanced Monitoring alerts, which were promptly investigated by Darktrace’s Security Operations Centre (SOC) and raised to the customer’s security team.

The earliest signs of attack observed by Darktrace involved the use of two likely compromised credentials to connect to the customer’s Virtual Private Network (VPN) environment.

Internal reconnaissance

Once inside, the threat actor performed internal reconnaissance activities and staged the Rclone tool “ProgramData\rclone-v1.69.0-windows-amd64.zip”, a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers, to an AWS instance whose hostname is associated with a public key infrastructure (PKI) service.

The threat actor was further observed accessing and downloading multiple files hosted on an AWS file server instance, notably finance and investment-related files. This likely represented data gathering prior to exfiltration.

Shortly after, the PKI-related EC2 instance started making SSH connections with the Rclone SSH client “SSH-2.0-rclone/v1.69.0” to a RockHoster Virtual Private Server (VPS) endpoint (193.242.184[.]178), suggesting the threat actor was exfiltrating the gathered data using the Rclone utility they had previously installed. The PKI instance continued to make repeated SSH connections attempts to transfer data to this external destination.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response

In response to this activity, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability intervened, blocking unusual external connectivity to the C2 server via SSH, effectively stopping the exfiltration of data.

This activity was further investigated by Darktrace’s SOC analysts as part of the MDR service. The team elected to extend the autonomously applied actions to ensure the compromise remained contained until the customer could fully remediate the incident.

Continued reconissance

Around the same time, the threat actor continued to conduct network scans using the Nmap tool, operating from both a separate AWS domain controller instance and a newly joined device on the network. These actions were accompanied by further internal data gathering activities, with around 5 GB of data downloaded from an AWS file server.

The two devices involved in reconnaissance activities were investigated and actioned by Darktrace SOC analysts after additional Enhanced Monitoring alerts had triggered.

Lateral movement attempts via RDP connections

Unusual internal RDP connections to a likely AWS printer instance indicated that the threat actor was looking to strengthen their foothold within the environment and/or attempting to pivot to other devices, likely in response to being hindered by Autonomous Response actions.

This triggered multiple scanning, internal data transfer and unusual RDP alerts in Darktrace, as well as additional Autonomous Response actions to block the suspicious activity.

Suspicious outbound SSH communication to known threat infrastructure

Darktrace subsequently observed the AWS printer instance initiating SSH communication with a rare external endpoint associated with the web hosting and VPS provider Host Department (67.217.57[.]252), suggesting that the threat actor was attempting to exfiltrate data to an alternative endpoint after connections to the original destination had been blocked.

Further investigation using open-source intelligence (OSINT) revealed that this IP address had previously been observed in connection with SSH-based data exfiltration activity during an Akira ransomware intrusion [1].

Once again, connections to this IP were blocked by Darktrace’s Autonomous Response and subsequently these blocks were extended by Darktrace’s SOC team.

The above behavior generated multiple Enhanced Monitoring alerts that were investigated by Darktrace SOC analysts as part of the Managed Threat Detection service.

Enhanced Monitoring alerts investigated by SOC analysts as part of the Managed Detection and Response service.
Figure 5: Enhanced Monitoring alerts investigated by SOC analysts as part of the Managed Detection and Response service.

Final containment and collaborative response

Upon investigating the unusual scanning activity, outbound SSH connections, and internal data transfers, Darktrace analysts extended the Autonomous Response actions previously triggered on the compromised devices.

As the threat actor was leveraging these systems for data exfiltration, all outgoing traffic from the affected devices was blocked for an additional 24 hours to provide the customer’s security team with time to investigate and remediate the compromise.

Additional investigative support was provided by Darktrace analysts through the Security Operations Service, after the customer's opened of a ticket related to the unfolding incident.

Simplified timeline of the attack
Figure 8: Simplified timeline of the attack

Around the same time of the compromise in Case 2, Darktrace observed a similar incident on the cloud environment of a different customer.

Initial access

On this occasion, the threat actor appeared to have gained entry into the AWS-based Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) network via a SonicWall SMA 500v EC2 instance allowing inbound traffic on any port.

The instance received HTTPS connections from three rare Vultr VPS endpoints (i.e., 45.32.205[.]52, 207.246.74[.]166, 45.32.90[.]176).

Lateral movement and exfiltration

Around the same time, the EC2 instance started scanning the environment and attempted to pivot to other internal systems via RDP, notably a DC EC2 instance, which also started scanning the network, and another EC2 instance.  

The latter then proceeded to transfer more than 230 GB of data to the rare external GTHost VPS endpoint 23.150.248[.]189, while downloading hundreds of GBs of data over SMB from another EC2 instance.

Cyber AI Analyst incident generated following the unusual scanning and RDP connections from the initial compromised device.
Figure 7: Cyber AI Analyst incident generated following the unusual scanning and RDP connections from the initial compromised device.

The same behavior was replicated across multiple EC2 instances, whereby compromised instances uploaded data over internal RDP connections to other instances, which then started transferring data to the same GTHost VPS endpoint over port 5000, which is typically used for Universal Plug and Play (UPnP).

What Darktrace detected

Darktrace observed the threat actor uploading a total of 718 GB to the external endpoint, after which they detonated ransomware within the compromised VPC networks.

This activity generated nine Enhanced Monitoring alerts in Darktrace, focusing on the scanning and external data activity, with the earliest of those alerts triggering around one hour after the initial intrusion.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was not configured to act on these devices. Therefore, the malicious activity was not autonomously blocked and escalated to the point of ransomware detonation.

Conclusion

This blog examined three real-world compromises in customer cloud environments each illustrating different stages in the attack lifecycle.

The first case showcased a notable progression from a SaaS compromise to a full cloud intrusion, emphasizing the critical role of anomaly detection when legitimate credentials are abused.

The latter two incidents demonstrated that while early detection is vital, the ability to autonomously block malicious activity at machine speed is often the most effective way to contain threats before they escalate.

Together, these incidents underscore the need for continuous visibility, behavioral analysis, and machine-speed intervention across hybrid environments. Darktrace's AI-driven detection and Autonomous Response capabilities, combined with expert oversight from its Security Operations Center, give defenders the speed and clarity they need to contain threats and reduce operational disruption, before the situation spirals.

Credit to Alexandra Sentenac (Senior Cyber Analyst) and Dylan Evans (Security Research Lead)

References

[1] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/67.217.57.252/community

Case 1

Darktrace / IDENTITY model alerts

IaaS / Compliance / Uncommon Azure External User Invite

SaaS / Resource / Repeated Unusual SaaS Resource Creation

IaaS / Compute / Azure Compute Resource Update

Cyber AI Analyst incidents

Possible Unsecured AzureActiveDirectory Resource

Possible Hijack of Office365 Account

Case 2

Darktrace / NETWORK model alerts

Compromise / SSH Beacon

Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Alerts

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Device / SMB Lateral Movement

Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination

Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Alerts

Device / Anonymous NTLM Logins

Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration

Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe Device / Network Scan

Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

Device / New Device with Attack Tools

Device / RDP Scan Device / Attack and Recon Tools

Compliance / High Priority Compliance Model Alert

Compliance / Outgoing NTLM Request from DC

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

Unusual Activity / Internal Data Transfer

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Connections

Device / Anomalous RDP Followed By Multiple Model Alerts

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity

Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Darktrace / Autonomous Response model alerts

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block

Antigena / Network / Manual / Quarantine Device

Antigena / MDR / MDR-Quarantined Device

Antigena / MDR / Model Alert on MDR-Actioned Device

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Network Scan Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Server Anomaly Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena SMB Enumeration Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Internal Data Transfer Block

Cyber AI Analyst incidents

Possible Application Layer Reconnaissance Activity

Scanning of Multiple Devices

Unusual Repeated Connections

Unusual External Data Transfer

Case 3

Darktrace / NETWORK model alerts

Unusual Activity / Unusual Large Internal Transfer

Compliance / Incoming Remote Desktop

Unusual Activity / High Volume Server Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / Internal Data Transfer

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Remote Desktop

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Incoming Data Volume

Anomalous Server Activity / Domain Controller Initiated to Client

Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

Anomalous Connection / Possible Flow Device Brute Force

Device / RDP Scan

Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

Device / Network Scan

Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

Anomalous Connection / Download and Upload

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / High Volume Client Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity

Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

Device / Increased External Connectivity

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration to IP

Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External UDP Port

Anomalous Connection / Possible Data Staging and External Upload

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

Device / Large Number of Model Alerts from Critical Network Device

Compliance / External Windows Communications

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Connections

Cyber AI Analyst incidents

Scanning of Multiple Devices

Extensive Unusual RDP Connections

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

(Technique name – Tactic ID)

Case 1

Defense Evasion - Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Create Cloud Instance

Persistence – Account Manipulation

Case 2

Initial Access - External Remote Services

Execution - Inter-Process Communication

Persistence - External Remote Services

Discovery - System Network Connections Discovery

Discovery - Network Service Discovery

Discovery - Network Share Discovery

Lateral Movement - Remote Desktop Protocol

Lateral Movement - Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares

Collection - Data from Network Shared Drive

Command and Control - Protocol Tunneling

Exfiltration - Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol

Case 3

Initial Access - Exploit Public-Facing Application

Discovery - Remote System Discovery

Discovery - Network Service Discovery

Lateral Movement - Remote Services

Lateral Movement - Remote Desktop Protocol  

Collection - Data from Network Shared Drive

Collection - Data Staged: Remote Data Staging

Exfiltration - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Command and Control - Non-Standard Port

Command and Control – Web Service

Impact - Data Encrypted for Impact

List of IoCs

IoC         Type      Description + Probability

193.242.184[.]178 - IP Address - Possible Exfiltration Server  

45.32.205[.]52  - IP Address  - Possible C2 Infrastructure

45.32.90[.]176 - IP Address - Possible C2 Infrastructure

207.246.74[.]166 - IP Address - Likely C2 Infrastructure

67.217.57[.]252 - IP Address - Likely C2 Infrastructure

23.150.248[.]189 - IP Address - Possible Exfiltration Server

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About the author
Alexandra Sentenac
Cyber Analyst
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