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July 9, 2019

Insights on Shamoon 3 Data-Wiping Malware

Gain insights into Shamoon 3 and learn how to protect your organization from its destructive capabilities.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO
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09
Jul 2019

Responsible for some of the “most damaging cyber-attacks in history” since 2012, the Shamoon malware wipes compromised hard drives and overwrites key system processes, intending to render infected machines unusable. During a trial period in the network of a global company, Darktrace observed a Shamoon-powered cyber-attack on December 10, 2018 — when several Middle Eastern firms were impacted by a new variant of the malware.

While there has been detailed reporting on the malware files and wiper modules that these latest Shamoon attacks employed, the complete cyber kill chain involved remains poorly understood, while the intrusions that led to the malware’s eventual “detonation” last December has not received nearly as much coverage. As a consequence, this blog post will focus on the insights that Darktrace’s cyber AI generated regarding (a) the activity of the infected devices during the “detonation” and (b) the indicators of compromise that most likely represent lateral movement activity during the weeks prior.

A high-level overview of major events leading up to the detonation on December 10th.

In the following, we will dive into that timeline more deeply in reverse chronological order, going back in time to trace the origins of the attack. Let’s begin with zero hour.

December 10: 42 devices “detonate”

A bird's-eye perspective of how Darktrace identified the alerts in December 2018.

What immediately strikes the analyst’s eye is the fact that a large accumulation of alerts, indicated by the red rectangle above, took place on December 10, followed by complete network silence over the subsequent four days.

These highlighted alerts represent Darktrace’s detection of unusual network scans on remote port 445 that were conducted by 42 infected devices. These devices proceeded to scan more machines — none of which were among those already infected. Such behavior indicates that the compromised devices started scanning and were wiped independently from each other, instead of conducting worming-style activity during the detonation of the malware. The initial scanning device started its scan at 12:56 p.m. UTC, while the last scanning device started its scan at 2:07 p.m. UTC.

Not only was this activity readily apparent from the bird’s-eye perspective shown above, the detonating devices also created the highest-priority Darktrace alerts over a several day period: “Device / Network Scan” and “Device / Expanded Network Scan”:

Moreover, when investigating “Devices — Overall Score,” the detonating devices rank as the most critical assets for the time period December 8–11:

Darktrace AI generated all of the above alerts because they represented significant anomalies from the normal ‘pattern of life’ that the AI had learned for each user and device on the company’s network. Crucially, none of the alerts were the product of predefined ‘rules and signatures’ — the mechanism that conventional security tools rely on to detect cyber-threats. Rather, the AI revealed the activity because the scans were unusual for the devices given their precise nature and timing, demonstrating the necessity of the such a nuanced approach in catching elusive threats like Shamoon. Of further importance is that the company’s network consists of around 15,000 devices, meaning that a rules-based approach without the ability to prioritize the most serious threats would have drowned out the Shamoon alerts in noise.

Now that we’ve seen how cyber AI sounded the alarms during the detonation itself, let’s investigate the various indicators of suspicious lateral movement that precipitated the events of December 10. Most of this activity happened in brief bursts, each of which could have been spotted and remediated if Darktrace had been closely monitored.

November 19: Unusual Remote Powershell Usage (WinRM)

One such burst of unusual activity occurred on November 19, when Darktrace detected 14 devices — desktops and servers alike — that all successfully used the WinRM protocol. None of these devices had previously used WinRM, which is also unusual for the organization’s environment as a whole. Conversely, Remote PowerShell is quite often abused in intrusions during lateral movement. The devices involved did not classify as traditional administrative devices, making their use of WinRM even more suspicious.

Note the clustering of the WinRM activity as indicated by the timestamp on the left.

October 29–31: Scanning, Unusual PsExec & RDP Brute Forcing

Another burst of likely lateral movement occurred between October 29 and 31, when two servers were seen using PsExec in an unusual fashion. No PsExec activity had been observed in the network before or after these detections, prompting Darktrace to flag the behavior. One of the servers conducted an ICMP Ping sweep shortly before the lateral movement. Not only did both servers start using PsExec on the same day, they also used SMBv1 — which, again, was very unusual for the network.

Most legitimate administrative activity involving PsExec these days uses SMBv2. The graphic below shows several Darktrace alerts on one of the involved servers — take note of the chronology of detections at the bottom of the graphic. This clearly reads like an attacker’s diary: ICMP scan, SMBv1 usage, and unusual PsExec usage, followed by new remote service controls. This server was among the top five highest ranking devices during the analyzed time period and was easy to identify.

Following the PsExec use, the servers also started an anomalous amount of remote services via the srvsvc and svcctl pipes over SMB. They did so by starting services on remote devices with which they usually did not communicate — using SMBv1, of course. Some of the attempted communication failed due to access violation and access permission errors. Both are often seen during malicious lateral movement.

Additional context around the SMBv1 and remote srvsvc pipe activity. Note the access failure.

Thanks to Darktrace’s deep packet inspection, we can see exactly what happened on the application layer. Darktrace highlights any unusual or new activity in italics below the connections — we can easily see that the SMB activity is not only unusual because of SMBv1 being used, but also because this server had never used this type of SMB activity remotely to those particular destinations before. We can also observe remote access to the winreg pipe — likely indicating more lateral movement and persistence mechanisms being established.

The other server conducted some targeted address scanning on the network on October 29, employing typical lateral movement ports 135, 139 and 445:

Another device was observed to conduct RDP brute forcing on October 29 around the same time as the above address scan. The desktop made an unusual amount of RDP connections to another internal server.

A clear plateau in increased internal connections (blue) can be seen. Every colored dot on top represents an RDP brute force detection. This was again a clear-cut detection not drowned in other noise — these were the only RDP brute force detections for a several-month monitoring time window.

October 9–11: Unusual Credential Usage

Darktrace identifies the unusual use of credentials — for instance, if administrative credentials are used on client device on which they are not commonly used. This might indicate lateral movement where service accounts or local admin accounts have been compromised.

Darktrace identified another cluster of activity that is likely representing lateral movement, this time involving unusual credential usage. Between October 9 and 11, Darktrace identified 17 cases of new administrative credentials being used on client devices. While new administrative credentials were being used from time to time on devices as part of normal administrative activity, this strong clustering of unusual admin credential usage was outstanding. Additionally, Darktrace also identified the source of some of the credentials being used as unusual.

Conclusion

Having observed a live Shamoon infection within Darktrace, there are a few key takeaways. While the actual detonation on December 10 was automated, the intrusion that built up to it was most likely manual. The fact that all detonating devices started their malicious activity roughly at the same time — without scanning each other — indicates that the payload went off based on a trigger like a scheduled task. This is in line with other reporting on Shamoon 3.

In the weeks leading up to December 10, there were various significant signs of lateral movement that occurred in disparate bursts — indicating a ‘low-and-slow’ manual intrusion.

The adversaries used classic lateral movement techniques like RDP brute forcing, PsExec, WinRM usage, and the abuse of stolen administrative credentials.

While the organization in question had a robust security posture, an attacker only needs to exploit one vulnerability to bring down an entire system. During the lifecycle of the attack, the Darktrace Enterprise Immune System identified the threatening activity in real time and provided numerous suggested actions that could have prevented the Shamoon attack at various stages. However, human action was not taken, while the organization had yet to activate Antigena, Darktrace’s autonomous response solution, which could have acted in the security team’s stead.

Despite having limited scope during the trial period, the Enterprise Immune System was able to detect the lateral movement and detonation of the payload, which was indicative of the malicious Shamoon virus activity. A junior analyst could have easily identified the activity, as high-severity alerts were consistently generated, and the likely infected devices were at the top of the suspicious devices list.

Darktrace Antigena would have prevented the movement responsible for the spread of the virus, while also sending high-severity alerts to the security team to investigate the activity. Even the scanning on port 445 from the detonating devices would have been shut down, as it presented a significant deviation from the known behavior of all scanning devices, which would have further limited the virus’s spread, and ultimately, spared the company and its devices from attack.


Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO

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September 2, 2026

Botnet Behind the Camera: Mirai Katana Activity on a Video Recording Device

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Key takeaways

  • Darktrace identified a camera device infected with the Mirai/Katana botnet in a sports-sector customer environment, showing how exposed IoT devices can become active participants in wider attack chains.
  • The compromise involved suspicious Wget behavior, file downloads from rare external IPs, unusual incoming HTTP connections to video recorder management interfaces, and large outbound data transfers to infrastructure associated with botnet activity.
  • The incident highlights the importance of extending visibility and response beyond traditional endpoints, as unmanaged or overlooked connected devices can be exploited for command-and-control, malware delivery, and data exfiltration.

Mirai and the Katana variant

Mirai is a botnet that first emerged in August 2016 and is well known for launching large-scale distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, typically targeting exposed Internet of Things (IoT) devices. It identifies vulnerable IoT devices ,often by abusing default credentials or exposed services, and recruiting them into a remotely controlled botnet that can be used in DDoS campaigns [1].

Katana, one of the many variants that arose after Mirai’s source code was released publicly, was first observed in late 2020 and has been seen using more advanced capabilities, including custom command-and-control (C2), persistence mechanisms, and DDoS functionality [2].

In March 2026, research from the Nokia Deepfield Emergency Response Team (ERT) identified Katana as a Mirai-derived DDoS botnet targeting Android-based TV set-top boxes through exposed Android Debug Bridge (ADB) access.  Observed capabilities included custom C2, runtime domain rotation, multiple DDoS methods, and an on-device compiled kernel rootkit used for persistence and stealth [3].

Darktrace’s detection of Mirai Botnet activity on a camera device

In early 2026, Darktrace identified a Network/Digital Video Recorder (NVR/DVR) on the network of a sports-sector customer that had been infected with the Mirai Katana botnet and subsequently used to exfiltrate data from the customer’s environment. Seemingly related follow-up activity was observed on the same device several months later.

In both instances, the Darktrace Security Operations Centre (SOC) alerted the customer as part of the Managed Threat Detection (MTD) service. However, as Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was not fully enabled on the affected device, Darktrace was unable to proactively block the suspicious activity or prevent the compromise from continuing and recurring.

The initial compromise appears to have occurred when the affected device was seen using Wget to download Linux-based Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) files from a rare external IP, 195.177.94[.]105, which had not previously been observed in the customer’s network. Further analysis downloaded file hashes identified files related to the Mirai botnet.

Figure 1: Darktrace’s Real-Time AI Analyst investigation into the unusual outbound connection where the ELF files were downloaded.

Within a few hours, Darktrace detected the device uploading close to 3GB of data to another external IP, 50.7.49[.]4:3017 (ASN AS30058 FDCSERVERS), suggesting that the activity was likely routed via a virtual private server (VPS) hosted by FDC Servers [2]. Attackers often abuse VPS infrastructure from legitimate cloud providers to blend in with legitimate traffic and evade IP reputation and geolocation-based detections.

Figure 2:  Darktrace’s detection of the unusual data upload activity by the affected camera device.

Darktrace continued to observe similar data transfers to multiple rare endpoints  including 171.225.223[.]53, 95.161.128[.]62, 61.7.209[.]88, 95.161.128[.]62, which have been linked to Mirai by open-source intelligence (OSINT).

Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of spikes in unusual external data transfer activity from the camera device.

Exploitation continued

Several months later, Darktrace identified the same exfiltration pattern on the device again, this time with stronger indications of associations with Mirai Katana botnet infection.

The device received incoming HTTP connections from 129.121.114[.]124, an external IP known to be associated with the Katana botnet IP [3]. The connections targeted the ‘/dvr/cmd’ path using the root username and user agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/42.0.2311.135 Safari/537.36 Edge/12.246.

The ‘/dvr/cmd’ path appears to be associated with the affected device’s web management functionality. This API endpoint has historically been targeted by Mirai and other IoT botnets through the exploitation of critical command injection vulnerabilities and automated botnet exploitation [4].

Figure 4: Darktrace’s  detection of HTTP connectivity from the external IP associated with Mirai Katana Botnet.

A few days later, Darktrace observed the Wget utility being used to download ELF files, including “/lil”,  from the IP 129.121.114[.]124. OSINT reporting has since associated this IP address with the Mirai Katana botnet. Notably, the IP observed earlier in the year, 195.177.94[.]105, had also hosted a file named “lil”, indicating a link between the observed activity.

Over the following days, the device received a sudden spike in connections from multiple rare external endpoints, suggesting a possible successful brute force attack. Darktrace also observed the device exfiltrating just under 4GB of data to another Mirai-associated IP address,  66.92.198[.]194, over ports 3344, 954922, and 80. Finally, the device was seen uploading data to the Mirai botnet IP 5.175.249[.]53 over port138 and exhibited an increase in UDP connections to 34.18.28[.]10 over port 9068.

Following both file download events, Darktrace identified spikes in external data transfers and connection attempts to rare destinations. While Darktrace’s Threat Research team could not confirm with high confidence that this to activity was directly associated with Mirai, it may indicate that Mirai Katana includes data exfiltration functionality.

Darktrace’s threat researchers also identified an internet-facing NTP server belonging to a separate customer receiving incoming connection attempts from the same initially observed IP, 195.177.94[.]105,over the port 123. This suggests that Mirai Katana may not exclusively target IoT devices.

Conclusion

This case demonstrates how threat actors can exploit overlooked IoT and OT devices to support broader malicious objectives. Here, a camera device infected with a botnet was used to exfiltrate data from the customer's environment, showing how peripheral assets can become active participants in an attack chain.

This case also reinforces a challenge many organizations face today: extending security visibility beyond traditional endpoints and servers. Cameras, sensors, and other connected devices often operate with limited monitoring and may fall outside established security processes, despite maintaining network connectivity and access to potentially sensitive environments. This is particularly relevant in the sports sector, where growing reliance on connected cameras, smart stadium technologies, and other IoT devices continues to expand the attack surface, as highlighted in Darktrace's Sports Sector Threat Report.

As botnets like Kata and Mirai continue to evolve, defenders need visibility across unmanaged IoT and edge devices, as well as security solutions that can recognize subtle deviations in device behavior that may indicate an emerging compromise.

Credit to Parvatha Ananthakannan (Cyber Analyst), Signe Zaharka (Principal Analyst)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

·      Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

·      Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

·      Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

·      Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

·      Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

·      Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

·      Device / Significant UDP Increase

·      Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration to IP

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

·      Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity

·      Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination

·      Unusual Activity / Unusual DNS

·      Device / External Network Scan

·      Device / Suspicious DNS Activity

·      Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Indicator of Compromise Type Description
195.177.94[.]105 IP C2 endpoint
50.7.49[.]4:30171 IP Possible C2 endpoint
129.121.114[.]124 IP C2 endpoint
hxxp://195.177.94[.]105/n3 URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://195.177.94[.]105/n2 URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/lil URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/HHn URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/JFc URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/jum URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/OaSf URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/OPWg URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/vHwK URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/VLv URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/WbJ URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/zkR URL Possible C2 endpoint
Ab17883ae4c3bc6afa18c439166eeeb4b03186e3093d984e3a95f573e0fcb7d8 SHA-256 Mirai payload
3d587e809dac49d34a3f717e072fd0aebe5e71db63333e45c81577d6b4266f87 SHA-256 Mirai payload
Bf6e81733a7e209d3dce80d15bf3c5d300752d961fae6b45d90c9bbe7f8c89a2 SHA-256 Possible payload
f25488303813ab1ec0eaa71562938601aac185e8aaf93adb84522557f7cf4dd6 SHA-256 Possible payload
0cb4ff6b71f4423184bfa35c34e9090297637208b0e30205d4b224e56abde2ef SHA-256 Possible payload
19c24cbeaf06b2e7697083f33a85521a9315105c784691bde7420fde4cc69410 SHA-256 Likely Mirai payload
1e74f734fff8df91f4f7172d0de10c421eca78aeb800e8a48e16bc5dbde5d20e SHA-256 Possible payload
6e71f7763d1f29d5712106ebb122e281c32787540aa2342b0fe5351d585d18d7 SHA-256 Possible payload
71f4ff7cdb6d6a7d2673c543c5d2535093afbd707b20a5b9ddf735466c1105c1 SHA-256 Possible payload
76db7ee73ebf15e48a3cb24a074d92248671ef2c6ed3bc3e708377341fb7674d SHA-256 Possible payload
da87a65f7beb438e61f0b61964fed8aa305a380f569042f84c55eca8fa7929b8 SHA-256 Possible payload
e15809eb6ba66477175270d62cfa53e4bf278595f69938708c81c4bc457930fe SHA-256 Mirai payload

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic Technique ID Technique / Sub-technique
Initial Access T1659 Content Injection
T1189 Drive-by Compromise
Exfiltration T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
Command and Control T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol
T1571 Non-Standard Port
Reconnaissance T1595.001 Scanning IP Blocks
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About the author
Parvatha Ananthakannan
Cyber Analyst

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August 26, 2026

AI Agents: Securing the Path from Intent to Action

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The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) recently published guidance on managing the cyber risk of agentic AI. While the document is framed as interim advice as more formal guidance is developed, the framing reflects the current state of the industry: organizations are already deploying agents into production environments while standards, controls, and operating models for autonomous systems remain unsettled. Governance is evolving alongside adoption rather than preceding it, a reality which underscores the importance of robust controls.  

The NCSC’s guidance recommends aligning controls to an agent's level of autonomy, assigning distinct identities, limiting permissions, constraining access to systems and data, monitoring activity, maintaining human oversight, and preserving the ability to intervene when necessary. Most of these recommendations will sound familiar to security teams. The challenge is not the novelty of the controls. It is the type of system those controls now need to govern.

The shift from model security to agent security

For several years, AI security discussions have focused heavily on models. Can a model be manipulated? Jailbroken? Trusted? Can it expose information it should not? Those questions remain important, but they capture only part of the problem. A model generating text is one thing. A system connected to identities, applications, tools, workflows, and business data is another.

The difference becomes clearer when comparing a chatbot that answers questions with an agent that can retrieve customer records, update tickets, invoke tools, trigger workflows, and interact with external systems. The underlying model may be identical. Its access is not. The security question begins to shift from what the model knows to what the system can do.

The same theme appears in the Five Eyes statement released earlier this year, describing AI as a force multiplier that is accelerating both offensive and defensive cyber operations. The NCSC guidance explores what that reality looks like when autonomous systems begin operating inside enterprise environments.

Securing AI agents in operation

The NCSC spends relatively little time debating model behavior and considerably more time discussing identity, permissions, monitoring, oversight, containment, and response. Agents are treated as participants within an environment rather than isolated pieces of technology.  

That's broadly consistent with how we think about the problem at Darktrace.

An agent should not be treated as an extension of a user account. It develops its own behavioral patterns. It accesses systems, interacts with data, invokes tools, and moves across workflows in ways that can be observed independently. Understanding what an agent is permitted to do matters. Understanding how it actually behaves once deployed, and whether that behavior aligns with business intent, matters just as much.

Identity provides an obvious example. The NCSC recommends assigning distinct identities to agents rather than allowing them to disappear into surrounding human or service accounts. Most importantly, assigning agents distinct identities enables independent behavioral monitoring.

Development assumptions vs. real-world behavior

The same principle extends to monitoring. NCSC guidance places agent activity within normal security operations rather than treating it as a separate AI governance function. Many of the controls described are put in place before an agent begins operating. Sandboxing, credential design, approval workflows and human oversight all reflect judgments about how the system is expected to behave and what risks it is likely to create.

Actual use may challenge those assumptions. Access patterns change. Workflows expand. Systems begin interacting with resources they have never touched before. Processes that appeared reasonable during design behave differently in production. Human oversight requirements may turn out to be either excessive or inadequate once the system is operating at scale and operating within the context of unique business processes.

The Five Eyes statement points to a similar issue: organizations need confidence that controls continue to work as intended once systems are exposed to real users, data, tools and operational pressures. Often, the question is not whether an agent is technically allowed to perform an action, but whether its behavior remains consistent with the role it was intended to play.

Monitoring and governance of AI agents go hand-in-hand

This problem is exactly why monitoring and governance should be treated as part of the same process. Governance sets the initial parameters for deployment, while monitoring provides evidence about whether those parameters remain appropriate. That evidence should, in turn, inform changes to permissions, controls and oversight.

This matters increasingly as autonomous systems are integrated into business processes. The relevant risk is shaped not only by the model or agent itself, but by what it can access, what actions it can take, and how its behavior changes in practice.

Developing continuous oversight of AI agent behavior

The implication is clear: governance cannot end at deployment. Organizations need a way to understand how agents behave after deployment, test whether controls remain appropriate, and adjust them as conditions change. That requires visibility not just into technical activity, but into whether that activity makes sense in the context of the business process the agent is intended to support.

This is where business-centric behavioral security can become critical. Risk does not emerge from the model itself: it emerges from the actions an autonomous system takes within the enterprise and the downstream consequences of those actions.  

An agent can operate exactly as intended and still create risk if it accesses sensitive information in an unexpected context, exercises permissions in ways that create unintended exposure, or influences business processes in ways that were not anticipated during design and review.

Traditional governance vs. behavioral security

Traditional governance frameworks provide assurance at a point in time. Behavioral security can provide ongoing visibility into how autonomous systems interact with the organization they are meant to serve. Rather than focusing exclusively on model performance or policy compliance, organizations need to understand whether an agent's behavior aligns with business intent, operational expectations, and acceptable risk tolerances as conditions change.

As enterprises move from isolated AI deployments to interconnected ecosystems of agents, visibility into behavior becomes as important as visibility into code. Governance determines what an autonomous system is permitted to do. Behavioral analytics helps determine what it is doing, what business outcomes it is producing, and whether those outcomes remain aligned with the organization's objectives.

[related-resource]

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About the author
Margaret Cunningham, PhD
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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