Detecting Malicious Email Activity & AI Impersonating
Discover how two different phishing attempts from some known and unknown senders used a payroll diversion and credential sealing box link to harm users.
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Isabelle Cheong
Cyber Security Analyst
Share
10
Apr 2023
Social engineering has become widespread in the cyber threat landscape in recent years, and the near-universal use of social media today has allowed attackers to research and target victims more effectively. Social engineering involves manipulating users to carry out actions such as revealing sensitive information like login credentials or credit card details. It can also lead to user account compromises, causing huge disruption to an organization’s digital estate.
As people use social media platforms not only for personal reasons, but also for business purposes, attackers gain information they can exploit in social engineering attacks. For example, a threat actor may attempt to impersonate a known individual or legitimate service to take advantage of a user’s established trust. This is a highly successful method of social engineering because mimicking known contacts makes it difficult for traditional security tools that rely on deny-lists to detect the attack.
In October 2022, Darktrace identified and responded to two separate malicious email campaigns in which threat actors attempted to impersonate known contacts in an effort to compromise customer devices. As it learns the normal behavior of every user in the email system, Darktrace was able to instantly detect these threats and mitigate them autonomously, preventing significant disruption to the customer networks.
Payroll Diversion Fraud Attempt Impersonating a Former Employee
While a customer in the Canadian energy sector was trialing Darktrace in October 2022, Darktrace/Email™ identified a suspicious email seemingly sent from an employee within the organization. The email was sent to the Senior Director of Human Resources (HR) with a subject line of “Change in payroll Direct Deposit.” The email requested a change in bank account information for an employee. However, Darktrace recognized that the sender was using a free mail address that contained random letters, indicating it may have been algorithmically generated. Since this incident occurred during a trial, Darktrace/Email was not configured to take action. Otherwise, it would have prevented the email from landing in the inbox. In this case though, the email went through, bypassing all other security tools in place.
Although the email was from an unknown sender, the HR director believed the email could have been legitimate as the employee who appeared to be the sender had left the organization seven days prior and no longer had access to their corporate email account. However, after reviewing it in the Darktrace/Email dashboard, the customer grew suspicious and contacted the former employee directly to verify if the request was legitimate. The former employee validated the suspicions by confirming they had sent no such email.
Further investigation by the customer revealed that the former employee had been vocal about their departure on various social media platforms. This gave threat actors valuable information to believably impersonate the former employee and defraud the organization.
Such attempts to target organizations’ HR departments and divert payroll are common tactics for cyber-criminals and are often identified by Darktrace/Email across the customer base. Darktrace/Email is able to instantly identify the indicators associated with these spoofing attempts and immediately bring them to the attention of the customer’s security team.
Using Legitimate File Sharing Service to Share a Phishing Link
On October 7, 2022, a customer in the Singaporean construction sector was targeted by a phishing campaign attempting to impersonate a law firm known to the organization. Almost 200 employees received an email with the subject line “Accepted: Valuation Agreement.”
Figure 1: Sample of an UI view of the message held showing anomaly indicators, history, association, and validation.
Four days earlier, Darktrace observed communication between another email address associated with the law firm and an employee of the customer. Darktrace/Email noted that it was the first time this correspondent had sent emails to the customer.
Figure 2: Metrics showing how well the sender’s domain is known within the digital environment.
The emails contained a highly unusual link to a file sharing service, (hxxps://ssvilvensstokes[.]app[.]box[.]com/notes), hidden behind the text “PREVIEW OR PRINT COPY OF DOCUMENT HERE.” Darktrace analysts investigated this event further and found that around 30 similar URLs had been identified as suspicious using OSINT security tools in October 2022, suggesting the customer was not the only target of this phishing campaign.
Figure 3: Preview of the phishing email’s body.
Figure 4: Darktrace’s evaluation of the link contained in the phishing email.
Additional OSINT work revealed that the link directed to a website which appeared to host a PDF file named “Valuation Agreement.” The recipient would then be prompted to follow another link (hulking-citrine-krypton[.]glitch[.]me), again hidden behind the text “OPEN OR ACCESS DOCUMENT HERE” to view the file. Subsequently, the user would be prompted to enter their Microsoft 365 credentials.
Figure 5: The page displayed when the phishing link was clicked, viewed in a sandbox environment.
Figure 6: Example of a page shown when recipient clicks the second link, accessing “hulking-citrine-krypton[.]glitch[.]me”.
This page contained the text “This document has been scanned for viruses by Norton Antivirus Security.” This is another example of threat actors’ employing social engineering techniques by impersonating well-known brands, such as established security vendors, to gain the trust of users and increase their likelihood of success.
It is highly probable that a real employee of the law firm had their account hijacked and that a malicious actor was exploiting it to send out these phishing emails en masse as part of a supply chain attack. In such cases, malicious actors rely on their targets’ trust of known contacts to not question departures from their normal conversations.
Darktrace was able to instantly detect multiple anomalies in these emails, despite the fact that they were seemingly sent by known correspondents. The activity detected automatically triggered model breaches associated with unexpected and visually prominent links. As a result, Darktrace/Email responded by locking the link, stopping users from being able to click it.
Darktrace subsequently identified additional emails from this sender attempting to target other recipients within the company, triggering the model breaches associated with a surge in email sending indicative of a phishing campaign. In response, Darktrace/Email autonomously acted and filed these emails as junk. As more emails were detected across the customer’s environment, the anomaly score of the sender increased and Darktrace ultimately held back over 160 malicious emails, safeguarding recipients from potential account compromise.
The following Darktrace/Email models were breached throughout the course of this phishing campaign:
Unusual/Sender Surge
Unusual/Undisclosed Recipients
Antigena Anomaly
Association/Unlikely Recipient Association
Link/Low Link Association
Link/Visually Prominent Link
Link/Visually Prominent Link Unexpected For Sender
Unusual/New Sender Wide Distribution
Unusual/Undisclosed Recipients + New Address Known Domain
Conclusion
Social engineering plays a role in many of the major threats challenging current email cyber security, as attackers can use it to manipulate users into transferring money, revealing credentials, clicking malicious links, and more.
The above threat stories happened before language generating AI became mainstream with the release of ChatGPT in December 2022. Now, it is even easier for malicious actors to generate sophisticated social engineering emails. By using social media posts as input, social engineering emails written by generative AI can be highly targeted and produced at scale. They often avoid the flags users are trained to look for, like poor grammar and spelling mistakes, and can hide payloads or forgo them entirely.
To mitigate the risk of possible social engineering attempts, it is recommended that organizations implement social media policies that advise employees to be cautious of what they post online and enact procedures to verify if fund transfer requests are legitimate.
Yet these policies are not enough on their own. Darktrace/Email can identify suspicious email traits, whether an email is sent from a known correspondent or an unknown sender. With Self-Learning AI, it knows an organization’s users better than any impersonator could. In this way, Darktrace/Email detects anomalies within emails and neutralizes malicious components at machine-speed, stopping attacks at their earliest stages, before employees fall victim.
Appendices
List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
Domain:
hxxps://ssvilvensstokes[.]app[.]box[.]com/notes/*?s=* - 1st external link (seen in email)
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Out of Character: Detecting Vendor Compromise and Trusted Relationship Abuse with Darktrace
Phishing emails from compromised vendors are increasingly difficult to distinguish from genuine correspondence. They challenge workers, security teams and traditional email SEGs alike. Anomaly detection can be a game-changer in spotting the subtle signs of these meticulous attacks.
Darktrace Collaborates with Microsoft: Unifying Email Security with a Shared Vision
Darktrace and Microsoft have joined forces to enhance email security through a new integration, unifying threat response and quarantine capabilities. This collaboration strengthens defenses and streamlines visibility for security teams, reflecting a shared vision for proactive cyber protection.
How a Major Civil Engineering Company Reduced MTTR across Network, Email and the Cloud with Darktrace
Asking more of the information security team
“What more can we be doing to secure the company?” is a great question for any cyber professional to hear from their Board of Directors. After successfully defeating a series of attacks and seeing the potential for AI tools to supercharge incoming threats, a UK-based civil engineering company’s security team had the answer: Darktrace.
“When things are coming at you at machine speed, you need machine speed to fight it off – it’s as simple as that,” said their Information Security Manager. “There were incidents where it took us a few hours to get to the bottom of what was going on. Darktrace changed that.”
Prevention was also the best cure. A peer organization in the same sector was still in business continuity measures 18 months after an attack, and the security team did not want to risk that level of business disruption.
Legacy tools were not meeting the team’s desired speed or accuracy
The company’s native SaaS email platform took between two and 14 days to alert on suspicious emails, with another email security tool flagging malicious emails after up to 24 days. After receiving an alert, responses often took a couple of days to coordinate. The team was losing precious time.
Beyond long detection and response times, the old email security platform was no longer performing: 19% of incoming spam was missed. Of even more concern: 6% of phishing emails reached users’ inboxes, and malware and ransomware email was also still getting through, with 0.3% of such email-borne payloads reaching user inboxes.
Choosing Darktrace
“When evaluating tools in 2023, only Darktrace had what I was looking for: an existing, mature, AI-based cybersecurity solution. ChatGPT had just come out and a lot of companies were saying ‘AI this’ and ‘AI that’. Then you’d take a look, and it was all rules- and cases-based, not AI at all,” their Information Security Manager.
The team knew that, with AI-enabled attacks on the horizon, a cybersecurity company that had already built, fielded, and matured an AI-powered cyber defense would give the security team the ability to fend off machine-speed attacks at the same pace as the attackers.
Darktrace accomplishes this with multi-layered AI that learns each organization’s normal business operations. With this detailed level of understanding, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI can recognize unusual activity that may indicate a cyber-attack, and works to neutralize the threat with precise response actions. And it does this all at machine speed and with minimal disruption.
On the morning the team was due to present its findings, the session was cancelled – for a good reason. The Board didn’t feel further discussion was necessary because the case for Darktrace was so conclusive. The CEO described the Darktrace option as ‘an insurance policy we can’t do without’.
Saving time with Darktrace / EMAIL
Darktrace / EMAIL reduced the discovery, alert, and response process from days or weeks to seconds .
Darktrace / EMAIL automates what was originally a time-consuming and repetitive process. The team has recovered between eight and 10 working hours a week by automating much of this process using / EMAIL.
Today, Darktrace / EMAIL prevents phishing emails from reaching employees’ inboxes. The volume of hostile and unsolicited email fell to a third of its original level after Darktrace / EMAIL was set up.
Further savings with Darktrace / NETWORK and Darktrace / IDENTITY
Since its success with Darktrace / EMAIL, the company adopted two more products from the Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platform – Darktrace / NETWORK and Darktrace / IDENTITY.
These have further contributed to cost savings. An initial plan to build a 24/7 SOC would have required hiring and retaining six additional analysts, rather than the two that currently use Darktrace, costing an additional £220,000 per year in salary. With Darktrace, the existing analysts have the tools needed to become more effective and impactful.
An additional benefit: Darktrace adoption has lowered the company’s cyber insurance premiums. The security team can reallocate this budget to proactive projects.
Detection of novel threats provides reassurance
Darktrace’s unique approach to cybersecurity added a key benefit. The team’s previous tool took a rules-based approach – which was only good if the next attack featured the same characteristics as the ones on which the tool was trained.
“Darktrace looks for anomalous behavior, and we needed something that detected and responded based on use cases, not rules that might be out of date or too prescriptive,” their Information Security Manager. “Our existing provider could take a couple of days to update rules and signatures, and in this game, speed is of the essence. Darktrace just does everything we need - without delay.”
Where rules-based tools must wait for a threat to emerge before beginning to detect and respond to it, Darktrace identifies and protects against unknown and novel threats, speeding identification, response, and recovery, minimizing business disruption as a result.
Looking to the future
With Darktrace in place, the UK-based civil engineering company team has reallocated time and resources usually spent on detection and alerting to now tackle more sophisticated, strategic challenges. Darktrace has also equipped the team with far better and more regularly updated visibility into potential vulnerabilities.
“One thing that frustrates me a little is penetration testing; our ISO accreditation mandates a penetration test at least once a year, but the results could be out of date the next day,” their Information Security Manager. “Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management will give me that view in real time – we can run it daily if needed - and that’s going to be a really effective workbench for my team.”
As the company looks to further develop its security posture, Darktrace remains poised to evolve alongside its partner.
Inside Akira’s SonicWall Campaign: Darktrace’s Detection and Response
Introduction: Background on Akira SonicWall campaign
Between July and August 2025, security teams worldwide observed a surge in Akira ransomware incidents involving SonicWall SSL VPN devices [1]. Initially believed to be the result of an unknown zero-day vulnerability, SonicWall later released an advisory announcing that the activity was strongly linked to a previously disclosed vulnerability, CVE-2024-40766, first identified over a year earlier [2].
On August 20, 2025, Darktrace observed unusual activity on the network of a customer in the US. Darktrace detected a range of suspicious activity, including network scanning and reconnaissance, lateral movement, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration. One of the compromised devices was later identified as a SonicWall virtual private network (VPN) server, suggesting that the incident was part of the broader Akira ransomware campaign targeting SonicWall technology.
As the customer was subscribed to the Managed Detection and Response (MDR) service, Darktrace’s Security Operations Centre (SOC) team was able to rapidly triage critical alerts, restrict the activity of affected devices, and notify the customer of the threat. As a result, the impact of the attack was limited - approximately 2 GiB of data had been observed leaving the network, but any further escalation of malicious activity was stopped.
Threat Overview
CVE-2024-40766 and other misconfigurations
CVE-2024-40766 is an improper access control vulnerability in SonicWall’s SonicOS, affecting Gen 5, Gen 6, and Gen 7 devices running SonicOS version 7.0.1 5035 and earlier [3]. The vulnerability was disclosed on August 23, 2024, with a patch released the same day. Shortly after, it was reported to be exploited in the wild by Akira ransomware affiliates and others [4].
Almost a year later, the same vulnerability is being actively targeted again by the Akira ransomware group. In addition to exploiting unpatched devices affected by CVE-2024-40766, security researchers have identified three other risks potentially being leveraged by the group [5]:
*The Virtual Office Portal can be used to initially set up MFA/TOTP configurations for SSLVPN users.
Thus, even if SonicWall devices were patched, threat actors could still target them for initial access by reusing previously stolen credentials and exploiting other misconfigurations.
Akira Ransomware
Akira ransomware was first observed in the wild in March 2023 and has since become one of the most prolific ransomware strains across the threat landscape [6]. The group operates under a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model and frequently uses double extortion tactics, pressuring victims to pay not only to decrypt files but also to prevent the public release of sensitive exfiltrated data.
The ransomware initially targeted Windows systems, but a Linux variant was later observed targeting VMware ESXi virtual machines [7]. In 2024, it was assessed that Akira would continue to target ESXi hypervisors, making attacks highly disruptive due to the central role of virtualisation in large-scale cloud deployments. Encrypting the ESXi file system enables rapid and widespread encryption with minimal lateral movement or credential theft. The lack of comprehensive security protections on many ESXi hypervisors also makes them an attractive target for ransomware operators [8].
Victimology
Akira is known to target organizations across multiple sectors, most notably those in manufacturing, education, and healthcare. These targets span multiple geographic regions, including North America, Latin America, Europe and Asia-Pacific [9].
Figure 1: Geographical distribution of organization’s affected by Akira ransomware in 2025 [9].
Common Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) [7][10]
Initial Access Targets remote access services such as RDP and VPN through vulnerability exploitation or stolen credentials.
Reconnaissance Uses network scanning tools like SoftPerfect and Advanced IP Scanner to map the environment and identify targets.
Lateral Movement Moves laterally using legitimate administrative tools, typically via RDP.
Persistence Employs techniques such as Kerberoasting and pass-the-hash, and tools like Mimikatz to extract credentials. Known to create new domain accounts to maintain access.
Command and Control Utilizes remote access tools including AnyDesk, RustDesk, Ngrok, and Cloudflare Tunnel.
Exfiltration Uses tools such as FileZilla, WinRAR, WinSCP, and Rclone. Data is exfiltrated via protocols like FTP and SFTP, or through cloud storage services such as Mega.
Darktrace’s Coverage of Akira ransomware
Reconnaissance
Darktrace first detected of unusual network activity around 05:10 UTC, when a desktop device was observed performing a network scan and making an unusual number of DCE-RPC requests to the endpoint mapper (epmapper) service. Network scans are typically used to identify open ports, while querying the epmapper service can reveal exposed RPC services on the network.
Multiple other devices were also later seen with similar reconnaissance activity, and use of the Advanced IP Scanner tool, indicated by connections to the domain advanced-ip-scanner[.]com.
Lateral movement
Shortly after the initial reconnaissance, the same desktop device exhibited unusual use of administrative tools. Darktrace observed the user agent “Ruby WinRM Client” and the URI “/wsman” as the device initiated a rare outbound Windows Remote Management (WinRM) connection to two domain controllers (REDACTED-dc1 and REDACTED-dc2). WinRM is a Microsoft service that uses the WS-Management (WSMan) protocol to enable remote management and control of network devices.
Darktrace also observed the desktop device connecting to an ESXi device (REDACTED-esxi1) via RDP using an LDAP service credential, likely with administrative privileges.
Credential access
At around 06:26 UTC, the desktop device was seen fetching an Active Directory certificate from the domain controller (REDACTED-dc1) by making a DCE-RPC request to the ICertPassage service. Shortly after, the device made a Kerberos login using the administrative credential.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of the of anomalous certificate download and subsequent Kerberos login.
Further investigation into the device’s event logs revealed a chain of connections that Darktrace’s researchers believe demonstrates a credential access technique known as “UnPAC the hash.”
This method begins with pre-authentication using Kerberos’ Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication (PKINIT), allowing the client to use an X.509 certificate to obtain a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) from the Key Distribution Center (KDC) instead of a password.
The next stage involves User-to-User (U2U) authentication when requesting a Service Ticket (ST) from the KDC. Within Darktrace's visibility of this traffic, U2U was indicated by the client and service principal names within the ST request being identical. Because PKINIT was used earlier, the returned ST contains the NTLM hash of the credential, which can then be extracted and abused for lateral movement or privilege escalation [11].
Figure 4: Flowchart of Kerberos PKINIT pre-authentication and U2U authentication [12]
Figure 5: Device event log showing the Kerberos Login and Kerberos Ticket events
Analysis of the desktop device’s event logs revealed a repeated sequence of suspicious activity across multiple credentials. Each sequence included a DCE-RPC ICertPassage request to download a certificate, followed by a Kerberos login event indicating PKINIT pre-authentication, and then a Kerberos ticket event consistent with User-to-User (U2U) authentication.
Darktrace identified this pattern as highly unusual. Cyber AI Analyst determined that the device used at least 15 different credentials for Kerberos logins over the course of the attack.
By compromising multiple credentials, the threat actor likely aimed to escalate privileges and facilitate further malicious activity, including lateral movement. One of the credentials obtained via the “UnPAC the hash” technique was later observed being used in an RDP session to the domain controller (REDACTED-dc2).
C2 / Additional tooling
At 06:44 UTC, the domain controller (REDACTED-dc2) was observed initiating a connection to temp[.]sh, a temporary cloud hosting service. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) reporting indicates that this service is commonly used by threat actors to host and distribute malicious payloads, including ransomware [13].
Shortly afterward, the ESXi device was observed downloading an executable named “vmwaretools” from the rare external endpoint 137.184.243[.]69, using the user agent “Wget.” The repeated outbound connections to this IP suggest potential command-and-control (C2) activity.
Figure 6: Cyber AI Analyst investigation into the suspicious file download and suspected C2 activity between the ESXI device and the external endpoint 137.184.243[.]69.
Figure 7: Packet capture (PCAP) of connections between the ESXi device and 137.184.243[.]69.
Data exfiltration
The first signs of data exfiltration were observed at around 7:00 UTC. Both the domain controller (REDACTED-dc2) and a likely SonicWall VPN device were seen uploading approximately 2 GB of data via SSH to the rare external endpoint 66.165.243[.]39 (AS29802 HVC-AS). OSINT sources have since identified this IP as an indicator of compromise (IoC) associated with the Akira ransomware group, known to use it for data exfiltration [14].
Figure 8: Cyber AI Analyst incident view highlighting multiple unusual events across several devices on August 20. Notably, it includes the “Unusual External Data Transfer” event, which corresponds to the anomalous 2 GB data upload to the known Akira-associated endpoint 66.165.243[.]39.
Cyber AI Analyst
Throughout the course of the attack, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst autonomously investigated the anomalous activity as it unfolded and correlated related events into a single, cohesive incident. Rather than treating each alert as isolated, Cyber AI Analyst linked them together to reveal the broader narrative of compromise. This holistic view enabled the customer to understand the full scope of the attack, including all associated activities and affected assets that might otherwise have been dismissed as unrelated.
Figure 9: Overview of Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation, correlating all related internal and external security events across affected devices into a single pane of glass.
Containing the attack
In response to the multiple anomalous activities observed across the network, Darktrace's Autonomous Response initiated targeted mitigation actions to contain the attack. These included:
Blocking connections to known malicious or rare external endpoints, such as 137.184.243[.]69, 66.165.243[.]39, and advanced-ip-scanner[.]com.
Blocking internal traffic to sensitive ports, including 88 (Kerberos), 3389 (RDP), and 49339 (DCE-RPC), to disrupt lateral movement and credential abuse.
Enforcing a block on all outgoing connections from affected devices to contain potential data exfiltration and C2 activity.
Figure 10: Autonomous Response actions taken by Darktrace on an affected device, including the blocking of malicious external endpoints and internal service ports.
Managed Detection and Response
As this customer was an MDR subscriber, multiple Enhanced Monitoring alerts—high-fidelity models designed to detect activity indicative of compromise—were triggered across the network. These alerts prompted immediate investigation by Darktrace’s SOC team.
Upon determining that the activity was likely linked to an Akira ransomware attack, Darktrace analysts swiftly acted to contain the threat. At around 08:05 UTC, devices suspected of being compromised were quarantined, and the customer was promptly notified, enabling them to begin their own remediation procedures without delay.
A wider campaign?
Darktrace’s SOC and Threat Research teams identified at least three additional incidents likely linked to the same campaign. All targeted organizations were based in the US, spanning various industries, and each have indications of using SonicWall VPN, indicating it had likely been targeted for initial access.
Across these incidents, similar patterns emerged. In each case, a suspicious executable named “vmwaretools” was downloaded from the endpoint 85.239.52[.]96 using the user agent “Wget”, bearing some resemblance to the file downloads seen in the incident described here. Data exfiltration was also observed via SSH to the endpoints 107.155.69[.]42 and 107.155.93[.]154, both of which belong to the same ASN also seen in the incident described in this blog: S29802 HVC-AS. Notably, 107.155.93[.]154 has been reported in OSINT as an indicator associated with Akira ransomware activity [15]. Further recent Akira ransomware cases have been observed involving SonicWall VPN, where no similar executable file downloads were observed, but SSH exfiltration to the same ASN was. These overlapping and non-overlapping TTPs may reflect the blurring lines between different affiliates operating under the same RaaS.
Lessons from the campaign
This campaign by Akira ransomware actors underscores the critical importance of maintaining up-to-date patching practices. Threat actors continue to exploit previously disclosed vulnerabilities, not just zero-days, highlighting the need for ongoing vigilance even after patches are released. It also demonstrates how misconfigurations and overlooked weaknesses can be leveraged for initial access or privilege escalation, even in otherwise well-maintained environments.
Darktrace’s observations further reveal that ransomware actors are increasingly relying on legitimate administrative tools, such as WinRM, to blend in with normal network activity and evade detection. In addition to previously documented Kerberos-based credential access techniques like Kerberoasting and pass-the-hash, this campaign featured the use of UnPAC the hash to extract NTLM hashes via PKINIT and U2U authentication for lateral movement or privilege escalation.
Credit to Emily Megan Lim (Senior Cyber Analyst), Vivek Rajan (Senior Cyber Analyst), Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead), and Sam Lister (Specialist Security Researcher)
Appendices
Darktrace Model Detections
Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel
Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain
Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
Anomalous Connection / Possible Data Staging and External Upload
Anomalous Connection / Rare WinRM Incoming
Anomalous Connection / Rare WinRM Outgoing
Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound
Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session
Anomalous Connection / Unusual Incoming Long Remote Desktop Session
Anomalous Connection / Unusual Incoming Long SSH Session
Anomalous Connection / Unusual Long SSH Session
Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device
Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
Compliance / Default Credential Usage
Compliance / High Priority Compliance Model Alert
Compliance / Outgoing NTLM Request from DC
Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination
Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections
Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint
Device / Anomalous Certificate Download Activity
Device / Anomalous SSH Followed By Multiple Model Alerts
Device / Anonymous NTLM Logins
Device / Attack and Recon Tools
Device / ICMP Address Scan
Device / Large Number of Model Alerts
Device / Network Range Scan
Device / Network Scan
Device / New User Agent To Internal Server
Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Brute Force
Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance
Device / RDP Scan
Device / Reverse DNS Sweep
Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity
Device / UDP Enumeration
Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint
Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer
User / Multiple Uncommon New Credentials on Device
User / New Admin Credentials on Client
User / New Admin Credentials on Server
Enhanced Monitoring Models
Compromise / Anomalous Certificate Download and Kerberos Login
Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity
Device / Large Number of Model Alerts from Critical Network Device
Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Alerts
Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity
Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer
Antigena/Autonomous Response Models
Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block