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November 29, 2020

Darktrace Cyber Analyst Investigates Sodinokibi Ransomware

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst uncovers the intricate details of a Sodinokibi ransomware attack on a retail organization. Dive into this real-time incident.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO
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29
Nov 2020

Sodinokibi is one of the most lucrative ransomware strains of 2020, with its creators, cyber-criminal gang REvil, recently claiming over $100 million in profits this year alone. The prevalent threat is known to wipe backup files, encrypt files on local shares and exfiltrate data.

Exfiltration before encryption is a technique being increasingly adopted by profit-seeking cyber-criminals, who can threaten to leak the stolen data should a target organization not comply with their demands. Sodinobiki also makes heavy use of code obfuscation and encryption techniques to evade detection by signature-based, anti-virus solutions.

Darktrace’s AI recently detected Sodinokibi targeting a retail organization in the US. Prior to this year, the company operated primarily face-to-face in physical stores, but have conducted the majority of their business in the digital realm since the onset of the pandemic.

Cyber AI Analyst automatically launched a full investigation into this incident in real time, as the attack was unfolding. The technology provided summary reports of the entire incident which the security team could immediately action for incident response. This blog explores its findings.

Sodinokibi timeline

Darktrace automatically investigated on the full scope of the Sodinokibi attack, with Cyber AI Analyst clearly identifying and summarising every stage of the attack lifecycle, which played out over the course of three weeks as below:

Figure 1: A timeline of the attack

Darktrace produced a large number of security-relevant anomalies associated with just three credentials, and displayed these along a common timeline shown below:

Figure 2: A timeline view of anomaly detections separated by users. Note the clusters of model breaches for the compromised credentials leading up to October 14.

While a human analyst might have been able to identify these unusual patterns and investigate what caused the clusters of anomalous activity, this process would have taken precious hours during a crisis. Cyber AI Analyst automatically performed the same analysis using supervised machine learning trained on Darktrace’s world-leading analysts, generating meaningful summaries of each stage of the event in real time, as the incident unfolded.

REvil ransomware attack

The following events occurred during a free trial period, and Darktrace was not being actively monitored. Its Autonomous Response technology, Darktrace Antigena, was installed in passive mode, and in the absence of automatic interference at an early stage, this compromise was allowed to unfold without interruption. However, with Darktrace’s AI learning normal ‘patterns of life’ for every device in the background, identifying anomalies, and launching an automated investigation into the attack, we are able to go back into the Threat Visualizer and see how the incident unfolded.

The attack began when the credentials of a highly privileged member of the retail organization’s IT team were compromised. REvil is known to make use of phishing emails, exploit kits, server vulnerabilities, and compromised MSP networks for initial intrusion.

In this case, the attacker used the IT credential to compromise a domain controller and exfiltrate data directly after initial reconnaissance. Darktrace’s AI detected the attacker logging into the domain controller via SMB, writing suspicious files and then deleting batch scripts and log files in the root directory to clear their tracks.

The domain controller then made connections to several rare external endpoints, and Darktrace witnessed a 28MB upload that was likely exfiltration of initial reconnaissance data. Four days later, the attacker connected to the same endpoint (sadstat[.]com) – likely a stager download for C2, which was then initiated via connections on port 443 later that same day.

A week on from the intial C2 connection, a SQL server was detected engaging in network scanning as the attacker sought to move laterally in search of sensitive and valuable data. Over the course of two weeks, Darktrace witnessed unusual internal RDP connections using administrative credentials, before data was uploaded to multiple cloud storage endpoints as well as an SSH server. PsExec was used to deploy the ransomware, resulting in file encryption.

The evasive nature of modern ransomware

REvil started with an inherent advantage in that they were armed with the credentials of a highly privileged IT admin. Nevertheless, they still made several attempts to evade traditional, signature-based tools, such as ‘Living off the Land’ – using common tools such PsExec, WMI, RDP to blend into to legitimate activity.

They leveraged frequently-used cloud storage solutions like Dropbox and pCloud for data transfer, and they conducted SSH on port 443, blending in with SSL connections on the same port. They used a newly-registered domain for C2 communication, meaning Open Source Intelligence Tools (OSINT) were blind to the threat.

Finally, the malware itself was evasive in that it made use of code obfuscation and encryption, and had no need for a system library or API imports. This is the basis for most modern ransomware attacks, and the reality is signature-based tools cannot keep up. Darktrace’s AI not only detected the anomalous activity associated with every stage of the attack, but generated fleshed-out summaries of each stage of the attack with Cyber AI Analyst.

Cyber AI Analyst: Real-time incident reporting

Between September 21 and October 12, Cyber AI Analyst created 15 incidents, investigating dozens of point detections and creating a coherent attack narrative.

Figure 3: Cyber AI Incident log of the first compromised DC. This incident tab details the connections to sadstat[.]com

Figure 4: The DC establishes C2 to the first GHOSTnet GmbH IP

Figure 5: This incident tab highlights the file encryption of files on network shares

Figure 6: Darktrace surfaces the IT admin account takeover

Figure 7: Example of a client type device involved in extensive administrative RDP and SMB activity, as well as data uploads to Dropbox (this upload to Dropbox occurs few seconds before file encryption begins)

REvil vs AI

This Sodinokibi ransomware attack slipped under the radar of a range of traditional tools deployed by the retail organization. However, despite the threat dwelling in the retail organization’s digital environment for over a month, and REvil using local tools to blend in to regular traffic, from Darktrace’s perspective these actions were noisy in comparison to the organization’s normal ‘pattern of life’, setting off a series of alerts and investigations.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to autonomously investigate nearly every attack phase of the ransomware. The technology works around the clock, without requiring training or time off, and can often reduce hours or days of incident response into just minutes, reducing time to triage by up to 92% and augmenting the capabilities of the human security team.

Thanks to Darktrace analyst Joel Lee for his insights on the above threat find.

Learn more about Cyber AI Analyst

Darktrace model detections:

  • Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel
  • Anomalous Connection / Data Sent To New External Device
  • Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain
  • Anomalous Connection / High Volume of New or Uncommon Service Control
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound
  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session
  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device
  • Compliance / SMB Drive Write
  • Compliance / Possible Tor Usage
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity
  • Device / ICMP Address Scan
  • Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches
  • Device / Network Scan
  • Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity
  • Device / New or Unusual Remote Command Execution
  • Device / RDP Scan
  • Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity
  • Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual Internal Connections
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO

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November 28, 2025

From Amazon to Louis Vuitton: How Darktrace Detects Black Friday Phishing Attacks

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Why Black Friday Drives a Surge in Phishing Attacks

In recent years, Black Friday has shifted from a single day of online retail sales and discounts to an extended ‘Black Friday Week’, often preceded by weeks of online hype. During this period, consumers are inundated with promotional emails and marketing campaigns as legitimate retailers compete for attention.

Unsurprisingly, this surge in legitimate communications creates an ideal environment for threat actors to launch targeted phishing campaigns designed to mimic legitimate retail emails. These campaigns often employ social engineering techniques that exploit urgency, exclusivity, and consumer trust in well-known brands, tactics designed to entice recipients into opening emails and clicking on malicious links.

Additionally, given the seasonal nature of Black Friday and the ever-changing habits of consumers, attackers adopt new tactics and register fresh domains each year, rather than reusing domains previously flagged as spam or phishing endpoints. While this may pose a challenge for traditional email security tools, it presents no such difficulty for Darktrace / EMAIL and its anomaly-based approach.

In the days and weeks leading up to ‘Black Friday’, Darktrace observed a spike in sophisticated phishing campaigns targeting consumers, demonstrating how attackers combine phycological manipulation with technical evasion to bypass basic security checks during this high-traffic period. This blog showcases several notable examples of highly convincing phishing emails detected and contained by Darktrace / EMAIL in mid to late November 2025.

Darktrace’s Black Friday Detections

Brand Impersonation: Deal Watchdogs’ Amazon Deals

The impersonation major online retailers has become a common tactic in retail-focused attacks, none more so than Amazon, which ranked as the fourth most impersonated brand in 2024, only behind Microsoft, Apple, Google, and Facebook [1]. Darktrace’s own research found Amazon to be the most mimicked brand, making up 80% of phishing attacks in its analysis of global consumer brands.

When faced with an email that appears to come from a trusted sender like Amazon, recipients are far more likely to engage, increasing the success rate of these phishing campaigns.

In one case observed on November 16, Darktrace detected an email with the subject line “NOW LIVE: Amazon’s Best Early Black Friday Deals on Gadgets Under $60”. The email was sent to a customer by the sender ‘Deal Watchdogs’, in what appeared to be an attempt to masquerade as a legitimate discount-finding platform. No evidence indicated that the company was legitimate. In fact, the threat actor made no attempt to create a convincing name, and the domain appeared to be generated by a domain generation algorithm (DGA), as shown in Figure 2.

Although the email was sent by ‘Deal Watchdogs’, it attempted to impersonate Amazon by featuring realistic branding, including the Amazon logo and a shade of orange similar to that used by them for the ‘CLICK HERE’ button and headline text.

Figure 1: The contents of the email observed by Darktrace, featuring authentic-looking Amazon branding.

Darktrace identified that the email, marked as urgent by the sender, contained a suspicious link to a Google storage endpoint (storage.googleapis[.]com), which had been hidden by the text “CLICK HERE”. If clicked, the link could have led to a credential harvester or served as a delivery vector for a malicious payload hosted on the Google storage platform.

Fortunately, Darktrace immediately identified the suspicious nature of this email and held it before delivery, preventing recipients from ever receiving or interacting with the malicious content.

Figure 2: Darktrace / EMAIL’s detection of the malicious phishing email sent to a customer.

Around the same time, Darktrace detected a similar email attempting to spoof Amazon on another customer’s network with the subject line “Our 10 Favorite Deals on Amazon That Started Today”, also sent by ‘Deal Watchdogs,’ suggesting a broader campaign.

Analysis revealed that this email originated from the domain petplatz[.]com, a fake marketing domain previously linked to spam activity according to open-source intelligence (OSINT) [2].

Brand Impersonation: Louis Vuitton

A few days later, on November 20, Darktrace / EMAIL detected a phishing email attempting to impersonate the luxury fashion brand Louis Vuitton. At first glance, the email, sent under the name ‘Louis Vuitton’ and titled “[Black Friday 2025] Discover Your New Favorite Louis Vuitton Bag – Elegance Starts Here”, appeared to be a legitimate Black Friday promotion. However, Darktrace’s analysis uncovered several red flags indicating a elaborate brand impersonation attempt.

The email was not sent by Louis Vuitton but by rskkqxyu@bookaaatop[.]ru, a Russia-based domain never before observed on the customer’s network. Darktrace flagged this as suspicious, noting that .ru domains were highly unusual for this recipient’s environment, further reinforcing the likelihood of malicious intent. Subsequent analysis revealed that the domain had only recently registered and was flagged as malicious by multiple OSINT sources [3].

Figure 3: Darktrace / EMAIL’s detection of the malicious email attempting to spoofLouis Vuitton, originating from a suspicious Russia-based domain.

Darktrace further noted that the email contained a highly suspicious link hidden behind the text “View Collection” and “Unsubscribe,” ensuring that any interaction, whether visiting the supposed ‘handbag store’ or attempting to opt out of marketing emails, would direct recipients to the same endpoint. The link resolved to xn--80aaae9btead2a[.]xn--p1ai (топааабоок[.]рф), a domain confirmed as malicious by multiple OSINT sources [4]. At the time of analysis, the domain was inaccessible, likely due to takedown efforts or the short-lived nature of the campaign.

Darktrace / EMAIL blocked this email before it reached customer inboxes, preventing recipients from interacting with the malicious content and averting any disruption.

Figure 4: The suspicious domain linked in the Louis Vuitton phishing email, now defunct.

Too good to be true?

Aside from spoofing well-known brands, threat actors frequently lure consumers with “too good to be true” luxury offers, a trend Darktrace observed in multiple cases throughout November.

In one instance, Darktrace identified an email with the subject line “[Black Friday 2025] Luxury Watches Starting at $250.” Emails contained a malicious phishing link, hidden behind text like “Rolex Starting from $250”, “Shop Now”, and “Unsubscribe”.

Figure 5: Example of a phishing email detected by Darktrace, containing malicious links concealed behind seemingly innocuous text.

Similarly to the Louis Vuitton email campaign described above, this malicious link led to a .ru domain (hxxps://x.wwwtopsalebooks[.]ru/.../d65fg4er[.]html), which had been flagged as malicious by multiple sources [5].

Figure 6: Darktrace / EMAIL’s detection of a malicious email promoting a fake luxury watch store, which was successfully held from recipient inboxes.

If accessed, this domain would redirect users to luxy-rox[.]com, a recently created domain (15 days old at the time of writing) that has also been flagged as malicious by OSINT sources [6]. When visited, the redirect domain displayed a convincing storefront advertising high-end watches at heavily discounted prices.

Figure 7: The fake storefront presented upon visiting the redirectdomain, luxy-rox[.]com.

Although the true intent of this domain could not be confirmed, it was likely a scam site or a credential-harvesting operation, as users were required to create an account to complete a purchase. As of the time or writing, the domain in no longer accessible .

This email illustrates a layered evasion tactic: attackers employed multiple domains, rapid domain registration, and concealed redirects to bypass detection. By leveraging luxury branding and urgency-driven discounts, the campaign sought to exploit seasonal shopping behaviors and entice victims into clicking.

Staying Protected During Seasonal Retail Scams

The investigation into these Black Friday-themed phishing emails highlights a clear trend: attackers are exploiting seasonal shopping events with highly convincing campaigns. Common tactics observed include brand impersonation (Amazon, Louis Vuitton, luxury watch brands), urgency-driven subject lines, and hidden malicious links often hosted on newly registered domains or cloud services.

These campaigns frequently use redirect chains, short-lived infrastructure, and psychological hooks like exclusivity and luxury appeal to bypass user scepticism and security filters. Organizations should remain vigilant during retail-heavy periods, reinforcing user awareness training, link inspection practices, and anomaly-based detection to mitigate these evolving threats.

Credit to Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead) and Owen Finn (Cyber Analyst)

Appendices

References

1.        https://keepnetlabs.com/blog/top-5-most-spoofed-brands-in-2024

2.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/petplatz.com

3.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/bookaaatop.ru

4.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/xn--80aaae9btead2a.xn--p1ai

5.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/e2b868a74531cd779d8f4a0e1e610ec7f4efae7c29d8b8ab32c7a6740d770897?nocache=1

6.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/luxy-rox.com

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC – Type – Description + Confidence

petplatz[.]com – Hostname – Spam domain

bookaaatop[.]ru – Hostname – Malicious Domain

xn--80aaae9btead2a[.]xn--p1ai (топааабоок[.]рф) – Hostname - Malicious Domain

hxxps://x.wwwtopsalebooks[.]ru/.../d65fg4er[.]html) – URL – Malicious Domain

luxy-rox[.]com – Hostname -  Malicious Domain

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping  

Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique  

Initial Access - Phishing – (T1566)  

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About the author
Ryan Traill
Analyst Content Lead

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November 27, 2025

CastleLoader & CastleRAT: Behind TAG150’s Modular Malware Delivery System

CastleLoader & CastleRAT: Behind TAG150’s Modular Malware Delivery SystemDefault blog imageDefault blog image

What is TAG-150?

TAG-150, a relatively new Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) operator, has been active since March 2025, demonstrating rapid development and an expansive, evolving infrastructure designed to support its malicious operations. The group employs two custom malware families, CastleLoader and CastleRAT, to compromise target systems, with a primary focus on the United States [1]. TAG-150’s infrastructure included numerous victim-facing components, such as IP addresses and domains functioning as command-and-control (C2) servers associated with malware families like SecTopRAT and WarmCookie, in addition to CastleLoader and CastleRAT [2].

As of May 2025, CastleLoader alone had infected a reported 469 devices, underscoring the scale and sophistication of TAG-150’s campaign [1].

What are CastleLoader and CastleRAT?

CastleLoader is a loader malware, primarily designed to download and install additional malware, enabling chain infections across compromised systems [3]. TAG-150 employs a technique known as ClickFix, which uses deceptive domains that mimic document verification systems or browser update notifications to trick victims into executing malicious scripts. Furthermore, CastleLoader leverages fake GitHub repositories that impersonate legitimate tools as a distribution method, luring unsuspecting users into downloading and installing malware on their devices [4].

CastleRAT, meanwhile, is a remote access trojan (RAT) that serves as one of the primary payloads delivered by CastleLoader. Once deployed, CastleRAT grants attackers extensive control over the compromised system, enabling capabilities such as keylogging, screen capturing, and remote shell access.

TAG-150 leverages CastleLoader as its initial delivery mechanism, with CastleRAT acting as the main payload. This two-stage attack strategy enhances the resilience and effectiveness of their operations by separating the initial infection vector from the final payload deployment.

How are they deployed?

Castleloader uses code-obfuscation methods such as dead-code insertion and packing to hinder both static and dynamic analysis. After the payload is unpacked, it connects to its command-and-control server to retrieve and running additional, targeted components.

Its modular architecture enables it to function both as a delivery mechanism and a staging utility, allowing threat actors to decouple the initial infection from payload deployment. CastleLoader typically delivers its payloads as Portable Executables (PEs) containing embedded shellcode. This shellcode activates the loader’s core module, which then connects to the C2 server to retrieve and execute the next-stage malware.[6]

Following this, attackers deploy the ClickFix technique, impersonating legitimate software distribution platforms like Google Meet or browser update notifications. These deceptive sites trick victims into copying and executing PowerShell commands, thereby initiating the infection kill chain. [1]

When a user clicks on a spoofed Cloudflare “Verification Stepprompt, a background request is sent to a PHP script on the distribution domain (e.g., /s.php?an=0). The server’s response is then automatically copied to the user’s clipboard using the ‘unsecuredCopyToClipboard()’ function. [7].

The Python-based variant of CastleRAT, known as “PyNightShade,” has been engineered with stealth in mind, showing minimal detection across antivirus platforms [2]. As illustrated in Figure 1, PyNightShade communicates with the geolocation API service ip-api[.]com, demonstrating both request and response behavior

Packet Capture (PCAP) of PyNightShade, the Python-based variant of CastleRAT, communicating with the geolocation API service ip-api[.]com.
Figure 1: Packet Capture (PCAP) of PyNightShade, the Python-based variant of CastleRAT, communicating with the geolocation API service ip-api[.]com.

Darktrace Coverage

In mid-2025, Darktrace observed a range of anomalous activities across its customer base that appeared linked to CastleLoader, including the example below from a US based organization.

The activity began on June 26, when a device on the customer’s network was observed connecting to the IP address 173.44.141[.]89, a previously unseen IP for this network along with the use of multiple user agents, which was also rare for the user.  It was later determined that the IP address was a known indicator of compromise (IoC) associated with TAG-150’s CastleRAT and CastleLoader operations [2][5].

Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of a device making unusual connections to the malicious endpoint 173.44.141[.]89.

The device was observed downloading two scripts from this endpoint, namely ‘/service/download/data_5x.bin’ and ‘/service/download/data_6x.bin’, which have both been linked to CastleLoader infections by open-source intelligence (OSINT) [8]. The archives contains embedded shellcode, which enables attackers to execute arbitrary code directly in memory, bypassing disk writes and making detection by endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools significantly more difficult [2].

 Darktrace’s detection of two scripts from the malicious endpoint.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of two scripts from the malicious endpoint.

In addition to this, the affected device exhibited a high volume of internal connections to a broad range of endpoints, indicating potential scanning activity. Such behavior is often associated with reconnaissance efforts aimed at mapping internal infrastructure.

Darktrace / NETWORK correlated these behaviors and generated an Enhanced Monitoring model, a high-fidelity security model designed to detect activity consistent with the early stages of an attack. These high-priority models are continuously monitored and triaged by Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) as part of the Managed Threat Detection and Managed Detection & Response services, ensuring that subscribed customers are promptly alerted to emerging threats.

Darktrace detected an unusual ZIP file download alongside the anomalous script, followed by internal connectivity. This activity was correlated under an Enhanced Monitoring model.
Figure 4: Darktrace detected an unusual ZIP file download alongside the anomalous script, followed by internal connectivity. This activity was correlated under an Enhanced Monitoring model.

Darktrace Autonomous Response

Fortunately, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was fully configured, enabling it to take immediate action against the offending device by blocking any further connections external to the malicious endpoint, 173.44.141[.]89. Additionally, Darktrace enforced a ‘group pattern of life’ on the device, restricting its behavior to match other devices in its peer group, ensuring it could not deviate from expected activity, while also blocking connections over 443, shutting down any unwanted internal scanning.

Figure 5: Actions performed by Darktrace’s Autonomous Response to contain the ongoing attack.

Conclusion

The rise of the MaaS ecosystem, coupled with attackers’ growing ability to customize tools and techniques for specific targets, is making intrusion prevention increasingly challenging for security teams. Many threat actors now leverage modular toolkits, dynamic infrastructure, and tailored payloads to evade static defenses and exploit even minor visibility gaps. In this instance, Darktrace demonstrated its capability to counter these evolving tactics by identifying early-stage attack chain behaviors such as network scanning and the initial infection attempt. Autonomous Response then blocked the CastleLoader IP delivering the malicious ZIP payload, halting the attack before escalation and protecting the organization from a potentially damaging multi-stage compromise

Credit to Ahmed Gardezi (Cyber Analyst) Tyler Rhea (Senior Cyber Analyst)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Connections
  • Anomalous File / Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location
  • Initial Attack Chain Activity (Enhanced Monitoring Model)

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T15588.001 - Resource Development – Malware
  • TG1599 – Defence Evasion – Network Boundary Bridging
  • T1046 – Discovery – Network Service Scanning
  • T1189 – Initial Access

List of IoCs
IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

  • 173.44.141[.]89 – IP – CastleLoader C2 Infrastructure
  • 173.44.141[.]89/service/download/data_5x.bin – URI – CastleLoader Script
  • 173.44.141[.]89/service/download/data_6x.bin – URI  - CastleLoader Script
  • wsc.zip – ZIP file – Possible Payload

References

[1] - https://blog.polyswarm.io/castleloader

[2] - https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/from-castleloader-to-castlerat-tag-150-advances-operations

[3] - https://www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/34160-castleloader-malware

[4] - https://www.scworld.com/brief/malware-loader-castleloader-targets-devices-via-fake-github-clickfix-phishing

[5] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/173.44.141.89/community

[6] https://thehackernews.com/2025/07/castleloader-malware-infects-469.html

[7] https://www.cryptika.com/new-castleloader-attack-using-cloudflare-themed-clickfix-technique-to-infect-windows-computers/

[8] https://www.cryptika.com/castlebot-malware-as-a-service-deploys-range-of-payloads-linked-to-ransomware-attacks/

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