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October 20, 2025

Salt Typhoon侵入事例に対するダークトレースの視点

中国に関係のあるサイバー諜報グループ、Salt TyphoonがDLLサイドローディングやゼロデイエクスプロイト等のステルス手法を使って世界的なインフラを狙っていることが確認されました。ダークトレースは最近Salt Typhoonの戦術と一致する初期の侵入アクティビティを検知しました。これは国家が支援する執拗な脅威に対する防御において従来のシグネチャベースの手法ではなく異常ベースの検知が重要であることを裏付けています。
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher
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20
Oct 2025

Salt Typhoonとは?

Salt Typhoonは、現在世界のインフラを狙っている最も執拗かつ巧妙なサイバー脅威の1つです。国家が支援する中国のアクターとされるこのAPT(Advanced Persistent Threat)グループは、主に米国の通信プロバイダー、エネルギーネットワーク、政府システムを標的とした、ー連のインパクトの大きいキャンペーンを実行しています。

少なくとも2019年から活動しており、Earth Estries、GhostEmperor、UNC2286としても記録されているこのグループは、エッジデバイスのエクスプロイトに高度な能力を示し、深い永続性を維持しつつ80か国以上において機密性の高いデータの抜き出しを行っています。公になっている被害の報告はほとんど米国の標的に集中していますが、Salt TyphoonのオペレーションはEMEA(ヨーロッパ、中東、アフリカ)地域にも拡大し、通信、政府機関、テクノロジー企業等が標的とされています。カスタムマルウェアの使用、およびインパクトの大きい脆弱性のエクスプロイト(例: Ivanti、Fortinet、Cisco等)は、インテリジェンス収集と地政学的影響を組み合わせたこのグループの戦略的性質を表しています [1]。

ゼロデイエクスプロイト、難読化テクニック、水平移動戦術を駆使することにより、Salt Typhoonは検知を回避し機密性の高い環境に長期間のアクセスを維持することのできる、恐るべき能力を実証しています。このグループのオペレーションにより合法的傍受システムが露出し、数百万のユーザーのメタデータが漏洩、必要不可欠なサービスの中断を招き、世界中で情報機関と民間パートナーの協調した対応が促されました。組織が自社の脅威モデルを評価するなかで、Salt Typhoonは国家が支援するサイバーオペレーションの進化と、積極的な防御戦略が緊急に必要であることをはっきりと思い出させる存在です。

Darktraceのカバレッジ

Darktraceはヨーロッパの通信企業において、DLLサイドローディングと正規のソフトウェアの悪用によるステルス性維持と実行を含む、Salt Typhoonのものとして知られているTTP(戦術、技法、手順)を確認しました。

初期アクセス

侵入は2025年7月、CVE-2025-5777のエクスプロイトから始まりました。これはCitrix NetScaler Gatewayアプライアンスに影響する脆弱性です。脅威アクターはここから、クライアントのMCS(Machine Creation Services)サービス内の Citrix VDA(Virtual Delivery Agent)ホストに移動しました。この侵入の初期のアクセス活動はSoftEther VPNサービスと関連するとみられるエンドポイントから発生しており、最初からインフラ難読化が行われていたことがわかります。

ツール

Darktraceはその後、この脅威アクターが複数のCitrix VDAホストに対し、高い確率でSNAPPYBEE(Deed RATとしても知られる) [2][3] であるとみられるバックドアを設置したことを検知しました。このバックドアはこれらの内部エンドポイントに対して、Norton Antivirus、Bkav Antivirus、IObit Malware Fighterなどのアンチウイルスソフトウェアの正規の実行形式ファイルと共にDLLとして仕掛けられました。このアクティビティのパターンは、攻撃者が正規のアンチウイルスソフトウェアを使ったDLLサイドローディングによりペイロードを実行しようとしたことを示しています。Salt Typhoonおよび類似のグループは過去にもこのテクニックを使用してきており[4][5]、これにより信頼されるソフトウェアの陰でペイロードを実行し従来型のセキュリティコントロールを回避することを可能にしています。

コマンド&コントロール(C2)

この脅威アクターが設置したバックドアはLightNode VPSエンドポイントをC2に使用し、HTTPと不明なTCPベースのプロトコルの両方を使って通信していました。このように二重のチャネルを使っていることは、Salt Typhoonが非標準プロトコルを多層的に使用して検知を回避することで知られていることと一致しています。バックドアに表示されたHTTP通信には、Internet Explorerの User-Agentヘッダーを持つPOSTリクエストや“/17ABE7F017ABE7F0” のようなTarget URIパターンが含まれていました。侵害されたエンドポイントが接続したC2ホストの1つはaar.gandhibludtric[.]com (38.54.63[.]75)であり、最近Salt Typhoonとの関連が確認されたドメインです[6]。

検知のタイムライン

Darktraceは侵入の初期段階に対して高確度の検知結果を生成しました。初期のツール使用とC2アクティビティは、Darktrace Cyber AI AnalystTMによる調査と、Darktraceのモデルの両方によって明確にカバーされていました。脅威アクターが高度であったにもかかわらず、侵入アクティビティはこれらの攻撃の初期段階から先へ進展する前に識別され、修正されました。Darktraceのタイムリーかつ高確度の検知が脅威の無害化に重要な役割を果たしたものと思われます。

Cyber AI Analystの知見

Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst は侵入の初期段階においてDarktraceが検知したモデルアラートを自律的に調査しました。この調査を通じ、Cyber AI Analystは初期のツール使用とC2イベントを突き止め、これらをつなぎ合わせて攻撃の進行を表す1つのインシデントにまとめました。

Cyber AI Analyst weaved together separate events from the intrusion into broader incidents summarizing the attacker’s progression.
図1: Cyber AI Analystは侵入アクティビティからの個別のイベントをつなぎ合わせて全体のインシデントを作成し、攻撃の進行状況を示しました。

まとめ

TTPやステージングパターン、インフラ、マルウェアの共通点に基づき、ダークトレースは一定の確信を持って観察されたアクティビティがSalt Typhoon/Earth Estries (ALA GhostEmperor/UNC2286)と一致していると評価しました。Salt Typhoonは引き続きそのステルス性、永続性、正規ツールの悪用によって防御者を悩ませています。攻撃者が通常のオペレーションに紛れ込もうとする傾向が高まるなかで、かすかな逸脱を識別し分散したシグナルを相関付けるには、動作の異常を検知することが不可欠となります。Salt Typhoonの特徴である変化する手法、そして信頼されるソフトウェアやインフラを別の目的に使用する能力により、従来の手法だけでは今後も検知が難しいことが確実です。この侵入インシデントは積極的な防御の重要性を示しており、そこではシグネチャの照合だけにとどまらない異常ベースの検知が、初期段階のアクティビティを明らかにする上で決定的な役割を果たします。

本稿の執筆には Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, FCISO)、Sam Lister(Specialist Security Researcher)、Emma Foulger(Global Threat Research Operations Lead)、Adam Potter(Senior Cyber Analystが協力しました。

編集:Ryan Traill(Analyst Content Lead)

付録

侵害インジケータ(IoC)

IoC-タイプ-説明 + 確度

89.31.121[.]101 – IP Address – Possible C2 server

hxxp://89.31.121[.]101:443/WINMM.dll - URI – Likely SNAPPYBEE download

b5367820cd32640a2d5e4c3a3c1ceedbbb715be2 - SHA1 – Likely SNAPPYBEE download

hxxp://89.31.121[.]101:443/NortonLog.txt - URI - Likely DLL side-loading activity

hxxp://89.31.121[.]101:443/123.txt - URI - Possible DLL side-loading activity

hxxp://89.31.121[.]101:443/123.tar - URI - Possible DLL side-loading activity

hxxp://89.31.121[.]101:443/pdc.exe - URI - Possible DLL side-loading activity

hxxp://89.31.121[.]101:443//Dialog.dat - URI - Possible DLL side-loading activity

hxxp://89.31.121[.]101:443/fltLib.dll - URI - Possible DLL side-loading activity

hxxp://89.31.121[.]101:443/DisplayDialog.exe - URI - Possible DLL side-loading activity

hxxp://89.31.121[.]101:443/DgApi.dll - URI - Likely DLL side-loading activity

hxxp://89.31.121[.]101:443/dbindex.dat - URI - Likely DLL side-loading activity

hxxp://89.31.121[.]101:443/1.txt - URI - Possible DLL side-loading activity

hxxp://89.31.121[.]101:443/imfsbDll.dll – Likely DLL side-loading activity

hxxp://89.31.121[.]101:443/imfsbSvc.exe - URI – Likely DLL side-loading activity

aar.gandhibludtric[.]com – Hostname – Likely C2 server

38.54.63[.]75 – IP – Likely C2 server

156.244.28[.]153 – IP – Possible C2 server

hxxp://156.244.28[.]153/17ABE7F017ABE7F0 - URI – Possible C2 activity

MITRE TTP

テクニック | 説明

T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application - Citrix NetScaler Gateway compromise

T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer – Delivery of backdoor to internal hosts

T1665 | Hide Infrastructure – Use of SoftEther VPN for C2

T1574.001 | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL – Execution of backdoor through DLL side-loading

T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol – Unidentified application-layer protocol for C2 traffic

T1071.001| Web Protocols – HTTP-based C2 traffic

T1571| Non-Standard Port – Port 443 for unencrypted HTTP traffic

侵入時のDarktraceモデルアラート

Anomalous File::Internal::Script from Rare Internal Location

Anomalous File::EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous File::Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

Anomalous Connection::Possible Callback URL

Antigena::Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious File Block

Antigena::Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Significant Server Anomaly Block

Antigena::Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

Antigena::Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

Antigena::Network::External Threat::Antigena File then New Outbound Block  

参考文献

[1] https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa25-239a

[2] https://www.trendmicro.com/en_gb/research/24/k/earth-estries.html

[3] https://www.trendmicro.com/content/dam/trendmicro/global/en/research/24/k/earth-estries/IOC_list-EarthEstries.txt

[4] https://www.trendmicro.com/en_gb/research/24/k/breaking-down-earth-estries-persistent-ttps-in-prolonged-cyber-o.html

[5] https://lab52.io/blog/deedrat-backdoor-enhanced-by-chinese-apts-with-advanced-capabilities/

[6] https://www.silentpush.com/blog/salt-typhoon-2025/

このブログで提供されるコンテンツはダークトレースが一般的な情報提供の目的でのみ公開するものであり、サイバーセキュリティに関するトピック、傾向、インシデント、出来事についての、公開の時点における当社の理解を反映したものです。当社は内容の正確性と重要性の担保に努めていますが、情報は明示的暗黙的を問わず、何らの表明あるいは保証も伴わわない「そのまま」の状態で提供されるものです。ダークトレースは本書に含まれる情報の完全性、正確性、信頼性、適時性について何らの責任も負わず、すべての保証を明示的に否認します。

本ブログに含まれるいかなる内容も法的、技術的、技術的助言を構成するものではなく、読者は本書に含まれる情報に基づいて行動する前に資格を持った専門家に相談されることをお勧めします。第三者の組織、技術、脅威アクター、インシデントに対する言及は情報目的のみであり、提携、承認、推奨を暗に意味するものではありません。

ダークトレース、その関連会社、従業員、あるいは代理人は、本ブログの情報の使用またはこれに対する信頼により生じた、いかなる損失、損害、危害についても責任を負いません。

サイバーセキュリティを取り巻く環境は急激に変化しており、ブログの内容は古くなるあるいは新しいものに代替される可能性があります。当社は任意のコンテンツを更新、変更、あるいは削除する権利を留保します。

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher

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July 31, 2026

Building Operational Resilience Across Mission-Critical Marine Services

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Mission-Critical Marine Services

This marine organization supports offshore energy production, export infrastructure, and regional logistics, delivering critical services through its diverse fleet and a regional shorebase footprint. To power rapid mobilization and 24/7 operational readiness, the organization has embraced cloud adoption and digital transformation, reshaping how crews, contractors, and shore-based teams access services.

While technology modernization has enhanced operations, it has also introduced new security complexities.

  • From perimeter to identity: As access becomes more distributed, identity has become the primary security control, elevating the risk of credential compromise and privilege misuse.
  • From confidentiality to availability and resilience: As cloud platforms increasingly underpin fleet and operational systems, cyber incidents can disrupt services and safety.
  • From isolated tools to unified visibility:  Because Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) often intersect, and legacy systems coexist with modern cloud platforms, fragmented monitoring makes it harder to understand risk and respond decisively across domains.
“Our cybersecurity priorities expanded along with our business goals, placing availability and resilience at the forefront. The impact of a potential threat became an operational risk, which elevated cybersecurity from an IT issue to an operational safety and resilience enabler.” - Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Manager.

A Unified, AI-Driven Platform for IT and OT

To strengthen visibility, detection, and response across its highly distributed environment, the customer adopted the Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platform™ in 2022.

Darktrace’s contextual detection capability was a key driver. Unlike traditional tools that rely on known threat signatures, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI learns “normal” behavior to identify emerging threats and correlate visibility across the customer's siloed on-premises and cloud domains.

Today, the customer relies on:

  • Darktrace / EMAIL™ to reduce phishing risk and minimize disruption from legacy mail controls and false positives
  • Darktrace / IDENTITY™ to support identity-centric security as cloud access expands across vessels and shore-based operations
  • Darktrace / NETWORK™ to strengthen oversight across the broader environment, including operational contexts where IT and OT intersect
  • Darktrace / CLOUD™ (Azure), added in 2024, to extend detection and response into Azure and support cloud transformation without treating cloud as a separate security silo
  • Darktrace / Incident Readiness & Recovery to strengthen incident readiness and recovery planning
  • Darktrace Managed Detection and Response Services to provide 24/7/365 monitoring and support

This combination supports a single operating model for the customer: security that can adapt as the environment changes while remaining practical for a lean team responsible for safeguarding both business operations and safety-critical services.

Extending cloud protection without complexity

As the customer accelerated cloud adoption, it expanded coverage in 2024 with Darktrace / CLOUD for Azure to bring cloud workloads under the same AI-driven visibility and response model – without adding operational burden. “This matters in hybrid environments because attacks rarely stay in one place,” explains the ICT Manager. “A compromised identity can trigger activity in the cloud, which can open pathways back into on-premises systems.”

In parallel, Darktrace / CLOUD’s posture management capabilities support governance and audit readiness by surfacing misconfigurations and exposure risks earlier, before they become incidents.

A Stronger, Faster, More Resilient Business

Since adopting Darktrace, the customer has strengthened cyber resilience while reducing operational burden on its small ICT team.

Darktrace continuously analyzes millions of individual events that can contribute to a wider incident. Within a single month, the solution autonomously investigated 88% of all potential threats, taking appropriate action within just 39.4 seconds on average.

Autonomous capabilities ensure threats are stopped and contained until the ICT team can investigate. In one standout instance, Darktrace autonomously blocked malicious links during a mass phishing/spam event before other controls flagged the threat. the ICT Manager later confirmed Microsoft reported the link as malicious, but Darktrace had already acted to prevent delivery and reduce exposure.

“Whether something happens during off hours, while we’re on vacation, or when our attention is focused elsewhere, we’re confident Darktrace will take control and stop a threat before it spreads,” says the ICT Manager.

Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI combines multiple AI methods and advanced techniques to improve threat detection, investigation, and response dramatically reducing alert overload and manual triage. Within a single month, the solution saved the customer's IT group 411 equivalent human investigation hours.

“For a lean team supporting a 24/7 operational footprint, this autonomous action eliminates the constant firefighting and stress, giving us the space to focus on higher-value priorities.”- Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Manager.

Protecting communications without disruption

the customer experienced friction from legacy email and network controls prior to Darktrace, which generated high false positive rates, disrupted legitimate communications, created operational drag, and added workload for ICT. With Darktrace / EMAIL learning normal email behavior and applying context-aware actions, the team reduced unnecessary interruptions while maintaining protection.

“That shift matters in marine services, where business communications directly support coordination across vessels, shore bases, clients, ports, and regulators,” says the ICT Manager. “Darktrace doesn’t just block more threats, it autonomously makes decisions that preserve operational continuity and enable my team to focus on credible threats instead of chasing volume.”

Delivering clarity and confidence

Darktrace has reduced manual triage by correlating activity across email, identity, network, and cloud, providing the context needed to prioritize what matters without requiring the ICT team to stitch together evidence across multiple tools.

“With unified visibility we can identify patterns across domains, make informed decisions about where risk actually exists, and align security actions with operational impact rather than theoretical threats,” explains the ICT Manager. “I can now prioritize effort and investment across our ICT landscape with far greater confidence.”

Regular Executive Threat Reports reinforce operational confidence by giving leadership clear visibility into threats Darktrace has handled autonomously, supporting decisive action when needed and confidence to avoid unnecessary disruption when it isn’t.

Scaling Securely in a Hybrid World

As the customer advances its cloud transformation, the ICT Manager sees the Darktrace partnership evolving into a foundational layer of resilience and assurance, supporting scale, governance, and operational confidence in an increasingly cloud-centric environment.

Key priorities include:

  • Shifting from hybrid visibility to cloud-first resilience, using continuous monitoring and posture insights to reduce exposure earlier
  • Strengthening governance and audit readiness, especially as critical workloads and sensitive data expand in Azure and expectations rise under regulatory and client assurance requirements
  • Increasing reliance on autonomous response and AI investigation as the number of identities, workloads, and access paths grows faster than headcount
  • Deepening cross-domain correlation so cloud signals further enrich decision-making, supporting faster containment and more confident prioritization

“As we accelerate our cloud strategy, Darktrace will play an even more strategic role,” says the ICT Manager, “providing the guidance, technology, and expertise that allow us to grow with confidence and innovate securely.”

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July 28, 2026

Hiding in Plain Sight: Uncovering a Multi-Stage Ransomware Attack Through Behavioral Detection

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Why ransomware has changed

Ransomware attacks have continued to increase globally, with 698 incidents reported in May 2026, representing a 48% rise compared to 472 incidents in May 2025 [1]. At the same time, the ransomware landscape is evolving. Several major ransomware groups, including LockBit [2], have been disrupted by successful joint law enforcement operations, resulting in a shift away from a small number of dominant actors towards a more fragmented and distributed ecosystem. This is increasingly composed of smaller groups who play a specialized role in the attack, such as initial access brokers, affiliates or developers.

As a result, ransomware tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are becoming more diverse and less predictable. On top of this, adversaries are leveraging native tools and legitimate penetration testing frameworks to evade detection. Anomaly-based detection is therefore critical to identify pre-ransomware activity, rather than relying on signatures associated with a handful of well-known ransomware groups.

As these attacks often unfold over several days, there is a critical window for defenders to act. In this context, behavioral-based detection plays a vital role in identifying suspicious pre-ransomware activity, and enabling early intervention before encryption or exfiltration occurs.

Inside a modern ransomware intrusion

In early 2026, Darktrace detected activity within a customer’s environment related to a multi-stage ransomware intrusion from the initial compromise. This activity does not appear to be attributable to a specific ransomware group, and no known ransomware payload was observed until the final stage.

The attack aligns with a broader industry trend in which compromised virtual private network (VPN) credentials are used as an entry point, followed by rapid internal reconnaissance and lateral movement using legitimate administrative tools. This growing preference for native tools and legitimate frameworks in cyber-attacks illustrates that it is increasingly unreliable to depend solely on traditional indicators of compromise such as known malware signatures or exploit detection.

The intrusion also involved the use of Sliver, an open-source adversary emulation framework, which is increasingly observed in real-world attacks. Originally designed for penetration testing and red teaming, Sliver has gained traction among threat actors as a stealthier alternative to more heavily signatured frameworks such as Cobalt Strike. As a legitimate framework, its use further complicates detection for security tools that rely on known malicious signatures.

Darktrace’s detection of a ransomware event in a customer’s environment

The initial compromise appears to have occurred via compromised credentials used over the VPN shortly before, or at the onset of the first indicators of suspicious activity. While it remains unclear as to how or when the threat actors gained access to these credentials, the use of initial access brokers (IABs) is a common feature of modern ransomware operations. This suggests that access to the environment may have been established several days or weeks beforehand.

The intrusion unfolded over three days, presenting multiple opportunities for early detection and intervention before ransomware deployment. The attack progressed through a compressed but structured sequence: initial access and reconnaissance were completed within hours, followed by privilege escalation and lateral movement the next day, and culminating in data exfiltration and encryption shortly thereafter. Throughout each stage, distinct behavioral anomalies emerged across the network providing clear indicators of malicious activity well before the ransomware was deployed.

While Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was enabled within the customer’s environment, it was not fully configured across the impacted devices, allowing the attack to progress to ransomware deployment. Had Autonomous Response been fully deployed across the affected systems, it could have taken targeted action against the earliest stages of malicious activity, potentially disrupting the intrusion before it escalated.

Figure 1: Timeline of the attack progression.

Day 1: Reconnaissance and privilege escalation

The threat actor gained access via compromised VPN credentials and initiated internal reconnaissance. Darktrace detected anomalous scanning behavior, including unusual port scanning activity and widespread network enumeration.

Specifically, Darktrace detected a high volume of east-west scanning activity across a broad range of ports, with TCP connections targeting ports 21, 80, 445, 4899 and 8080. Associated URIs suggested the use of Nmap, a widely used penetration testing tool. This highlights how attackers often leverage legitimate penetration testing tools for malicious reconnaissance, enabling them to blend into normal network activity and evade traditional signature-based detection methods.

Figure 2: Darktrace's detection of a sharp increase in anomalous internal connections, triggering multiple high-severity model alerts associated with reconnaissance activity.

Several devices were observed using administrative credentials to carry out privileged actions in a manner that was highly anomalous for the environment. This activity was accompanied by behavior consistent with SMB authentication scanning, suggesting efforts to identify and access additional systems. As the activity intensified, an increasing number of devices became involved, signalling lateral movement and further spread across the network.

Darktrace also identified privilege escalation through active directory (AD) replication abuse, specifically via the drsuapi::DRSGetNCChanges function. This technique allows an attacker with sufficient privileges to request directory replication data from a domain controller (DC), enabling them to extract credentials, including password hashes, without directly interacting with user accounts. Commonly associated with ‘DCSync’ attacks, this technique is frequently used to obtain highly privileged credentials and enable further escalation within an environment.

Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of anomalous AD replication activity indicative of privilege escalation.

This activity was seen alongside the use of the now obsolete SMBv1, repeated NTLM authentication attempts using multiple variations of ‘Administrator’ credentials, reverse DNS scanning, and large-scale network scanning. Darktrace observed widespread use of SMBv1 across the customer’s environment, exposing a significant security weakness. As a legacy protocol with well-documented weaknesses, SMBv1 can be exploited to facilitate lateral movement, allowing the attackers to expand their access following initial compromise.

Day 3: Lateral Movement, Command & Control, and Exfiltration

Two days later, the attacker escalated privileges and expanded their foothold using living-off-the-land (LOTL) techniques such as PSExec, WMI, and RDP. Concurrently, Darktrace identified command-and-control (C2)-style communications consistent with the Sliver framework, alongside rare outbound connections to cloud infrastructure indicating potential data exfiltration. The volume and severity of observed activity increased as attack behavior intensified.

The device was observed conducting extensive lateral movement, leveraging LOTL techniques to evade detection. Activity included WMI execution (e.g. ExecQuery), DCE-RPC activity, SMB sessions and file writes, most of which were successful, as well as the deployment of PSEXESVC.exe via ADMIN$ shares and prolonged RDP sessions. Darktrace identified this behavior as highly anomalous for the environment. Such activity is commonly associated with the transfer of attacker tooling, remote command execution, and the establishment of persistent access across compromised systems.  

Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of a spike in RPC binding events indicative of potential lateral movement.

On the same day, Darktrace detected C2-style SSL communications originating from multiple internal devices to rare external endpoints. These connections exhibited anomalous characteristics, including invalid SSL certificates and repeated connection patterns resembling beaconing. Analysis of the observed JA3 fingerprint further linked the activity to Sliver, the adversary simulation framework referenced earlier, as the hash has previously been associated with Sliver-related infrastructure [3]. The use of this framework reflects a broader trend of attackers repurposing legitimate offensive security tools for stealthy C2 communications. Connections to 137[.]220[.]59[.]55 (ASN AS20473 AS-VULTR) indicated that the communications were likely routed via a virtual private server (VPS) hosted by Vultr. Attackers often utilize VPS infrastructure from legitimate cloud providers like Vultr to obscure their true origin, blend into benign traffic, and evade IP-based detection mechanisms [4].

Figure 5: Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst detection of two linked unusual connections to Vultr infrastructure.

Darktrace also observed a device initiating SSL connections to safedata.s3[.]wasabisys[.]com, an endpoint associated with Wasabi cloud storage. Darktrace recognized that neither the destination nor the associated IP address had previously been observed within the environment.  More than 200 MB of data was subsequently uploaded externally to endpoints sharing the same JA3 client hash, indicating a sustained transfer session and potential data exfiltration to third-party storage. The apparent exfiltration prior to encryption is consistent with a double-extortion ransomware strategy.

Figure 6: Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst detection of more than 30 rare outbound connections to a Wasabi cloud storage endpoint, indicative of potential data exfiltration

Day 4: Encryption

The attack culminated in ransomware deployment, marking the transition from suspicious network activity to a business-impacting incident. Using SMB-based propagation, the threat actor encrypted thousands of files across the network, affecting multiple systems and disrupting normal operations. Throughout the encryption event, the legacy SMBv1 protocol was used extensively across multiple internal systems, resulting in a significant increase in newly encrypted files.

Figure 7: Darktrace’s detection of abnormal spikes in SMB activity and associated model alerts, indicative of ransomware encryption and propagation.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst automatically investigated and correlated the encryption activity and related events into a single incident narrative, providing the customer with real-time visibility into the attack while significantly reducing investigation time.

Figure 8: Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the encryption activity. AI Analyst incident detailing example encryption activity in real time. Related events are automatically correlated and summarized into a clear narrative, reducing investigation time.

Defender action recommendations

What Could Have Stopped the Attack Earlier?

Although the attack ultimately resulted in ransomware deployment, there were multiple opportunities to detect, contain, and disrupt the intrusion before encryption occurred. The following actions could have significantly reduced the overall impact:

Detect and investigate indicators of reconnaissance and lateral movement

  • Unusual scanning
  • Active Directory replication anomalies consistent with DCSync activity
  • Anomalous use of native tools and processes indicative of LOTL attacks
  • Unusual use of common reconnaissance tools such as Nmap and NetScan

Contain compromised credentials and affected devices

  • Disable and reset compromised VPN credentials
  • Isolate devices performing anomalous scanning and lateral movement activity

Block suspicious external communications and data exfiltration

  • Use anomaly-based detection to detect and block repeated outbound connections to rare external infrastructure
  • Prevent data exfiltration to unauthorized cloud storage services such as Wasabi

Conclusion

The incident highlights the importance of anomaly-based detection, particularly against attacks that primarily use native or legitimate tools to evade traditional security measures. Darktrace identified suspicious activity from the first day of the compromise, providing multiple opportunities to disrupt the intrusion before it progressed to lateral movement and data exfiltration.

In this instance, detection was not the limiting factor; response time was. Prompt investigation and containment of devices exhibiting anomalous behavior could have prevented lateral movement, data exfiltration, and ultimately ransomware deployment.

As adversaries increasingly prioritize stealth over custom malware, relying instead on legitimate tools, valid credentials, and trusted infrastructure, traditional signature-based detection becomes less effective. Identifying subtle behavioral deviations early remains critical to disrupting attacks before they escalate into full-scale ransomware incidents.

Credit to Alexandra Evzona (Cyber Analyst), Priya Thapa (Senior Cyber Analyst)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

References

[1] https://industrialcyber.co/ransomware/check-point-reports-ransomware-attacks-jump-48-year-over-year-despite-decline-in-overall-cyberattack-activity/

[2] https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/law-enforcement-disrupt-worlds-biggest-ransomware-operation

[3] https://fieldeffect.com/blog/field-effect-mitigates-not-so-simplehelp-exploits-enabling-deployment-of-backdoors

[4] https://www.darktrace.com/blog/from-vps-to-phishing-how-darktrace-uncovered-saas-hijacks-through-virtual-infrastructure-abuse

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IP Addresses

  • 137[.]220[.]59[.]55 – Potential C2 infrastructure (Vultr AS20473)
  • 38[.]27[.]106[.]123 – Wasabi cloud storage endpoint associated with potential data exfiltration
  • 38[.]27[.]106[.]128 – Wasabi cloud storage endpoint associated with potential data exfiltration
  • 38[.]27[.]106[.]117 – Wasabi cloud storage endpoint associated with potential data exfiltration

Domains

  • safedata[.]s3[.]wasabisys[.]com – Potential data exfiltration endpoint
  • *.wasabisys[.]com – Associated Wasabi cloud storage infrastructure

JA3 Fingerprint

  • d6828e30ab66774a91a96ae93be4ae4c – Associated with the Sliver adversary emulation framework

Files

  • Delete[.]me – File observed during reconnaissance activity, commonly associated with NetScan

Darktrace Model Coverage

·       Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel

·       Anomalous Connection / Anomalous Remote Registry Service Control

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Windows UDP

·       Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control

·       Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Enumeration

·       Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

·       Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration

·       Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Activity On High Risk Device

·       Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio

·       Anomalous Connection / Sustained MIME Type Conversion

·       Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

·       Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session

·       Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

·       Anomalous Connection / Unusual SMB Version 1 Connectivity

·       Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

·       Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File

·       Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

·       Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

·       Compromise / Ransomware / Possible Ransom Note Read

·       Compromise / Ransomware / Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB

·       Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity

·       Device / Anonymous NTLM Logins

·       Device / Attack and Recon Tools

·       Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

·       Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

·       Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint

·       Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Alerts

·       Device / Network Scan

·       Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe

·       Device / New or Unusual Remote Command Execution

·       Device / New User Agent

·       Device / Possible RPC Lateral Movement

·       Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Brute Force

·       Device / RDP Scan

·       Device / SMB Lateral Movement

·       Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Non-Admin)

·       Device / SMB Version 1 Access Failures

·       Device / Suspicious File Delete Activity

·       Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

·       Device / Unusual SMB Error Detected

·       Device / Unusual SMB To Critical Resource

·       Device / Unusual Winreg Operation

·       Unusual Activity / Multiple Failed Internal Connections

·       Unusual Activity / Possible RPC Recon Activity

·       Unusual Activity / Sustained Anomalous SMB Activity

·       Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

·       Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

·       Unusual Activity / Unusual File Storage Data Transfer

·       Unusual Activity / Unusual Large Internal Transfer

·       User / New Admin Credentials on Client

·       User / NTLM Login from Unauthenticated Device

Autonomous Response Model Alerts

·       Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Ransomware Block

·       Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

·       Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Active Threat SMB Write Block

·       Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Internal Anomalous File Activity

·       Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Large Data Volume Outbound Block

·       Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Network Scan Block

·       Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Unusual Privileged User Activities Block

·       Antigena / Network / Manual / Quarantine Device

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block 100

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

MITRE ATT&CK MAPPING

Command and control - Protocol Tunneling - T1572

Command and control – Web Protocols – T1071.001

Credential Access- Exploitation for Credential Access- T1212

Credential Access- Password Guessing- T1110

Discovery- File and Directory Discovery- T1083

Discovery- Network Service Discovery- T1046

Discovery- Network Share Discovery- T1135

Discovery- Remote System Discovery- T1018

Exfiltration- Exfiltration Over C2 Channel- T1041

Exfiltration- Exfiltration to Cloud Storage- T1567

Impact- Data Encrypted for Impact- T1486

Impact- Data Encrypted for Impact- T1486

Impact- Service Stop - T1489

Initial Access- Public-Facing Application- T1190

Lateral Movement- Exploitation of Remote Services- T1210

Lateral Movement- Remote Desktop Protocol- T1021

Lateral Movement- SMB/Windows Admin Shares- T1021

Lateral Movement- Taint Shared Content- T1080

Persistence- Modify Registry- T1112

Privilege Escalation- Exploitation for Privilege Escalation- T0890

Privilege Escalation- Valid Accounts- T1078

Reconnaissance- Scanning IP Blocks- T1595

Reconnaissance- Vulnerability Scanning- T1595

Resource Development- Malware- T1588

Stealth- File Deletion- T1070

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About the author
Alexandra Evzona
Cyber Analyst
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