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二重恐喝ランサムウェア

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18
May 2021
18
May 2021
With ransomware attacks against AXA ASIA, Colonial Pipeline, and Ireland’s Health Service last week, this blog explores how cyber-criminal groups are exfiltrating data to coerce victims into paying, in what is known as ‘double extortion’ ransomware.

1年半前、「二重恐喝」ランサムウェアを使っていた既知の脅威アクターは1つだけでした。現在では、16を超えるランサムウェアグループがこの戦術を活発に使用しています。二重恐喝とはどのようなもので、なぜこれほど人気が出たのでしょうか?

二重恐喝ランサムウェアとは何か

これまでのランサムウェアのストーリーは、悪意あるコードが公開鍵RSA暗号化を使ってファイルを急速に暗号化し、被害者が身代金を支払わなければファイルを削除してしまうというものでした。

しかし、2017年にかけて悪名高いWannaCryとNotPetya ランサムウェア攻撃以後、企業はサイバー防御を強化しました。バックアップおよびリストアのプロセスがより重視され、ファイルがもし削除されても、組織にはコピーがありデータを簡単にリストアすることができるようになりました。

ところが、サイバー犯罪者達もテクニックを適応させたのです。今度はファイルを暗号化するだけではなく、二重恐喝ランサムウェアは最初にデータを抜き出します。つまり企業が身代金を支払わなければ、情報をオンラインでリークする、あるいは最も高い金額を払う者に売り払うこともできるのです。突如として、苦労したバックアップやデータ復旧計画の価値が失われました。

Mazeランサムウェアとその仲間

2019年末には、二重恐喝の最初の有名な事例であるMazeランサムウェアが登場しました。ほどなく他の種類もそれに続き、その年の大晦日には外貨両替企業Travelexの業務を停止に追い込んだSodinokibi攻撃が発生しました。

2020年半ばまでには、数百の組織が二重恐喝攻撃の被害者となり、ダークネット上のさまざまなウェブサイトで企業データが取引され、Ransomware-as-a-Serviceビジネスが急拡大し、開発者が新しいタイプのマルウェアを売ったり借りたりするようになりました。

さらに、サイバー犯罪者は、サイバーセキュリティ規制さえも兵器化しています。コンプライアンス違反(CCPA、GDPR、NYSDFS規制等)には多大な罰金が伴うため、黙って身代金(罰金よりも少額)を払うよう脅迫するのです。

2020年に発生した二重恐喝ランサムウェアインシデントは63か国で1,200件発生し、その60%以上が米国および英国を標的としていました。

これらの攻撃を緩和しようと次々に新しい規制が作成されていますが、勢いが弱まる様子はありません。RUSIによる最近の調査によれば、2020年には1,200件の二重恐喝ランサムウェア攻撃が 63か国で発生しています。その60%は米国に本社がある組織を標的とし、英国はそれに次ぐ数の侵害を受けました。

先月、REvilとして知られるサイバー犯罪者集団が彼らのサイト‘Happy Blog’ においてAppleの新しいMacbook Proについての情報を掲載し、さらなる設計情報を公開すると脅迫して身代金として5000万ドルを要求しました。さらに先週、Colonial Pipeline社は壊滅的な被害を受けたOTランサムウェア攻撃から復旧するために500万ドルをビットコインで支払ったと噂されています。

二重恐喝ランサムウェア攻撃の構成

Darktraceは昨年、二重恐喝ランサムウェア攻撃の急激な増大を観測しましたが、最近のケースはカナダにあるエネルギー企業に対するものです。ハッカーたちは明らかに下調べをしてきた様子で、攻撃をこの会社に合わせてカスタマイズし、侵入後はすばやく、密かに内部を移動しました。以下は、ほぼ24時間の間に実行された実際のインシデントのタイムラインです。

図1: 攻撃のタイムライン

Darktraceは侵入のあらゆる段階を検知し、高優先度のアラートでセキュリティチームに通知しました。この環境内でDarktrace RESPOND が運用されていれば、侵害を受けたサーバーは異常な動作を開始した後すぐに隔離され、感染が拡大するのを防いでいたはずです。

暗号化および拡張子

最初の感染ベクトルはわかっていませんが、管理者アカウントに侵入されたのはフィッシングリンクまたは脆弱性のエクスプロイトによるものと思われます。これは過去10年間に見られた広範な「乱射型」ランサムウェア攻撃から、より標的型のアプローチに変化するトレンドを示しています。

Cyber AIは不審なネットワークスキャニングを行い、リモートデスクトッププロトコル(RDP)を使って水平移動を試みている内部のサーバーを発見しました。漏えいした管理者認証情報を使って、このサーバーから別の内部デバイス‘serverps’ に対して急激に拡散しました。

デバイス ‘serverps’ はTeamViewer(正当なファイルストレージサービス)に対して接続し、それは21時間近く継続しました。この接続はデバイスをリモートコントロールし、攻撃の次の段階を進めるために使用されました。この企業のデジタル環境においてTeamViewerはそれほど広く使われていませんでしたが、既存の防御システムはいずれもこれをブロックしませんでした。

その後、デバイスは内部のファイルサーバーに接続し、1.95TBのデータをダウンロードし、同じボリュームのデータを pcloud[.]com にアップロードしました。抜き出しは通常の管理者アクティビティに紛れ込むために業務時間内に行われました。

また、このデバイスがRcloneソフトウェアをダウンロードしている様子も見られました。これはオープンソースのツールで、正規のファイルストレージサービスであるpCloudにデータを自動的に同期させるために適用されたものと思われます。

漏えいした管理者認証情報により脅威アクターは水平方向への移動が可能になりました。データ抜き出しが完了した後、デバイス ‘serverps’ はついに12台のデバイス上のファイルを*.06d79000という拡張子で暗号化し始めました。

ほとんどのランサムウェアインシデント同様、暗号化は営業時間外(現地時間では夜間)に実行されました。これはセキュリティチームが迅速に対応できる可能性を最小化するためでした。

AIを駆使した調査

Cyber AI Analystはこの攻撃に関連した4つのインシデントについて報告し、不審な動作をセキュリティチームに対して指摘するとともに、影響を受けたデバイスについてのレポートを提供して即座に修正を促しました。このような簡潔なレポートによりセキュリティチームは感染の範囲をすばやく特定し適切に対応することができました。

図2:1週間分のCyber AI Analyst インシデントトレイ

Cyber AI Analystによるオンデマンド調査

3月13日に行われたさらなる分析の後、セキュリティチームはCyber AI Analystを使って、侵害されたMicrosoft 365の管理者アカウント、および潜在的な脅威として識別された別のデバイスに対してオンデマンド調査を実施しました。

Cyber AI Analystはこの別のデバイスに対してインシデントを作成し、そこから感染の期間に発生していた不審なポートスキャニングが判明しました。このデバイスは直ちにネットワークから取り除かれました。

図3:侵入されたデバイスに対するCyber AI Analystインシデント。不審な内部ダウンロードの詳細が示されている。

二重苦

正規のツールの使用、および ‘Living off the Land’(環境に寄生する)テクニックの使用(RDPと漏えいした管理者認証情報の使用)により、脅威アクターは攻撃のほとんどを24時間以内に実行することができました。「悪」であることが既知のドメインや最近登録されたドメインではなく、正規のファイルストレージソリューションであるTeamViewerをデータ抜き出しに使うことにより、ハッカーたちはあらゆるシグネチャベースの防御を簡単に回避することができたのです。

Darktraceがこの侵入を検知して即座にセキュリティチームに警告していなければ、この攻撃は従業員がファイルを使えなくなる「ビジネス拒否」だけではなく、機密データの損失にもつながっていたかもしれません。AIはさらに、自動調査とオンデマンドのレポート生成により、セキュリティチームの貴重な時間を節約しました。

二重恐喝ランサムウェアによる損失は甚大です。データの抜き出しによってさらなるリスクが加わり、知的財産の侵害、評判上の損失、コンプライアンス違反の罰金につながります。脅威グループの手にデータが渡れば、その後さらに支払いを要求される可能性も大いにあるでしょう。したがって、そうなる前にこれらの攻撃を防御する必要があり、脅威が発生次第即座に検知し、自律的に遮断できるサイバーセキュリティ対策をあらかじめ導入しておくことが必要です。

二重恐喝ランサムウェアについてもっと知る

Darktraceによるモデル検知:

  • Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity
  • Device / RDP Scan
  • Device / Network Scan
  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session
  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session
  • Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches
  • User / New Admin Credentials on Client
  • Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound
  • Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration
  • Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model
  • Anomalous Connection / Download and Upload
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Activity On High Risk Device
  • Anomalous File / Internal::Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
  • Compromise / Ransomware::Suspicious SMB Activity
  • Anomalous Connection / Sustained MIME Type Conversion
  • Device / Anomalous RDP Followed By Multiple Model Breaches
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio
  • Device / Large Number of Model Breaches
INSIDE THE SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
AUTHOR
ABOUT ThE AUTHOR
Brianna Leddy
Director of Analysis

Based in San Francisco, Brianna is Director of Analysis at Darktrace. She joined the analyst team in 2016 and has since advised a wide range of enterprise customers on advanced threat hunting and leveraging Self-Learning AI for detection and response. Brianna works closely with the Darktrace SOC team to proactively alert customers to emerging threats and investigate unusual behavior in enterprise environments. Brianna holds a Bachelor’s degree in Chemical Engineering from Carnegie Mellon University.

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A Thorn in Attackers’ Sides: How Darktrace Uncovered a CACTUS Ransomware Infection

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24
Apr 2024

What is CACTUS Ransomware?

In May 2023, Kroll Cyber Threat Intelligence Analysts identified CACTUS as a new ransomware strain that had been actively targeting large commercial organizations since March 2023 [1]. CACTUS ransomware gets its name from the filename of the ransom note, “cAcTuS.readme.txt”. Encrypted files are appended with the extension “.cts”, followed by a number which varies between attacks, e.g. “.cts1” and “.cts2”.

As the cyber threat landscape adapts to ever-present fast-paced technological change, ransomware affiliates are employing progressively sophisticated techniques to enter networks, evade detection and achieve their nefarious goals.

How does CACTUS Ransomware work?

In the case of CACTUS, threat actors have been seen gaining initial network access by exploiting Virtual Private Network (VPN) services. Once inside the network, they may conduct internal scanning using tools like SoftPerfect Network Scanner, and PowerShell commands to enumerate endpoints, identify user accounts, and ping remote endpoints. Persistence is maintained by the deployment of various remote access methods, including legitimate remote access tools like Splashtop, AnyDesk, and SuperOps RMM in order to evade detection, along with malicious tools like Cobalt Strike and Chisel. Such tools, as well as custom scripts like TotalExec, have been used to disable security software to distribute the ransomware binary. CACTUS ransomware is unique in that it adopts a double-extortion tactic, stealing data from target networks and then encrypting it on compromised systems [2].

At the end of November 2023, cybersecurity firm Arctic Wolf reported instances of CACTUS attacks exploiting vulnerabilities on the Windows version of the business analytics platform Qlik, specifically CVE-2023-41266, CVE-2023-41265, and CVE-2023-48365, to gain initial access to target networks [3]. The vulnerability tracked as CVE-2023-41266 can be exploited to generate anonymous sessions and perform HTTP requests to unauthorized endpoints, whilst CVE-2023-41265 does not require authentication and can be leveraged to elevate privileges and execute HTTP requests on the backend server that hosts the application [2].

Darktrace’s Coverage of CACTUS Ransomware

In November 2023, Darktrace observed malicious actors leveraging the aforementioned method of exploiting Qlik to gain access to the network of a customer in the US, more than a week before the vulnerability was reported by external researchers.

Here, Qlik vulnerabilities were successfully exploited, and a malicious executable (.exe) was detonated on the network, which was followed by network scanning and failed Kerberos login attempts. The attack culminated in the encryption of numerous files with extensions such as “.cts1”, and SMB writes of the ransom note “cAcTuS.readme.txt” to multiple internal devices, all of which was promptly identified by Darktrace DETECT™.

While traditional rules and signature-based detection tools may struggle to identify the malicious use of a legitimate business platform like Qlik, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was able to confidently identify anomalous use of the tool in a CACTUS ransomware attack by examining the rarity of the offending device’s surrounding activity and comparing it to the learned behavior of the device and its peers.

Unfortunately for the customer in this case, Darktrace RESPOND™ was not enabled in autonomous response mode during their encounter with CACTUS ransomware meaning that attackers were able to successfully escalate their attack to the point of ransomware detonation and file encryption. Had RESPOND been configured to autonomously act on any unusual activity, Darktrace could have prevented the attack from progressing, stopping the download of any harmful files, or the encryption of legitimate ones.

Cactus Ransomware Attack Overview

Holiday periods have increasingly become one of the favoured times for malicious actors to launch their attacks, as they can take advantage of the festive downtime of organizations and their security teams, and the typically more relaxed mindset of employees during this period [4].

Following this trend, in late November 2023, Darktrace began detecting anomalous connections on the network of a customer in the US, which presented multiple indicators of compromise (IoCs) and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) associated with CACTUS ransomware. The threat actors in this case set their attack in motion by exploiting the Qlik vulnerabilities on one of the customer’s critical servers.

Darktrace observed the server device making beaconing connections to the endpoint “zohoservice[.]net” (IP address: 45.61.147.176) over the course of three days. This endpoint is known to host a malicious payload, namely a .zip file containing the command line connection tool PuttyLink [5].

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to autonomously identify over 1,000 beaconing connections taking place on the customer’s network and group them together, in this case joining the dots in an ongoing ransomware attack. AI Analyst recognized that these repeated connections to highly suspicious locations were indicative of malicious command-and-control (C2) activity.

Cyber AI Analyst Incident Log showing the offending device making over 1,000 connections to the suspicious hostname “zohoservice[.]net” over port 8383, within a specific period.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst Incident Log showing the offending device making over 1,000 connections to the suspicious hostname “zohoservice[.]net” over port 8383, within a specific period.

The infected device was then observed downloading the file “putty.zip” over a HTTP connection using a PowerShell user agent. Despite being labelled as a .zip file, Darktrace’s detection capabilities were able to identify this as a masqueraded PuttyLink executable file. This activity resulted in multiple Darktrace DETECT models being triggered. These models are designed to look for suspicious file downloads from endpoints not usually visited by devices on the network, and files whose types are masqueraded, as well as the anomalous use of PowerShell. This behavior resembled previously observed activity with regards to the exploitation of Qlik Sense as an intrusion technique prior to the deployment of CACTUS ransomware [5].

The downloaded file’s URI highlighting that the file type (.exe) does not match the file's extension (.zip). Information about the observed PowerShell user agent is also featured.
Figure 2: The downloaded file’s URI highlighting that the file type (.exe) does not match the file's extension (.zip). Information about the observed PowerShell user agent is also featured.

Following the download of the masqueraded file, Darktrace observed the initial infected device engaging in unusual network scanning activity over the SMB, RDP and LDAP protocols. During this activity, the credential, “service_qlik” was observed, further indicating that Qlik was exploited by threat actors attempting to evade detection. Connections to other internal devices were made as part of this scanning activity as the attackers attempted to move laterally across the network.

Numerous failed connections from the affected server to multiple other internal devices over port 445, indicating SMB scanning activity.
Figure 3: Numerous failed connections from the affected server to multiple other internal devices over port 445, indicating SMB scanning activity.

The compromised server was then seen initiating multiple sessions over the RDP protocol to another device on the customer’s network, namely an internal DNS server. External researchers had previously observed this technique in CACTUS ransomware attacks where an RDP tunnel was established via Plink [5].

A few days later, on November 24, Darktrace identified over 20,000 failed Kerberos authentication attempts for the username “service_qlik” being made to the internal DNS server, clearly representing a brute-force login attack. There is currently a lack of open-source intelligence (OSINT) material definitively listing Kerberos login failures as part of a CACTUS ransomware attack that exploits the Qlik vulnerabilities. This highlights Darktrace’s ability to identify ongoing threats amongst unusual network activity without relying on existing threat intelligence, emphasizing its advantage over traditional security detection tools.

Kerberos login failures being carried out by the initial infected device. The destination device detected was an internal DNS server.
Figure 4: Kerberos login failures being carried out by the initial infected device. The destination device detected was an internal DNS server.

In the month following these failed Kerberos login attempts, between November 26 and December 22, Darktrace observed multiple internal devices encrypting files within the customer’s environment with the extensions “.cts1” and “.cts7”. Devices were also seen writing ransom notes with the file name “cAcTuS.readme.txt” to two additional internal devices, as well as files likely associated with Qlik, such as “QlikSense.pdf”. This activity detected by Darktrace confirmed the presence of a CACTUS ransomware infection that was spreading across the customer’s network.

The model, 'Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB', triggered in response to SMB file writes of the ransom note, ‘cAcTuS.readme.txt’, that was observed on the customer’s network.
Figure 5: The model, 'Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB', triggered in response to SMB file writes of the ransom note, ‘cAcTuS.readme.txt’, that was observed on the customer’s network.
CACTUS ransomware extensions, “.cts1” and “.cts7”, being appended to files on the customer’s network.
Figure 6: CACTUS ransomware extensions, “.cts1” and “.cts7”, being appended to files on the customer’s network.

Following this initial encryption activity, two affected devices were observed attempting to remove evidence of this activity by deleting the encrypted files.

Attackers attempting to remove evidence of their activity by deleting files with appendage “.cts1”.
Figure 7: Attackers attempting to remove evidence of their activity by deleting files with appendage “.cts1”.

結論

In the face of this CACTUS ransomware attack, Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection enabled it to quickly identify multiple stages of the cyber kill chain occurring in the customer’s environment. These stages ranged from ‘initial access’ by exploiting Qlik vulnerabilities, which Darktrace was able to detect before the method had been reported by external researchers, to ‘actions on objectives’ by encrypting files. Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was also able to detect a previously unreported stage of the attack: multiple Kerberos brute force login attempts.

If Darktrace’s autonomous response capability, RESPOND, had been active and enabled in autonomous response mode at the time of this attack, it would have been able to take swift mitigative action to shut down such suspicious activity as soon as it was identified by DETECT, effectively containing the ransomware attack at the earliest possible stage.

Learning a network’s ‘normal’ to identify deviations from established patterns of behaviour enables Darktrace’s identify a potential compromise, even one that uses common and often legitimately used administrative tools. This allows Darktrace to stay one step ahead of the increasingly sophisticated TTPs used by ransomware actors.

Credit to Tiana Kelly, Cyber Analyst & Analyst Team Lead, Anna Gilbertson, Cyber Analyst

付録

参考文献

[1] https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/cactus-ransomware-prickly-new-variant-evades-detection

[2] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cactus-ransomware-exploiting-qlik-sense-flaws-to-breach-networks/

[3] https://explore.avertium.com/resource/new-ransomware-strains-cactus-and-3am

[4] https://www.soitron.com/cyber-attackers-abuse-holidays/

[5] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/qlik-sense-exploited-in-cactus-ransomware-campaign/

Darktrace DETECT Models

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)

Anomalous Connection / PowerShell to Rare External

Device / New PowerShell User Agent

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Remote Desktop

User / Kerberos Password Brute Force

Compromise / Ransomware / Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB

Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Delete Volume

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare  

Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination  

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server  

Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Server

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)  

Compromise / Suspicious File and C2  

Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert  

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches  

Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer

Anomalous File / Internet facing System File Download  

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise  

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)  

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)  

IoC一覧

IoC - Type - Description

zohoservice[.]net: 45.61.147[.]176 - Domain name: IP Address - Hosting payload over HTTP

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT; Windows NT 10.0; en-US) WindowsPowerShell/5.1.17763.2183 - User agent -PowerShell user agent

.cts1 - File extension - Malicious appendage

.cts7- File extension - Malicious appendage

cAcTuS.readme.txt - Filename -Ransom note

putty.zip – Filename - Initial payload: ZIP containing PuTTY Link

MITRE ATT&CK マッピング

Tactic - Technique  - SubTechnique

Web Protocols: COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071 -T1071.001

Powershell: EXECUTION - T1059 - T1059.001

Exploitation of Remote Services: LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1210 – N/A

Vulnerability Scanning: RECONAISSANCE     - T1595 - T1595.002

Network Service Scanning: DISCOVERY - T1046 - N/A

Malware: RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1588 - T1588.001

Drive-by Compromise: INITIAL ACCESS - T1189 - N/A

Remote Desktop Protocol: LATERAL MOVEMENT – 1021 -T1021.001

Brute Force: CREDENTIAL ACCESS        T – 1110 - N/A

Data Encrypted for Impact: IMPACT - T1486 - N/A

Data Destruction: IMPACT - T1485 - N/A

File Deletion: DEFENSE EVASION - T1070 - T1070.004

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著者について
Tiana Kelly
Deputy Team Lead, London & Cyber Analyst

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The State of AI in Cybersecurity: How AI will impact the cyber threat landscape in 2024

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22
Apr 2024

About the AI Cybersecurity Report

We surveyed 1,800 CISOs, security leaders, administrators, and practitioners from industries around the globe. Our research was conducted to understand how the adoption of new AI-powered offensive and defensive cybersecurity technologies are being managed by organizations.

This blog is continuing the conversation from our last blog post “The State of AI in Cybersecurity: Unveiling Global Insights from 1,800 Security Practitioners” which was an overview of the entire report. This blog will focus on one aspect of the overarching report, the impact of AI on the cyber threat landscape.

To access the full report click here.

Are organizations feeling the impact of AI-powered cyber threats?

Nearly three-quarters (74%) state AI-powered threats are now a significant issue. Almost nine in ten (89%) agree that AI-powered threats will remain a major challenge into the foreseeable future, not just for the next one to two years.

However, only a slight majority (56%) thought AI-powered threats were a separate issue from traditional/non AI-powered threats. This could be the case because there are few, if any, reliable methods to determine whether an attack is AI-powered.

Identifying exactly when and where AI is being applied may not ever be possible. However, it is possible for AI to affect every stage of the attack lifecycle. As such, defenders will likely need to focus on preparing for a world where threats are unique and are coming faster than ever before.

a hypothetical cyber attack augmented by AI at every stage

Are security stakeholders concerned about AI’s impact on cyber threats and risks?

The results from our survey showed that security practitioners are concerned that AI will impact organizations in a variety of ways. There was equal concern associated across the board – from volume and sophistication of malware to internal risks like leakage of proprietary information from employees using generative AI tools.

What this tells us is that defenders need to prepare for a greater volume of sophisticated attacks and balance this with a focus on cyber hygiene to manage internal risks.

One example of a growing internal risks is shadow AI. It takes little effort for employees to adopt publicly-available text-based generative AI systems to increase their productivity. This opens the door to “shadow AI”, which is the use of popular AI tools without organizational approval or oversight. Resulting security risks such as inadvertent exposure of sensitive information or intellectual property are an ever-growing concern.

Are organizations taking strides to reduce risks associated with adoption of AI in their application and computing environment?

71.2% of survey participants say their organization has taken steps specifically to reduce the risk of using AI within its application and computing environment.

16.3% of survey participants claim their organization has not taken these steps.

These findings are good news. Even as enterprises compete to get as much value from AI as they can, as quickly as possible, they’re tempering their eager embrace of new tools with sensible caution.

Still, responses varied across roles. Security analysts, operators, administrators, and incident responders are less likely to have said their organizations had taken AI risk mitigation steps than respondents in other roles. In fact, 79% of executives said steps had been taken, and only 54% of respondents in hands-on roles agreed. It seems that leaders believe their organizations are taking the needed steps, but practitioners are seeing a gap.

Do security professionals feel confident in their preparedness for the next generation of threats?

A majority of respondents (six out of every ten) believe their organizations are inadequately prepared to face the next generation of AI-powered threats.

The survey findings reveal contrasting perceptions of organizational preparedness for cybersecurity threats across different regions and job roles. Security administrators, due to their hands-on experience, express the highest level of skepticism, with 72% feeling their organizations are inadequately prepared. Notably, respondents in mid-sized organizations feel the least prepared, while those in the largest companies feel the most prepared.

Regionally, participants in Asia-Pacific are most likely to believe their organizations are unprepared, while those in Latin America feel the most prepared. This aligns with the observation that Asia-Pacific has been the most impacted region by cybersecurity threats in recent years, according to the IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index.

The optimism among Latin American respondents could be attributed to lower threat volumes experienced in the region, but it's cautioned that this could change suddenly (1).

What are biggest barriers to defending against AI-powered threats?

The top-ranked inhibitors center on knowledge and personnel. However, issues are alluded to almost equally across the board including concerns around budget, tool integration, lack of attention to AI-powered threats, and poor cyber hygiene.

The cybersecurity industry is facing a significant shortage of skilled professionals, with a global deficit of approximately 4 million experts (2). As organizations struggle to manage their security tools and alerts, the challenge intensifies with the increasing adoption of AI by attackers. This shift has altered the demands on security teams, requiring practitioners to possess broad and deep knowledge across rapidly evolving solution stacks.

Educating end users about AI-driven defenses becomes paramount as organizations grapple with the shortage of professionals proficient in managing AI-powered security tools. Operationalizing machine learning models for effectiveness and accuracy emerges as a crucial skill set in high demand. However, our survey highlights a concerning lack of understanding among cybersecurity professionals regarding AI-driven threats and the use of AI-driven countermeasures indicating a gap in keeping pace with evolving attacker tactics.

The integration of security solutions remains a notable problem, hindering effective defense strategies. While budget constraints are not a primary inhibitor, organizations must prioritize addressing these challenges to bolster their cybersecurity posture. It's imperative for stakeholders to recognize the importance of investing in skilled professionals and integrated security solutions to mitigate emerging threats effectively.

To access the full report click here.

参考文献

1. IBM, X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2024, Available at: https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/L0GKXDWJ

2. ISC2, Cybersecurity Workforce Study 2023, Available at: https://media.isc2.org/-/media/Project/ISC2/Main/Media/ documents/research/ISC2_Cybersecurity_Workforce_Study_2023.pdf?rev=28b46de71ce24e6ab7705f6e3da8637e

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