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March 7, 2019

State-Sponsored Cyber Attacks on Colleges

Discover how universities should embrace cyber AI to safeguard research and intellectual property while maintaining campus connectivity.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO
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07
Mar 2019

Securing higher education institutions poses a unique challenge compared to just about any other type of organization, from governments to nonprofits to private companies.

Higher education institutions typically prioritize an open-access IT environment, which must balance an interest in facilitating the free exchange of ideas with the imperative of robust cyber defenses to protect against intellectual property theft. Indeed, the marked rise in cyber-attacks over the past three years has not been exclusive to the private sector. Universities are, in fact, a high-value target for any cyber-criminal, as their networks hold a wealth of sensitive information, ranging from student financial details to social security numbers to cutting-edge research. And crucially, the nature of this research makes universities a prime target for advanced, state-sponsored attackers, as this information can be highly valuable to foreign governments.

The week’s news of attacks by Chinese criminals on more than two dozen universities — including MIT, The University of Hawaii, and The University of Washington — demonstrate just how serious such attacks can be. The group allegedly responsible for these attacks, Mudcarp, attempted to steal highly sensitive military research on submarine missiles using targeted phishing emails. Ostensibly written by trusted colleagues at partner universities and research institutions, these emails delivered malicious payloads by exploiting macros in Microsoft Word and Excel documents, thereby gaining access to sensitive collegiate networks. Due to the value of the technology in question, experts have speculated that these attacks were likely state-sponsored as part of China’s efforts to advance its naval operations.

A defensive nightmare

Despite containing lucrative IP and vast quantities of personal information, university networks are among the most difficult to secure. For one, the high number of both students and staff connecting to the network each day means universities must deploy hundreds, if not thousands of access points, and in contrast to private businesses, it is nearly impossible to guarantee that these access points are tightly secured. This reality makes gaining an initial foothold in the network — one of the most difficult and time-consuming stages of the attack life cycle — far easier. Moreover, as higher education institutions often facilitate high-traffic networks, they must deploy a decentralised system, with different faculties responsible for the security of their specific portion of the network. While it is common practice in the private sector, deploying a uniform set of security policies proves difficult in a university environment.

To make matters worse, an increasing number of students are now connecting multiple BYOD devices to the network, and as a consequence, higher education institutions typically have a far greater attack surface than private businesses. And at the same time, the continuous stream of students on campus also increases the difficulty of distinguishing between genuine security threats and benign — albeit undesirable — activity, such as video torrenting. This open-access culture also negatively impacts users’ attitude towards risk, with students less likely to feel responsible for their network activity compared to employees of a private business. In other words, users of higher education networks are more likely to click on suspicious links or mail attachments, while the high volume of emails sent amongst students and staff using institutional addresses makes universities an ideal target for phishing campaigns. Social engineering methods — such as delivering malware via illegitimate Facebook and Twitter accounts — are especially effective at universities, due to these services’ more or less ubiquitous use among students.

Finally, the widespread integration of poorly secured Internet of Things (IoT) devices within universities facilitates even more avenues into the network. For instance, in 2017, attackers used readily available brute-forcing tools to exploit default passwords on more than 5,000 IOT devices at an undisclosed U.S. university, implementing these devices as part of a botnet to attack the university’s network. Incidents such as this not only wreak havoc on daily activity but also inflict lasting harm on a school’s reputation.

Turning the tide with AI

Rather than focusing on building perimeter walls around campus networks, security teams should instead concentrate on tracking and monitoring network devices, ensuring that they are immediately alerted whenever an incident occurs. Indeed, with such an expansive attack surface to safeguard, and so many poorly secured IoT and BYOD devices online at all times, attackers will inevitably breach network perimeters. The key, therefore, is to attain the ability to see inside the network, and ultimately, to neutralize attacks that have already infiltrated.

Unfortunately, this internal network visibility is where the traditional security tools employed by most universities are most limited. By searching only for known threats at the perimeter using fixed rules and signatures, conventional tools alone are likely to miss the next novel attack on the world’s universities — making it all the more imperative that these institutions learn their lesson before it’s too late. On the contrary, AI security systems learn to differentiate between normal and abnormal behavior for each user, device, and network, enabling them to autonomously detect and respond to the subtle anomalies that indicate an in-progress cyber-attack.

The primary goal of a university network is to provide highly accessible learning environments on the securest possible platform. Universities should embrace cyber AI to protect valuable research and IP, without impacting on the interconnectivity that we’ve come to expect on campus.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO

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January 30, 2026

ClearFake: From Fake CAPTCHAs to Blockchain-Driven Payload Retrieval

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What is ClearFake?

As threat actors evolve their techniques to exploit victims and breach target networks, the ClearFake campaign has emerged as a significant illustration of this continued adaptation. ClearFake is a campaign observed using a malicious JavaScript framework deployed on compromised websites, impacting sectors such as e‑commerce, travel, and automotive. First identified in mid‑2023, ClearFake is frequently leveraged to socially engineer victims into installing fake web browser updates.

In ClearFake compromises, victims are steered toward compromised WordPress sites, often positioned by attackers through search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning. Once on the site, users are presented with a fake CAPTCHA. This counterfeit challenge is designed to appear legitimate while enabling the execution of malicious code. When a victim interacts with the CAPTCHA, a PowerShell command containing a download string is retrieved and executed.

Attackers commonly abuse the legitimate Microsoft HTML Application Host (MSHTA) in these operations. Recent campaigns have also incorporated Smart Chain endpoints, such as “bsc-dataseed.binance[.]org,” to obtain configuration code. The primary payload delivered through ClearFake is typically an information stealer, such as Lumma Stealer, enabling credential theft, data exfiltration, and persistent access [1].

Darktrace’s Coverage of ClearFake

Darktrace / ENDPOINT first detected activity likely associated with ClearFake on a single device on over the course of one day on November 18, 2025. The system observed the execution of “mshta.exe,” the legitimate Microsoft HTML Application Host utility. It also noted a repeated process command referencing “weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru”, indicating suspicious external activity. Subsequent analysis of this endpoint using open‑source intelligence (OSINT) indicated that it was a malicious, domain generation algorithm (DGA) endpoint [2].

The process line referencing weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, as observed by Darktrace / ENDPOINT.
Figure 1: The process line referencing weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, as observed by Darktrace / ENDPOINT.

This activity indicates that mshta.exe was used to contact a remote server, “weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru/rpxacc64mshta,” and execute the associated HTA file to initiate the next stage of the attack. OSINT sources have since heavily flagged this server as potentially malicious [3].

The first argument in this process uses the MSHTA utility to execute the HTA file hosted on the remote server. If successful, MSHTA would then run JavaScript or VBScript to launch PowerShell commands used to retrieve malicious payloads, a technique observed in previous ClearFake campaigns. Darktrace also detected unusual activity involving additional Microsoft executables, including “winlogon.exe,” “userinit.exe,” and “explorer.exe.” Although these binaries are legitimate components of the Windows operating system, threat actors can abuse their normal behavior within the Windows login sequence to gain control over user sessions, similar to the misuse of mshta.exe.

EtherHiding cover

Darktrace also identified additional ClearFake‑related activity, specifically a connection to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org, a legitimate BNB Smart Chain endpoint. This activity was triggered by injected JavaScript on the compromised site www.allstarsuae[.]com, where the script initiated an eth_call POST request to the Smart Chain endpoint.

Example of a fake CAPTCHA on the compromised site www.allstarsuae[.]com.
Figure 2: Example of a fake CAPTCHA on the compromised site www.allstarsuae[.]com.

EtherHiding is a technique in which threat actors leverage blockchain technology, specifically smart contracts, as part of their malicious infrastructure. Because blockchain is anonymous, decentralized, and highly persistent, it provides threat actors with advantages in evading defensive measures and traditional tracking [4].

In this case, when a user visits a compromised WordPress site, injected base64‑encoded JavaScript retrieved an ABI string, which was then used to load and execute a contract hosted on the BNB Smart Chain.

JavaScript hosted on the compromised site www.allstaruae[.]com.
Figure 3: JavaScript hosted on the compromised site www.allstaruae[.]com.

Conducting malware analysis on this instance, the Base64 decoded into a JavaScript loader. A POST request to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org was then used to retrieve a hex‑encoded ABI string that loads and executes the contract. The JavaScript also contained hex and Base64‑encoded functions that decoded into additional JavaScript, which attempted to retrieve a payload hosted on GitHub at “github[.]com/PrivateC0de/obf/main/payload.txt.” However, this payload was unavailable at the time of analysis.

Darktrace’s detection of the POST request to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org.
Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of the POST request to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of the executable file and the malicious hostname.

Autonomous Response

As Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was enabled on this customer’s network, Darktrace was able to take swift mitigative action to contain the ClearFake‑related activity early, before it could lead to potential payload delivery. The affected device was blocked from making external connections to a number of suspicious endpoints, including 188.114.96[.]6, *.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, and neighb0rrol1[.]ru, ensuring that no further malicious connections could be made and no payloads could be retrieved.

Autonomous Response also acted to prevent the executable mshta.exe from initiating HTA file execution over HTTPS from this endpoint by blocking the attempted connections. Had these files executed successfully, the attack would likely have resulted in the retrieval of an information stealer, such as Lumma Stealer.

Autonomous Response’s intervention against the suspicious connectivity observed.
Figure 6: Autonomous Response’s intervention against the suspicious connectivity observed.

Conclusion

ClearFake continues to be observed across multiple sectors, but Darktrace remains well‑positioned to counter such threats. Because ClearFake’s end goal is often to deliver malware such as information stealers and malware loaders, early disruption is critical to preventing compromise. Users should remain aware of this activity and vigilant regarding fake CAPTCHA pop‑ups. They should also monitor unusual usage of MSHTA and outbound connections to domains that mimic formats such as “bsc-dataseed.binance[.]org” [1].

In this case, Darktrace was able to contain the attack before it could successfully escalate and execute. The attempted execution of HTA files was detected early, allowing Autonomous Response to intervene, stopping the activity from progressing. As soon as the device began communicating with weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, an Autonomous Response inhibitor triggered and interrupted the connections.

As ClearFake continues to rise, users should stay alert to social engineering techniques, including ClickFix, that rely on deceptive security prompts.

Credit to Vivek Rajan (Senior Cyber Analyst) and Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Process / New Executable Launched

Endpoint / Anomalous Use of Scripting Process

Endpoint / New Suspicious Executable Launched

Endpoint / Process Connection::Unusual Connection from New Process

Autonomous Response Models

Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

  • weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru – URL - Malicious Domain
  • 188.114.96[.]6 – IP – Suspicious Domain
  • *.neighb0rrol1[.]ru – URL – Malicious Domain

MITRE Tactics

Initial Access, Drive-by Compromise, T1189

User Execution, Execution, T1204

Software Deployment Tools, Execution and Lateral Movement, T1072

Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1059

System Binary Proxy Execution: MSHTA, T1218.005

References

1.        https://www.kroll.com/en/publications/cyber/rapid-evolution-of-clearfake-delivery

2.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/weiss.neighb0rrol1.ru

3.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/1f1aabe87e5e93a8fff769bf3614dd559c51c80fc045e11868f3843d9a004d1e/community

4.        https://www.packetlabs.net/posts/etherhiding-a-new-tactic-for-hiding-malware-on-the-blockchain/

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Vivek Rajan
Cyber Analyst

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January 30, 2026

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector: Six Trends to Watch

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The evolving cybersecurity threat landscape in finance

The financial sector, encompassing commercial banks, credit unions, financial services providers, and cryptocurrency platforms, faces an increasingly complex and aggressive cyber threat landscape. The financial sector’s reliance on digital infrastructure and its role in managing high-value transactions make it a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored threat actors.

Darktrace’s latest threat research, The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector, draws on a combination of Darktrace telemetry data from real-world customer environments, open-source intelligence, and direct interviews with financial-sector CISOs to provide perspective on how attacks are unfolding and how defenders in the sector need to adapt.  

Six cybersecurity trends in the finance sector for 2026

1. Credential-driven attacks are surging

Phishing continues to be a leading initial access vector for attacks targeting confidentiality. Financial institutions are frequently targeted with phishing emails designed to harvest login credentials. Techniques including Adversary-in-The-Middle (AiTM) to bypass Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) and QR code phishing (“quishing”) are surging and are capable of fooling even trained users. In the first half of 2025, Darktrace observed 2.4 million phishing emails within financial sector customer deployments, with almost 30% targeted towards VIP users.  

2. Data Loss Prevention is an increasing challenge

Compliance issues – particularly data loss prevention -- remain a persistent risk. In October 2025 alone, Darktrace observed over 214,000 emails across financial sector customers that contained unfamiliar attachments and were sent to suspected personal email addresses highlighting clear concerns around data loss prevention. Across the same set of customers within the same time frame, more than 351,000 emails containing unfamiliar attachments were sent to freemail addresses (e.g. gmail, yahoo, icloud), highlighting clear concerns around DLP.  

Confidentiality remains a primary concern for financial institutions as attackers increasingly target sensitive customer data, financial records, and internal communications.  

3. Ransomware is evolving toward data theft and extortion

Ransomware is no longer just about locking systems, it’s about stealing data first and encrypting second. Groups such as Cl0p and RansomHub now prioritize exploiting trusted file-transfer platforms to exfiltrate sensitive data before encryption, maximizing regulatory and reputational fallout for victims.  

Darktrace’s threat research identified routine scanning and malicious activity targeting internet-facing file-transfer systems used heavily by financial institutions. In one notable case involving Fortra GoAnywhere MFT, Darktrace detected malicious exploitation behavior six days before the CVE was publicly disclosed, demonstrating how attackers often operate ahead of patch cycles

This evolution underscores a critical reality: by the time a vulnerability is disclosed publicly, it may already be actively exploited.

4. Attackers are exploiting edge devices, often pre-disclosure.  

VPNs, firewalls, and remote access gateways have become high-value targets, and attackers are increasingly exploiting them before vulnerabilities are publicly disclosed. Darktrace observed pre-CVE exploitation activity affecting edge technologies including Citrix, Palo Alto, and Ivanti, enabling session hijacking, credential harvesting, and privileged lateral movement into core banking systems.  

Once compromised, these edge devices allow adversaries to blend into trusted network traffic, bypassing traditional perimeter defenses. CISOs interviewed for the report repeatedly described VPN infrastructure as a “concentrated focal point” for attackers, especially when patching and segmentation lag behind operational demands.

5. DPRK-linked activity is growing across crypto and fintech.  

State-sponsored activity, particularly from DPRK-linked groups affiliated with Lazarus, continues to intensify across cryptocurrency and fintech organizations. Darktrace identified coordinated campaigns leveraging malicious npm packages, previously undocumented BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret malware, and exploitation of React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) for credential theft and persistent backdoor access.  

Targeting was observed across the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Chile, Nigeria, Kenya, and Qatar, highlighting the global scope of these operations.  

6. Cloud complexity and AI governance gaps are now systemic risks.  

Finally, CISOs consistently pointed to cloud complexity, insider risk from new hires, and ungoverned AI usage exposing sensitive data as systemic challenges. Leaders emphasized difficulty maintaining visibility across multi-cloud environments while managing sensitive data exposure through emerging AI tools.  

Rapid AI adoption without clear guardrails has introduced new confidentiality and compliance risks, turning governance into a board-level concern rather than a purely technical one.

Building cyber resilience in a shifting threat landscape

The financial sector remains a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored adversaries. What this research makes clear is that yesterday’s security assumptions no longer hold. Identity attacks, pre-disclosure exploitation, and data-first ransomware require adaptive, behavior-based defenses that can detect threats as they emerge, often ahead of public disclosure.

As financial institutions continue to digitize, resilience will depend on visibility across identity, edge, cloud, and data, combined with AI-driven defense that learns at machine speed.  

Learn more about the threats facing the finance sector, and what your organization can do to keep up in The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector report here.  

Acknowledgements:

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance sector report was authored by Calum Hall, Hugh Turnbull, Parvatha Ananthakannan, Tiana Kelly, and Vivek Rajan, with contributions from Emma Foulger, Nicole Wong, Ryan Traill, Tara Gould, and the Darktrace Threat Research and Incident Management teams.

[related-resource]  

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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