Cyber attacks have occurred since the early days of the Internet. They can be extremely unpredictable. Learn about the dangers and unintended consequences!
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Marcus Fowler
CEO of Darktrace Federal
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07
Jun 2021
In 1988, a Harvard graduate began an experiment to see how many computers were connected to the Internet. 24 hours later, 10% of all computers around the world had been taken down and the damages soared into the millions. Robert Tappan Morris had inadvertently created the first ever computer worm.
Once Morris realized the speed at which his program was replicating, he tried to send instructions to the victims to dismantle the worm and curb the attack. But it was too late. He was indicted one year later and faced fines of over $10,000.
Fast forward to the present day, and we’re facing the most recent example of a cyber-threat miscalculation, or a criminal group that simply did not understand the full impact their attack would have. The DarkSide ransomware group most likely only intended to hit the IT system and corporate business operations of Colonial Pipeline and underestimated the full impact the malware would have. The consequences were disastrous, halting the supply of fuel across the East Coast, leading to gas shortages, hoarding, and spikes in gasoline prices around the world.
In an apparent show of social responsibility, the DarkSide group issued a seemingly heartfelt apology for the attack on social media:
We are apolitical, we do not participate in geopolitics, do not need to tie us with a defined government and look for other our motives. From today, we introduce moderation and check each company that our partners want to encrypt to avoid social consequences in the future.
The motivation behind this statement is clear: self-preservation. The aftermath of the attack affected not only Colonial Pipeline but the DarkSide group themselves. They fell into the direct firing line of the full force of the US government, as well as becoming pariahs among other criminal groups for the attention they have drawn. It also appears they lost whatever formal or informal state supervision or protection they may have held.
As a result of the blowback and possible direct actions against them and their operating infrastructure, in less than a week, DarkSide announced that they would close their operations for good. They could however resurface under a different name, or join another group, if allowed in.
Misjudging the impact and collateral damage of a cyber-attack can lead to a range of unintended ramifications, from a cyber-crime group feeling increased heat from law enforcement to a nation state escalating a conflict greater than they intended.
It is for this reason that many ransomware groups historically have tended to keep their affairs under the radar. Over 70% of ransomware attacks target SMBs. Unfortunately, while many cyber-crime groups pledge to avoid larger bodies like hospitals and critical infrastructure, the allure of fast payouts for record-breaking ransoms has led to the healthcare sector, even vaccine efforts, being a heavy target for ransomware actors.
Following the incident at Colonial Pipeline, and no doubt in the fear of moving up the FBI’s Most Wanted list, a major Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) group, REvil, announced the following policy:
Work in the social sector (health care, educational institutions) is prohibited;
It is forbidden to work on the gov-sector (state) of any country.
Organized cyber-crime groups often stress that they are apolitical and motivated solely by financial gain.
But when the boat is pushed too far, attacks can easily spill over into geopolitical tensions, encouraging governments to issue executive orders and pushing cyber-threats into the headlines – all bad business for criminal groups. And if a threat actor gets in over their head, they either need to lay low and rebrand in what is known as an ‘exit scam’, as ransomware groups such as Maze and Jokeroo have done in the past, or they’re shut down completely, as seen in the disruption of the Emotet botnet at the beginning of this year.
The effects of a cyber-attack are becoming increasingly difficult to predict and control. The reason for this is twofold. The first is this idea of interconnectivity. We live in a digitized world which is so interlinked that an attack on one server can have global consequences, whether that’s reverberations down the supply chain, IT converging with OT, or a cyber-threat against one country affecting the world.
More isolated than federal bodies, the private sector will most often take the brunt of this collateral damage. Just take NotPetya – where a targeted attack against Ukrainian infrastructure went into the wild paralyzing factories across the globe and costing shipping company Maersk $300 million.
The second reason is easier access to more sophisticated tools. The commercialization of cyber-crime has enabled less advanced actors to rent state-of-the-art malware and launch campaigns with speed and with ease. In fact, the Colonial Pipeline attack was likely orchestrated by an affiliate who had paid for the DarkSide malware. This makes it far more challenging to monitor who is being targeted. When it comes to RaaS, even the developers probably do not know for certain how their malware will be used.
When preparing any kind of cyber-attack, the intelligence that an actor has going into the target environment is rarely 100%. If the intention is to impact a single component of a bank, for example, but the attacker fails to realize that a nearby hospital relies on that same electrical grid, the situation can escalate very quickly. And when it’s a low-skilled attacker with little regard or understanding of what a high-powered tool can do, miscalculations become alarmingly easy.
As far as we know, DarkSide itself was not a state-sponsored APT, merely a private criminal franchise. Yet they advertised their ransomware as the fastest in the world and managed to pull off one of the most disruptive critical infrastructure cyber-attacks of all time. As history has shown, from the Morris worm to Colonial Pipeline, when malware is fast and designed to propagate, it is unpredictable. It is nearly impossible to put a highly destructive genie back in the bottle.
As automation and AI-powered attacks become a reality, these trends will increase exponentially and transform the threat landscape. Ransomware is no longer a human-scalable problem. Organizational resilience depends not on throwing more people into the mix, or even upskilling existing teams – machine-speed attacks need a machine-speed response which can adapt as fast as an attack propagates. Thwarting ransomware is both a board-level issue and a national security concern. As such, self-learning AI technology proves critical in tackling the unpredictability and speed of the threats of today, and of tomorrow.
Thanks to Lucas Marsden-Smedley for his contributions.
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Hola VPN Abuse: From Proxy Traffic to Malware and Cryptomining
Introduction
In enterprise environments, non-compliant software traffic can introduce unexpected exposure by creating unmanaged paths for outbound connectivity. Hola VPN is a notable example because of its peer-to-peer design, which can effectively turn user devices into routing or exit nodes for other parties’ traffic, shifting the risk profile from that of a traditional virtual private network (VPN) to something closer to a distributed proxy.
As a result, the appearance of Hola-related activity, whether from prior installation or unintended background connections, should be treated with caution. Such activity may provide a foothold for malicious behavior, including lateral movement or command-and-control communication.
This blog explores how Hola-associated activity appeared as part of broader patterns of suspicious behavior observed across the Darktrace customer base.
The campaign
In February and March 2026, Darktrace observed similar anomalous activity across multiple customer environments, with affected devices showing consistent behavioral patterns. These included connections to multiple *.hola[.]org endpoints using Hola-related user agents, suggesting interaction with Hola infrastructure rather than isolated or incidental traffic.
Following these connections, affected customer environments showed downloads of suspicious executable files from rare external endpoints 188.241.219[.]55 and 184.241.218[.]111. Both endpoints have been flagged as potentially malicious by open-source intelligence (OSINT) [1][2].
These downloads were conducted using consistent user agents across impacted customers, specifically ‘Hola svc_js_win32/1.249.408’ and ‘Hola svc_js_win32/1.251.389’, suggesting a possible association with Hola-related activity.
Notably, this pattern aligns with recent reporting that, in some cases, Hola distributed an undeclared executable component, me[.]exe, which was later assessed to be a likely Monero-mining binary introduced via a compromised delivery pipeline [3].
Case Study 1
Darktrace first observed a new device on January 19, 2026, within a customer environment based in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region. On the same day it appeared on the network, the device communicated with multiple pieces of Hola VPN-linked infrastructure before downloading a binary from a hola[.]org subdomain.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst investigation highlighting Hola VPN service activity potentially associated with subsequent HTTP command-and-control (C2) connections.
Subsequent Darktrace telemetry revealed a recurring pattern of activity from the day the device was first observed through to March 4, 2026. During this period, the device repeatedly issued HTTP GET requests to the URI /bwfile?size=1048576, each returning a 200 OK response, indicating successful file retrieval.
This behavior was accompanied by a POST request to /bwfile, followed by an additional GET request for a significantly larger file at /bwfile?size=26214400, suggesting a deliberate and structured file transfer pattern.
Notably, the binary download activity was not tied to a single static host. Instead, it was observed across multiple URLs that changed over time while remaining within the same hola[.]org domain. This pattern suggests the use of rotating or distributed delivery infrastructure rather than a fixed endpoint.
Figure 2: Variation in URLs over time within the same hola[.]org domain, indicating the use of dynamically changing endpoints.
Across these events, the activity was consistently associated with the user agent Hola svc_js_win32/1.249.408, further linking the traffic to Hola-related service components. Amid these persistent and unusual connections, on February 22, Darktrace observed the device connecting to 188.241.219[.]55/proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe, resulting in the download of an executable file.
Figure 3: File transfer event showing the download of an executable from the rare external endpoint 188.241.219[.]55.
Based on its file hash, the downloaded file was assessed as a likely Trojan downloader [4], with import hash (imphash) values showing similarities to samples linked to Vidar, Rhadamanthys, and Stealc according to OSINT [5]. Overall, this sequence of activity suggests that Hola-related connectivity may have been leveraged as part of a broader malware delivery chain.
Darktrace’s Autonomous Response
Due to the highly unusual activity observed, Darktrace Autonomous Response was triggered by the device’s behavior. However, as the customer deployment was configured in “Human Confirmation” mode, manual approval was required before any action could be taken.
Had the deployment been set to “Fully Autonomous” mode, Darktrace would have automatically:
Blocked connections to the associated ports and external endpoints
Prevented all outgoing network connections from the device
Enforced the device’s established ‘pattern of life’, allowing normal activity to continue while restricting any anomalous behavior
Figure 4: Example of a Darktrace Autonomous Response model highlighting the action that would have been taken, demonstrating how the system identifies anomalous behavior and applies targeted containment measures to restrict suspicious network activity.
Case Study 2
While the first case focused on anomalous activity from a newly observed device, Darktrace also identified cases in which devices had already been communicating with Hola-related endpoints prior to the suspected campaign. This may suggest pre-existing Hola usage within the environment, potentially increasing exposure and creating an avenue for subsequent suspicious activity.
One case involved three devices within a customer network based in the Americas (AMS). In this instance, a different payload was identified: me[.]exe, a potentially malicious cryptocurrency miner also referred to as HolaMonitorService[.]exe [6][7]. The downloads were observed from infrastructure similar to that seen in Case 1, including an IP address within the same 188.241.0.0/16 subnet.
Connections to *.hola[.]org, alongside the use of potential Hola-related user agents consistent with those in Case 1, were also identified, further suggesting a link between the observed activity and Hola-associated infrastructure.
Darktrace observed activity indicative of unusual VPN usage on the first affected device on February 2, followed by telemetry suggesting potential Tor usage. This was later followed by the download of me[.]exe on March 10 from 188.241.218[.]111. Notably, this device was the earliest among the three within the deployment to exhibit the presence of the suspicious executable.
Figure 5: Cyber AI Analyst detection highlighting the download of a suspicious executable from a similar external endpoint in a separate deployment.
On March 5, 2026, the second affected device exhibited a slightly different progression, initiating connections to http-test1[.]hola[.]org using the user agent ‘hola_get’. This activity was followed by the download of me[.]exe from the same endpoint on March 13, consistent with the broader pattern of Hola-related downloads observed across the environment.
Figure 6: Example of Hola VPN-related connectivity observed on the network prior to the suspected campaign, indicating pre-existing usage that may have contributed to subsequent activity.
The final affected device within this customer’s network demonstrated a more limited but related pattern, also downloading me[.]exe on March 17 using the same ‘hola_get’ user agent.
While the earlier Hola VPN usage observed across the deployment may not have been directly related to the suspected malware campaign, it may nonetheless have contributed to reduced visibility. The presence of pre-existing Hola-related traffic could have obscured malicious activity, making it more difficult to distinguish legitimate usage from attacker-driven behavior and, in turn, hindering the timely identification of the emerging compromise.
Darktrace’s Autonomous Response
For this deployment, the customer had their Autonomous Response capability configured in “Fully Autonomous” mode, allowing Darktrace to take action without human intervention. As a result, the system was able to autonomously disrupt the activity as soon as relevant events were identified through model detections.
Figure 7: Darktrace Autonomous Response actions taken against suspicious activity linked to Hola VPN.
Suspected cryptomining activity
As previously noted, some of the observed executable payloads appear to be linked to cryptomining malware. Across a subset of affected customer environments, this assessment was further supported by subsequent device activity consistent with Monero mining. Affected devices established follow-on connections to multiple external endpoints aligned with known mining infrastructure, indicating post-download execution.
Considering the broader sequence of activity, this pattern may point to a wider form of abuse in which legitimate VPN-related traffic is used to mask or facilitate malicious behavior following compromise.
On several devices, the download of executable files, including a newly observed peer[.]exe, was followed by alerts indicative of cryptocurrency mining activity. Mining-related credentials such as ‘x’ were observed using the Minergate protocol to communicate with endpoints within the 89.125.255.0/24 subnet and 188.241.218[.]111, the same endpoint involved in earlier download activity. Additional credentials appeared to reflect device-specific CPU identifiers, for example ‘12th Gen Intel(R) Core (TM) i5-1235U’.
Observed mining methods included login, submit, and job, consistent with active participation in a pool-based mining workflow rather than passive or incidental contact. The login method indicates that the host authenticated to the mining service as a worker, job reflects the assignment of computational tasks, and submit shows completed work being returned to the pool [8]. This sequence suggests that affected devices were actively contributing processing resources as part of an unauthorized distributed mining operation.
The presence of unauthorized cryptominers can lead to degraded system performance and reduced device stability. Beyond the immediate resource impact, such activity often serves as an indicator of a broader compromise rather than an isolated issue. This may increase the risk of further malware deployment, persistence mechanisms, and lateral movement, particularly in environments where the initial intrusion has not been fully contained.
Conclusion
Across affected environments, detections such as unusual VPN usage, connections to Hola infrastructure, anomalous HTTP activity, suspicious file downloads, and subsequent cryptomining behavior were linked into a single, evolving incident narrative. This aggregation provided a clearer view of attack progression, enabling security teams to understand not just isolated alerts, but the full sequence of compromise from initial contact through to post-exploitation.
Ultimately, these activities show that the risk posed by non-compliant software such as Hola VPN can extend far beyond simple policy violations. What began as traffic to Hola-related infrastructure was, in multiple cases, followed by behavior suggesting deliberate misuse, including suspicious executable downloads using Hola-related user agents and, in some instances, evidence of active cryptomining. These were not isolated anomalies, but elements of a broader pattern in which seemingly benign proxy or VPN-related communications may have created a pathway for malicious delivery and unauthorized resource exploitation.
The significance of this activity lies not only in the downloads or mining, but in what it reveals about an attacker’s ability to blend malicious operations into traffic associated with software that may already have a foothold in the environment. When unapproved software operates within an enterprise, it can reduce visibility, blur the distinction between legitimate and malicious traffic, and create opportunities to extend compromise in ways that are persistent and difficult to detect. Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach enables these behavioral distinctions to be identified, regardless of whether the device is new or long established within the network.
Credit to Min Kim (Associate Principal Analyst), Priya Thapa (Senior Cyber Analyst) Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)
![Variation in URLs over time within the same hola[.]org domain, indicating the use of dynamically changing endpoints.](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/626ff4d25aca2edf4325ff97/6a304bdeff111215c0436931_Screenshot%202026-06-15%20at%2012.00.43%E2%80%AFPM.avif)
![File transfer event showing the download of an executable from the rare external endpoint 188.241.219[.]55.](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/626ff4d25aca2edf4325ff97/6a304c2468d20aeff16a2721_Screenshot%202026-06-15%20at%2012.01.53%E2%80%AFPM.avif)
