June 16, 2025

Tracking CVE-2025-31324: Darktrace’s detection of SAP Netweaver exploitation before and after disclosure

A critical SAP vulnerability, CVE-2025-31324, allows unauthenticated remote code execution via NetWeaver Visual Composer. Despite early mitigation guidance, many systems remain exposed. Darktrace detected exploitation attempts six days before public disclosure, highlighting the importance of proactive, threat-agnostic detection.

Written by

Signe Zaharka

Principal Cyber Analyst

Inside the SOC

Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.

Written by

Signe Zaharka

Principal Cyber Analyst

Jun 2025

Introduction: Exploiting SAP platforms

Global enterprises depend extensively on SAP platforms, such as SAP NetWeaver and Visual Composer, to run critical business processes worldwide. These systems; however, are increasingly appealing targets for well-resourced adversaries:

In March 2025, CISA issued an alert confirming active exploitation of a 2017 SAP NetWeaver vulnerability (CVE‑2017‑12637), enabling attackers to perform directory traversal and exfiltrate sensitive files, including credentials, from internet-facing systems
In April–May 2025, public reporting revealed that a high‑severity zero-day in SAP Visual Composer (CVE‑2025‑31324, CVSS 10.0) has been used in the wild by threat actors deploying web‑shells and achieving full system compromise
Moreover, CISA has added both NetWeaver and Visual Composer flaws to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, marking them as verified active threats due to widespread abuse

What is CVE-2025-31324?

CVE-2025-31324 affects SAP’s NetWeaver Visual Composer, a web-based software modeling tool. SAP NetWeaver is an application server and development platform that runs and connects SAP and non-SAP applications across different technologies [2]. It is commonly used by process specialists to develop application components without coding in government agencies, large enterprises, and by critical infrastructure operators [4].

CVE-2025-31324 affects SAP’s Netweaver Visual Composer Framework 7.1x (all SPS) and above [4]. The vulnerability in a Java Servlet (/irj/servlet_jsp) would enable an unauthorized actor to upload arbitrary files to the /developmentserver/metadatauploader endpoint, potentially resulting in remote code execution (RCE) and full system compromise [3]. The issue stems from an improper authentication and authorization check in the SAP NetWeaver Application Server Java systems [4].

What is the severity rating of CVE-2025-31324?

The vulnerability, first disclosed on April 24, 2025, carries the highest severity rating (CVSS v3 score: 10.0) and could allow remote attackers to upload malicious files without requiring authentication [1][5]. Although SAP released a workaround on April 8, many organizations are hesitant to take their business-critical SAP NetWeaver systems offline, leaving them exposed to potential exploitation [2].

How is CVE-2025-31324 exploited?

The vulnerability is exploitable by sending specifically crafted GET, POST, or HEAD HTTP requests to the /developmentserver/metadatauploader URL using either HTTP or HTTPS. Attackers have been seen uploading malicious files (.jsp, .java, or .class files to paths containing “\irj\servlet_jsp\irj\”), most of them being web shells, to publicly accessible SAP NetWeaver systems.

External researchers observed reconnaissance activity targeting this vulnerability in late January 2025, followed by a surge in exploitation attempts in February. The first confirmed compromise was reported in March [4].

Multiple threat actors have reportedly targeted the vulnerability, including Chinese Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) groups Chaya_004 [7], UNC5221, UNC5174, and CL-STA-0048 [8], as well as ransomware groups like RansomEXX, also known as Storm-2460, BianLian [4] or Qilin [6] (the latter two share the same indicators of compromise (IoCs)).

Following the initial workaround published on April 8, SAP released a security update addressing CVE-2025-31324 and subsequently issued a patch on May 13 (Security Note 3604119) to resolve the root cause of the vulnerability [4].

Darktrace’s coverage of CVE-2025-31324 exploitation

Darktrace has observed activity indicative of threat actors exploiting CVE-2025-31324, including one instance detected before the vulnerability was publicly disclosed.

In April 2025, the Darktrace Threat Research team investigated activity related to the CVE-2025-31324 on SAP devices and identified two cases suggesting active exploitation of the vulnerability. One case was detected prior to the public disclosure of the vulnerability, and the other just two days after it was published.

Early detection of CVE 2025-31324 by Darktrace

Figure 1: Timeline of events for an internet-facing system, believed to be a SAP device, exhibiting activity indicative of CVE-2025-31324 exploitation.

On April 18, six days prior to the public disclosure of CVE-2025-31324, Darktrace began to detect unusual activity on a device belonging to a logistics organization in the Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA) region. Multiple IoCs observed during this incident have since been linked via OSINT to the exploitation of CVE-2025-31324. Notably, however, this reporting was not available at the time of detection, highlighting Darktrace’s ability to detect threats agnostically, without relying on threat intelligence.

The device was observed making domain name resolution request for the Out-of-Band Application Security Testing (OAST) domain cvvr9gl9namk9u955tsgaxy3upyezhnm6.oast[.]online. OAST is often used by security teams to test if exploitable vulnerabilities exist in a web application but can similarly be used by threat actors for the same purpose [9].

Four days later, on April 22, Darktrace observed the same device, an internet-facing system believed to be a SAP device, downloading multiple executable (.exe) files from several Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3). Darktrace’s Threat Research team later found these files to be associated with the KrustyLoader malware [23][24][25].

KrustyLoader is known to be associated with the Chinese threat actor UNC5221, also known as UTA0178, which has been reported to aggressively target devices exposed to the internet [10] [14] [15]. It is an initial-stage malware which downloads and launches a second-stage payload – Sliver C2. Sliver is a similar tool to Cobalt Strike (an open-source post-exploitation toolkit). It is used for command-and-control (C2) connections [11][12]13]. After its successful download, KrustyLoader deletes itself to evade detection. It has been reported that multiple Chinese APT groups have deployed KrustyLoader on SAP Netweaver systems post-compromise [8].

The actors behind KrustyLoader have also been associated with the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities in other enterprise systems, including Ivanti devices [12]. Notably, in this case, one of the Amazon S3 domains observed (abode-dashboard-media.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws[.]com ) had previously been investigated by Darktrace’s Threat Research team as part of their investigation into Ivanti Connect Secure (CS) and Policy Secure (PS) appliances.

In addition to the download of known malicious files, Darktrace also detected new IoCs, including several executable files that could not be attributed to any known malware families or previous attacks, and for which no corresponding OSINT reporting was available.

Figure 2: Darktrace's detection of a likely SAP device downloading an executable file from an Amazon S3 domain on April 22*.

*The model alert was recreated in a demo environment using real incident metadata, as the original customer environment was no longer accessible.

‍

Post-CVE publication detection

Exploit Validation

Between April 27 and 29, Darktrace observed unusual activity from an SAP device on the network of a manufacturing customer in EMEA.

Figure 3: Darktrace / NETWORK’s detection of an SAP device performing a large volume of suspicious activity between April 27 and April 29.

The device was observed making DNS requests for OAST domains (e.g. aaaaaaaa.d06qqn7pu5a6u25tv9q08p5xhbjzw33ge.oast[.]online and aaaaaaaaaaa.d07j2htekalm3139uk2gowmxuhapkijtp.oast[.]pro), suggesting that a threat actor was testing for exploit validation [9].

Figure 4: Darktrace / NETWORK’s detection of a SAP device making suspicious domain name resolution requests for multiple OAST domains.

Privilege escalation tool download attempt

One day later, Darktrace observed the same device attempting to download an executable file from hxxp://23.95.123[.]5:666/xmrigCCall/s.exe (SHA-1 file hash: e007edd4688c5f94a714fee036590a11684d6a3a).

‍Darktrace / NETWORK identified the user agents Microsoft-CryptoAPI/10.0 and CertUtil URL Agent during the connections to 23.95.123[.]5. The connections were made over port 666, which is not typically used for HTTP connections.

Multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) vendors have identified the executable file as either JuicyPotato or SweetPotato, both Windows privilege escalation tools[16][17][18][19]. The file hash and the unusual external endpoint have been associated with the Chinese APT group Gelsemium in the past, however, many threat actors are known to leverage this tool in their attacks [20] [21].

Figure 5: Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of a SAP device downloading a suspicious executable file from hxxp://23.95.123[.]5:666/xmrigCCall/s.exe on April 28, 2025.

Darktrace deemed this activity highly suspicious and triggered an Enhanced Monitoring model alert, a high-priority security model designed to detect activity likely indicative of compromise. As the customer was subscribed to the Managed Threat Detection service, Darktrace’s Security Operations Centre (SOC) promptly investigated the alert and notified the customer for swift remediation. Additionally, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability automatically blocked connections to the suspicious IP, 23.95.123[.]5, effectively containing the compromise in its early stages.

Actions taken by Darktrace’s Autonomous Response to block connections to the suspicious external endpoint 23.95.123[.]5. This event log shows that the connections to 23.95.123[.]5 were made over a rare destination port for the HTTP protocol and that new user agents were used during the connections. — Figure 6: Actions taken by Darktrace’s Autonomous Response to block connections to the suspicious external endpoint 23.95.123[.]5. This event log shows that the connections to **23.95.123[.]5** were made over a rare destination port for the HTTP protocol and that new user agents were used during the connections.

Conclusion

The exploitation of CVE-2025-31324 to compromise SAP NetWeaver systems highlights the persistent threat posed by vulnerabilities in public-facing assets. In this case, threat actors leveraged the flaw to gain an initial foothold, followed by attempts to deploy malware linked to groups affiliated with China [8][20].

Crucially, Darktrace demonstrated its ability to detect and respond to emerging threats even before they are publicly disclosed. Six days prior to the public disclosure of CVE-2025-31324, Darktrace detected unusual activity on a device believed to be a SAP system, which ultimately represented an early detection of the CVE. This detection was made possible through Darktrace’s behavioral analysis and anomaly detection, allowing it to recognize unexpected deviations in device behavior without relying on signatures, rules or known IoCs. Combined with its Autonomous Response capability, this allowed for immediate containment of suspicious activity, giving security teams valuable time to investigate and mitigate the threat.

Credit to Signe Zaharka (Principal Cyber Analyst), Emily Megan Lim, (Senior Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

List of IoCs

23.95.123[.]5:666/xmrigCCall/s.exe - URL- JuicyPotato/SweetPotato - high confidence

29274ca90e6dcf5ae4762739fcbadf01- MD5 file hash - JuicyPotato/SweetPotato - high confidence

e007edd4688c5f94a714fee036590a11684d6a3a - SHA-1 file hash - JuicyPotato/SweetPotato -high confidence

3268f269371a81dbdce8c4eedffd8817c1ec2eadec9ba4ab043cb779c2f8a5d2 - SHA-256 file hash - JuicyPotato/SweetPotato -high confidence

abode-dashboard-media.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws[.]com/nVW2lsYsYnv58 - URL- high confidence

applr-malbbal.s3.ap-northeast-2.amazonaws[.]com/7p3ow2ZH - URL- high confidence

applr-malbbal.s3.ap-northeast-2.amazonaws[.]com/UUTICMm - URL- KrustyLoader - high confidence

beansdeals-static.s3.amazonaws[.]com/UsjKy - URL- high confidence

brandnav-cms-storage.s3.amazonaws[.]com/3S1kc - URL- KrustyLoader - high confidence

bringthenoiseappnew.s3.amazonaws[.]com/pp79zE - URL- KrustyLoader - high confidence

f662135bdd8bf792a941ea222e8a1330 - MD5 file hash- KrustyLoader - high confidence

fa645f33c0e3a98436a0161b19342f78683dbd9d - SHA-1 file hash- KrustyLoader - high confidence

1d26fff4232bc64f9ab3c2b09281d932dd6afb84a24f32d772d3f7bc23d99c60 - SHA-256 file hash- KrustyLoader - high confidence

6900e844f887321f22dd606a6f2925ef - MD5 file hash- KrustyLoader - high confidence

da23dab4851df3ef7f6e5952a2fc9a6a57ab6983 - SHA-1 file hash- KrustyLoader - high confidence

1544d9392eedf7ae4205dd45ad54ec67e5ce831d2c61875806ce4c86412a4344 - SHA-256 file hash- KrustyLoader - high confidence

83a797e5b47ce6e89440c47f6e33fa08 - MD5 file hash - high confidence

a29e8f030db8990c432020441c91e4b74d4a4e16 - SHA-1 file hash - high confidence

72afde58a1bed7697c0aa7fa8b4e3b03 - MD5 file hash- high confidence

fe931adc0531fd1cb600af0c01f307da3314c5c9 - SHA-1 file hash- high confidence

b8e56de3792dbd0f4239b54cfaad7ece3bd42affa4fbbdd7668492de548b5df8 - SHA-256 file hash- KrustyLoader - high confidence

17d65a9d8d40375b5b939b60f21eb06eb17054fc - SHA-1 file hash- KrustyLoader - high confidence

8c8681e805e0ae7a7d1a609efc000c84 - MD5 file hash- KrustyLoader - high confidence

29274ca90e6dcf5ae4762739fcbadf01 - MD5 file hash- KrustyLoader - high confidence

Darktrace Model Detections

Anomalous Connection / CertUtil Requesting Non Certificate

Anomalous Connection / CertUtil to Rare Destination

Anomalous Connection / Powershell to Rare External

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

Anomalous File / Internet Facing System File Download

Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer (Enhanced Monitoring)

Anomalous Server Activity / New User Agent from Internet Facing System

Compliance / CertUtil External Connection

Compromise / High Priority Tunnelling to Bin Services (Enhanced Monitoring)

Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity (Enhanced Monitoring)

Device / Suspicious Domain

Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

Device / Large Number of Model Alerts from Critical Network Device (Enhanced Monitoring)

Device / New PowerShell User Agent

Device / New User Agent

Autonomous Response Model Alerts

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Server Anomaly Block

Antigena/ Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

Antigena/ Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Pattern of Life Block

Antigena/ Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

Antigena/ Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

Antigena/ Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block

Antigena/ Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Server Anomaly Block

Cyber AI Analyst Incidents

Possible HTTP Command and Control

Suspicious File Download

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Malware - RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1588.001

PowerShell - EXECUTION - T1059.001

Drive-by Compromise - INITIAL ACCESS - T1189

Ingress Tool Transfer - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1105

Application Layer Protocol - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071

Exploitation of Remote Services - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1210

Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol - EXFILTRATION - T1048.003

References

1. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31324

2. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/over-1-200-sap-netweaver-servers-vulnerable-to-actively-exploited-flaw/

3. https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-reliaquest-uncovers-vulnerability-behind-sap-netweaver-compromise/

4. https://onapsis.com/blog/active-exploitation-of-sap-vulnerability-cve-2025-31324/

5. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/sap-fixes-suspected-netweaver-zero-day-exploited-in-attacks/

6. https://op-c.net/blog/sap-cve-2025-31324-qilin-breach/

7. https://www.forescout.com/blog/threat-analysis-sap-vulnerability-exploited-in-the-wild-by-chinese-threat-actor/

8. https://blog.eclecticiq.com/china-nexus-nation-state-actors-exploit-sap-netweaver-cve-2025-31324-to-target-critical-infrastructures

9. https://portswigger.net/burp/application-security-testing/oast

10. https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/unc5221-cve-2025-22457-ivanti-connect-secure

11. https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/elf.krustyloader

12. https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/krustyloader-backdoor

13. https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/new-krustyloader-variant-dropped-via-screenconnect-exploit

14. https://blog.eclecticiq.com/china-nexus-threat-actor-actively-exploiting-ivanti-endpoint-manager-mobile-cve-2025-4428-vulnerability

15. https://thehackernews.com/2024/01/chinese-hackers-exploiting-critical-vpn.html

16. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3268f269371a81dbdce8c4eedffd8817c1ec2eadec9ba4ab043cb779c2f8a5d2

17. https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/3268f269371a81dbdce8c4eedffd8817c1ec2eadec9ba4ab043cb779c2f8a5d2/

18. https://www.fortinet.com/content/dam/fortinet/assets/analyst-reports/report-juicypotato-hacking-tool-discovered.pdf

19. https://www.manageengine.com/log-management/correlation-rules/detecting-sweetpotato.html

20. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/rare-possible-gelsemium-attack-targets-se-asia/

21. https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/in/pdf/2023/10/kpmg-ctip-gelsemium-apt-31-oct-2023.pdf

22. https://securityaffairs.com/177522/hacking/experts-warn-of-a-second-wave-of-attacks-targeting-sap-netweaver-bug-cve-2025-31324.html

23. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b8e56de3792dbd0f4239b54cfaad7ece3bd42affa4fbbdd7668492de548b5df8

24. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/1d26fff4232bc64f9ab3c2b09281d932dd6afb84a24f32d772d3f7bc23d99c60/detection

25. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/1544d9392eedf7ae4205dd45ad54ec67e5ce831d2c61875806ce4c86412a4344/detection

Written by

Signe Zaharka

Principal Cyber Analyst

Inside the SOC

Written by

Signe Zaharka

Principal Cyber Analyst

Product Marketing Manager, Network Detection & Response

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November 12, 2025

Unmasking Vo1d: Inside Darktrace’s Botnet Detection

What is vo1d APK malware?

Vo1d malware first appeared in the wild in September 2024 and has since evolved into one of the most widespread Android botnets ever observed. This large-scale Android malware primarily targets smart TVs and low-cost Android TV boxes. Initially, Vo1d was identified as a malicious backdoor capable of installing additional third-party software [1]. Its functionality soon expanded beyond the initial infection to include deploying further malicious payloads, running proxy services, and conducting ad fraud operations. By early 2025, it was estimated that Vo1d had infected 1.3 to 1.6 million devices worldwide [2].

From a technical perspective, Vo1d embeds components into system storage to enable itself to download and execute new modules at any time. External researchers further discovered that Vo1d uses Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to create new command-and-control (C2) domains, ensuring that regardless of existing servers being taken down, the malware can quickly reconnect to new ones. Previous published analysis identified dozens of C2 domains and hundreds of DGA seeds, along with new downloader families. Over time, Vo1d has grown increasingly sophisticated with clear signs of stronger obfuscation and encryption methods designed to evade detection [2].

Darktrace’s coverage

Earlier this year, Darktrace observed a surge in Vo1d-related activity across customer environments, with the majority of affected customers based in South Africa. Devices that had been quietly operating as expected began exhibiting unusual network behavior, including excessive DNS lookups. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) has long highlighted South Africa as one of the countries most impacted by Vo1d infections [2].

What makes the recent activity particularly interesting is that the surge observed by Darktrace appears to be concentrated specifically in South African environments. This localized spike suggests that a significant number of devices may have been compromised, potentially due to vulnerable software, outdated firmware, or even preloaded malware. Regions with high prevalence of low-cost, often unpatched devices are especially susceptible, as these everyday consumer electronics can be quietly recruited into the botnet’s network. This specifically appears to be the case with South Africa, where public reporting has documented widespread use of low-cost boxes, such as non-Google-certified Android TV sticks, that frequently ship with outdated firmware [3].

The initial triage highlighted the core mechanism Vo1d uses to remain resilient: its use of DGA. A DGA deterministically creates a large list of pseudo-random domain names on a predictable schedule. This enables the malware to compute hundreds of candidate domains using the same algorithm, instead of using a hard-coded single C2 hostname that defenders could easily block or take down. To ensure reproducible from the infected device’s perspective, Vo1d utilizes DGA seeds. These seeds might be a static string, a numeric value, or a combination of underlying techniques that enable infected devices to generate the same list of candidate domains for a time window, provided the same DGA code, seed, and date are used.

Interestingly, Vo1d’s DGA seeds do not appear to be entirely unpredictable, and the generated domains lack fully random-looking endings. As observed in Figure 1, there is a clear pattern in the names generated. In this case, researchers identified that while the first five characters would change to create the desired list of domain names, the trailing portion remained consistent as part of the seed: 60b33d7929a, which OSINT sources have linked to the Vo1d botnet. [2]. Darktrace’s Threat Research team also identified a potential second DGA seed, with devices in some cases also engaging in activity involving hostnames matching the regular expression /[a-z]{5}fc975904fc9\.(com|top|net). This second seed has not been reported by any OSINT vendors at the time of writing.

Another recurring characteristic observed across multiple cases was the choice of top-level domains (TLDs), which included .com, .net, and .top.

Figure 1: Advanced Search results showing DNS lookups, providing a glimpse on the DGA seed utilized.

The activity was detected by multiple models in Darktrace / NETWORK, which triggered on devices making an unusually large volume of DNS requests for domains uncommon across the network.

During the network investigation, Darktrace analysts traced Vo1d’s infrastructure and uncovered an interesting pattern related to responder ASNs. A significant number of connections pointed to AS16509 (AMAZON-02). By hosting redirectors or C2 nodes inside major cloud environments, Vo1d is able to gain access to highly available and geographically diverse infrastructure. When one node is taken down or reported, operators can quickly enable a new node under a different IP within the same ASN. Another feature of cloud infrastructure that hardens Vo1d’s resilience is the fact that many organizations allow outbound connections to cloud IP ranges by default, assuming they are legitimate. Despite this, Darktrace was able to identify the rarity of these endpoints, identifying the unusualness of the activity.

Analysts further observed that once a generated domain successfully resolved, infected devices consistently began establishing outbound connections to ephemeral port ranges like TCP ports 55520 and 55521. These destination ports are atypical for standard web or DNS traffic. Even though the choice of high-numbered ports appears random, it is likely far from not accidental. Commonly used ports such as port 80 (HTTP) or 443 (HTTPS) are often subject to more scrutiny and deeper inspection or content filtering, making them riskier for attackers. On the other hand, unregistered ports like 55520 and 55521 are less likely to be blocked, providing a more covert channel that blends with outbound TCP traffic. This tactic helps evade firewall rules that focus on common service ports. Regardless, Darktrace was able to identify external connections on uncommon ports to locations that the network does not normally visit.

The continuation of the described activity was identified by Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst, which correlated individual events into a broader interconnected incident. It began with the multiple DNS requests for the algorithmically generated domains, followed by repeated connections to rare endpoints later confirmed as attacker-controlled infrastructure. Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation further enabled it to categorize the events as part of the “established foothold” phase of the attack.

Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst incident illustrating the transition from DNS requests for DGA domains to connections with resolved attacker-controlled infrastructure.

Conclusion

The observations highlighted in this blog highlight the precision and scale of Vo1d’s operations, ranging from its DGA-generated domains to its covert use of high-numbered ports. The surge in affected South African environments illustrate how regions with many low-cost, often unpatched devices can become major hubs for botnet activity. This serves as a reminder that even everyday consumer electronics can play a role in cybercrime, emphasizing the need for vigilance and proactive security measures.

Credit to Christina Kreza (Cyber Analyst & Team Lead) and Eugene Chua (Principal Cyber Analyst & Team Lead)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

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Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Anomalous Connection / Devices Beaconing to New Rare IP
Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint
Compromise / DGA Beacon
Compromise / Domain Fluxing
Compromise / Fast Beaconing to DGA
Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

3.132.75[.]97 – IP address – Likely Vo1d C2 infrastructure
g[.]sxim[.]me – Hostname – Likely Vo1d C2 infrastructure
snakeers[.]com – Hostname – Likely Vo1d C2 infrastructure

Selected DGA IoCs

semhz60b33d7929a[.]com – Hostname – Possible Vo1d C2 DGA endpoint
ggqrb60b33d7929a[.]com – Hostname – Possible Vo1d C2 DGA endpoint
eusji60b33d7929a[.]com – Hostname – Possible Vo1d C2 DGA endpoint
uacfc60b33d7929a[.]com – Hostname – Possible Vo1d C2 DGA endpoint
qilqxfc975904fc9[.]top – Hostname – Possible Vo1d C2 DGA endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

T1071.004 – Command and Control – DNS
T1568.002 – Command and Control – Domain Generation Algorithms
T1568.001 – Command and Control – Fast Flux DNS
T1571 – Command and Control – Non-Standard Port

[1] https://news.drweb.com/show/?lng=en&i=14900

[2] https://blog.xlab.qianxin.com/long-live-the-vo1d_botnet/

[3] https://mybroadband.co.za/news/broadcasting/596007-warning-for-south-africans-using-specific-types-of-tv-sticks.html

‍

About the author

Christina Kreza

Cyber Analyst

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November 6, 2025

Darktrace Named the Only 2025 Gartner® Peer Insights™ Customers’ Choice for Network Detection and Response

Darktrace: The only Customers’ Choice for NDR in 2025

In a year defined by rapid change across the threat landscape, recognition from those who use and rely on security technology every day means the most.

That’s why we’re proud to share that Darktrace has been named the only Customers’ Choice in the 2025 Gartner® Peer Insights™ Voice of the Customer for Network Detection and Response (NDR).

Out of 11 leading NDR vendors evaluated, Darktrace stood alone as the sole Customers’ Choice, a recognition that we feel reflects not just our innovation, but the trust and satisfaction of the customers who secure their networks with Darktrace every day.

What the Gartner® Peer Insights™ Voice of the Customer means

“Voice of the Customer” is a document that synthesizes Gartner Peer Insights reviews into insights for buyers of technology and services. This aggregated peer perspective, along with the individual detailed reviews, is complementary to Gartner expert research and can play a key role in your buying process. Peers are verified reviewers of a technology product or service, who not only rate the offering, but also provide valuable feedback to consider before making a purchase decision. Vendors placed in the upper-right “Customers’ Choice” quadrant of the “Voice of the Customer” have scores that meet or exceed the market average for both axes (User Interest and Adoption, and Overall Experience).It’s not just a rating. We feel it’s a reflection of genuine customer sentiment and success in the field.

In our view, Customers consistently highlight Darktrace’s ability to:

Detect and respond to unknown threats in real time
Deliver unmatched visibility across IT, OT, and cloud environments
Automate investigations and responses through AI-driven insights

We believe this recognition reinforces what our customers already know: that Darktrace helps them see, understand, and stop attacks others miss.

A rare double: recognized by customers and analysts alike

This distinction follows another major recogniton. Darktrace’s placement as a Leader in the Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for Network Detection and Response earlier this year.

That makes Darktrace the only vendor to achieve both:

A Leader status in the Gartner Magic Quadrant for NDR, and
A Customers’ Choice in Gartner Peer Insights 2025

It’s a rare double that we feel reflects both industry leadership and customer trust, two perspectives that, together, define what great cybersecurity looks like.

A Customers’ Choice across the network and the inbox

To us, this recognition also builds on Darktrace’s momentum across multiple domains. Earlier this year, Darktrace was also named a Customers’ Choice for Email Security Platforms in the Gartner® Peer Insights™ report.

With more than 1,000 verified reviews across Network Detection and Response, Email Security Platforms, and Cyber Physical Systems (CPS), we at Darktrace are proud to be trusted across the full attack surface, from the inbox to the industrial network.

Thank you to our customers

We’re deeply grateful to every customer who shared their experience with Darktrace on Gartner Peer Insights. Your insights drive our innovation and continue to shape how we protect complex, dynamic environments across the world.

Discover why customers choose Darktrace for network and email security.

^{Gartner® Peer Insights™ content consists of the opinions of individual end users based on their own experiences, and should not be construed as statements of fact, nor do they represent the views of Gartner or its affiliates. Gartner does not endorse any vendor, product or service depicted in this content nor makes any warranties, expressed or implied, with respect to this content, about its accuracy or completeness, including any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.}

^{Gartner, Voice of the Customer for Network Detection and Response, By Peer Community Contributor, 30 October 2025}

About the author

Mikey Anderson

Product Marketing Manager, Network Detection & Response

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Check out this article by Darktrace: Darktrace Tracks CVE‑2025‑31324 Activity

Tracking CVE-2025-31324: Darktrace’s detection of SAP Netweaver exploitation before and after disclosure

Introduction: Exploiting SAP platforms

What is CVE-2025-31324?

What is the severity rating of CVE-2025-31324?

How is CVE-2025-31324 exploited?

Darktrace’s coverage of CVE-2025-31324 exploitation

Early detection of CVE 2025-31324 by Darktrace

Post-CVE publication detection

Exploit Validation

Privilege escalation tool download attempt

Conclusion

Appendices

List of IoCs

Darktrace Model Detections

Autonomous Response Model Alerts

Cyber AI Analyst Incidents

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

References

Unmasking Vo1d: Inside Darktrace’s Botnet Detection

Darktrace Named the Only 2025 Gartner® Peer Insights™ Customers’ Choice for Network Detection and Response

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