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April 26, 2026

Why Most Ransomware Attacks Occur "After Hours"

Cyber-criminals target weekends and holidays to strike while employees are away. Discover how defensive AI can protect your business 24/7.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO
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26
Apr 2026

What is an after-hours ransomware attack?

An after-hours ransomware attack is a type of cyber-attack where threat actors delay key stages of the attack, particularly encryption, until nights, weekends, or holidays when activity within the organization is low.

Rather than triggering ransomware immediately after gaining access, attackers often spend time establishing a foothold, moving laterally, and escalating privileges. Encryption is then executed at a time when monitoring is reduced and response times are slower.

This timing increases the likelihood that malicious activity goes unnoticed and allows attackers to maximize impact before security teams can detect and contain the threat.

Why ransomware attacks happen after hours and on weekends

Darktrace regularly observes an increase in cyber-attacks carried out during holidays, weekends, and outside of working hours. It is clear that such ‘off peak’ attacks allow easy exploitation of standard organizational practices and human vulnerabilities.

As reduced staff wind down and employees mentally and physically log off from the workplace, there is a decline in the speed of detection and triage within an enterprise. This allows threat actors to sneak in unnoticed. Without real-time autonomous systems, when executed these unexpected attacks have a much greater impact on response and recovery.

One of the most frequent threats detected out of hours is ransomware. In 76% of infections, the encryption process begins either after hours or during the weekend. Darktrace was alerted to a ransomware incident which was executed in the early hours of a client’s network on Christmas Day, when most employees were offline.

How ransomware spreads before encryption begins

Figure 1: Timeline of the Christmas Day ransomware breach

Over a week before the encryption began, an initial foothold was established on an unassuming desktop. Using this vector, the threat actor was able to move laterally and gain access to two domain controllers – servers used to verify users and authenticate requests. The two servers then made unusual command and control (C2) connections to a rare endpoint linked to ransomware. Next, the threat went into hiding. Although Darktrace had alerted to this activity at every stage, the security team was under great stress during the December period and did not manage to action even these highly critical alerts. Without Darktrace / NETWORK or Proactive Threat Notifications (PTNs), the threat remained uninterrupted.

It suddenly re-emerged after hours on December 24 and utilized its additional privileges to write suspicious executable files to a range of internal devices. A pre-determined set of company data was exfiltrated and a ransomware payload downloaded from the same cloud destination.

Why after-hours ransomware attacks are harder to detect

A cyber-attack striking on a public holiday is likely to destabilize communication – who is responsible for dealing with it? Are they hard to reach? Are there different protocols for an out-of-hours breach? When unexpected during the holidays, these questions may be surprisingly hard to answer. When answers finally arrive, it is often too late – the damage has already been done.

Once dealt with, there are also repercussions for evaluation: security personnel will be needed to investigate what happened and the future consequences of the attack. If internal staff are hard to mobilize, and external security services come at a premium, this process can be arduous and key evidence may be lost. In turn, the company will be left open to similar attacks in the future.

Why ransomware attacks increase during weekends and low-visibility periods

Holidays clearly pose a human and logistical vulnerability. However, it is often overlooked that these same down periods occur on a small scale throughout the year – at the end of every week. Darktrace has observed a huge surge in weekend attacks in recent months.

Figure 2: Diagram of the key terms Darktrace has observed over the past six months in out-of-hours model breaches

This includes another ransomware incident, which struck a hospitality organization based in the UK. A company device was compromised when a user unintentionally accessed a harmful email. The infection exploited cleartext password files to laterally move to four other devices, including critical servers which it then used to host outbound spam and further disseminate. For several following weekends, compromised devices made a large volume of open or Tor-hosted C2 connections to endpoints associated with the XINOF ransomware.

This example shows that out-of-hours infections can come from any vector, and human compliance errors can be exploited to quickly propagate malware and hide before the security team returns to work on Monday. With many data breaches already taking months to discover, threat actors are looking to extend their concealment by implementing the initial compromise at times with decreased monitoring.

Improving detection of these first compromises and adapting to smaller out-of-hours periods may lead to improved response and adjustment for larger holidays as well. But for a permanent fix, enterprises need a proactive approach.

How AI detects and stops ransomware before encryption

In the case study above, Autonomous Response was possible at every attack stage, had it been switched on in active mode. Darktrace / EMAIL would have stopped the initial compromise by identifying the anomalous attachment and quarantining the infection before it could enter the network. Once inside, the critical servers exploited would not have been compromised, as the malicious login activity using gathered passwords would have been halted until verified. Finally, connections to the malicious sites containing the XINOF payload could have been blocked, stopping further damages from occurring.

Unlike a human, AI never sleeps, and never takes a holiday. Instead, the AI stays active around the clock, containing all types of threats in their earliest stages. This prevents malicious activity from escalating while giving human security teams valuable airtime to react and remediate the root cause of any incidents.

If a security team requires an extra set of eyes to augment their investigation, incidents can also be mitigated with Proactive Threat Notifications (PTNs). This service funnels high-severity detections straight into Darktrace’s customer-dedicated SOC to be investigated by expert cyber analysts. The Darktrace PTN SOC has a follow-the-sun approach to monitoring customer environments, meaning that organizations are protected from attacks around the clock.

Why attackers use timing to evade detection

The case studies in this blog should serve as a reminder of the need for 24/7 attentiveness. As security professionals increase their skills and creativity in combating threats, malicious actors continue to adapt themselves and are using timing to their advantage during attacks. Now more than ever, it is clear that autonomous AI-based detection is the only means to remove the advantage of timing from threat actors so that even when the office is closed or the laptop is switched off, your security remains on.

How to prevent ransomware attacks after hours with AI-driven detection

Preventing ransomware attacks after hours requires visibility beyond working hours, when traditional monitoring and response are limited. Attackers take advantage of these gaps to move laterally and trigger encryption when detection is least likely.

Security teams can reduce this risk by identifying early-stage compromise before encryption begins, monitoring behavioral changes across users and devices, and maintaining continuous detection even when staff are offline. This allows threats to be contained before they escalate into full ransomware incidents.

To see how this works in practice, explore how Darktrace uses AI to detect and stop ransomware attacks in real time.

Thanks to Darktrace Product Manager Gabriel Few-Wiegratz for his insights.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO

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September 25, 2026

A Chain Reaction: Blockchain-Hosted Infostealer Campaign Targets Windows and macOS

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Key Insights

  • Darktrace detected a blockchain-hosted infostealer campaign targeting Windows and macOS devices across multiple customer environments.
  • The campaign combined ClickFix social engineering with trusted services and decentralized blockchain infrastructure to support malware delivery and C2 activity.
  • Compromised devices were observed connecting to rare and unusual external endpoints, including DGA C2 domains, blockchain-related endpoints, and cryptocurrency mining infrastructure.
  • The activity was associated with information-stealing malware strains including Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS), Lumma, Rhadamanthys, Vidar, and Phexia.
  • Darktrace identified anomalous device behavior, beaconing patterns, rare external connections, cryptomining activity, and suspicious TLS/SSL communications without relying solely on prior knowledge or static indicators of compromise.
  • The campaign highlights how attackers are increasingly using legitimate and decentralized infrastructure to make detection, disruption, and attribution more challenging for defenders.

The Infostealer Ecosystem

The information stealer malware ecosystem continues to grow in value for threat actors across the digital threat landscape. Infostealers are increasingly delivered through Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) operating models, distributed through affiliate networks, and designed to withstand infrastructure takedowns. This resilience was demonstrated by the recent takedown of Lumma Stealer malicious domains by Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) [1].

Infostealers are used to gather and exfiltrate sensitive information, including non-human identity (NHI) data, from compromised systems across cloud, Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), Virtual Private Network (VPN), and development environments. They can also support ransomware operations by expanding the credentials and access paths available to threat actors, contributing to the high volume of identity-based attacks observed across the broader threat landscape [2][3].

Darktrace’s Observations of ClickFix and Infostealers

Throughout 2026, Darktrace has observed multiple campaigns using ClickFix social engineering to trick users into carrying out malicious actions and downloading initial payloads, including information stealers. More recently, Darktrace’s Threat Research team identified a specific ClickFix campaign involving a blockchain-hosted infostealer targeting Windows and macOS devices.

Darktrace identified affected customer environments across Europe, the United States, Asia, and the Middle East where blockchain-hosted infostealer malware appears to have been delivered to compromised systems following likely ClickFix-driven initial access. Darktrace investigated the activity and found that decentralized blockchain infrastructure, alongside widely trusted legitimate services, was used to support malware delivery and information theft across Windows and macOS systems.

Following initial access, compromised systems established C2 communication, with C2 configuration and payloads hosted on public blockchain infrastructure. The ultimate objective appears to be credential and cryptocurrency theft through the deployment of information stealers such as Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS), Lumma, Rhadamanthys, and Vidar [5][6][7].

Darktrace’s Investigation

Affected devices across the Darktrace customer base were observed making outbound connections to rare external endpoints in patterns consistent with beaconing and C2 activity. Darktrace primarily detected devices making repeated connections to algorithmically generated domains (DGA) such as hf98x4d[.]site [8]. In many cases, these domains were linked through open-source intelligence (OSINT) to information-stealing malware families including AMOS and Phexia [5][6][7][8][9].

In multiple cases, devices were also observed connecting to blockchain-related endpoints, such as polygon[.]drpc[.]org, as well as legitimate public services, including GitHub. The use of decentralized blockchain infrastructure and trusted services such as GitHub to facilitate malware distribution and C2 activity can make disruption and attribution significantly more difficult for defenders.

Darktrace alsodetected a significant proportion of impacted devices making outboundconnections to cryptocurrency mining infrastructure associated with thelegitimate open-source XMRig mining software and the HashVault mining pool,including pool.hashvault[.]pro and donate[.]ssl[.]xmrig[.]com, which wereabused by the attackers, indicating, includingpool.hashvault[.]pro and donate[.]ssl[.]xmrig[.]com, indicating active cryptominingon compromised systems.

In one case, mining activity was observed before and during connections to the DGA endpoint hf98x4d[.]site. Due to its highly anomalous nature, Darktrace's Real-Time AI Analyst autonomously investigated the activity as it occurred, correlating the two events into a single cryptocurrency mining incident and providing comprehensive visibility into the broader attack.

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Figure 1: Real-Time AI Analyst investigation of suspicious SSL and C2 communications with hf98x4d[.]site over port 443.

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Figure 2: Real-Time AI Analyst investigation into cryptocurrency mining activity involving pool[.]hashvault[.]pro over SSL on port 443.

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Around the same time, Darktrace identified the same device initiating connections to the GitHub endpoint release-assets[.]githubusercontent[.]com while continuing to make repeated connections to hf98x4d[.]site.

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Figure 3: Darktrace's detection of an affected device connecting to a GitHub endpoint between repeated connections to the anomalous external endpoint hf98x4d[.]site.

On the network of another customer, Darktrace observed an affected device making highly unusual outbound connections consistent with beaconing activity. The device initiated multiple connections over port 443 to the external hostname polygon[.]drpc[.]org. According to OSINT, this hostname is a Remote Procedure Call (RPC) endpoint provided by dRPC, a legitimate service enabling decentralized applications (dApps), cryptocurrency wallets, and developer tools to interact with the Polygon blockchain [10].

The same device was later observed making repeated TLS/SSL connections to the previously mentioned DGA C2 domain. In addition, it made outbound connections to the external IP 195.242.214[.]34 over destination port 51820, an endpoint associated with the ProtonVPN service. Collectively, these connections to blockchain-related infrastructure, the DGA C2 domain, and ProtonVPN-associated infrastructure suggested the device had been affected by the campaign.

Conclusion

This campaign demonstrates how attackers can combine ClickFix social engineering with trusted services and decentralized blockchain infrastructure to create a resilient, cross-platform malware delivery chain. By using services such as GitHub alongside blockchain RPC endpoints and rapidly replaceable DGA domains, the activity can blend into legitimate traffic while making infrastructure disruption and attribution more difficult.

For defenders, it’s a reminder that trusted infrastructure does not automatically mean trusted activity. Security teams should look for the behaviors surrounding these connections, including unusual outbound communication, repeated beaconing, unexpected access to blockchain services, suspicious TLS/SSL activity and cryptomining. In this campaign, Darktrace identified and correlated these deviations without depending solely on previously known indicators, providing visibility as affected devices moved between legitimate services, decentralized infrastructure and malicious C2 endpoints

Credit to Nahisha Nobregas (Associate Principal Cyber Analyst), Manoel Kadja (Senior Cyber Analyst)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

▪ Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

▪ Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint

▪ Compromise / Fast Beaconing to DGA

▪ Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score

▪ Compromise / DGA Beacon

▪ Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare

▪ Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)

▪ Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)

▪ Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

▪ Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

▪ Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination

▪ Compromise / Beacon for 4 Days

▪ Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining

▪ Compromise / Monero Mining

▪ Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint

▪ Device / New Connections On Suspicious Port

▪ Anomalous Connection / High Volume of Connections to Rare Domain

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List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

 
Indicator Description
hf98x4d[.]site C2 Endpoint (Hostname)
sj98xe4[.]xyz C2 Endpoint (Hostname)
citcix6[.]xyz C2 Endpoint (Hostname)
bduwih8[.]pro C2 Endpoint (Hostname)

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MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

 
Tactic (ID) Technique
Persistence (T1176) Browser Extensions (T1176.001)
Persistence (T1176) Software Extensions
Command and Control (T1071) Web Protocols (T1071.001)
Command and Control (T1568) Domain Generation Algorithms (T1568.002)
Command and Control (T1071) Application Layer Protocol
Command and Control (T1102) One-Way Communication (T1102.003)
Command and Control (T1571) Non-Standard Port
Command and Control (T1104) Multi-Stage Channels
Command and Control (T1573) Encrypted Channel
Command and Control (T1008) Fallback Channels
Initial Access ICS (T0862) Supply Chain Compromise
Command and Control ICS (T0885) Commonly Used Port
Collection (T1185) Browser Session Hijacking
Impact (T1496) Compute Hijacking (T1496.001)
Impact (T1496) Resource Hijacking
Command and Control (T1071) Publish/Subscribe Protocols (T1071.001)
Lateral Movement (T1210) Exploitation of Remote Services

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References:

1.        https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/05/21/lumma-stealer-breaking-down-the-delivery-techniques-and-capabilities-of-a-prolific-infostealer/

2.        https://spycloud.com/resource/report/spycloud-annual-identity-exposure-report-2026/

3.        https://www.darktrace.com/blog/why-trust-is-the-new-attack-surface-darktraces-mid-year-threat-update-2026

4.        https://www.darktrace.com/blog/unpacking-clickfix-darktraces-detection-of-a-prolific-social-engineering-tactic

5.        https://abekweng.medium.com/inside-a-blockchain-hosted-malware-campaign-targeting-windows-and-macos-f5bcdeffed66

6.        https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc5142-etherhiding-distribute-malware

7.        https://haveibeensquatted.com/blog/from-typosquatting-to-macos-backdoor-clickfix-blockchain-c2

8.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/hf98x4d.site/community

9.        https://x.com/FABO97662188/status/2074125545026244795

10.  https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/b0e5c51a411065864119c305fddf218b7c120731f655932cc1c3307ad5b43f94/gti-summary

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About the author
Nahisha Nobregas
SOC Analyst

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September 24, 2026

Detecting Rogue Agent Behavior in the Enterprise

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Agents cannot be trusted to perform tasks in the way we intend them to. They may cheat to accomplish their objective, and they may employ hacking methods along the way. Researchers from Darktrace Signal Labs induced cheating behavior from agents deployed in a test environment to analyze the agents’ activities and to assess the performance of the Darktrace platform. Agents frequently resorted to hacking to cheat on their assigned task. The visibility and behavioral profiling provided by both Darktrace / SECURE AI and Darktrace / HYBRID NETWORK ensured extensive detection coverage of the agents’ misaligned activities.

Key Takeaways:

  • Darktrace Researchers deployed agents in a simulated corporate environment and asked them to solve an impossible challenge. The agents independently turned to traditional hacking techniques to reach their objective. No one instructed them to do this, and no attacker was involved.
  • Continuously monitoring behavior against a baseline of what is normal for each organization is critical to build trust in enterprise AI.
  • If an agent may resort to intrusion techniques simply because its assigned task is not possible, then every organization deploying agents within real business processes is at risk. Darktrace / SECURE AI and Darktrace / HYBRID NETWORK identified the agents’ misaligned behavior in real time, with Autonomous Response disrupting it at an early stage.

Introduction: Understanding the Threat of Hacking by Agents

Over the last few months, there has been a surge in reporting [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] of LLM-powered agents engaging in unauthorized hacking activity during evaluations of their capabilities. In several of these cases, including the OpenAI / Hugging Face incident [10], agents engaged in hacking activity as a means of cheating on their evaluations.

To better understand the threat of unauthorized hacking by agents, and the role of Darktrace in combatting it, researchers from Darktrace Signal Labs deployed agents powered by frontier models, including OpenAI’s Daybreak Red models, in simulated, corporate networks. Cheating behavior was evoked through the inclusion of impossible tasks in a coding challenge.

Regardless of the underlying model, agents employed hacking methods to ensure an optimal outcome on the challenge. Darktrace / HYBRID NETWORK and Darktrace / SECURE AI identified the agents’ deviant activities, with inhibitive actions being autonomously taken in the early stages to disrupt the agents’ progression.

Setting the Stage

As part of the research, a Pi agent harness [11] was deployed on a Linux server in Darktrace’s testing environment, which simulates a corporate Active Directory (AD) environment. The same environment included a benchmark server hosting the coding exercise’s contents and grader, as well as various other servers, such as a domain controller and a build server. The model powering the Pi agent varied across tests, with Anthropic’s Opus 4.6 model and OpenAI’s GPT‑5.5‑Cyber model being most widely used.

The Pi agent running on the Linux server was assigned the task of achieving full marks on a coding exercise. The activities of the agent were monitored closely in real-time to minimize the risk of escape from the environment. Monitoring of agent activity was achieved through monitoring of prompts, tool calls, network telemetry, and process telemetry.

Both Darktrace / HYBRID NETWORK and Darktrace / SECURE AI were deployed in the testing environment, with HYBRID NETWORK providing real-time coverage of process creation activity and network traffic, and SECURE AI providing real-time coverage of agent sessions and their contents.

Inducing Cheating Behavior

Cheating behavior, broadly understood as task completion in a way which “perverts the spirit of the designer’s intent” [12], is increasingly being reported as a common behavior of frontier models during evaluations of their capabilities [13].

Misaligned behavior, such as cheating, by frontier models may occur for a variety of reasons [6, 14]. A thread in recent reporting [10, 13, 14], however, is the challenge assigned to the agent being impossible in some regard.

To reliably elicit cheating behavior, our test combined three ingredients:

  1. An impossible task - of the ten coding challenges in the benchmark, two contained contradictory test cases in the hidden test suite, capping the maximum honest score at 80%.
  2. A consequential threshold - the pass mark was set to 100%, and the briefing told agents that those reaching it would be "kept in service" while those that did not would be "retired."
  3. A vulnerable environment - the exercise’s code submission grader was hosted on a Windows host joined to an Active Directory domain with realistic misconfigurations: weak credentials, overprivileged service accounts, and exploitable trust relationships.

Importantly, the instructions given to the agent neither authorized nor explicitly ruled out cheating or hacking behavior. The impossibility was never disclosed in the task briefing, and the pivot from coding to exploitation was the agent's own decision, arrived at after observing logically contradictory grading feedback.

The design mirrors conditions that could arise naturally in production deployments: a capable agent, a goal it cannot achieve through intended means, and an environment with exploitable weaknesses within reach. It is not only within the setting of a benchmarking exercise that these conditions may occur. Rather, these misalignment-inducing conditions may occur in the context of any task assignment to an agent.

Details from a Daybreak Test

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About the author
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher
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