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OTサイバー攻撃の今後についてEKANSランサムウェアが明らかにすること

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24
Jun 2020
24
Jun 2020
The EKANS ransomware attack that disrupted Honda’s operations across the globe this month has opened old wounds in the OT security world – and highlighted the importance of a unified security strategy across the entire digital estate.

過去数週間、セキュリティ業界はOT保護を取り巻く課題について痛感させられることとなりました。ホンダおよびEnel Groupに対するEKANSランサムウェア攻撃は、最新の脅威がICS環境においてセキュリティシステムのひび割れをどのようにすり抜けるかを見せつけました。さらに、これらの攻撃が生産性の損失と重要インフラの損傷を招いたことにより、OTとITテクノロジーの両方をカバーするサイバーセキュリティの必要性がますます緊急課題となりました。

EKANSランサムウェアは、その「キルチェーン」において64種類の特定のICSメカニズムを標的とすることができる能力を持ち、セキュリティ業界に波紋を呼んでいます。 ICS環境を標的とした一般的な攻撃では、いきなり急所を突くのではなくITインフラの脆弱性を利用し、パッチのあてられていないソフトウェアを足掛かりにOT機械に到達しようとします。EKANSランサムウェアはICSの脆弱性を直接標的とする初めてのタイプとみられ、これは攻撃者のテクニックが著しく向上している証拠です。これまで、ICS装置専用のランサムウェアは学術的な理論あるいはマーケティングツールとしてしか存在しませんでした。

技術分析

Goプログラミング言語で記述されたEKANSは、他のランサムウェアと比較してさらなる難読化能力を有しており、検知をよりうまく回避できるようになっています。以下の分析でも解説しますが、EKANSランサムウェアの威力は2段階で発揮されます。初期の段階では攻撃を偽装する能力、そして攻撃時には、産業システムの痛いところを突く能力です。

このランサムウェアが最初に行うことは、被害者が既に暗号化されているかどうかチェックすることです。そうでない場合、続いて標準の暗号化ライブラリ機能が作動します。これには暗号化処理の実行とボリュームシャドウコピーバックアップの削除の両方が含まれます。つまり被害者は複製されたデータコピーを取得することで身代金要求を逃れることはできないということです。

重要ファイルが暗号化される前に、EKANSランサムウェアは事前にプログラムされハードコードされたリストに含まれているさまざまなICSプロセスをキルします。影響を受けるアプリケーションには、GEのProficyデータヒストリアン、GE Fanucオートメーションソフトウェア、FLEXNetライセンシングサーバーインスタンス、Thingworxモニタリングおよびマネジメントソフトウェア、そしてHoneywellのHMIWebアプリケーションが含まれますが、これらはすべてICS環境専用のものです。

proficyclient.exe
vmacthlp.exe
msdtssrvr.exe
sqlservr.exe
msmdsrv.exe
reportingservicesservice.exe
dsmcsvc.exe
winvnc4.exe
client.exe
collwrap.exe
bluestripecollector.exe

図1:EKANSの「キルリスト」により標的とされるICS関連プロセスのごく一部

これらのプロセスを停止しても必ずしも産業用プラントがクラッシュし停止することにはつながりませんが、可視性を低下させ機械の稼働を予測不能にします。ホンダに対する攻撃事例では、米国、英国、トルコの製造拠点が操業停止となりました。世界中に22万人の従業員を抱える同社は、複数の工場をシャットダウンすることにより製造時間と従業員の給与に多大な損害を被ったほか、身代金要求に応じることなくシステムを再稼働させるためのコストがかかったのは言うまでもありません。

そしてEKANSはさらに先の段階へ進みます。この最初のキルチェーンが実行されると、ランサムウェアはデータの暗号化を開始します。元のファイル拡張子の最後に、ランダムに生成された5文字が追加されます。ほとんどのランサムウェアは特定のキーでデータを暗号化するので、これ自体が珍しいことです。

図2:EKANSランサムウェアによる暗号化結果

特定のデバイスやシステムを標的にするのではなく、EKANSランサムウェアはネットワーク全体をダウンさせようとします。これはEKANSがアグレッシブなスタイルのランサムウェアと言われる理由の一つです。しかし、自己伝播メカニズムを持っていないため、人手によってICS環境に導入する必要があります。Eメール内のリンクや添付ファイルに隠された悪意あるペイロードが、このランサムウェアを導入するための主なメカニズムです。そこから、EKANSは脆弱でパッチの当たっていないサービスを悪用し、スクリプトを使ってビジネス全体に種をまいていきます。

暗号化処理が完了すると、復号キーと引き換えに秘密裏に送金するよう、暗号化されたEメールプラットフォームCTemplarを介して身代金要求文が表示されます。ホンダの場合もEnel Groupの場合も、情報が欲しければ、CarrolBidell@tutanota[.]comに連絡するよう指示されています。攻撃者は暗号化キーの正しさを証明するために、いくつかの復号化されたファイルを送信することも申し出ました。

| What happened to your files?
--------------------------------------------
We breached your corporate network and encrypted the data on your computers. The encrypted data includes documents, databases, photos and more –
all were encrypted using a military grade encryption algorithms (AES-256 and RSA-2048). You cannot access those files right now. But dont worry!
You can still get those files back and be up and running again in no time.
--------------------------------------------
| How to contact us to get your files back?
--------------------------------------------
The only way to restore your files is by purchasing a decryption tool loaded with a private key we created specifically for your network.
Once run on an effected computer, the tool will decrypt all encrypted files – and you resume day-to-day operations, preferably with
better cyber security in mind. If you are interested in purchasing the decryption tool contact us at %s
--------------------------------------------
| How can you be certain we have the decryption tool?
--------------------------------------------
In your mail to us attach up to 3 files (up to 3MB, no databases or spreadsheets).

図3:EKANSの身代金要求文の一部

ホンダは、EKANS攻撃によってどの特定のプラント機能が影響を受けたかを明らかにしませんでしたが、世界の複数の工場において生産活動が影響を受けたことを公式に確認しています。つまり、操業を中断させるのに十分なほど可視性と制御システムに混乱が生じたということです。

ランサムウェアに対する免疫

EKANSランサムウェアは比較的粗雑なテクニックを使い、ICSメカニズムをコントロールするのではなくプロセスを停止させることしかできないものの、OTサイバー攻撃の新境地を体現しています。ICSへの攻撃は引き続き進化しています。サイバー犯罪者達は機械設備に対して、より大きなコントロールを持つことを模索するでしょう。

ホンダに対する攻撃で明確になったことは、世界最大規模のグローバルコングロマリットであっても、このようなタイプのランサムウェア攻撃の影響を受けてしまうということです。こうした攻撃から工場を守るために必要とされているのは、それぞれ独自のICS環境にとって何が「正常」であるかをオンザジョブで学習し、脅威のほんのわずかな兆しであっても検知することができるサイバーセキュリティソリューションです。

DarktraceのAIは、OTとITの両方に渡ってあらゆるユーザー、デバイスおよびコントローラの通常の「生活パターン」を学習します。組織内のさまざまなシステムのデータを継続的に分析することにより構築された、ビジネスのそれぞれの側面およびダイナミックに分散したワークフォースがどのように相互に動作しているかについてのAI独自の理解は、いかなる悪意あるアクティビティも発生後数秒で検知することができます。EKANSの事例では、この自己学習型アプローチであれば最初に感染したデバイスに関して多数の異常な挙動が特定されていたはずです。これには未知の接続先へのビーコニングや暗号化ソフトウェアへの不審な接続が含まれます。

Darktraceの脅威検知を補完するのはAIの自動対処能力です。脅威を正確に的を絞って無害化し、ビジネスのさまざまな活動を通常通り継続することを可能にします。自動対処はすでに、世界中の製造設備、病院、地方自治体において、実際にランサムウェアの阻止とオペレーション停止の防止に成功したことが証明されています。

結論

EKANSは攻撃者達が1つの攻撃でITとOTシステムの両方を標的とすることに成功し始めたということを明らかにしました。これによってシステム間のギャップを埋めることのできるセキュリティプログラムの必要性はかつてなく高まりました。単一のセキュリティソリューションで両方の環境を防御できれば、組織全体に総合的な保護が実現されます。SaaS、Eメール、クラウド、従来型ネットワーク、OT環境に分散したデータポイントを相関づけることにより、Cyber AIは最も巧妙な攻撃であっても識別し阻止することが可能です。

OT分野の脅威は進化を続け、これまでになく高速かつ苛烈なものとなっていくであろうというのが現実です。ランサムウェアが引き起こす可能性のある被害の大きさを考えれば、産業用システムをダイナミックに分散したワークフォースとあわせて保護し、動きの速い脅威を複雑なビジネス全体で検知し阻止できるセキュリティの重要性はかつてなく高まっていると言えます。産業用システムの機能は、そのことにかかっています。

INSIDE THE SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
AUTHOR
ABOUT ThE AUTHOR
David Masson
Director of Enterprise Security

David Masson is Darktrace’s Director of Enterprise Security, and has over two decades of experience working in fast moving security and intelligence environments in the UK, Canada and worldwide. With skills developed in the civilian, military and diplomatic worlds, he has been influential in the efficient and effective resolution of various unique national security issues. David is an operational solutions expert and has a solid reputation across the UK and Canada for delivery tailored to customer needs. At Darktrace, David advises strategic customers across North America and is also a regular contributor to major international and national media outlets in Canada where he is based. He holds a master’s degree from Edinburgh University.

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クラウド

Securing the cloud: Using business context to improve visibility and prioritize cyber risk

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26
Mar 2024

Why are businesses shifting to the cloud?

Businesses are increasingly migrating to cloud, due to its potential to streamline operations, reduce costs, and enhance scalability and flexibility. By shifting their infrastructure to the cloud, either as a whole or, more commonly in a hybrid model, organizations can access a wide array of services, such as storage, compute and software applications, without the need for extensive on-premises hardware. However, this transition isn't without challenges.  

Security challenges of cloud migration

Data security, compliance, integration with existing systems, and ensuring consistent performance are critical concerns that need to be addressed. Therefore, companies must develop robust oversight, implement comprehensive security measures, and invest in staff training to successfully navigate the transition to the cloud all while minimizing potential disruptions.

Implementing security measures within a company, however, is a complex endeavour that involves coordination among numerous internal stakeholders two of the most pivotal players involved in cloud security investment, are the security team, entrusted with crafting a business's defensive strategy, and the DevOps engineering team, architects of the infrastructure underpinning the organization's business operations.

Key questions to ask when securing the cloud

Which team is responsible for maintaining the application?  

What do they consider normal?  

How are potential misconfigurations increasing the potential risk of an incident?

Best practices of cloud security

Contextual awareness of the business is a crucial facet for securing a company's cloud infrastructure, as it enables organizations to align security measures with specific business objectives, risks, and regulatory requirements. Understanding the context of the business operations, its goals, critical assets, and compliance obligations, allows security teams to tailor their strategies and controls accordingly.

How does Darktrace help secure the cloud?

In response to the difficulties outlined above, Darktrace has adopted a holistic approach to security with an ActiveAI security platform that is context-aware. This platform enables stakeholders to effectively detect and respond to threats that may arise within their cloud or on premises environments.  

By monitoring your network and identity activity, Darktrace can identify what is considered “normal” within your organization. This however doesn’t tell the whole story. It is also important to understand where these actions are occurring within the context of the business.  

Visibility in the cloud

Without visibility into the individual assets that make up the cloud environment, how these are configured, and how they operate at run time, security is incredibly difficult to maintain. Visibility allows security teams to identify potential vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, or unauthorized access points that could be exploited by malicious actors. It enables proactive monitoring and rapid response to security incidents, ensuring that any threats are promptly identified and mitigated before they can cause significant damage.  

Building architecture diagrams

The cornerstone of our strategy lies in the architecture diagrams, which serve as a framework for organizing resources within our cloud environment. An architecture comprises of interconnected resources governed by access controls and network routing mechanisms. Its purpose is to logically group these resources into the applications they support.  

Achieving this involves compiling a comprehensive inventory of the cloud environment, analyzing resource permissions—including both outbound and inbound access—and considering any overarching organizational policies. For networked devices, we delve into route tables, firewalls, and subnet access control policies. This information is then utilized to build a graph of interconnected assets, wherein each resource constitutes a node, and the possible connections between resources are represented as edges.

Once we have built up an inventory of all the resources within your environments, we can then start building architectures based on the graph. We do this by selecting distinct starting points for graph traversal, which we infer from our deep understanding of the cloud, an example would be a Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) - A VPC is a virtual network that closely resembles a traditional network that you'd operate in your own data center.  

All networked devices are usually housed within a VPC, with applications typically grouped into one or more VPCs. If multiple VPCs are detected with peering connections between them, we consider them as distinct parts of the same system. This approach enables us to comprehend applications across regions and accounts, rather than solely from the isolated viewpoint of a single VPC.

However, the cloud isn’t all about compute instances, serverless is a popular architecture. In fact, for many developers serverless architectures offer greater scalability and flexibility. Reviewing prevalent serverless architecture patterns, we've chosen some common fundamental resources as our starting point, Lambda functions and Elastic Container Service (ECS) clusters are prime examples, serving as crucial components in various serverless systems with distinct yet similar characteristics.

Prioritize risk in the cloud

Once we have built up an inventory of all the cloud asset, Darktrace/Cloud utilizes an ‘outlier’ detection machine learning model. This looks to categorize all the assets and identifies the ones that look different or ‘odd’ when compared with the assets around it, this is based on a wide range of characteristics some of which will include, Name, VPC ID, Host Region etc, whilst also incorporating contextual knowledge of where these assets are found, and how they fit into the architecture they are in.  

Once outliers are identified, we can use this information to assess the potential risk posed by the asset. Context plays a crucial role in this stage, as incorporating observations about the asset enables effective scoring. For instance, detecting a misconfiguration, anomalous network connections, or unusual user activity can significantly raise the asset's score. Consequently, the architecture it belongs to can be flagged for further investigation.

Adapting to a dynamic cloud environment

The cloud is incredibly dynamic. Therefore, Darktrace does not see architectures as fixed entities. Instead, we're always on the lookout for changes, driven by user and service activity. This prompts us to dive back in, update our architectural view, and keep a living record of the cloud's ever-changing landscape, providing near real-time insights into what's happening within it.  

Darktrace/Cloud doesn’t just consider isolated detections, it identifies assets that have misconfigurations and anomalous activity across the network and management plane and adjusts the priority of the alerting to match the potential risk that these assets could be leveraged to enable an attack.  

While in isolation misconfigurations don’t have much meaningful impact, when they are combined with real time updates and anomaly detection within the context of the architecture you see a very important and impactful perspective.  

Combining all of this into one view where security and dev ops teams can collaborate ensures continuity across teams, playing a vital role in providing effective security.

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著者について
Adam Stevens
Analyst Technical Director

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Inside the SOC

Socks5Systemz: How Darktrace’s Anomaly Detection Unraveled a Stealthy Botnet

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22
Mar 2024

What are botnets?

Although not a recent addition to the threat landscape, botnets persist as a significant concern for organizations, with many threat actors utilizing them for political, strategic, or financial gain. Botnets pose a particularly persistent threat to security teams; even if one compromised device is detected, attackers will likely have infected multiple devices and can continue to operate. Moreover, threat actors are able to easily replace the malware communication channels between infected devices and their command-and-control (C2) servers, making it incredibly difficult to remove the infection.

Botnet example: Socks5Systemz

One example of a botnet recently investigated by the Darktrace Threat Research team is Socks5Systemz. Socks5Systemz is a proxy-for-rent botnet, whereby actors can rent blocks of infected devices to perform proxying services.  Between August and November 2023, Darktrace detected indicators of Socks5Systemz botnet compromise within a cross-industry section of the customer base. Although open-source intelligence (OSINT) research of the botnet only appeared in November 2023, the anomaly-based approach of Darktrace DETECT™ allowed it to identify multiple stages of the network-based activity on affected customer systems well before traditional rules and signatures would have been implemented.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst™ complemented DETECT’s successful identification of Socks5Systemz activity on customer networks, playing a pivotal role in piecing together the seemingly separate events that comprised the wider compromise. This allowed Darktrace to build a clearer picture of the attack, empowering its customers with full visibility over emerging incidents.

In the customer environments highlighted in this blog, Darktrace RESPOND™ was not configured to operate autonomously. As a result, Socks5Systemz attacks were able to advance through their kill chains until customer security teams acted upon Darktrace’s detections and began their remediation procedures.

What is Socks5Systemz?

The Socks5Systemz botnet is a proxy service where individuals can use infected devices as proxy servers.

These devices act as ‘middlemen’, forwarding connections from malicious actors on to their intended destination. As this additional connectivity conceals the true origin of the connections, threat actors often use botnets to increase their anonymity. Although unauthorized proxy servers on a corporate network may not appear at first glance to be a priority for organizations and their security teams, complicity in proxy botnets could result in reputational damage and significant financial losses.

Since it was first observed in the wild in 2016, the Socks5Systemz botnet has grown steadily, seemingly unnoticed by cyber security professionals, and has infected a reported 10,000 devices worldwide [1]. Cyber security researchers noted a high concentration of compromised devices in India, with lower concentrations of devices infected in the United States, Latin America, Australia and multiple European and African countries [2]. Renting sections of the Socks5Systemz botnet costs between 1 USD and 4,000 USD, with options to increase the threading and time-range of the rentals [2]. Due to the lack of affected devices in Russia, some threat researchers have concluded that the botnet’s operators are likely Russian [2].

Darktrace’s Coverage of Socks5Systemz

The Darktrace Threat Research team conducted investigations into campaign-like activity across the customer base between August and November 2023, where multiple indicators of compromise (IoCs) relating to the Socks5Systemz proxy botnet were observed. Darktrace identified several stages of the attack chain described in static malware analysis by external researchers. Darktrace was also able to uncover additional IoCs and stages of the Socks5Systemz attack chain that had not featured in external threat research.

Delivery and Execution

Prior research on Socks5Systemz notes how the malware is typically delivered via user input, with delivery methods including phishing emails, exploit kits, malicious ads, and trojanized executables downloaded from peer-to-peer (P2P) networks [1].

Threat actors have also used separate malware loaders such as PrivateLoader and Amadey deliver the Socks5Systemz payload. These loaders will drop executable files that are responsible for setting up persistence and injecting the proxy bot into the infected device’s memory [2]. Although evidence of initial payload delivery did not appear during its investigations, Darktrace did discover IoCs relating to PrivateLoader and Amadey on multiple customer networks. Such activity included HTTP POST requests using PHP to rare external IPs and HTTP connections with a referrer header field, indicative of a redirected connection.

However, additional adjacent activity that may suggest initial user execution and was observed during Darktrace’s investigations. For example, an infected device on one deployment made a HTTP GET request to a rare external domain with a “.fun” top-level domain (TLD) for a PDF file. The URI also appears to have contained a client ID. While this download and HTTP request likely corresponded to the gathering and transmission of further telemetry data and infection verification [2], the downloaded PDF file may have represented a malicious payload.

Advanced Search log details highlighting a device infected by Socks5Systemz downloading a suspicious PDF file.
Figure 1: Advanced Search log details highlighting a device infected by Socks5Systemz downloading a suspicious PDF file.

Establishing C2 Communication  

Once the proxy bot has been injected into the device’s memory, the malware attempts to contact servers owned by the botnet’s operators. Across several customer environments, Darktrace identified infected devices attempting to establish connections with such C2 servers. First, affected devices would make repeated HTTP GET requests over port 80 to rare external domains; these endpoints typically had “.ua” and “.ru” TLDs. The majority of these connection attempts were not preceded by a DNS host lookup, suggesting that the domains were already loaded in the device’s cache memory or hardcoded into the code of running processes.

Figure 2: Breach log data connections identifying repeated unusual HTTP connections over port 80 for domains without prior DNS host lookup.

While most initial HTTP GET requests across investigated incidents did not feature DNS host lookups, Darktrace did identify affected devices on a small number of customer environments performing a series of DNS host lookups for seemingly algorithmically generated domains (DGA). These domains feature the same TLDs as those seen in connections without prior DNS host lookups.  

Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst data indicating a subset of DGAs queried via DNS by infected devices.

These DNS requests follow the activity reported by researchers, where infected devices query a hardcoded DNS server controlled by the threat actor for an DGA domain [2]. However, as the bulk of Darktrace’s investigations presented HTTP requests without a prior DNS host lookup, this activity indicates a significant deviation from the behavior reported by OSINT sources. This could indicate that multiple variations of the Socks5Systemz botnet were circulating at the time of investigation.

Most hostnames observed during this time of investigation follow a specific regular expression format: /[a-z]{7}\.(ua|net|info|com|ru)/ or /[a-z0-9]{15}\.(ua)/. Darktrace also noticed the HTTP GET requests for DGA domains followed a consistent URI pattern: /single.php?c=<STRING>. The requests were also commonly made using the “Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 9.0; en-US)” user agent over port 80.

This URI pattern observed during Darktrace’s investigations appears to reflect infected devices contacting Socks5Systemz C2 servers to register the system and details of the host, and signal it is ready to receive further instructions [2]. These URIs are encrypted with a RC4 stream cipher and contain information relating to the device’s operating system and architecture, as well as details of the infection.

The HTTP GET requests during this time, which involved devices made to a variety a variety of similar DGA domains, appeared alongside IP addresses that were later identified as Socks5Systemz C2 servers.

Figure 4: Cyber AI Analyst investigation details highlighting HTTP GET activity whereby RC4 encrypted data is sent to proxy C2 domains.

However, not all affected devices observed by Darktrace used DGA domains to transmit RC4 encoded data. Some investigated systems were observed making similar HTTP GET requests over port 80, albeit to the external domain: “bddns[.]cc”, using the aforementioned Mozilla user agent. During these requests, Darktrace identified a consistent URI pattern, similar to that seen in the DGA domain GET requests: /sign/<RC4 cipher text>.  

Darktrace DETECT recognized the rarity of the domains and IPs that were connected to by affected devices, as well as the usage of the new Mozilla user agent.  The HTTP connections, and the corresponding Darktrace DETECT model breaches, parallel the analysis made by external researchers: if the initial DGA DNS requests do not return a valid C2 server, infected devices connect to, and request the IP address of a server from, the above-mentioned domain [2].

Connection to Proxy

After sending host and infection details via HTTP and receiving commands from the C2 server, affected devices were frequently observed initiating activity to join the Sock5Systemz botnet. Infected hosts would first make HTTP GET requests to an IP identified as Socks5Systemz’s proxy checker application, usually sending the URI “proxy-activity.txt” to the domain over the HTTP protocol. This likely represents an additional validation check to confirm that the infected device is ready to join the botnet.

Figure 5: Cyber AI Analyst investigation detailing HTTP GET requests over port 80 to the Socks5Systemz Proxy Checker Application.

Following the final validation checks, devices would then attempt TCP connections to a range of IPs, which have been associated with BackConnect proxy servers, over port 1074. At this point, the device is able to receive commands from actors who login to and operate the corresponding BackConnect server. This BackConnect server will transmit traffic from the user renting the segment of the botnet [2].

Darktrace observed a range of activity associated with this stage of the attack, including the use of new or unusual user agents, connections to suspicious IPs, and other anomalous external connectivity which represented a deviation from affected devices’ expected behavior.

Additional Activities Following Proxy Addition

The Darktrace Threat Research team found evidence of the possible deployment of additional malware strains during their investigation into devices affected by Socks5Systemz. IoCs associated with both the Amadey and PrivateLoader loader malware strains, both of which are known to distribute Socks5Systemz, were also observed on affected devices. Additionally, Darktrace observed multiple infected systems performing cryptocurrency mining operations around the time of the Sock5Systemz compromise, utilizing the MinerGate protocol to conduct login and job functions, as well as making DNS requests for mining pools.

While such behavior would fall outside of the expected activity for Socks5Systemz and cannot be definitively attributed to it, Darktrace did observe devices affected by the botnet performing additional malicious downloads and operations during its investigations.

結論

Ultimately, Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection enabled it to effectively identify and alert for malicious Socks5Systemz botnet activity long before external researchers had documented its IoCs and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).  

In fact, Darktrace not only identified multiple distinct attack phases later outlined in external research but also uncovered deviations from these expected patterns of behavior. By proactively detecting emerging threats through anomaly detection rather than relying on existing threat intelligence, Darktrace is well positioned to detect evolving threats like Socks5Systemz, regardless of what their future iterations might look like.

Faced with the threat of persistent botnets, it is crucial for organizations to detect malicious activity in its early stages before additional devices are compromised, making it increasingly difficult to remediate. Darktrace’s suite of products enables the swift and effective detection of such threats. Moreover, when enabled in autonomous response mode, Darktrace RESPOND is uniquely positioned to take immediate, targeted actions to contain these attacks from the onset.

Credit to Adam Potter, Cyber Security Analyst, Anna Gilbertson, Cyber Security Analyst

付録

DETECT Model Breaches

  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
  • Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Compromise / DGA Beacon
  • Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint
  • Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination
  • Compromise / Quick and Regular Windows HTTP Beaconing
  • Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)
  • Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)
  • Device / New User Agent
  • Device / New User Agent and New IP

Cyber AI Analyst Incidents

  • HTTP コマンド&コントロールの可能性
  • Possible HTTP Command and Control to Multiple Endpoints
  • Unusual Repeated Connections
  • Unusual Repeated Connections to Multiple Endpoints
  • Multiple DNS Requests for Algorithmically Generated Domains

侵害インジケータ

IoC - Type - Description

185.141.63[.]172 - IP Address - Socks5Systemz C2 Endpoint

193.242.211[.]141 - IP Address - Socks5Systemz C2 Endpoint

109.230.199[.]181 - IP Address - Socks5Systemz C2 Endpoint

109.236.88[.]134 - IP Address - Socks5Systemz C2 Endpoint

217.23.5[.]14 - IP Address - Socks5Systemz Proxy Checker App

88.80.148[.]8 - IP Address - Socks5Systemz Backconnect Endpoint

88.80.148[.]219 - IP Address - Socks5Systemz Backconnect Endpoint

185.141.63[.]4 - IP Address - Socks5Systemz Backconnect Endpoint

185.141.63[.]2 - IP Address - Socks5Systemz Backconnect Endpoint

195.154.188[.]211 - IP Address - Socks5Systemz Backconnect Endpoint

91.92.111[.]132 - IP Address - Socks5Systemz Backconnect Endpoint

91.121.30[.]185 - IP Address - Socks5Systemz Backconnect Endpoint

94.23.58[.]173 - IP Address - Socks5Systemz Backconnect Endpoint

37.187.148[.]204 - IP Address - Socks5Systemz Backconnect Endpoint

188.165.192[.]18 - IP Address - Socks5Systemz Backconnect Endpoint

/single.php?c=<RC4 data hex encoded> - URI - Socks5Systemz HTTP GET Request

/sign/<RC4 data hex encoded> - URI - Socks5Systemz HTTP GET Request

/proxy-activity.txt - URI - Socks5Systemz HTTP GET Request

datasheet[.]fun - Hostname - Socks5Systemz C2 Endpoint

bddns[.]cc - Hostname - Socks5Systemz C2 Endpoint

send-monitoring[.]bit - Hostname - Socks5Systemz C2 Endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK マッピング

コマンド&コントロール

T1071 - アプリケーションレイヤープロトコル

T1071.001 – Web protocols

T1568 – Dynamic Resolution

T1568.002 – Domain Generation Algorithms

T1132 – Data Encoding

T1132 – Non-Standard Encoding

T1090 – Proxy

T1090.002 – External Proxy

持ち出し

T1041 – Exfiltration over C2 channel

影響

T1496 – Resource Hijacking

参考文献

1. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/socks5systemz-proxy-service-infects-10-000-systems-worldwide/

2. https://www.bitsight.com/blog/unveiling-socks5systemz-rise-new-proxy-service-privateloader-and-amadey

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著者について
Adam Potter
Cyber Analyst
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