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ContiランサムウェアがOT環境をダウンさせた理由

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09
Feb 2022
09
Feb 2022
このブログでは、IT/OTが統合された環境にランサムウェアがどのように拡散するか、また、自己学習型AIがどのようにこれらの脅威を抑制する力を与えるかについて説明します。

ランサムウェアが世界を席巻していますが、影響を受けるテクノロジーはITだけではありません。ITとの融合が進んでいる運用技術(OT)も、ランサムウェアの戦術、技術、手順(TTP)の影響を受けやすいのです。そして、ランサムウェアがOTを攻撃した場合、その影響は壊滅的なものとなる可能性を秘めています。

ここでは、ITシステムからOTシステムに拡散したランサムウェアの攻撃について見ていきます。この攻撃を最初に検知したのは、DarktraceのAIです。

この脅威の発見は、Darktraceの技術が OT を持つ組織に非常に大きな価値を提供するユースケースを示すものです。これは、企業や産業環境が相互に接続されている組織にとって、特に有用な手段です。

  1. 新たな攻撃は、OTに横展開する前にITで食い止めることができ、さらにITのデバイスからデバイスに広がる前に食い止めることができます。
  2. 企業は、OT環境を詳細に可視化し、正常な活動からの逸脱を検知し、是正措置を迅速に特定することができます。

脅威の発見:ITおよびOTシステムに影響を及ぼすランサムウェアとクリプトマイニングによるハイジャック

Darktrace は最近、EMEA の OT 研究開発向けの投資会社を標的とした積極的な攻撃が確認されました。この攻撃は、もともとクリプトマイニングのキャンペーンとして始まり、後にランサムウェアに発展しました。この企業は、3,000台以上のデバイスにまたがるITとOTの双方の資産を含むデジタル環境に、Darktrace を展開しました。

もし、この組織がDarktraceの自律遮断テクノロジーをアクティブモードで導入していれば、この脅威は初期の段階で食い止められたはずです。しかし、自律遮断能力がない場合でも、人間が注意を払うだけで、この攻撃の進行を止めることができたはずです。ランサムウェアが爆発する前の1か月間、Darktraceの自己学習型AIは、継続的な侵害の兆候を明確に示していました。しかし、このケースでは、セキュリティチームがDarktraceのインターフェイスを監視していなかったため、攻撃が進行してしまったのです。

侵害されたOT機器

今回の脅威検知では、HMI(ヒューマン・マシン・インターフェース)とICS Historian(産業データの収集と記録に使用)という2つのOTデバイスを乗っ取るために使用された攻撃手法に焦点を当てます。これらのOTデバイスは、いずれもWindows OSを実行するVMware仮想マシンであり、Contiランサムウェアの感染拡大の一部として侵入されました。これらのデバイスは、主に産業用制御システム(ICS)内で使用されており、一般的なICSソフトウェアパッケージを実行し、産業用クラウドプラットフォームに定期的に接続していました。

これらの機器はICSaaS(ICS-as-a-Service)環境の一部であり、仮想化およびクラウドプラットフォームを使用して、分析の実行、脅威情報の更新、および産業プロセスの制御が行われていたのです。以前、 Darktraceが強調したように、クラウドとICSの融合は、ネットワークの攻撃対象領域を拡大し、サイバーリスクを増大させます。

攻撃のライフサイクル

オープニングステージ

OTデバイスへの最初の感染は、感染したドメインコントローラ(DC)が異常なActive Directoryリクエストを行った際に発生しました。その後、攻撃者がコマンド実行によく使用するepmapperと、攻撃者が認証ポリシーを悪用して特権を昇格させるために使用するlsarpcのDCE-RPCバインドがデバイスで実行されました。

このペイロードは、OT機器がSMBを使用してDCのsysvolフォルダに接続し、SetupPrep.exeという悪意のある実行ファイルを読み込んだ際に配信されました。

図1:10月21日の初感染から11月15日の爆発まで、ネットワーク全体で観測されたDarktraceのモデルブリーチ

図2:ランサムウェアの爆発までの間、爆発時、および爆発後のHMIに表示されたICSの表示

デバイスの暗号化と横展開

悪意のあるペイロードは、3週間にわたりOTデバイス上で休眠したままでした。攻撃者はこの間に、ネットワーク上の他の場所にクリプトマイニング用マルウェアをインストールし、足場を固めたようです。

ランサムウェアが爆発した日、攻撃者はリモート管理ツールを使用して暗号化を開始しました。PSEXECツールは、感染したサーバー(元のDCとは別)上で使用され、感染したOTデバイス上で悪意のある.dllファイルをリモートで実行するために使用されていました。

その後、デバイスは、疑わしいポートを使用して、希少な外部エンドポイントへのコマンド&コントロール(C2)接続を試みました。多くのICSネットワークと同様に、HMIデバイスがインターネットへの接続に成功しないよう、十分なネットワーク分離が実施されていたため、C2通信は失敗していました。しかし、心配なことに、C2が失敗しても、攻撃の進行やランサムウェアの爆発は防げませんでした。

Historianデバイスは、約40のユニークな外部エンドポイントへのC2接続に成功しました。Darktraceは、465、995、2078、2222を含む疑わしいTCP/SSLポート上でビーコンタイプの動作を検知しました。接続は、サーバー名表示(SNI)拡張ホスト名を指定せず、自己署名および/または期限切れのSSL証明書を使用した珍しい宛先IPアドレスに対して行われました。

両デバイスとも、ネットワークのSMB共有を列挙し、ネットワークサーバーに疑わしいシェルスクリプトを書き込んでいました。最後に、これらのデバイスはSMBを使用してネットワーク共有に保存されたファイルを暗号化し、この被害者に固有のものと思われるファイル拡張子を追加し、このブログの目的上、ABCXXと呼ぶことにします。暗号化されたファイルのほとんどは、ファイルが元々あったフォルダにアップロードされましたが、場合によっては、画像フォルダに移動されることもありました。

暗号化されている間、デバイスはSMBセッションの認証にマシンアカウントを使用していました。これは、Darktrace が観察した他のランサムウェアの事件とは対照的で、管理者またはサービスアカウントが攻撃者によって侵害され、悪用されたものです。この例では、攻撃者が「環境寄生型」技術(例えば、lsarpcパイプの使用)を駆使して、マシンアカウントに管理者権限を与えることができた可能性があります。

ファイルを暗号化して移動している例:

  • SMB move success
  • File: new\spbr0007\0000006A.bak
  • Renamed: new\spbr0007\0000006A.bak.ABCXX
  • SMB move success
  • File: ActiveMQ\readme.txt
  • Renamed: Images\10j0076kS1UA8U975GC2e6IY.488431411265952821382.png.ABCXX

ランサムウェアの爆発

爆発時には、暗号化活動の一環として、ランサムウェアのノートreadme.txtがICSによって標的のデバイスに書き込まれました。

ランサムウェアの影響によりデバイスが動作しなくなったか、ネットワークから削除されたため、デバイスが突破した最終モデルは Unresponsive ICS Device となりました。

図3: abc-histdev - 宛先ポート995にフィルタされた外部接続は、暗号化開始の1時間前頃からC2接続が発生していることを示しています。

セキュリティスタックの残りの部分を迂回した攻撃方法

この脅威の発見では、OT機器が危険にさらされる要因がいくつかありました。

1つ目は、IT/OTの融合です。ICSネットワークは、企業ネットワークとの分離が不十分でした。これは、攻撃の横移動の段階で、侵害されたDCがデバイスにアクセスできることを意味します。OTのITへの依存度が高まる中、十分な分離が行われていること、あるいは攻撃者がその分離を回避できないことを保証することは、セキュリティチームにとってますます大きな課題になってきています。

もう一つの理由は、攻撃者が、ITネットワークかOTネットワークかを区別することなく、機器を危険にさらすために、Living off the Land(環境寄生型)の技術を活用した攻撃方法を使用したことです。今回取り上げた機器を含め、ICSネットワークの運用に使用されている機器の多くは、今回観測されたようなTTPやランサムウェアグループが常用している手法に対して脆弱なOSを使用しています。

Darktrace の考察

DarktraceのCyber AI Analystは、侵害されたデバイスに見られる多くの異質な活動をつなぎ合わせ、攻撃の詳細を含む明確なセキュリティシナリオを作成することができました。Historianサーバーのインシデントレポートを以下に示します。これは、Cyber AI AnalystがITとOTの専門家の間のスキルやコミュニケーションのギャップをどのように埋めることができるかを明確に示しています。

図4:Historianサーバ(abc-histdev)のCyber AI Analyst。TCPスキャンによるネットワーク偵察(ステップ3)の直前に開始されたC2通信(ステップ2)と、その後のSMBによるファイル暗号化(ステップ4)を調査・報告しました

攻撃者がデジタルエステートに滞在した日数は、合計で25日でした。残念ながら、この攻撃により、運用技術の混乱、ファイルの暗号化、金銭的な損失が発生しました。合計で36台のデバイスが20日以上クリプトマイニングされ、その後、ランサムウェアの爆発に伴い、約100台のデバイス(ITおよびOT)が暗号化されました。

もしそれが有効であれば、Darktraceの自律遮断技術はこの活動を無力化し、被害が危機に拡大する前に食い止めたことでしょう。Darktraceランサムウェアが爆発する前の1か月間、独自の自己学習型AIは進行中の侵害について明確な示唆を与えていたので、Darktraceの暴露に対して人間がある程度注意を払えば、攻撃を食い止めることができたはずです。

自律遮断技術は高度な設定が可能なため、空中に設置されたOTやITとOTの融合したエコシステムなど、産業環境において様々な方法でアンチジェナを展開することができます。人間確認モードでは、AIが行動を起こす前に、人間のオペレーターが許可を出す必要があります。また、Purdueモデルの上位レベル、つまり「IT in OT」のみにRESPONDを導入し、ランサムウェアのような動きの速い攻撃からコアアセットを保護することも可能です。

ランサムウェアと相互接続されたIT/OTシステム

ICSネットワークは、ランサムウェアグループが常用するTTP、つまりITとOTを区別しないLiving off the Land(環境寄生)のようなTTPの影響を受けやすいOSに依存したマシンによって運用されていることが多いです。

ランサムウェアが重要インフラを含むOTを持つ組織に与える脅威は非常に深刻で、2021年夏にはサイバーセキュリティインフラストラクチャセキュリティ庁(CISA)がこれらの脅威に関するファクトシートを公開し、IT攻撃がOTネットワークに与えるリスクに言及しています。

"OTコンポーネントは、しばしば情報技術(IT)ネットワークに接続されており、サイバー行為者がITからOTネットワークにピボットする経路を提供しています。最近のサイバー事件が示すように、ITネットワークに影響を及ぼす侵入は、OTネットワークに直接影響を及ぼさない場合でも、重要な業務プロセスにも影響を及ぼす可能性があります。"

Colonial PipelineとJBS Foodsに対する大規模なランサムウェア攻撃は、OTに影響を及ぼすランサムウェアが、国内および国際的な規模で深刻な経済混乱を引き起こす可能性を示しています。また、ランサムウェアは、OTシステムを直接標的とするかどうかにかかわらず、OTシステムに大損害を与える可能性があります。

IT/OT、ICSaaS、あるいは単に分離が困難なレガシーシステムなど、産業環境が融合し進化し続ける中、Darktrace は、被害が発生する前に攻撃を食い止める準備ができているのです。産業環境を持つ組織は、Darktraceの自己学習型AIが提供する飛躍的な前進をする時が来たのです。

この調査結果についての考察はDarktraceアナリストAsh BriceとAndras Baloghが協力しました。

Darktrace がランサムウェアからOT環境を保護する方法の詳細をご覧ください

Darktraceによるモデル検知

爆発時のHMIを時系列に並べたもの:

  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual SMB Script Write
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity [Enhanced Monitoring]
  • ICS / Unusual Data Transfer By OT Device
  • ICS / Unusual Unresponsive ICS Device

Historian

  • ICS / Rare External from OT Device
  • Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
  • ICS / Unusual Activity From OT Device
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Activity On High Risk Device
  • Unusual Activity / SMB Access Failures
  • Device / Large Number of Model Breaches
  • ICS / Unusual Data Transfer By OT Device
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
  • Device / SMB Lateral Movement
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity [Enhanced Monitoring]
  • Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches [Enhanced Monitoring]

INSIDE THE SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
AUTHOR
ABOUT ThE AUTHOR
Oakley Cox
Analyst Technical Director, APAC

Oakley is a technical expert with 5 years’ experience as a Cyber Analyst. After leading a team of Cyber Analysts at the Cambridge headquarters, he relocated to New Zealand and now oversees the defense of critical infrastructure and industrial control systems across the APAC region. His research into cyber-physical security has been published by Cyber Security journals and CISA. Oakley is GIAC certified in Response and Industrial Defense (GRID), and has a Doctorate (PhD) from the University of Oxford.

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Inside the SOC

A Thorn in Attackers’ Sides: How Darktrace Uncovered a CACTUS Ransomware Infection

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24
Apr 2024

What is CACTUS Ransomware?

In May 2023, Kroll Cyber Threat Intelligence Analysts identified CACTUS as a new ransomware strain that had been actively targeting large commercial organizations since March 2023 [1]. CACTUS ransomware gets its name from the filename of the ransom note, “cAcTuS.readme.txt”. Encrypted files are appended with the extension “.cts”, followed by a number which varies between attacks, e.g. “.cts1” and “.cts2”.

As the cyber threat landscape adapts to ever-present fast-paced technological change, ransomware affiliates are employing progressively sophisticated techniques to enter networks, evade detection and achieve their nefarious goals.

How does CACTUS Ransomware work?

In the case of CACTUS, threat actors have been seen gaining initial network access by exploiting Virtual Private Network (VPN) services. Once inside the network, they may conduct internal scanning using tools like SoftPerfect Network Scanner, and PowerShell commands to enumerate endpoints, identify user accounts, and ping remote endpoints. Persistence is maintained by the deployment of various remote access methods, including legitimate remote access tools like Splashtop, AnyDesk, and SuperOps RMM in order to evade detection, along with malicious tools like Cobalt Strike and Chisel. Such tools, as well as custom scripts like TotalExec, have been used to disable security software to distribute the ransomware binary. CACTUS ransomware is unique in that it adopts a double-extortion tactic, stealing data from target networks and then encrypting it on compromised systems [2].

At the end of November 2023, cybersecurity firm Arctic Wolf reported instances of CACTUS attacks exploiting vulnerabilities on the Windows version of the business analytics platform Qlik, specifically CVE-2023-41266, CVE-2023-41265, and CVE-2023-48365, to gain initial access to target networks [3]. The vulnerability tracked as CVE-2023-41266 can be exploited to generate anonymous sessions and perform HTTP requests to unauthorized endpoints, whilst CVE-2023-41265 does not require authentication and can be leveraged to elevate privileges and execute HTTP requests on the backend server that hosts the application [2].

Darktrace’s Coverage of CACTUS Ransomware

In November 2023, Darktrace observed malicious actors leveraging the aforementioned method of exploiting Qlik to gain access to the network of a customer in the US, more than a week before the vulnerability was reported by external researchers.

Here, Qlik vulnerabilities were successfully exploited, and a malicious executable (.exe) was detonated on the network, which was followed by network scanning and failed Kerberos login attempts. The attack culminated in the encryption of numerous files with extensions such as “.cts1”, and SMB writes of the ransom note “cAcTuS.readme.txt” to multiple internal devices, all of which was promptly identified by Darktrace DETECT™.

While traditional rules and signature-based detection tools may struggle to identify the malicious use of a legitimate business platform like Qlik, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was able to confidently identify anomalous use of the tool in a CACTUS ransomware attack by examining the rarity of the offending device’s surrounding activity and comparing it to the learned behavior of the device and its peers.

Unfortunately for the customer in this case, Darktrace RESPOND™ was not enabled in autonomous response mode during their encounter with CACTUS ransomware meaning that attackers were able to successfully escalate their attack to the point of ransomware detonation and file encryption. Had RESPOND been configured to autonomously act on any unusual activity, Darktrace could have prevented the attack from progressing, stopping the download of any harmful files, or the encryption of legitimate ones.

Cactus Ransomware Attack Overview

Holiday periods have increasingly become one of the favoured times for malicious actors to launch their attacks, as they can take advantage of the festive downtime of organizations and their security teams, and the typically more relaxed mindset of employees during this period [4].

Following this trend, in late November 2023, Darktrace began detecting anomalous connections on the network of a customer in the US, which presented multiple indicators of compromise (IoCs) and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) associated with CACTUS ransomware. The threat actors in this case set their attack in motion by exploiting the Qlik vulnerabilities on one of the customer’s critical servers.

Darktrace observed the server device making beaconing connections to the endpoint “zohoservice[.]net” (IP address: 45.61.147.176) over the course of three days. This endpoint is known to host a malicious payload, namely a .zip file containing the command line connection tool PuttyLink [5].

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to autonomously identify over 1,000 beaconing connections taking place on the customer’s network and group them together, in this case joining the dots in an ongoing ransomware attack. AI Analyst recognized that these repeated connections to highly suspicious locations were indicative of malicious command-and-control (C2) activity.

Cyber AI Analyst Incident Log showing the offending device making over 1,000 connections to the suspicious hostname “zohoservice[.]net” over port 8383, within a specific period.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst Incident Log showing the offending device making over 1,000 connections to the suspicious hostname “zohoservice[.]net” over port 8383, within a specific period.

The infected device was then observed downloading the file “putty.zip” over a HTTP connection using a PowerShell user agent. Despite being labelled as a .zip file, Darktrace’s detection capabilities were able to identify this as a masqueraded PuttyLink executable file. This activity resulted in multiple Darktrace DETECT models being triggered. These models are designed to look for suspicious file downloads from endpoints not usually visited by devices on the network, and files whose types are masqueraded, as well as the anomalous use of PowerShell. This behavior resembled previously observed activity with regards to the exploitation of Qlik Sense as an intrusion technique prior to the deployment of CACTUS ransomware [5].

The downloaded file’s URI highlighting that the file type (.exe) does not match the file's extension (.zip). Information about the observed PowerShell user agent is also featured.
Figure 2: The downloaded file’s URI highlighting that the file type (.exe) does not match the file's extension (.zip). Information about the observed PowerShell user agent is also featured.

Following the download of the masqueraded file, Darktrace observed the initial infected device engaging in unusual network scanning activity over the SMB, RDP and LDAP protocols. During this activity, the credential, “service_qlik” was observed, further indicating that Qlik was exploited by threat actors attempting to evade detection. Connections to other internal devices were made as part of this scanning activity as the attackers attempted to move laterally across the network.

Numerous failed connections from the affected server to multiple other internal devices over port 445, indicating SMB scanning activity.
Figure 3: Numerous failed connections from the affected server to multiple other internal devices over port 445, indicating SMB scanning activity.

The compromised server was then seen initiating multiple sessions over the RDP protocol to another device on the customer’s network, namely an internal DNS server. External researchers had previously observed this technique in CACTUS ransomware attacks where an RDP tunnel was established via Plink [5].

A few days later, on November 24, Darktrace identified over 20,000 failed Kerberos authentication attempts for the username “service_qlik” being made to the internal DNS server, clearly representing a brute-force login attack. There is currently a lack of open-source intelligence (OSINT) material definitively listing Kerberos login failures as part of a CACTUS ransomware attack that exploits the Qlik vulnerabilities. This highlights Darktrace’s ability to identify ongoing threats amongst unusual network activity without relying on existing threat intelligence, emphasizing its advantage over traditional security detection tools.

Kerberos login failures being carried out by the initial infected device. The destination device detected was an internal DNS server.
Figure 4: Kerberos login failures being carried out by the initial infected device. The destination device detected was an internal DNS server.

In the month following these failed Kerberos login attempts, between November 26 and December 22, Darktrace observed multiple internal devices encrypting files within the customer’s environment with the extensions “.cts1” and “.cts7”. Devices were also seen writing ransom notes with the file name “cAcTuS.readme.txt” to two additional internal devices, as well as files likely associated with Qlik, such as “QlikSense.pdf”. This activity detected by Darktrace confirmed the presence of a CACTUS ransomware infection that was spreading across the customer’s network.

The model, 'Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB', triggered in response to SMB file writes of the ransom note, ‘cAcTuS.readme.txt’, that was observed on the customer’s network.
Figure 5: The model, 'Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB', triggered in response to SMB file writes of the ransom note, ‘cAcTuS.readme.txt’, that was observed on the customer’s network.
CACTUS ransomware extensions, “.cts1” and “.cts7”, being appended to files on the customer’s network.
Figure 6: CACTUS ransomware extensions, “.cts1” and “.cts7”, being appended to files on the customer’s network.

Following this initial encryption activity, two affected devices were observed attempting to remove evidence of this activity by deleting the encrypted files.

Attackers attempting to remove evidence of their activity by deleting files with appendage “.cts1”.
Figure 7: Attackers attempting to remove evidence of their activity by deleting files with appendage “.cts1”.

結論

In the face of this CACTUS ransomware attack, Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection enabled it to quickly identify multiple stages of the cyber kill chain occurring in the customer’s environment. These stages ranged from ‘initial access’ by exploiting Qlik vulnerabilities, which Darktrace was able to detect before the method had been reported by external researchers, to ‘actions on objectives’ by encrypting files. Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was also able to detect a previously unreported stage of the attack: multiple Kerberos brute force login attempts.

If Darktrace’s autonomous response capability, RESPOND, had been active and enabled in autonomous response mode at the time of this attack, it would have been able to take swift mitigative action to shut down such suspicious activity as soon as it was identified by DETECT, effectively containing the ransomware attack at the earliest possible stage.

Learning a network’s ‘normal’ to identify deviations from established patterns of behaviour enables Darktrace’s identify a potential compromise, even one that uses common and often legitimately used administrative tools. This allows Darktrace to stay one step ahead of the increasingly sophisticated TTPs used by ransomware actors.

Credit to Tiana Kelly, Cyber Analyst & Analyst Team Lead, Anna Gilbertson, Cyber Analyst

付録

参考文献

[1] https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/cactus-ransomware-prickly-new-variant-evades-detection

[2] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cactus-ransomware-exploiting-qlik-sense-flaws-to-breach-networks/

[3] https://explore.avertium.com/resource/new-ransomware-strains-cactus-and-3am

[4] https://www.soitron.com/cyber-attackers-abuse-holidays/

[5] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/qlik-sense-exploited-in-cactus-ransomware-campaign/

Darktrace DETECT Models

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)

Anomalous Connection / PowerShell to Rare External

Device / New PowerShell User Agent

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Remote Desktop

User / Kerberos Password Brute Force

Compromise / Ransomware / Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB

Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Delete Volume

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare  

Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination  

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server  

Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Server

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)  

Compromise / Suspicious File and C2  

Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert  

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches  

Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer

Anomalous File / Internet facing System File Download  

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise  

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)  

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)  

IoC一覧

IoC - Type - Description

zohoservice[.]net: 45.61.147[.]176 - Domain name: IP Address - Hosting payload over HTTP

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT; Windows NT 10.0; en-US) WindowsPowerShell/5.1.17763.2183 - User agent -PowerShell user agent

.cts1 - File extension - Malicious appendage

.cts7- File extension - Malicious appendage

cAcTuS.readme.txt - Filename -Ransom note

putty.zip – Filename - Initial payload: ZIP containing PuTTY Link

MITRE ATT&CK マッピング

Tactic - Technique  - SubTechnique

Web Protocols: COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071 -T1071.001

Powershell: EXECUTION - T1059 - T1059.001

Exploitation of Remote Services: LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1210 – N/A

Vulnerability Scanning: RECONAISSANCE     - T1595 - T1595.002

Network Service Scanning: DISCOVERY - T1046 - N/A

Malware: RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1588 - T1588.001

Drive-by Compromise: INITIAL ACCESS - T1189 - N/A

Remote Desktop Protocol: LATERAL MOVEMENT – 1021 -T1021.001

Brute Force: CREDENTIAL ACCESS        T – 1110 - N/A

Data Encrypted for Impact: IMPACT - T1486 - N/A

Data Destruction: IMPACT - T1485 - N/A

File Deletion: DEFENSE EVASION - T1070 - T1070.004

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Tiana Kelly
Deputy Team Lead, London & Cyber Analyst

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The State of AI in Cybersecurity: How AI will impact the cyber threat landscape in 2024

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22
Apr 2024

About the AI Cybersecurity Report

We surveyed 1,800 CISOs, security leaders, administrators, and practitioners from industries around the globe. Our research was conducted to understand how the adoption of new AI-powered offensive and defensive cybersecurity technologies are being managed by organizations.

This blog is continuing the conversation from our last blog post “The State of AI in Cybersecurity: Unveiling Global Insights from 1,800 Security Practitioners” which was an overview of the entire report. This blog will focus on one aspect of the overarching report, the impact of AI on the cyber threat landscape.

To access the full report click here.

Are organizations feeling the impact of AI-powered cyber threats?

Nearly three-quarters (74%) state AI-powered threats are now a significant issue. Almost nine in ten (89%) agree that AI-powered threats will remain a major challenge into the foreseeable future, not just for the next one to two years.

However, only a slight majority (56%) thought AI-powered threats were a separate issue from traditional/non AI-powered threats. This could be the case because there are few, if any, reliable methods to determine whether an attack is AI-powered.

Identifying exactly when and where AI is being applied may not ever be possible. However, it is possible for AI to affect every stage of the attack lifecycle. As such, defenders will likely need to focus on preparing for a world where threats are unique and are coming faster than ever before.

a hypothetical cyber attack augmented by AI at every stage

Are security stakeholders concerned about AI’s impact on cyber threats and risks?

The results from our survey showed that security practitioners are concerned that AI will impact organizations in a variety of ways. There was equal concern associated across the board – from volume and sophistication of malware to internal risks like leakage of proprietary information from employees using generative AI tools.

What this tells us is that defenders need to prepare for a greater volume of sophisticated attacks and balance this with a focus on cyber hygiene to manage internal risks.

One example of a growing internal risks is shadow AI. It takes little effort for employees to adopt publicly-available text-based generative AI systems to increase their productivity. This opens the door to “shadow AI”, which is the use of popular AI tools without organizational approval or oversight. Resulting security risks such as inadvertent exposure of sensitive information or intellectual property are an ever-growing concern.

Are organizations taking strides to reduce risks associated with adoption of AI in their application and computing environment?

71.2% of survey participants say their organization has taken steps specifically to reduce the risk of using AI within its application and computing environment.

16.3% of survey participants claim their organization has not taken these steps.

These findings are good news. Even as enterprises compete to get as much value from AI as they can, as quickly as possible, they’re tempering their eager embrace of new tools with sensible caution.

Still, responses varied across roles. Security analysts, operators, administrators, and incident responders are less likely to have said their organizations had taken AI risk mitigation steps than respondents in other roles. In fact, 79% of executives said steps had been taken, and only 54% of respondents in hands-on roles agreed. It seems that leaders believe their organizations are taking the needed steps, but practitioners are seeing a gap.

Do security professionals feel confident in their preparedness for the next generation of threats?

A majority of respondents (six out of every ten) believe their organizations are inadequately prepared to face the next generation of AI-powered threats.

The survey findings reveal contrasting perceptions of organizational preparedness for cybersecurity threats across different regions and job roles. Security administrators, due to their hands-on experience, express the highest level of skepticism, with 72% feeling their organizations are inadequately prepared. Notably, respondents in mid-sized organizations feel the least prepared, while those in the largest companies feel the most prepared.

Regionally, participants in Asia-Pacific are most likely to believe their organizations are unprepared, while those in Latin America feel the most prepared. This aligns with the observation that Asia-Pacific has been the most impacted region by cybersecurity threats in recent years, according to the IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index.

The optimism among Latin American respondents could be attributed to lower threat volumes experienced in the region, but it's cautioned that this could change suddenly (1).

What are biggest barriers to defending against AI-powered threats?

The top-ranked inhibitors center on knowledge and personnel. However, issues are alluded to almost equally across the board including concerns around budget, tool integration, lack of attention to AI-powered threats, and poor cyber hygiene.

The cybersecurity industry is facing a significant shortage of skilled professionals, with a global deficit of approximately 4 million experts (2). As organizations struggle to manage their security tools and alerts, the challenge intensifies with the increasing adoption of AI by attackers. This shift has altered the demands on security teams, requiring practitioners to possess broad and deep knowledge across rapidly evolving solution stacks.

Educating end users about AI-driven defenses becomes paramount as organizations grapple with the shortage of professionals proficient in managing AI-powered security tools. Operationalizing machine learning models for effectiveness and accuracy emerges as a crucial skill set in high demand. However, our survey highlights a concerning lack of understanding among cybersecurity professionals regarding AI-driven threats and the use of AI-driven countermeasures indicating a gap in keeping pace with evolving attacker tactics.

The integration of security solutions remains a notable problem, hindering effective defense strategies. While budget constraints are not a primary inhibitor, organizations must prioritize addressing these challenges to bolster their cybersecurity posture. It's imperative for stakeholders to recognize the importance of investing in skilled professionals and integrated security solutions to mitigate emerging threats effectively.

To access the full report click here.

参考文献

1. IBM, X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2024, Available at: https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/L0GKXDWJ

2. ISC2, Cybersecurity Workforce Study 2023, Available at: https://media.isc2.org/-/media/Project/ISC2/Main/Media/ documents/research/ISC2_Cybersecurity_Workforce_Study_2023.pdf?rev=28b46de71ce24e6ab7705f6e3da8637e

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