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March 7, 2025

Darktrace's Early Detection of the Latest Ivanti Exploits

In January 2025, Ivanti disclosed two critical vulnerabilities affecting their products. Darktrace detected exploitation of these vulnerabilities as early as December 2024.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Hugh Turnbull
Cyber Analyst
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07
Mar 2025

As reported in Darktrace’s 2024 Annual Threat Report, the exploitation of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) in edge infrastructure has consistently been a significant concern across the threat landscape, with internet-facing assets remaining highly attractive to various threat actors.

Back in January 2024, the Darktrace Threat Research team investigated a surge of malicious activity from zero-day vulnerabilities such as those at the time on Ivanti Connect Secure (CS) and Ivanti Policy Secure (PS) appliances. These vulnerabilities were disclosed by Ivanti in January 2024 as CVE-2023-46805 (Authentication bypass vulnerability) and CVE-2024-21887 (Command injection vulnerability), where these two together allowed for unauthenticated, remote code execution (RCE) on vulnerable Ivanti systems.

What are the latest vulnerabilities in Ivanti products?

In early January 2025, two new vulnerabilities were disclosed in Ivanti CS and PS, as well as their Zero Trust Access (ZTA) gateway products.

  • CVE-2025-0282: A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthenticated remote code execution, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code on the affected system [1]
  • CVE-2025-0283: When combined with CVE-2025-0282, this vulnerability could allow a local authenticated attacker to escalate privileges, gaining higher-level access on the affected system [1]

Ivanti also released a statement noting they are currently not aware of any exploitation of CVE-2025-0283 at the time of disclosure [1].

Darktrace coverage of Ivanti

The Darktrace Threat Research team investigated the new Ivanti vulnerabilities across their customer base and discovered suspicious activity on two customer networks. Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) potentially indicative of successful exploitation of CVE-2025-0282 were identified as early as December 2024, 11 days before they had been publicly disclosed by Ivanti.

Case 1: December 2024

Authentication with a Privileged Credential

Darktrace initially detected suspicious activity connected with the exploitation of CVE-2025-0282 on December 29, 2024, when a customer device was observed logging into the network via SMB using the credential “svc_negbackups”, before authenticating with the credential “svc_negba” via RDP.

This likely represented a threat actor attempting to identify vulnerabilities within the system or application and escalate their privileges from a basic user account to a more privileged one. Darktrace / NETWORK recognized that the credential “svc_negbackups” was new for this device and therefore deemed it suspicious.

Darktrace / NETWORK’s detection of the unusual use of a new credential.
Figure 1: Darktrace / NETWORK’s detection of the unusual use of a new credential.

Likely Malicious File Download

Shortly after authentication with the privileged credential, Darktrace observed the device performing an SMB write to the C$ share, where a likely malicious executable file, ‘DeElevate64.exe’ was detected. While this is a legitimate Windows file, it can be abused by malicious actors for Dynamic-Link Library (DLL) sideloading, where malicious files are transferred onto other devices before executing malware. There have been external reports indicating that threat actors have utilized this technique when exploiting the Ivanti vulnerabilities [2].

Darktrace’s detection the SMB write of the likely malicious file ‘DeElevate64.exe’ on December 29, 2024.
Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection the SMB write of the likely malicious file ‘DeElevate64.exe’ on December 29, 2024.

Shortly after, a high volume of SMB login failures using the credential “svc_counteract-ext” was observed, suggesting potential brute forcing activity. The suspicious nature of this activity triggered an Enhanced Monitoring model alert that was escalated to Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) for further investigation and prompt notification, as the customer was subscribed to the Security Operations Support service.  Enhanced Monitoring are high-fidelity models detect activities that are more likely to be indicative of compromise

Suspicious Scanning and Internal Reconnaissance

Darktrace then went on to observe the device carrying out network scanning activity as well as anomalous ITaskScheduler activity. Threat actors can exploit the task scheduler to facilitate the initial or recurring execution of malicious code by a trusted system process, often with elevated permissions. The same device was also seen carrying out uncommon WMI activity.

Darktrace’s detection of a suspicious network scan from the compromised device.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of a suspicious network scan from the compromised device.

Further information on the suspicious scanning activity retrieved by Cyber AI Analyst, including total number of connections and ports scanned.
Figure 4: Further information on the suspicious scanning activity retrieved by Cyber AI Analyst, including total number of connections and ports scanned.
Darktrace’s detection of a significant spike in WMI activity represented by DCE_RPC protocol request increases at the time, with little to no activity observed one week either side.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of a significant spike in WMI activity represented by DCE_RPC protocol request increases at the time, with little to no activity observed one week either side.

Case 2: January 2025

Suspicious File Downloads

On January 13, 2025, Darktrace began to observe activity related to the exploitation of CVE-2025-0282  on the network of another customer, with one in particular device attempting to download likely malicious files.

Firstly, Darktrace observed the device making a GET request for the file “DeElevator64.dll” hosted on the IP 104.238.130[.]185. The device proceeded to download another file, this time “‘DeElevate64.exe”. from the same IP. This was followed by the download of “DeElevator64.dll”, similar to the case observed in December 2024. External reporting indicates that this DLL has been used by actors exploiting CVE-2025-0282 to sideload backdoor into infected systems [2]

Darktrace’s detection of the download of the suspicious file “DeElevator64.dll” on January 13, 2025.
Figure 6: Darktrace’s detection of the download of the suspicious file “DeElevator64.dll” on January 13, 2025.

Suspicious Internal Activity

Just like the previous case, on January 15, the same device was observed making numerous internal connections consistent with network scanning activity, as well as DCE-RPC requests.

Just a few minutes later, Darktrace again detected the use of a new administrative credential, observing the following details:

  • domain=REDACTED hostname=DESKTOP-1JIMIV3 auth_successful=T result=success ntlm_version=2 .

The hostname observed by Darktrace, “DESKTOP-1JIMIV3,” has also been identified by other external vendors and was associated with a remote computer name seen accessing compromised accounts [2].

Darktrace also observed the device performing an SMB write of an additional file, “to.bat,” which may have represented another malicious file loaded from the DLL files that the device had downloaded earlier. It is possible this represented the threat actor attempting to deploy a remote scheduled task.

Darktrace’s detection of SMB Write of the suspicious file “to.bat”.
Figure 7: Darktrace’s detection of SMB Write of the suspicious file “to.bat”.

Further investigation revealed that the device was likely a Veeam server, with its MAC address indicating it was a VMware device. It also appeared that the Veeam server was capturing activities referenced from the hostname DESKTOP-1JIMIV3. This may be analogous to the remote computer name reported by external researchers as accessing accounts [2]. However, this activity might also suggest that while the same threat actor and tools could be involved, they may be targeting a different vulnerability in this instance.

Autonomous Response

In this case, the customer had Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability enabled on their network. As a result, Darktrace was able to contain the compromise and shut down any ongoing suspicious connectivity by blocking internal connections and enforcing a “pattern of life” on the affected device. This action allows a device to make its usual connections while blocking any that deviate from expected behavior. These mitigative actions by Darktrace ensured that the compromise was promptly halted, preventing any further damage to the customer’s environment.

Darktrace's Autonomous Response capability actively mitigating the suspicious internal connectivity.
Figure 8: Darktrace's Autonomous Response capability actively mitigating the suspicious internal connectivity.

Conclusion

If the previous blog in January 2024 was a stark reminder of the threat posed by malicious actors exploiting Internet-facing assets, the recent activities surrounding CVE-2025-0282 and CVE-2025-0283 emphasize this even further.

Based on the telemetry available to Darktrace, a wide range of malicious activities were identified, including the malicious use of administrative credentials, the download of suspicious files, and network scanning in the cases investigated .

These activities included the download of suspicious files such as “DeElevate64.exe” and “DeElevator64.dll” potentially used by attackers to sideload backdoors into infected systems. The suspicious hostname DESKTOP-1JIMIV3 was also observed and appears to be associated with a remote computer name seen accessing compromised accounts. These activities are far from exhaustive, and many more will undoubtedly be uncovered as threat actors evolve.

Fortunately, Darktrace was able to swiftly detect and respond to suspicious network activity linked to the latest Ivanti vulnerabilities, sometimes even before these vulnerabilities were publicly disclosed.

Credit to: Nahisha Nobregas, Senior Cyber Analyst, Emma Foulger, Principle Cyber Analyst, Ryan Trail, Analyst Content Lead and the Darktrace Threat Research Team

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Case 1

·      Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

·      Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual SMB Script Write

·      Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

·      Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location

·      Compliance / SMB Drive Write

·      Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Alerts

·      Device / Network Range Scan

·      Device / Network Scan

·      Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity

·      Device / RDP Scan

·      Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

·      Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

·      User / New Admin Credentials on Client

·      User / New Admin Credentials on Server 

Case 2

·      Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

·      Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session

·      Compliance / SMB Drive Write

·      Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Alerts

·      Device / SMB Lateral Movement

·      Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Brute Force

·      Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

·      Device / Network Scan

·      Device / RDP Scan

·      Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

·      Device / Anomalous ITaskScheduler Activity

·      Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

·      Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity

List of IoCs Possible IoCs:

·      DeElevator64.dll

·      deelevator64.dll

·      DeElevate64.exe

·      deelevator64.dll

·      deelevate64.exe

·      to.bat

Mid-high confidence IoCs:

-       104.238.130[.]185

-       http://104.238.130[.]185/DeElevate64.exe

-       http://104.238.130[.]185/DeElevator64.dll

-       DESKTOP-1JIMIV3

References:

1.     https://www.ivanti.com/blog/security-update-ivanti-connect-secure-policy-secure-and-neurons-for-zta-gateways

2.     https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-ivanti-cve-2025-0282-cve-2025-0283/

3.     https://www.proofpoint.com/uk/blog/identity-threat-defense/privilege-escalation-attack#:~:text=In%20this%20approach%2C%20attackers%20exploit,handing%20over%20their%20login%20credentials

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Hugh Turnbull
Cyber Analyst

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June 3, 2026

Stopping Stealth Attacks with Precision: How Núclea Prevented a Breach Without Disruption

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Núclea is a Brazilian data and technology company that supports the country’s financial system by delivering digital services exclusively to banks and financial institutions. Operating in an environment where trust, availability, and data integrity are critical, the company faces a threat landscape that has evolved rapidly—particularly with the rise of AI-driven cyberattacks.

Brazil has experienced a wave of successful cyber incidents targeting financial institutions, many of them enabled by insiders or compromised credentials. The result was a noticeable shift in attacker strategy: instead of focusing on end customers, threat actors began targeting the institutions and platforms that underpin the financial ecosystem itself.

“Attacks became far more directed and contextual,” explains Guilherme, who leads incident response within Núclea’s security platform engineering team. “They weren’t noisy or obviously malicious—they were precise, patient, and designed to blend into normal operations.”

That precision was on full display in January 2026, when Núclea faced one of the most convincing phishing attacks the team had seen.

A real attack, built on trust and context

The attack began with a seemingly routine email.

It was sent from a real Brazilian government institution, using legitimate infrastructure and valid credentials that were later confirmed to have been compromised. Núclea had an established, ongoing relationship with this organization, and the email’s language, tone, and subject matter aligned perfectly with the type of communication the recipient team handled every day.

Attached to the email was a PDF document containing content that looked entirely legitimate.

The problem? A single URL embedded inside that PDF.

“The message itself was correct. The sender was real. The context was familiar. Even the document content made sense,” Guilherme explains. “There was just one small element that didn’t belong.”

That small detail was enough to initiate a full attack chain.

What the attackers were trying to do

If clicked, the URL would have downloaded a malicious payload designed to:

  • Collect information about the user and device
  • Identify where the system was located within the financial ecosystem
  • Install remote access tools to maintain control
  • Deploy an infostealer to extract sensitive data
  • Execute anti-forensic scripts to erase traces of the intrusion

In other words, it was a carefully engineered operation designed for persistence and stealth, not immediate disruption.

The attack also employed urgency—a classic social engineering technique. When the link didn’t open as expected, employees requested assistance from the security team, insisting the document was important and needed to be accessed quickly.

This is precisely the kind of scenario where traditional security tools struggle: almost everything about the interaction is legitimate.

Where Darktrace made the difference

Instead of blocking the entire message or relying on known indicators of compromise, Darktrace focused on behavioral context.

Darktrace recognized:

  • That the sending organization was normally trusted
  • That the communication pattern matched historical behavior
  • That the PDF content itself was not suspicious

But it also identified that the URL embedded within the document deviated from established behavioral patterns.

Rather than disrupting business operations, Darktrace took precise action: it rewrote the URL, preventing the malicious download while leaving the rest of the email untouched.

“When we analyzed it afterward, it became clear how dangerous the attack would have been,” says Guilherme. “But it never progressed—because Darktrace acted at exactly the right point.”

Subsequent forensic analysis confirmed the payload’s malicious intent. The attack never succeeded.

Precision over disruption

For Núclea, this incident reinforced a critical lesson: modern attacks don’t always look malicious—they hide within normal activity.

“What stands out to me is the precision,” Guilherme says. “Darktrace doesn’t rely on big, obvious signals. It’s effective in situations that fall outside the standard patterns we all know.”

Building resilience in a high trust ecosystem

For Núclea, cybersecurity is not just a defensive measure—it’s a business enabler.

Availability failures or successful breaches in the financial ecosystem can have immediate, large-scale consequences, from financial loss to reputational damage. Preventing those outcomes protects not just Núclea, but its partners and customers as well.

“Cyber resilience means keeping the business running—even under attack,” Guilherme explains. “And that requires people, processes, and technology working together.”

As AI continues to accelerate both attacks and defenses, the role of security is evolving. Precision, behavioral understanding, and intelligent automation are no longer optional—they’re essential.

“The easy days were yesterday,” Guilherme says. “The challenges ahead are bigger. We need to be prepared—internally and with partners that help us build resilience.”

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June 2, 2026

効率化の裏にあるリスク:AI導入が製造現場にもたらす見えない脆弱性

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AIエージェントが製造業に与える影響

製造業界のセキュリティチームやIT担当者は、生産を守り、稼働時間を維持し、重要資産を保護するという絶え間ないプレッシャー下にあります。そしてAIは非常に大きなチャンスとともに、新たなサイバーリスクももたらしています。製造業全体で、AIはワークフローや意思決定に組み込まれつつあり、自律型AIエージェントが従業員やシステムに代わって行動する場面が増えています。

エージェント型システムは独立して行動できるため強力ですが、その同じ自律性がサイバーリスク、運用上のリスクも生み出します。エージェントは広範な権限を持ち、複雑なタスクの実行、意思決定、ツールや外部システムとのやり取りを、ほとんどまたは全く人間の介入なしに行うことができます。

あらかじめ定義されたタスクを実行する従来のAIモデルとは異なり、AIエージェントは高度なテクニックを使用して人間の意思決定プロセスを模倣することにより、新たな課題に動的に適応し、また自らの判断に基づいて意思決定し、アクションを実行します。彼らは業務の上では従業員のように見えますが、人間が持つ判断力、倫理観、または行動の結果に対する恐れが欠けています。これは、サイバー犯罪者によって簡単に操られる可能性があることを意味しており、OTネットワーク全体に埋め込まれたAIエージェントは、データ漏洩をはるかに超える脅威を生み出します。たとえば、BMWでは、AI は溶接プロセスのエラーの発生を識別するのに使われています。同社のスパータンバーグ(米サウスカロライナ州)の工場では、すべてのSUVフレーム上の300-400個のスタッドの溶接をAIが監視し、スタッドの配置間違いや欠陥を検知し直ちに修正します。このAIシステムが破損すれば壊滅的な品質管理問題につながる恐れがあります。

製造全体にエージェント型AIシステムを導入することについて多くのセキュリティチームはさまざまな懸念を示しています。ダークトレースの行ったAIサイバーセキュリティの現状調査では、製造業のセキュリティプロフェッショナルの78%が従業員によるAIエージェントの利用に懸念を抱いており、これは彼らの最も大きな危惧でした。それに続く問題点が従業員によるCopilotやChatGPT等の生成AIツールの使用であり、製造業のセキュリティプロフェッショナルの76%が懸念を抱いていました。これらのツールがますます多くのビジネスデータやプロセスにアクセスし、組織内でより多くの自律性を持つようになるにつれ、エージェントのアクティビティがほとんど可視化されていない現在、セキュリティチームにおいては機密データの露出(60%)や偶発的なポリシーおよび規制違反(59%)への懸念が高まっています。

外部からのAIによる脅威も急激に進化

製造業を変革しているのと同じAIの能力が、サイバー攻撃の形も変貌させています。

AIにより攻撃者は偵察を自動化し、標的をより高度に絞り込み、リアルタイムで適応できるようになっています。かつては人手による作業と時間を要していたことが、今では継続的かつ大規模に実行できるようになりました。そして、製造業はすでにその影響を実感しています。当社が調査した製造業のセキュリティプロフェッショナルの76%は、すでにAIを活用した脅威の影響を受けており、90%がAIによってソーシャルエンジニアリング攻撃の成功率が高まっていると回答しています。

また、攻撃のテクニック自体も進化しています。製造業界全体で、AIを利用した攻撃の経路の多様化に対する懸念が高まっています。特にリアルタイムで進化する適応型マルウェアについて、調査対象の製造業のセキュリティプロフェッショナルの半数近く(49%)が懸念しており、これは全産業の平均よりも9%高い数値です。AIを使った適応型マルウェアに続くその他の懸念には次が含まれます:

  • 自動化された脆弱性スキャンとエクスプロイトチェイニング(48%):Anthropicの新しいMythos AIモデルにより脆弱性探索が深刻化する中で、この問題は一層差し迫ったものとなっています。
  • 超パーソナライズされたフィッシングキャンペーン(46%):フィッシングは依然としてハッカーの主力兵器の1つであり、AIによってフィッシングメールはより説得力が高く検知困難なものとなり、その効果は増幅されました。

これは単に攻撃の量の増加だけでなく、攻撃の展開につれて静的な防御が対応できるよりも速く進化する脅威への変化なのです。

こうした認識が高まっているにもかかわらず、製造業の多くはまだこの変化に対応する準備ができていません。半数以上(51%)がAI駆動の脅威への準備が十分にできていないと回答し、AIの導入を管理する正式なポリシーを持っている組織はわずか37%でした。  

可視性、コンテキスト、およびガードレールを通じてAIのセキュリティを確保

これらの問題に対処するためにAIイノベーションを遅らせる必要はありません。それには、AIと同じスピードと規模で動作できる、これまでとは異なるアプローチのセキュリティが必要です。具体的には、製造業がAIの力を活用する上で、次の3つの優先課題が浮上しています。

可視性はすべての土台  

AIがどこで使用されているか、何にアクセスできるか、そしてITおよびOT環境にわたってどのように動作するかを理解する必要があります。それがなければ、リスクを測定したり管理したりすることはできません。ダークトレースの調査において、製造業のセキュリティプロフェッショナルの91%が、AIを信頼する前に、それがどのように意思決定を行うかを理解する必要があると回答したのは当然のことです。OT環境においてこのことはさらに重要です。稼働の中断は安全や環境、財務、および評判に大きな影響を及ぼすからです。

可視性をアクションにつなげるにはコンテキストが必要  

AIによって形作られる環境において、正常とされる挙動は絶えず変化します。つまり、脅威を検知するにはビヘイビアベースのアプローチが必要なのです。組織全体で生活パターンを理解し、わずかな逸脱をリアルタイムに検知すること- これは従来のセキュリティとリスク管理に対するアプローチからの根本的な変化です。

エージェントからの露出を防ぐガードレール  

AIシステムがより大きな責任を担うようになるなかで、組織はAIが何をできるか、そしていつ独立して行動できるかについて、明確な境界を設ける必要があります。これらのコントロールは何かがあってから適用されるのではなく、システム自体に組み込んでおかなければなりません。  

製造業のITおよびOT環境におけるAIエージェントのセキュリティ

エージェント型AIの出現は製造業を変革し、次世代のオペレーションを支える一方で、脅威ランドスケープも一変させています。これは単なる脅威の増加ではなく、自律型システムへの移行、挙動の絶え間ない変化、そしてマシンスピードで進行するリスクです。AIを活用しつつリスクを管理するという課題に取り組む組織にとって、可視性、コンテキスト、ガードレールはセキュリティの基盤となります。

Darktraceはこの基盤を実現することにより、製造業の安全なAIアプローチ構築を支援します。ITおよびOT環境全体を可視化し、異常なアクティビティに対するリアルタイムの検知および対応を提供することにより、従業員が使用するプロンプトや構築するエージェントから、それらのエージェントの環境全体での動作に至るまで、AIアクティビティの理解を可能にします。これにより、AIの導入を拡大する製造業はコントロールを犠牲にすることなくイノベーションの基盤を構築することができます。

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Dr. Oakley Cox-Robinson
Senior Director of Product
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