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August 22, 2022

Emotet Resurgence: Cross-Industry Analysis

Technical insights on the Emotet resurgence in 2022 across various client environments, industries, and regions.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Eugene Chua
Cyber Security Analyst
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22
Aug 2022

Introduction

Last year provided further evidence that the cyber threat landscape remains both complex and challenging to predict. Between uncertain attribution, novel exploits and rapid malware developments, it is becoming harder to know where to focus security efforts. One of the largest surprises of 2021 was the re-emergence of the infamous Emotet botnet. This is an example of a campaign that ignored industry verticals or regions and seemingly targeted companies indiscriminately. Only 10 months after the Emotet takedown by law enforcement agencies in January, new Emotet activities in November were discovered by security researchers. These continued into the first quarter of 2022, a period which this blog will explore through findings from the Darktrace Threat Intel Unit. 

Dating back to 2019, Emotet was known to deliver Trickbot payloads which ultimately deployed Ryuk ransomware strains on compromised devices. This interconnectivity highlighted the hydra-like nature of threat groups wherein eliminating one (even with full-scale law enforcement intervention) would not rule them out as a threat nor indicate that the threat landscape would be any more secure. 

When Emotet resurged, as expected, one of the initial infection vectors involved leveraging existing Trickbot infrastructure. However, unlike the original attacks, it featured a brand new phishing campaign.

Figure 1: Distribution of observed Emotet activities across Darktrace deployments

Although similar to the original Emotet infections, the new wave of infections has been classified into two categories: Epochs 4 and 5. These had several key differences compared to Epochs 1 to 3. Within Darktrace’s global deployments, Emotet compromises associated to Epoch 4 appeared to be the most prevalent. Affected customer environments were seen within a large range of countries (Figure 1) and industry verticals such as manufacturing and supply chain, hospitality and travel, public administration, technology and telecoms and healthcare. Company demographics and size did not appear to be a targeting factor as affected customers had varying employee counts ranging from less than 250, to over 5000.

Key differences between Epochs 1-3 vs 4-5

Based on wider security research into the innerworkings of the Emotet exploits, several key differences were identified between Epochs 4/5 and its predecessors. The newer epochs used:

·       A different Microsoft document format (OLE vs XML-based).

·       A different encryption algorithm for communication. The new epochs used Elliptic Curve Cryptograph (ECC) [1] with public encryption keys contained in the C2 configuration file [2]. This was different from the previous Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) key encryption method.

·       Control Flow Flattening was used as an obfuscation technique to make detection and reverse engineering more difficult. This is done by hiding a program’s control flow [3].

·       New C2 infrastructure was observed as C2 communications were directed to over 230 unique IPs all associated to the new Epochs 4 and 5.

In addition to the new Epoch 4 and 5 features, Darktrace detected unsurprising similarities in those deployments affected by the renewed campaign. This included self-signed SSL connections to Emotet’s new infrastructure as well as malware spam activities to multiple rare external endpoints. Preceding these outbound communications, devices across multiple deployments were detected downloading Emotet-associated payloads (algorithmically generated DLL files).

Emotet Resurgence Campaign

Figure 2: Darktrace’s Detection Timeline for Emotet Epoch 4 and 5 compromises

1. Initial Compromise

The initial point of entry for the resurgence activity was almost certainly via Trickbot infrastructure or a successful phishing attack (Figure 2). Following the initial intrusion, the malware strain begins to download payloads via macro-ladened files which are used to spawn PowerShell for subsequent malware downloads.

Following the downloads, malicious communication with Emotet’s C2 infrastructure was observed alongside activities from the spam module. Within Darktrace, key techniques were observed and documented below.

2. Establish Foothold: Binary Dynamic-link library (.dll) with algorithmically generated filenames 

Emotet payloads are polymorphic and contain algorithmically generated filenames . Within deployments, HTTP GET requests involving a suspicious hostname, www[.]arkpp[.]com, and Emotet related samples such as those seen below were observed:

·       hpixQfCoJb0fS1.dll (SHA256 hash: 859a41b911688b00e104e9c474fc7aaf7b1f2d6e885e8d7fbf11347bc2e21eaa)

·       M0uZ6kd8hnzVUt2BNbRzRFjRoz08WFYfPj2.dll (SHA256 hash: 9fbd590cf65cbfb2b842d46d82e886e3acb5bfecfdb82afc22a5f95bda7dd804)

·       TpipJHHy7P.dll (SHA256 hash: 40060259d583b8cf83336bc50cc7a7d9e0a4de22b9a04e62ddc6ca5dedd6754b)

These DLL files likely represent the distribution of Emotet loaders which depends on windows processes such as rundll32[.]exe and regsvr32[.]exe to execute. 

3. Establish Foothold: Outbound SSL connections to Emotet C2 servers 

A clear network indicator of compromise for Emotet’s C2 communication involved self-signed SSL using certificate issuers and subjects which matched ‘CN=example[.]com,OU=IT Department,O=Global Security,L=London,ST=London,C=GB’ , and a common JA3 client fingerprint (72a589da586844d7f0818ce684948eea). The primary C2 communications were seen involving infrastructures classified as Epoch 4 rather than 5. Despite encryption in the communication content, network contextual connection details were sufficient for the detection of the C2 activities (Figure 3).

Figure 3: UI Model Breach logs on download and outbound SSL activities.

Outbound SSL and SMTP connections on TCP ports 25, 465, 587 

An anomalous user agent such as, ‘Microsoft Outlook 15.0’, was observed being used for SMTP connections with some subject lines of the outbound emails containing Base64-encoded strings. In addition, this JA3 client fingerprint (37cdab6ff1bd1c195bacb776c5213bf2) was commonly seen from the SSL connections. Based on the set of malware spam hostnames observed across at least 10 deployments, the majority of the TLDs were .jp, .com, .net, .mx, with the Japanese TLD being the most common (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Malware Spam TLDs observed in outbound SSL and SMTP

 Plaintext spam content generated from the spam module were seen in PCAPs (Figure 5). Examples of clear phishing or spam indicators included 1) mismatched personal header and email headers, 2) unusual reply chain and recipient references in the subject line, and 3) suspicious compressed file attachments, e.g. Electronic form[.]zip.

Figure 5: Example of PCAP associated to SPAM Module

4. Accomplish Mission

 The Emotet resurgence also showed through secondary compromises involving anomalous SMB drive writes related to CobaltStrike. This consistently included the following JA3 hash (72a589da586844d7f0818ce684948eea) seen in SSL activities as well as SMB writes involving the svchost.exe file.

Darktrace Detection

 The key DETECT models used to identify Emotet Resurgence activities were focused on determining possible C2. These included:

·       Suspicious SSL Activity

·       Suspicious Self-Signed SSL

·       Rare External SSL Self-Signed

·       Possible Outbound Spam

File-focused models were also beneficial and included:

·       Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location

·       EXE from Rare External Location

Darktrace’s detection capabilities can also be shown through a sample of case studies identified during the Threat Research team’s investigations.

Case Studies 

Darktrace’s detection of Emotet activities was not limited by industry verticals or company sizing. Although there were many similar features seen across the new epoch, each incident displayed varying techniques from the campaign. This is shown in two client environments below:

When investigating a large customer environment within the public administration sector, 16 different devices were detected making 52,536 SSL connections with the example[.]com issuer. Devices associated with this issuer were mainly seen breaching the same Self-Signed and Spam DETECT models. Although anomalous incoming octet-streams were observed prior to this SSL, there was no clear relation between the downloads and the Emotet C2 connections. Despite the total affected devices occupying only a small portion of the total network, Darktrace analysts were able to filter against the much larger network ‘noise’ and locate detailed evidence of compromise to notify the customer.

Darktrace also identified new Emotet activities in much smaller customer environments. Looking at a company in the healthcare and pharmaceutical sector, from mid-March 2022 a single internal device was detected making an HTTP GET request to the host arkpp[.]com involving the algorithmically-generated DLL, TpipJHHy7P.dll with the SHA256 hash: 40060259d583b8cf83336bc50cc7a7d9e0a4de22b9a04e62ddc6ca5dedd6754b (Figure 6). 

Figure 6: A screenshot from VirusTotal, showing that the SHA256 hash has been flagged as malicious by other security vendors.

After the sample was downloaded, the device contacted a large number of endpoints that had never been contacted by devices on the network. The endpoints were contacted over ports 443, 8080, and 7080 involving Emotet related IOCs and the same SSL certificate mentioned previously. Malware spam activities were also observed during a similar timeframe.

 The Emotet case studies above demonstrate how autonomous detection of an anomalous sequence of activities - without depending on conventional rules and signatures - can reveal significant threat activities. Though possible staged payloads were only seen in a proportion of the affected environments, the following outbound C2 and malware spam activities involving many endpoints and ports were sufficient for the detection of Emotet.

 If present, in both instances Darktrace’s Autonomous Response technology, RESPOND, would recommend or implement surgical actions to precisely target activities associated with the staged payload downloads, outgoing C2 communications, and malware spam activities. Additionally, restriction to the devices’ normal pattern of life will prevent simultaneously occurring malicious activities while enabling the continuity of normal business operations.

 Conclusion 

·       The technical differences between past and present Emotet strains emphasizes the versatility of malicious threat actors and the need for a security solution that is not reliant on signatures.

·       Darktrace’s visibility and unique behavioral detection continues to provide visibility to network activities related to the novel Emotet strain without reliance on rules and signatures. Key examples include the C2 connections to new Emotet infrastructure.

·       Looking ahead, detection of C2 establishment using suspicious DLLs will prevent further propagation of the Emotet strains across networks.

·       Darktrace’s AI detection and response will outpace conventional post compromise research involving the analysis of Emotet strains through static and dynamic code analysis, followed by the implementation of rules and signatures.

Thanks to Paul Jennings and Hanah Darley for their contributions to this blog.

Appendices

Model breaches

·       Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External 

·       Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port 

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port 

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint 

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname 

·       Anomalous Connection / Possible Outbound Spam 

·       Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed 

·       Anomalous Connection / Repeated Rare External SSL Self-Signed      

·       Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Expired SSL 

·       Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL

·       Anomalous File / Anomalous Octet Stream (No User Agent) 

·       Anomalous File / Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location 

·       Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

·       Compromise / Agent Beacon to New Endpoint 

·       Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint 

·       Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare 

·       Compromise / New or Repeated to Unusual SSL Port 

·       Compromise / Repeating Connections Over 4 Days 

·       Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare 

·       Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination 

·       Compromise / Suspicious Beaconing Behaviour 

·       Compromise / Suspicious Spam Activity 

·       Compromise / Suspicious SSL Activity 

·       Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase 

·       Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise 

·       Device / Large Number of Connections to New Endpoints 

·       Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint 

·       Device / New User Agent 

·       Device / New User Agent and New IP 

·       Device / SMB Session Bruteforce 

·       Device / Suspicious Domain 

·       Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity 

For Darktrace customers who want to know more about using Darktrace to triage Emotet, refer here for an exclusive supplement to this blog.

References

[1] https://blog.lumen.com/emotet-redux/

[2] https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2022/03/emotet-c2-configuration-extraction-and-analysis.html

[3] https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/05/04/attacking-emotets-control-flow-flattening/

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Eugene Chua
Cyber Security Analyst

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July 9, 2025

Defending the Cloud: Stopping Cyber Threats in Azure and AWS with Darktrace

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Real-world intrusions across Azure and AWS

As organizations pursue greater scalability and flexibility, cloud platforms like Microsoft Azure and Amazon Web Services (AWS) have become essential for enabling remote operations and digitalizing corporate environments. However, this shift introduces a new set of security risks, including expanding attack surfaces, misconfigurations, and compromised credentials frequently exploited by threat actors.

This blog dives into three instances of compromise within a Darktrace customer’s Azure and AWS environment which Darktrace.

  1. The first incident took place in early 2024 and involved an attacker compromising a legitimate user account to gain unauthorized access to a customer’s Azure environment.
  2. The other two incidents, taking place in February and March 2025, targeted AWS environments. In these cases, threat actors exfiltrated corporate data, and in one instance, was able to detonate ransomware in a customer’s environment.

Case 1 - Microsoft Azure

Simplified timeline of the attack on a customer’s Azure environment.
Figure 1: Simplified timeline of the attack on a customer’s Azure environment.

In early 2024, Darktrace identified a cloud compromise on the Azure cloud environment of a customer in the Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA) region.

Initial access

In this case, a threat actor gained access to the customer’s cloud environment after stealing access tokens and creating a rogue virtual machine (VM). The malicious actor was found to have stolen access tokens belonging to a third-party external consultant’s account after downloading cracked software.

With these stolen tokens, the attacker was able to authenticate to the customer’s Azure environment and successfully modified a security rule to allow inbound SSH traffic from a specific IP range (i.e., securityRules/AllowCidrBlockSSHInbound). This was likely performed to ensure persistent access to internal cloud resources.

Detection and investigation of the threat

Darktrace / IDENTITY recognized that this activity was highly unusual, triggering the “Repeated Unusual SaaS Resource Creation” alert.

Cyber AI Analyst launched an autonomous investigation into additional suspicious cloud activities occurring around the same time from the same unusual location, correlating the individual events into a broader account hijack incident.

Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into unusual cloud activity performed by the compromised account.
Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into unusual cloud activity performed by the compromised account.
Figure 2: Surrounding resource creation events highlighted by Cyber AI Analyst.
Figure 3: Surrounding resource creation events highlighted by Cyber AI Analyst.
Figure 4: Surrounding resource creation events highlighted by Cyber AI Analyst.

“Create resource service limit” events typically indicate the creation or modification of service limits (i.e., quotas) for a specific Azure resource type within a region. Meanwhile, “Registers the Capacity Resource Provider” events refer to the registration of the Microsoft Capacity resource provider within an Azure subscription, responsible for managing capacity-related resources, particularly those related to reservations and service limits. These events suggest that the threat actor was looking to create new cloud resources within the environment.

Around ten minutes later, Darktrace detected the threat actor creating or modifying an Azure disk associated with a virtual machine (VM), suggesting an attempt to create a rogue VM within the environment.

Threat actors can leverage such rogue VMs to hijack computing resources (e.g., by running cryptomining malware), maintain persistent access, move laterally within the cloud environment, communicate with command-and-control (C2) infrastructure, and stealthily deliver and deploy malware.

Persistence

Several weeks later, the compromised account was observed sending an invitation to collaborate to an external free mail (Google Mail) address.

Darktrace deemed this activity as highly anomalous, triggering a compliance alert for the customer to review and investigate further.

The next day, the threat actor further registered new multi-factor authentication (MFA) information. These actions were likely intended to maintain access to the compromised user account. The customer later confirmed this activity by reviewing the corresponding event logs within Darktrace.

Case 2 – Amazon Web Services

Simplified timeline of the attack on a customer’s AWS environment
Figure 5: Simplified timeline of the attack on a customer’s AWS environment

In February 2025, another cloud-based compromised was observed on a UK-based customer subscribed to Darktrace’s Managed Detection and Response (MDR) service.

How the attacker gained access

The threat actor was observed leveraging likely previously compromised credential to access several AWS instances within customer’s Private Cloud environment and collecting and exfiltrating data, likely with the intention of deploying ransomware and holding the data for ransom.

Darktrace alerting to malicious activity

This observed activity triggered a number of alerts in Darktrace, including several high-priority Enhanced Monitoring alerts, which were promptly investigated by Darktrace’s Security Operations Centre (SOC) and raised to the customer’s security team.

The earliest signs of attack observed by Darktrace involved the use of two likely compromised credentials to connect to the customer’s Virtual Private Network (VPN) environment.

Internal reconnaissance

Once inside, the threat actor performed internal reconnaissance activities and staged the Rclone tool “ProgramData\rclone-v1.69.0-windows-amd64.zip”, a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers, to an AWS instance whose hostname is associated with a public key infrastructure (PKI) service.

The threat actor was further observed accessing and downloading multiple files hosted on an AWS file server instance, notably finance and investment-related files. This likely represented data gathering prior to exfiltration.

Shortly after, the PKI-related EC2 instance started making SSH connections with the Rclone SSH client “SSH-2.0-rclone/v1.69.0” to a RockHoster Virtual Private Server (VPS) endpoint (193.242.184[.]178), suggesting the threat actor was exfiltrating the gathered data using the Rclone utility they had previously installed. The PKI instance continued to make repeated SSH connections attempts to transfer data to this external destination.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response

In response to this activity, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability intervened, blocking unusual external connectivity to the C2 server via SSH, effectively stopping the exfiltration of data.

This activity was further investigated by Darktrace’s SOC analysts as part of the MDR service. The team elected to extend the autonomously applied actions to ensure the compromise remained contained until the customer could fully remediate the incident.

Continued reconissance

Around the same time, the threat actor continued to conduct network scans using the Nmap tool, operating from both a separate AWS domain controller instance and a newly joined device on the network. These actions were accompanied by further internal data gathering activities, with around 5 GB of data downloaded from an AWS file server.

The two devices involved in reconnaissance activities were investigated and actioned by Darktrace SOC analysts after additional Enhanced Monitoring alerts had triggered.

Lateral movement attempts via RDP connections

Unusual internal RDP connections to a likely AWS printer instance indicated that the threat actor was looking to strengthen their foothold within the environment and/or attempting to pivot to other devices, likely in response to being hindered by Autonomous Response actions.

This triggered multiple scanning, internal data transfer and unusual RDP alerts in Darktrace, as well as additional Autonomous Response actions to block the suspicious activity.

Suspicious outbound SSH communication to known threat infrastructure

Darktrace subsequently observed the AWS printer instance initiating SSH communication with a rare external endpoint associated with the web hosting and VPS provider Host Department (67.217.57[.]252), suggesting that the threat actor was attempting to exfiltrate data to an alternative endpoint after connections to the original destination had been blocked.

Further investigation using open-source intelligence (OSINT) revealed that this IP address had previously been observed in connection with SSH-based data exfiltration activity during an Akira ransomware intrusion [1].

Once again, connections to this IP were blocked by Darktrace’s Autonomous Response and subsequently these blocks were extended by Darktrace’s SOC team.

The above behavior generated multiple Enhanced Monitoring alerts that were investigated by Darktrace SOC analysts as part of the Managed Threat Detection service.

Enhanced Monitoring alerts investigated by SOC analysts as part of the Managed Detection and Response service.
Figure 5: Enhanced Monitoring alerts investigated by SOC analysts as part of the Managed Detection and Response service.

Final containment and collaborative response

Upon investigating the unusual scanning activity, outbound SSH connections, and internal data transfers, Darktrace analysts extended the Autonomous Response actions previously triggered on the compromised devices.

As the threat actor was leveraging these systems for data exfiltration, all outgoing traffic from the affected devices was blocked for an additional 24 hours to provide the customer’s security team with time to investigate and remediate the compromise.

Additional investigative support was provided by Darktrace analysts through the Security Operations Service, after the customer's opened of a ticket related to the unfolding incident.

Simplified timeline of the attack
Figure 8: Simplified timeline of the attack

Around the same time of the compromise in Case 2, Darktrace observed a similar incident on the cloud environment of a different customer.

Initial access

On this occasion, the threat actor appeared to have gained entry into the AWS-based Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) network via a SonicWall SMA 500v EC2 instance allowing inbound traffic on any port.

The instance received HTTPS connections from three rare Vultr VPS endpoints (i.e., 45.32.205[.]52, 207.246.74[.]166, 45.32.90[.]176).

Lateral movement and exfiltration

Around the same time, the EC2 instance started scanning the environment and attempted to pivot to other internal systems via RDP, notably a DC EC2 instance, which also started scanning the network, and another EC2 instance.  

The latter then proceeded to transfer more than 230 GB of data to the rare external GTHost VPS endpoint 23.150.248[.]189, while downloading hundreds of GBs of data over SMB from another EC2 instance.

Cyber AI Analyst incident generated following the unusual scanning and RDP connections from the initial compromised device.
Figure 7: Cyber AI Analyst incident generated following the unusual scanning and RDP connections from the initial compromised device.

The same behavior was replicated across multiple EC2 instances, whereby compromised instances uploaded data over internal RDP connections to other instances, which then started transferring data to the same GTHost VPS endpoint over port 5000, which is typically used for Universal Plug and Play (UPnP).

What Darktrace detected

Darktrace observed the threat actor uploading a total of 718 GB to the external endpoint, after which they detonated ransomware within the compromised VPC networks.

This activity generated nine Enhanced Monitoring alerts in Darktrace, focusing on the scanning and external data activity, with the earliest of those alerts triggering around one hour after the initial intrusion.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was not configured to act on these devices. Therefore, the malicious activity was not autonomously blocked and escalated to the point of ransomware detonation.

Conclusion

This blog examined three real-world compromises in customer cloud environments each illustrating different stages in the attack lifecycle.

The first case showcased a notable progression from a SaaS compromise to a full cloud intrusion, emphasizing the critical role of anomaly detection when legitimate credentials are abused.

The latter two incidents demonstrated that while early detection is vital, the ability to autonomously block malicious activity at machine speed is often the most effective way to contain threats before they escalate.

Together, these incidents underscore the need for continuous visibility, behavioral analysis, and machine-speed intervention across hybrid environments. Darktrace's AI-driven detection and Autonomous Response capabilities, combined with expert oversight from its Security Operations Center, give defenders the speed and clarity they need to contain threats and reduce operational disruption, before the situation spirals.

Credit to Alexandra Sentenac (Senior Cyber Analyst) and Dylan Evans (Security Research Lead)

References

[1] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/67.217.57.252/community

Case 1

Darktrace / IDENTITY model alerts

IaaS / Compliance / Uncommon Azure External User Invite

SaaS / Resource / Repeated Unusual SaaS Resource Creation

IaaS / Compute / Azure Compute Resource Update

Cyber AI Analyst incidents

Possible Unsecured AzureActiveDirectory Resource

Possible Hijack of Office365 Account

Case 2

Darktrace / NETWORK model alerts

Compromise / SSH Beacon

Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Alerts

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Device / SMB Lateral Movement

Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination

Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Alerts

Device / Anonymous NTLM Logins

Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration

Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe Device / Network Scan

Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

Device / New Device with Attack Tools

Device / RDP Scan Device / Attack and Recon Tools

Compliance / High Priority Compliance Model Alert

Compliance / Outgoing NTLM Request from DC

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

Unusual Activity / Internal Data Transfer

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Connections

Device / Anomalous RDP Followed By Multiple Model Alerts

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity

Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Darktrace / Autonomous Response model alerts

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block

Antigena / Network / Manual / Quarantine Device

Antigena / MDR / MDR-Quarantined Device

Antigena / MDR / Model Alert on MDR-Actioned Device

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Network Scan Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Server Anomaly Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena SMB Enumeration Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Internal Data Transfer Block

Cyber AI Analyst incidents

Possible Application Layer Reconnaissance Activity

Scanning of Multiple Devices

Unusual Repeated Connections

Unusual External Data Transfer

Case 3

Darktrace / NETWORK model alerts

Unusual Activity / Unusual Large Internal Transfer

Compliance / Incoming Remote Desktop

Unusual Activity / High Volume Server Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / Internal Data Transfer

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Remote Desktop

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Incoming Data Volume

Anomalous Server Activity / Domain Controller Initiated to Client

Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

Anomalous Connection / Possible Flow Device Brute Force

Device / RDP Scan

Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

Device / Network Scan

Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

Anomalous Connection / Download and Upload

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / High Volume Client Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity

Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

Device / Increased External Connectivity

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration to IP

Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External UDP Port

Anomalous Connection / Possible Data Staging and External Upload

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

Device / Large Number of Model Alerts from Critical Network Device

Compliance / External Windows Communications

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Connections

Cyber AI Analyst incidents

Scanning of Multiple Devices

Extensive Unusual RDP Connections

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

(Technique name – Tactic ID)

Case 1

Defense Evasion - Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Create Cloud Instance

Persistence – Account Manipulation

Case 2

Initial Access - External Remote Services

Execution - Inter-Process Communication

Persistence - External Remote Services

Discovery - System Network Connections Discovery

Discovery - Network Service Discovery

Discovery - Network Share Discovery

Lateral Movement - Remote Desktop Protocol

Lateral Movement - Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares

Collection - Data from Network Shared Drive

Command and Control - Protocol Tunneling

Exfiltration - Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol

Case 3

Initial Access - Exploit Public-Facing Application

Discovery - Remote System Discovery

Discovery - Network Service Discovery

Lateral Movement - Remote Services

Lateral Movement - Remote Desktop Protocol  

Collection - Data from Network Shared Drive

Collection - Data Staged: Remote Data Staging

Exfiltration - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Command and Control - Non-Standard Port

Command and Control – Web Service

Impact - Data Encrypted for Impact

List of IoCs

IoC         Type      Description + Probability

193.242.184[.]178 - IP Address - Possible Exfiltration Server  

45.32.205[.]52  - IP Address  - Possible C2 Infrastructure

45.32.90[.]176 - IP Address - Possible C2 Infrastructure

207.246.74[.]166 - IP Address - Likely C2 Infrastructure

67.217.57[.]252 - IP Address - Likely C2 Infrastructure

23.150.248[.]189 - IP Address - Possible Exfiltration Server

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About the author
Alexandra Sentenac
Cyber Analyst

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July 8, 2025

Top Eight Threats to SaaS Security and How to Combat Them

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The latest on the identity security landscape

Following the mass adoption of remote and hybrid working patterns, more critical data than ever resides in cloud applications – from Salesforce and Google Workspace, to Box, Dropbox, and Microsoft 365.

On average, a single organization uses 130 different Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) applications, and 45% of organizations reported experiencing a cybersecurity incident through a SaaS application in the last year.

As SaaS applications look set to remain an integral part of the digital estate, organizations are being forced to rethink how they protect their users and data in this area.

What is SaaS security?

SaaS security is the protection of cloud applications. It includes securing the apps themselves as well as the user identities that engage with them.

Below are the top eight threats that target SaaS security and user identities.

1.  Account Takeover (ATO)

Attackers gain unauthorized access to a user’s SaaS or cloud account by stealing credentials through phishing, brute-force attacks, or credential stuffing. Once inside, they can exfiltrate data, send malicious emails, or escalate privileges to maintain persistent access.

2. Privilege escalation

Cybercriminals exploit misconfigurations, weak access controls, or vulnerabilities to increase their access privileges within a SaaS or cloud environment. Gaining admin or superuser rights allows attackers to disable security settings, create new accounts, or move laterally across the organization.

3. Lateral movement

Once inside a network or SaaS platform, attackers move between accounts, applications, and cloud workloads to expand their foot- hold. Compromised OAuth tokens, session hijacking, or exploited API connections can enable adversaries to escalate access and exfiltrate sensitive data.

4. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) bypass and session hijacking

Threat actors bypass MFA through SIM swapping, push bombing, or exploiting session cookies. By stealing an active authentication session, they can access SaaS environments without needing the original credentials or MFA approval.

5. OAuth token abuse

Attackers exploit OAuth authentication mechanisms by stealing or abusing tokens that grant persistent access to SaaS applications. This allows them to maintain access even if the original user resets their password, making detection and mitigation difficult.

6. Insider threats

Malicious or negligent insiders misuse their legitimate access to SaaS applications or cloud platforms to leak data, alter configurations, or assist external attackers. Over-provisioned accounts and poor access control policies make it easier for insiders to exploit SaaS environments.

7. Application Programming Interface (API)-based attacks

SaaS applications rely on APIs for integration and automation, but attackers exploit insecure endpoints, excessive permissions, and unmonitored API calls to gain unauthorized access. API abuse can lead to data exfiltration, privilege escalation, and service disruption.

8. Business Email Compromise (BEC) via SaaS

Adversaries compromise SaaS-based email platforms (e.g., Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace) to send phishing emails, conduct invoice fraud, or steal sensitive communications. BEC attacks often involve financial fraud or data theft by impersonating executives or suppliers.

BEC heavily uses social engineering techniques, tailoring messages for a specific audience and context. And with the growing use of generative AI by threat actors, BEC is becoming even harder to detect. By adding ingenuity and machine speed, generative AI tools give threat actors the ability to create more personalized, targeted, and convincing attacks at scale.

Protecting against these SaaS threats

Traditionally, security leaders relied on tools that were focused on the attack, reliant on threat intelligence, and confined to a single area of the digital estate.

However, these tools have limitations, and often prove inadequate for contemporary situations, environments, and threats. For example, they may lack advanced threat detection, have limited visibility and scope, and struggle to integrate with other tools and infrastructure, especially cloud platforms.

AI-powered SaaS security stays ahead of the threat landscape

New, more effective approaches involve AI-powered defense solutions that understand the digital business, reveal subtle deviations that indicate cyber-threats, and action autonomous, targeted responses.

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About the author
Carlos Gray
Senior Product Marketing Manager, Email
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