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August 22, 2022

Emotet Resurgence: Cross-Industry Analysis

Technical insights on the Emotet resurgence in 2022 across various client environments, industries, and regions.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Eugene Chua
Cyber Security Analyst
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Aug 2022

Introduction

Last year provided further evidence that the cyber threat landscape remains both complex and challenging to predict. Between uncertain attribution, novel exploits and rapid malware developments, it is becoming harder to know where to focus security efforts. One of the largest surprises of 2021 was the re-emergence of the infamous Emotet botnet. This is an example of a campaign that ignored industry verticals or regions and seemingly targeted companies indiscriminately. Only 10 months after the Emotet takedown by law enforcement agencies in January, new Emotet activities in November were discovered by security researchers. These continued into the first quarter of 2022, a period which this blog will explore through findings from the Darktrace Threat Intel Unit. 

Dating back to 2019, Emotet was known to deliver Trickbot payloads which ultimately deployed Ryuk ransomware strains on compromised devices. This interconnectivity highlighted the hydra-like nature of threat groups wherein eliminating one (even with full-scale law enforcement intervention) would not rule them out as a threat nor indicate that the threat landscape would be any more secure. 

When Emotet resurged, as expected, one of the initial infection vectors involved leveraging existing Trickbot infrastructure. However, unlike the original attacks, it featured a brand new phishing campaign.

Figure 1: Distribution of observed Emotet activities across Darktrace deployments

Although similar to the original Emotet infections, the new wave of infections has been classified into two categories: Epochs 4 and 5. These had several key differences compared to Epochs 1 to 3. Within Darktrace’s global deployments, Emotet compromises associated to Epoch 4 appeared to be the most prevalent. Affected customer environments were seen within a large range of countries (Figure 1) and industry verticals such as manufacturing and supply chain, hospitality and travel, public administration, technology and telecoms and healthcare. Company demographics and size did not appear to be a targeting factor as affected customers had varying employee counts ranging from less than 250, to over 5000.

Key differences between Epochs 1-3 vs 4-5

Based on wider security research into the innerworkings of the Emotet exploits, several key differences were identified between Epochs 4/5 and its predecessors. The newer epochs used:

·       A different Microsoft document format (OLE vs XML-based).

·       A different encryption algorithm for communication. The new epochs used Elliptic Curve Cryptograph (ECC) [1] with public encryption keys contained in the C2 configuration file [2]. This was different from the previous Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) key encryption method.

·       Control Flow Flattening was used as an obfuscation technique to make detection and reverse engineering more difficult. This is done by hiding a program’s control flow [3].

·       New C2 infrastructure was observed as C2 communications were directed to over 230 unique IPs all associated to the new Epochs 4 and 5.

In addition to the new Epoch 4 and 5 features, Darktrace detected unsurprising similarities in those deployments affected by the renewed campaign. This included self-signed SSL connections to Emotet’s new infrastructure as well as malware spam activities to multiple rare external endpoints. Preceding these outbound communications, devices across multiple deployments were detected downloading Emotet-associated payloads (algorithmically generated DLL files).

Emotet Resurgence Campaign

Figure 2: Darktrace’s Detection Timeline for Emotet Epoch 4 and 5 compromises

1. Initial Compromise

The initial point of entry for the resurgence activity was almost certainly via Trickbot infrastructure or a successful phishing attack (Figure 2). Following the initial intrusion, the malware strain begins to download payloads via macro-ladened files which are used to spawn PowerShell for subsequent malware downloads.

Following the downloads, malicious communication with Emotet’s C2 infrastructure was observed alongside activities from the spam module. Within Darktrace, key techniques were observed and documented below.

2. Establish Foothold: Binary Dynamic-link library (.dll) with algorithmically generated filenames 

Emotet payloads are polymorphic and contain algorithmically generated filenames . Within deployments, HTTP GET requests involving a suspicious hostname, www[.]arkpp[.]com, and Emotet related samples such as those seen below were observed:

·       hpixQfCoJb0fS1.dll (SHA256 hash: 859a41b911688b00e104e9c474fc7aaf7b1f2d6e885e8d7fbf11347bc2e21eaa)

·       M0uZ6kd8hnzVUt2BNbRzRFjRoz08WFYfPj2.dll (SHA256 hash: 9fbd590cf65cbfb2b842d46d82e886e3acb5bfecfdb82afc22a5f95bda7dd804)

·       TpipJHHy7P.dll (SHA256 hash: 40060259d583b8cf83336bc50cc7a7d9e0a4de22b9a04e62ddc6ca5dedd6754b)

These DLL files likely represent the distribution of Emotet loaders which depends on windows processes such as rundll32[.]exe and regsvr32[.]exe to execute. 

3. Establish Foothold: Outbound SSL connections to Emotet C2 servers 

A clear network indicator of compromise for Emotet’s C2 communication involved self-signed SSL using certificate issuers and subjects which matched ‘CN=example[.]com,OU=IT Department,O=Global Security,L=London,ST=London,C=GB’ , and a common JA3 client fingerprint (72a589da586844d7f0818ce684948eea). The primary C2 communications were seen involving infrastructures classified as Epoch 4 rather than 5. Despite encryption in the communication content, network contextual connection details were sufficient for the detection of the C2 activities (Figure 3).

Figure 3: UI Model Breach logs on download and outbound SSL activities.

Outbound SSL and SMTP connections on TCP ports 25, 465, 587 

An anomalous user agent such as, ‘Microsoft Outlook 15.0’, was observed being used for SMTP connections with some subject lines of the outbound emails containing Base64-encoded strings. In addition, this JA3 client fingerprint (37cdab6ff1bd1c195bacb776c5213bf2) was commonly seen from the SSL connections. Based on the set of malware spam hostnames observed across at least 10 deployments, the majority of the TLDs were .jp, .com, .net, .mx, with the Japanese TLD being the most common (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Malware Spam TLDs observed in outbound SSL and SMTP

 Plaintext spam content generated from the spam module were seen in PCAPs (Figure 5). Examples of clear phishing or spam indicators included 1) mismatched personal header and email headers, 2) unusual reply chain and recipient references in the subject line, and 3) suspicious compressed file attachments, e.g. Electronic form[.]zip.

Figure 5: Example of PCAP associated to SPAM Module

4. Accomplish Mission

 The Emotet resurgence also showed through secondary compromises involving anomalous SMB drive writes related to CobaltStrike. This consistently included the following JA3 hash (72a589da586844d7f0818ce684948eea) seen in SSL activities as well as SMB writes involving the svchost.exe file.

Darktrace Detection

 The key DETECT models used to identify Emotet Resurgence activities were focused on determining possible C2. These included:

·       Suspicious SSL Activity

·       Suspicious Self-Signed SSL

·       Rare External SSL Self-Signed

·       Possible Outbound Spam

File-focused models were also beneficial and included:

·       Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location

·       EXE from Rare External Location

Darktrace’s detection capabilities can also be shown through a sample of case studies identified during the Threat Research team’s investigations.

Case Studies 

Darktrace’s detection of Emotet activities was not limited by industry verticals or company sizing. Although there were many similar features seen across the new epoch, each incident displayed varying techniques from the campaign. This is shown in two client environments below:

When investigating a large customer environment within the public administration sector, 16 different devices were detected making 52,536 SSL connections with the example[.]com issuer. Devices associated with this issuer were mainly seen breaching the same Self-Signed and Spam DETECT models. Although anomalous incoming octet-streams were observed prior to this SSL, there was no clear relation between the downloads and the Emotet C2 connections. Despite the total affected devices occupying only a small portion of the total network, Darktrace analysts were able to filter against the much larger network ‘noise’ and locate detailed evidence of compromise to notify the customer.

Darktrace also identified new Emotet activities in much smaller customer environments. Looking at a company in the healthcare and pharmaceutical sector, from mid-March 2022 a single internal device was detected making an HTTP GET request to the host arkpp[.]com involving the algorithmically-generated DLL, TpipJHHy7P.dll with the SHA256 hash: 40060259d583b8cf83336bc50cc7a7d9e0a4de22b9a04e62ddc6ca5dedd6754b (Figure 6). 

Figure 6: A screenshot from VirusTotal, showing that the SHA256 hash has been flagged as malicious by other security vendors.

After the sample was downloaded, the device contacted a large number of endpoints that had never been contacted by devices on the network. The endpoints were contacted over ports 443, 8080, and 7080 involving Emotet related IOCs and the same SSL certificate mentioned previously. Malware spam activities were also observed during a similar timeframe.

 The Emotet case studies above demonstrate how autonomous detection of an anomalous sequence of activities - without depending on conventional rules and signatures - can reveal significant threat activities. Though possible staged payloads were only seen in a proportion of the affected environments, the following outbound C2 and malware spam activities involving many endpoints and ports were sufficient for the detection of Emotet.

 If present, in both instances Darktrace’s Autonomous Response technology, RESPOND, would recommend or implement surgical actions to precisely target activities associated with the staged payload downloads, outgoing C2 communications, and malware spam activities. Additionally, restriction to the devices’ normal pattern of life will prevent simultaneously occurring malicious activities while enabling the continuity of normal business operations.

 Conclusion 

·       The technical differences between past and present Emotet strains emphasizes the versatility of malicious threat actors and the need for a security solution that is not reliant on signatures.

·       Darktrace’s visibility and unique behavioral detection continues to provide visibility to network activities related to the novel Emotet strain without reliance on rules and signatures. Key examples include the C2 connections to new Emotet infrastructure.

·       Looking ahead, detection of C2 establishment using suspicious DLLs will prevent further propagation of the Emotet strains across networks.

·       Darktrace’s AI detection and response will outpace conventional post compromise research involving the analysis of Emotet strains through static and dynamic code analysis, followed by the implementation of rules and signatures.

Thanks to Paul Jennings and Hanah Darley for their contributions to this blog.

Appendices

Model breaches

·       Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External 

·       Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port 

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port 

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint 

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname 

·       Anomalous Connection / Possible Outbound Spam 

·       Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed 

·       Anomalous Connection / Repeated Rare External SSL Self-Signed      

·       Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Expired SSL 

·       Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL

·       Anomalous File / Anomalous Octet Stream (No User Agent) 

·       Anomalous File / Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location 

·       Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

·       Compromise / Agent Beacon to New Endpoint 

·       Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint 

·       Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare 

·       Compromise / New or Repeated to Unusual SSL Port 

·       Compromise / Repeating Connections Over 4 Days 

·       Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare 

·       Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination 

·       Compromise / Suspicious Beaconing Behaviour 

·       Compromise / Suspicious Spam Activity 

·       Compromise / Suspicious SSL Activity 

·       Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase 

·       Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise 

·       Device / Large Number of Connections to New Endpoints 

·       Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint 

·       Device / New User Agent 

·       Device / New User Agent and New IP 

·       Device / SMB Session Bruteforce 

·       Device / Suspicious Domain 

·       Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity 

For Darktrace customers who want to know more about using Darktrace to triage Emotet, refer here for an exclusive supplement to this blog.

References

[1] https://blog.lumen.com/emotet-redux/

[2] https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2022/03/emotet-c2-configuration-extraction-and-analysis.html

[3] https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/05/04/attacking-emotets-control-flow-flattening/

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Eugene Chua
Cyber Security Analyst

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September 2, 2026

Botnet Behind the Camera: Mirai Katana Activity on a Video Recording Device

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Key takeaways

  • Darktrace identified a camera device infected with the Mirai/Katana botnet in a sports-sector customer environment, showing how exposed IoT devices can become active participants in wider attack chains.
  • The compromise involved suspicious Wget behavior, file downloads from rare external IPs, unusual incoming HTTP connections to video recorder management interfaces, and large outbound data transfers to infrastructure associated with botnet activity.
  • The incident highlights the importance of extending visibility and response beyond traditional endpoints, as unmanaged or overlooked connected devices can be exploited for command-and-control, malware delivery, and data exfiltration.

Mirai and the Katana variant

Mirai is a botnet that first emerged in August 2016 and is well known for launching large-scale distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, typically targeting exposed Internet of Things (IoT) devices. It identifies vulnerable IoT devices ,often by abusing default credentials or exposed services, and recruiting them into a remotely controlled botnet that can be used in DDoS campaigns [1].

Katana, one of the many variants that arose after Mirai’s source code was released publicly, was first observed in late 2020 and has been seen using more advanced capabilities, including custom command-and-control (C2), persistence mechanisms, and DDoS functionality [2].

In March 2026, research from the Nokia Deepfield Emergency Response Team (ERT) identified Katana as a Mirai-derived DDoS botnet targeting Android-based TV set-top boxes through exposed Android Debug Bridge (ADB) access.  Observed capabilities included custom C2, runtime domain rotation, multiple DDoS methods, and an on-device compiled kernel rootkit used for persistence and stealth [3].

Darktrace’s detection of Mirai Botnet activity on a camera device

In early 2026, Darktrace identified a Network/Digital Video Recorder (NVR/DVR) on the network of a sports-sector customer that had been infected with the Mirai Katana botnet and subsequently used to exfiltrate data from the customer’s environment. Seemingly related follow-up activity was observed on the same device several months later.

In both instances, the Darktrace Security Operations Centre (SOC) alerted the customer as part of the Managed Threat Detection (MTD) service. However, as Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was not fully enabled on the affected device, Darktrace was unable to proactively block the suspicious activity or prevent the compromise from continuing and recurring.

The initial compromise appears to have occurred when the affected device was seen using Wget to download Linux-based Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) files from a rare external IP, 195.177.94[.]105, which had not previously been observed in the customer’s network. Further analysis downloaded file hashes identified files related to the Mirai botnet.

Figure 1: Darktrace’s Real-Time AI Analyst investigation into the unusual outbound connection where the ELF files were downloaded.

Within a few hours, Darktrace detected the device uploading close to 3GB of data to another external IP, 50.7.49[.]4:3017 (ASN AS30058 FDCSERVERS), suggesting that the activity was likely routed via a virtual private server (VPS) hosted by FDC Servers [2]. Attackers often abuse VPS infrastructure from legitimate cloud providers to blend in with legitimate traffic and evade IP reputation and geolocation-based detections.

Figure 2:  Darktrace’s detection of the unusual data upload activity by the affected camera device.

Darktrace continued to observe similar data transfers to multiple rare endpoints  including 171.225.223[.]53, 95.161.128[.]62, 61.7.209[.]88, 95.161.128[.]62, which have been linked to Mirai by open-source intelligence (OSINT).

Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of spikes in unusual external data transfer activity from the camera device.

Exploitation continued

Several months later, Darktrace identified the same exfiltration pattern on the device again, this time with stronger indications of associations with Mirai Katana botnet infection.

The device received incoming HTTP connections from 129.121.114[.]124, an external IP known to be associated with the Katana botnet IP [3]. The connections targeted the ‘/dvr/cmd’ path using the root username and user agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/42.0.2311.135 Safari/537.36 Edge/12.246.

The ‘/dvr/cmd’ path appears to be associated with the affected device’s web management functionality. This API endpoint has historically been targeted by Mirai and other IoT botnets through the exploitation of critical command injection vulnerabilities and automated botnet exploitation [4].

Figure 4: Darktrace’s  detection of HTTP connectivity from the external IP associated with Mirai Katana Botnet.

A few days later, Darktrace observed the Wget utility being used to download ELF files, including “/lil”,  from the IP 129.121.114[.]124. OSINT reporting has since associated this IP address with the Mirai Katana botnet. Notably, the IP observed earlier in the year, 195.177.94[.]105, had also hosted a file named “lil”, indicating a link between the observed activity.

Over the following days, the device received a sudden spike in connections from multiple rare external endpoints, suggesting a possible successful brute force attack. Darktrace also observed the device exfiltrating just under 4GB of data to another Mirai-associated IP address,  66.92.198[.]194, over ports 3344, 954922, and 80. Finally, the device was seen uploading data to the Mirai botnet IP 5.175.249[.]53 over port138 and exhibited an increase in UDP connections to 34.18.28[.]10 over port 9068.

Following both file download events, Darktrace identified spikes in external data transfers and connection attempts to rare destinations. While Darktrace’s Threat Research team could not confirm with high confidence that this to activity was directly associated with Mirai, it may indicate that Mirai Katana includes data exfiltration functionality.

Darktrace’s threat researchers also identified an internet-facing NTP server belonging to a separate customer receiving incoming connection attempts from the same initially observed IP, 195.177.94[.]105,over the port 123. This suggests that Mirai Katana may not exclusively target IoT devices.

Conclusion

This case demonstrates how threat actors can exploit overlooked IoT and OT devices to support broader malicious objectives. Here, a camera device infected with a botnet was used to exfiltrate data from the customer's environment, showing how peripheral assets can become active participants in an attack chain.

This case also reinforces a challenge many organizations face today: extending security visibility beyond traditional endpoints and servers. Cameras, sensors, and other connected devices often operate with limited monitoring and may fall outside established security processes, despite maintaining network connectivity and access to potentially sensitive environments. This is particularly relevant in the sports sector, where growing reliance on connected cameras, smart stadium technologies, and other IoT devices continues to expand the attack surface, as highlighted in Darktrace's Sports Sector Threat Report.

As botnets like Kata and Mirai continue to evolve, defenders need visibility across unmanaged IoT and edge devices, as well as security solutions that can recognize subtle deviations in device behavior that may indicate an emerging compromise.

Credit to Parvatha Ananthakannan (Cyber Analyst), Signe Zaharka (Principal Analyst)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

·      Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

·      Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

·      Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

·      Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

·      Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

·      Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

·      Device / Significant UDP Increase

·      Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration to IP

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

·      Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity

·      Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination

·      Unusual Activity / Unusual DNS

·      Device / External Network Scan

·      Device / Suspicious DNS Activity

·      Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Indicator of Compromise Type Description
195.177.94[.]105 IP C2 endpoint
50.7.49[.]4:30171 IP Possible C2 endpoint
129.121.114[.]124 IP C2 endpoint
hxxp://195.177.94[.]105/n3 URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://195.177.94[.]105/n2 URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/lil URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/HHn URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/JFc URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/jum URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/OaSf URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/OPWg URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/vHwK URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/VLv URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/WbJ URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/zkR URL Possible C2 endpoint
Ab17883ae4c3bc6afa18c439166eeeb4b03186e3093d984e3a95f573e0fcb7d8 SHA-256 Mirai payload
3d587e809dac49d34a3f717e072fd0aebe5e71db63333e45c81577d6b4266f87 SHA-256 Mirai payload
Bf6e81733a7e209d3dce80d15bf3c5d300752d961fae6b45d90c9bbe7f8c89a2 SHA-256 Possible payload
f25488303813ab1ec0eaa71562938601aac185e8aaf93adb84522557f7cf4dd6 SHA-256 Possible payload
0cb4ff6b71f4423184bfa35c34e9090297637208b0e30205d4b224e56abde2ef SHA-256 Possible payload
19c24cbeaf06b2e7697083f33a85521a9315105c784691bde7420fde4cc69410 SHA-256 Likely Mirai payload
1e74f734fff8df91f4f7172d0de10c421eca78aeb800e8a48e16bc5dbde5d20e SHA-256 Possible payload
6e71f7763d1f29d5712106ebb122e281c32787540aa2342b0fe5351d585d18d7 SHA-256 Possible payload
71f4ff7cdb6d6a7d2673c543c5d2535093afbd707b20a5b9ddf735466c1105c1 SHA-256 Possible payload
76db7ee73ebf15e48a3cb24a074d92248671ef2c6ed3bc3e708377341fb7674d SHA-256 Possible payload
da87a65f7beb438e61f0b61964fed8aa305a380f569042f84c55eca8fa7929b8 SHA-256 Possible payload
e15809eb6ba66477175270d62cfa53e4bf278595f69938708c81c4bc457930fe SHA-256 Mirai payload

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic Technique ID Technique / Sub-technique
Initial Access T1659 Content Injection
T1189 Drive-by Compromise
Exfiltration T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
Command and Control T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol
T1571 Non-Standard Port
Reconnaissance T1595.001 Scanning IP Blocks
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Parvatha Ananthakannan
Cyber Analyst

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August 26, 2026

AI Agents: Securing the Path from Intent to Action

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The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) recently published guidance on managing the cyber risk of agentic AI. While the document is framed as interim advice as more formal guidance is developed, the framing reflects the current state of the industry: organizations are already deploying agents into production environments while standards, controls, and operating models for autonomous systems remain unsettled. Governance is evolving alongside adoption rather than preceding it, a reality which underscores the importance of robust controls.  

The NCSC’s guidance recommends aligning controls to an agent's level of autonomy, assigning distinct identities, limiting permissions, constraining access to systems and data, monitoring activity, maintaining human oversight, and preserving the ability to intervene when necessary. Most of these recommendations will sound familiar to security teams. The challenge is not the novelty of the controls. It is the type of system those controls now need to govern.

The shift from model security to agent security

For several years, AI security discussions have focused heavily on models. Can a model be manipulated? Jailbroken? Trusted? Can it expose information it should not? Those questions remain important, but they capture only part of the problem. A model generating text is one thing. A system connected to identities, applications, tools, workflows, and business data is another.

The difference becomes clearer when comparing a chatbot that answers questions with an agent that can retrieve customer records, update tickets, invoke tools, trigger workflows, and interact with external systems. The underlying model may be identical. Its access is not. The security question begins to shift from what the model knows to what the system can do.

The same theme appears in the Five Eyes statement released earlier this year, describing AI as a force multiplier that is accelerating both offensive and defensive cyber operations. The NCSC guidance explores what that reality looks like when autonomous systems begin operating inside enterprise environments.

Securing AI agents in operation

The NCSC spends relatively little time debating model behavior and considerably more time discussing identity, permissions, monitoring, oversight, containment, and response. Agents are treated as participants within an environment rather than isolated pieces of technology.  

That's broadly consistent with how we think about the problem at Darktrace.

An agent should not be treated as an extension of a user account. It develops its own behavioral patterns. It accesses systems, interacts with data, invokes tools, and moves across workflows in ways that can be observed independently. Understanding what an agent is permitted to do matters. Understanding how it actually behaves once deployed, and whether that behavior aligns with business intent, matters just as much.

Identity provides an obvious example. The NCSC recommends assigning distinct identities to agents rather than allowing them to disappear into surrounding human or service accounts. Most importantly, assigning agents distinct identities enables independent behavioral monitoring.

Development assumptions vs. real-world behavior

The same principle extends to monitoring. NCSC guidance places agent activity within normal security operations rather than treating it as a separate AI governance function. Many of the controls described are put in place before an agent begins operating. Sandboxing, credential design, approval workflows and human oversight all reflect judgments about how the system is expected to behave and what risks it is likely to create.

Actual use may challenge those assumptions. Access patterns change. Workflows expand. Systems begin interacting with resources they have never touched before. Processes that appeared reasonable during design behave differently in production. Human oversight requirements may turn out to be either excessive or inadequate once the system is operating at scale and operating within the context of unique business processes.

The Five Eyes statement points to a similar issue: organizations need confidence that controls continue to work as intended once systems are exposed to real users, data, tools and operational pressures. Often, the question is not whether an agent is technically allowed to perform an action, but whether its behavior remains consistent with the role it was intended to play.

Monitoring and governance of AI agents go hand-in-hand

This problem is exactly why monitoring and governance should be treated as part of the same process. Governance sets the initial parameters for deployment, while monitoring provides evidence about whether those parameters remain appropriate. That evidence should, in turn, inform changes to permissions, controls and oversight.

This matters increasingly as autonomous systems are integrated into business processes. The relevant risk is shaped not only by the model or agent itself, but by what it can access, what actions it can take, and how its behavior changes in practice.

Developing continuous oversight of AI agent behavior

The implication is clear: governance cannot end at deployment. Organizations need a way to understand how agents behave after deployment, test whether controls remain appropriate, and adjust them as conditions change. That requires visibility not just into technical activity, but into whether that activity makes sense in the context of the business process the agent is intended to support.

This is where business-centric behavioral security can become critical. Risk does not emerge from the model itself: it emerges from the actions an autonomous system takes within the enterprise and the downstream consequences of those actions.  

An agent can operate exactly as intended and still create risk if it accesses sensitive information in an unexpected context, exercises permissions in ways that create unintended exposure, or influences business processes in ways that were not anticipated during design and review.

Traditional governance vs. behavioral security

Traditional governance frameworks provide assurance at a point in time. Behavioral security can provide ongoing visibility into how autonomous systems interact with the organization they are meant to serve. Rather than focusing exclusively on model performance or policy compliance, organizations need to understand whether an agent's behavior aligns with business intent, operational expectations, and acceptable risk tolerances as conditions change.

As enterprises move from isolated AI deployments to interconnected ecosystems of agents, visibility into behavior becomes as important as visibility into code. Governance determines what an autonomous system is permitted to do. Behavioral analytics helps determine what it is doing, what business outcomes it is producing, and whether those outcomes remain aligned with the organization's objectives.

[related-resource]

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About the author
Margaret Cunningham, PhD
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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